Opinion
No. 2 CA-JV 2017-0165
02-06-2018
RICHARD R., Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY AND M.R., Appellees.
COUNSEL Rosemary Gordon Pánuco, Tucson Counsel for Appellant Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General By Cathleen E. Fuller, Assistant Attorney General, Tucson Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety
THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c)(1); Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 28(a)(1), (f); Ariz. R. P. Juv. Ct. 103(G). Appeal from the Superior Court in Pinal County
No. S1100JD201700116
The Honorable Daniel A. Washburn, Judge
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL Rosemary Gordon Pánuco, Tucson
Counsel for Appellant Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General
By Cathleen E. Fuller, Assistant Attorney General, Tucson
Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge Eppich authored the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Vásquez and Judge Espinosa concurred. EPPICH, Judge:
¶1 Richard R. appeals from the juvenile court's order adjudicating his daughter, M.R., born in November 2000, a dependent child. We affirm.
¶2 We view the evidence in the light most favorable to affirming the factual findings upon which the juvenile court's order is based. Willie G. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 211 Ariz. 231, ¶ 21 (App. 2005). In April 2017, the Department of Child Safety (DCS) received reports that M.R. was suffering from severe mental health issues and had been admitted to a treatment center, but that Richard had "been interfering with [her] treatment," intended to remove her from the facility, and had threatened "to kill everyone at the hospital including the therapist who he blames for getting DCS involved." DCS filed a dependency petition, alleging M.R. was dependent as to her parents "due to abuse or neglect." After a contested hearing, the juvenile court granted the petition. This appeal followed.
M.R. has been diagnosed with "OCD, paranoia, autistic spectrum disorder, and possibly schizoaffective disorder." A DCS report notes that she would not shower at home, "refuses to eat," and "has been wearing the same clothes for a year." The report further notes that M.R. "will not go in the bathroom" at her home and instead uses "a bucket in her room" as a toilet. Additionally, when home, "she sits in the closet with her ears plugged and the closet door closed and remains there until the family has gone to sleep."
M.R.'s mother is not a party to this appeal. --------
¶3 A dependent child includes one "[i]n need of proper and effective parental care and control . . . who has no parent . . . willing to exercise or capable of exercising such care and control," or one whose "home is unfit by reason of abuse, neglect, cruelty or depravity by a parent." A.R.S. § 8-201(15)(a)(i), (iii). Neglect includes "[t]he inability or unwillingness of a parent, guardian or custodian of a child to provide that child with supervision, food, clothing, shelter or medical care if that inability or unwillingness causes unreasonable risk of harm to the child's health or welfare." § 8-201(25)(a). The allegations in a dependency petition must be proven only by a preponderance of the evidence, A.R.S. § 8-844(C), and, because the primary concern in a dependency proceeding is the best interests of the child, "the juvenile court is vested with a great deal of discretion." Willie G., 211 Ariz. 231, ¶ 21, quoting Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec. v. Superior Court, 178 Ariz. 236, 239 (App. 1994). We defer to the juvenile court's ability to weigh and analyze the evidence. Shella H. v. Dep't of Child Safety, 239 Ariz. 47, ¶ 13 (App. 2016). Accordingly, we will only disturb a dependency adjudication if no reasonable evidence supports it. Id.
¶4 Richard contends on appeal that "DCS did not prove that M.R. is dependent" and that "continued DCS custody is not in M.R.'s best interests." He appears to argue that, because some of DCS's factual assertions in its petition are incorrect and M.R.'s mental health has grown "worse" while she has been in DCS's care due to DCS's mishandling of her case, the juvenile court erred in finding her dependent.
¶5 But Richard has ignored the juvenile court's numerous factual findings, including that he failed to provide her adequate professional mental health treatment prior to 2017 despite her having suffered serious symptoms since "second grade," that he attempted to remove her from a treatment facility despite being warned "it was not yet safe for [her] to leave," and that he "prevent[ed] her from taking appropriate medications and/or dosages." Richard has not established these findings are incorrect or explained how they fail to support the court's finding that M.R. is dependent. Nor has he explained how placing M.R. in the care of DCS (who has pursued treatment for M.R.) rather than in the care of Richard (who interfered with her treatment when it was finally initiated) is not in M.R.'s best interests.
¶6 Richard's arguments, which are largely ungrounded in legal authority, essentially ask that we reweigh the evidence. It is not, however, our purview to do so. Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, ¶ 12 (App. 2002) ("The resolution of . . . conflicts in the evidence is uniquely the province of the juvenile court as the trier of fact; we do not re-weigh the evidence on review."); see also Melissa W. v. Dep't of Child Safety, 238 Ariz. 115, ¶ 9 (App. 2015) (argument unsupported by authority is waived); City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., 218 Ariz. 172, ¶ 88 (App. 2008) (argument on appeal waived by party's failure to adequately develop it).
¶7 We affirm the juvenile court's order adjudicating M.R. dependent.