From Casetext: Smarter Legal Research

R.F. v. N.C. (In re J.C.)

California Court of Appeals, Fifth District
Aug 2, 2023
No. F085371 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 2, 2023)

Opinion

F085371

08-02-2023

In re J.C., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. v. N.C., Objector and Appellant. R.F., Petitioner and Respondent,

Carolyn S. Hurley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Objector and Appellant. Griswold LaSalle Cobb Dowd & Gin and Jeffrey L. Levinson for Petitioner and Respondent.


NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kings County. No. 18A0046 Jennifer Lee Giuliani, Judge.

Carolyn S. Hurley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Objector and Appellant.

Griswold LaSalle Cobb Dowd & Gin and Jeffrey L. Levinson for Petitioner and Respondent.

OPINION

THE COURT [*]

INTRODUCTION

Nicholas C. (father) appeals from the family court's order freeing his biological daughter, J.C., from his custody and control due to abandonment under Family Code section 7822. Father claims the court erred when it found that the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) (ICWA) does not apply because the court failed to ensure an adequate inquiry was conducted in accordance with state law requirements.(Welf. &Inst. Code, § 224.2; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481.) Father seeks reversal and remand for an adequate inquiry. Ryan F. (stepfather and petitioner) concedes the inquiry was inadequate and he does not oppose a conditional remand to ensure compliance with the requirements under California law.

"[B]ecause ICWA uses the term 'Indian,' we do the same for consistency, even though we recognize that other terms, such as 'Native American' or 'indigenous,' are preferred by many." (In re Benjamin M. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 735, 739, fn. 1 (Benjamin M.).).

All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise stated, and all further references to rules are to the California Rules of Court.

As explained herein, we accept stepfather's concession of error and, in accordance with our decisions in K.H. and E.C., conclude the error is prejudicial, which necessitates a conditional reversal of the trial court's finding that ICWA does not apply and remand for further proceedings. (In re K.H. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 566 (K.H.); In re E.C. (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 123 (E.C.).)

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The sole issue on appeal is father's ICWA claim. Therefore, we do not include a detailed summary of facts.

In September 2013, J.C. was born to mother and father, who were married. Shortly thereafter, they separated and mother filed for divorce. A judgment of dissolution was entered in April 2014, and mother was awarded sole legal and physical custody of J.C.

Father last had contact with J.C. sometime in 2014, but he paid child support. When J.C. was two years old, mother and stepfather began dating. They married in 2017.

In October 2018, stepfather filed an adoption petition. In June 2021, stepfather filed an amended adoption petition, and, in July 2021, he filed a petition to have J.C. declared free from the custody and control of father.

The court set a hearing on the petition to declare J.C. free of father's custody and control in June 2022, and father filed an opposition. Prior to the hearing, stepfather filed a Judicial Council Forms, form ICWA-010(A) stating he inquired of mother and there is no reason to believe J.C. is an Indian child. Mother filed a form ICWA-020, stating there is no reason to believe J.C. is an Indian child.

Further references to forms are to Judicial Council Forms.

At the hearing, father notified the court that through genetic testing, he learned he has almost 40 percent Indian ancestry and was in the process of trying to determine which tribe. The court appointed counsel for father and ordered him to file ICWA-020 and ICWA-030 forms. Father thereafter filed an ICWA-020 form, stating that he and J.C. may be members of, or eligible for membership in, a federally recognized tribe; and he told the court-connected investigator that his grandmother had mentioned Cherokee heritage.

In October 2022, the court held a hearing on the issue of ICWA. Concurrently, father's counsel provided the court with an ICWA-030 form he served on the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) in Sacramento and a letter dated September 2022, in which a representative with BIA stated that no documentation was provided indicating J.C. or her parents were members of a federally recognized tribe or were eligible for membership in a federally recognized tribe. Father had no further information at that time and the court found ICWA did not apply.

In November 2022, following a contested hearing at which father, mother and stepfather testified, the court ordered J.C. free from the custody and control of father and set a hearing on the adoption petition. (Fam. Code, §§ 7820-7822, 9000.)

Father filed a timely notice of appeal.

DISCUSSION

I. Legal Principles

A. ICWA

"'ICWA is a federal law giving Indian tribes concurrent jurisdiction over state court child custody proceedings that involve Indian children living off of a reservation' (In re W.B. (2012) 55 Cal.4th 30, 48 (W.B.), citing 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b)-(c) &Mississippi Choctaw Indian Band v. Holyfield (1989) 490 U.S. 30, 36 (Holyfield)), in furtherance of 'federal policy "'that, where possible, an Indian child should remain in the Indian community'"' (W.B., supra, at p. 48, quoting Holyfield, supra, at p. 37)." (K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 594, fn. omitted; accord, E.C., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 138.) ICWA applies to both involuntary and voluntary child custody proceedings (25 U.S.C. § 1903(1); 25 C.F.R. § 23.103 (2023); Haaland v. Brackeen (2023) __U.S.__,__ [143 S.Ct. 1609, 1623-1624]), and when found applicable, "'the Indian tribe has a right to intervene in or exercise jurisdiction over the proceeding'" (K.H., supra, at p. 594, fn. omitted, quoting In re K.T. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 732, 741 [citing 25 U.S.C. § 1911]; accord, In re Isaiah W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 8; E.C., supra, at p. 138).

"Within the meaning of ICWA, federal and state law define an '"Indian child" [as] any unmarried person who is under age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe.' (25 U.S.C. § 1903(4); accord, Welf. &Inst. Code, § 224.1, subd. (a).) In addition, state law provides, 'As used in connection with an Indian child custody proceeding, the term "Indian child" also means an unmarried person who is 18 years of age or over, but under 21 years of age, who is a member of an Indian tribe or eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe, and who is under the jurisdiction of the dependency court, unless that person or their attorney elects not to be considered an Indian child for purposes of the Indian child custody proceeding. All Indian child custody proceedings involving persons 18 years of age and older shall be conducted in a manner that respects the person's status as a legal adult.' (§ 224.1, subd. (b).)" (K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 596; accord, E.C., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 139.)

B. Duty of Inquiry

ICWA "'establishes minimum federal standards, both procedural and substantive, governing the removal of Indian children from their families' [citations] ._" (K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 594, quoting In re H.A. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1206, 1210; accord, E.C., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 138.) "California law implementing ICWA also imposes requirements to protect the rights of Indian children, their families, and their tribes." (In re Ricky R. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 671, 678, citing §§ 224-224.6 (Ricky R.); see In re Abbigail A. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 83, 91 ["persistent noncompliance with ICWA led the Legislature in 2006 to 'incorporate[] ICWA's requirements into California statutory law'"].) Inquiry into whether a child is or may be an Indian child is integral to ensuring that the relevant tribe or tribes receive notice if the proceeding involves, or may involve, an Indian child. (K.H., supra, at p. 609; E.C., supra, at p. 135.) In K.H., in the context of a dependency proceeding under section 300, we explained that "whether a child is a member, or is eligible for membership, in a particular tribe is a determination that rests exclusively with the tribe, and neither the agency nor the court plays any role in making that determination. ([In re] T.G. [(2020)] 58 Cal.App.5th [275,] 294; accord, In re Rylei S. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 309, 321, fn. 8 (Rylei S.).) '"Because it typically is not selfevident whether a child is an Indian child, both federal and state law mandate certain inquiries to be made in each case."' (Ricky R., supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 678, quoting Benjamin M., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 741.)" (K.H., supra, at p. 596; accord, E.C., supra, at pp. 139-140.)

As discussed post, under the California Rules of Court, ICWA requirements also apply in proceedings such as this one (rule 5.480(4)), there is an affirmative and ongoing duty of inquiry that includes extended family (rule 5.481(a)(1)), there is a duty of further inquiry if there is reason to believe an Indian child may be involved (rule 5.481(a)(4)), and the court's finding that ICWA does not apply must be based on a finding that "proper and adequate inquiry, further inquiry, and due diligence were conducted under Welfare and institutions Code 224.2" and that "there is no reason to know the child is an Indian child" (rule 5.482(c)(1)).

This is not a dependency proceeding under section 300, but the inquiry and notice requirements under ICWA also apply in certain proceedings under the Family Code, including this one. (See, e.g., Fam. Code, §§ 170, 175, 177; rule 5.480(4).) "In the context of a petition to free a minor from a parent's custody and care pursuant to Family Code section 7820 or 7822 ..., the court, petitioner, and court-appointed investigator have an affirmative and continuing duty to inquire whether the child is, or might be, an Indian child." (Adoption of M.R. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 537, 541, citing In re Noreen G. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1387 &rule 5.481(a)(1).) The California Rules of Court addressing ICWA expressly apply, in relevant part, to "most proceedings involving Indian children that may result in ... [a] declaration freeing a child from the custody and control of one or both parents; termination of parental rights; preadoptive placement; or adoptive placement" (rule 5.480), including "[p]roceedings under the Family Code resulting in adoption or termination of parental rights" (rule 5.480(4)).

Rule 5.481 provides that "The court, court-connected investigator, and party seeking a foster-care placement, guardianship, conservatorship, custody placement under Family Code section 3041, declaration freeing a child from the custody or control of one or both parents, termination of parental rights, preadoptive placement, or adoption have an affirmative and continuing duty to inquire whether a child is or may be an Indian child in all proceedings identified in rule 5.480. The court, court-connected investigator, and party include the county welfare department, probation department, licensed adoption agency, adoption service provider, investigator, petitioner, appointed guardian or conservator of the person, and appointed fiduciary." (Italics added.)

Sometimes referred to as the duty of initial inquiry, "The party seeking a fostercare placement, guardianship, conservatorship, custody placement under Family Code section 3041, declaration freeing a child from the custody or control of one or both parents, termination of parental rights, preadoptive placement, or adoption must ask the child, if the child is old enough, and the parents, Indian custodian, or legal guardians, extended family members, others who have an interest in the child, and where applicable the party reporting child abuse or neglect, whether the child is or may be an Indian child and whether the residence or domicile of the child, the parents, or Indian custodian is on a reservation or in an Alaska Native village, and must complete the Indian Child Inquiry Attachment (form ICWA-010(A)) and attach it to the petition unless the party is filing a subsequent petition and there is no new information." (Rule 5.481(a)(1), first italics added.)

As we noted in K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at page 597, footnote 10, because this duty "'"begins with the initial contact" (§ 224.2, subd. (a)) and continues throughout the dependency proceedings'" (accord, In re J.C. (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 70, 77), some courts have described the term "initial duty of inquiry" is somewhat inaccurate (In re Rylei S. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 309, 319).

Further inquiry and notice may be required as follows: "If the social worker, probation officer, licensed adoption agency, adoption service provider, investigator, or petitioner knows or has reason to know or believe that an Indian child is or may be involved, that person or entity must make further inquiry as soon as practicable by: [¶] (A) Interviewing the parents, Indian custodian, and 'extended family members' as defined in 25 United States Code section 1903, to gather the information listed in Welfare and Institutions Code section 224.3[, subdivision ](a)(5), Family Code section 180[, subdivision ](b)(5), or Probate Code section 1460.2[, subdivision ](b)(5); [¶] (B) Contacting the [BIA] and the California Department of Social Services for assistance in identifying the names and contact information of the tribes in which the child may be a member or eligible for membership; and [¶] (C) Contacting the tribes and any other person who reasonably can be expected to have information regarding the child's membership status or eligibility. These contacts must at a minimum include the contacts and sharing of information listed in Welfare and Institutions Code section 224.2[, subdivision ](e)(3)." (Rule 5.481(4).)

With respect to the family court's ICWA finding, rule 5.482(c) provides, "(1) If the court finds that proper and adequate inquiry, further inquiry, and due diligence were conducted under ... section 224.2 and, if applicable, notice provided under .. section 224.3, and the court determines there is no reason to know the child is an Indian child, the court may make a finding that the [ICWA] does not apply to the proceedings. [¶] (2) The determination of the court that the [ICWA] does not apply in (c)(1) is subject to reversal based on sufficiency of the evidence. The court must reverse its determination if it subsequently receives information providing reason to believe that the child is an Indian child and order the social worker or probation officer to conduct further inquiry under ... section 224.3."

II. Standard of Review

"The [lower] court's finding that ICWA does not apply to the proceeding rests on two elemental determinations, 'subject to reversal based on sufficiency of the evidence.'" (K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 601, quoting § 224.2, subd. (i)(2); accord, E.C., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 142; Adoption of M.R., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 542; rule 5.482(c).) First, "[t]he court must find there is 'no reason to know whether the child is an Indian child,' which is dependent upon whether any of the six circumstances set forth in subdivision (d) of section 224.2 apply." (K.H., supra, at p. 601, quoting § 224.2, subd. (i)(2); accord, E.C., supra, at p. 143; rule 5.482(c)(1).) Second, "[t]he [lower] court must . find a 'proper and adequate further inquiry and due diligence ..'" (K.H., supra, at p. 601, quoting § 224.2, subd. (i)(2); accord, E.C., supra, at p. 143; rule 5.482(c)(1).)

The lower court's finding on the second element "requires the ... court to 'engage in a delicate balancing of' various factors in assessing whether the . „ inquiry was proper and adequate within the context of ICWA and California law, and whether . „ [there was] due diligence." (K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 601, quoting In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 640; accord, E.C., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 143; In re Ezequiel G. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 984, 1004-1005.) Therefore, we employ a hybrid standard and review the court's determination for substantial evidence and abuse of discretion. (K.H., supra, at p. 589; accord, E.C., supra, at p. 143; In re Ezequiel G., supra, at pp. 1004-1005.)

III. Analysis

A. Error

As previously set forth, mother and stepfather filed forms stating there is no reason to believe J.C. is an Indian child, and they provided the court-connected investigator the same information. Father filed a form stating he and J.C. may be members of, or eligible for membership in, a federally recognized tribe, and he informed the court he had information he has approximately 40 percent Indian ancestry in an unknown tribe. Father was directed to file ICWA-020 and ICWA-030 forms, and he subsequently told the investigator that his grandmother had mentioned Cherokee heritage. The investigator documented that mother was informed of father's claim and that she was provided with an ICWA-030 form.

In June 2022, father's counsel served an ICWA-030 form on the BIA in Sacramento. The form included father's and mother's names, addresses, dates of birth, and birth places. The form also included the same information for paternal grandmother and paternal grandfather, with the exception of a birth place for paternal grandfather; and name, date of birth, and date and place of death for paternal great-grandmother. The form included a list of 13 tribes in which father might be eligible for membership. In a letter dated September 2022, a representative with BIA stated that no documentation was provided indicating J.C. or her parents were members of a federally recognized tribe or were eligible for membership in a federally recognized tribe.

On appeal, father claims the court's finding that ICWA does not apply is not supported by substantial evidence of due diligence because there was no inquiry of mother's or his extended family. Stepfather does not dispute that the questioning of only himself, mother, and father falls short of the adequate, proper, and diligent inquiry required under California law. (§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2); rule 5.482(c).) We accept the concession.

The law does not require the court, court-connected investigator or petitioner "'to cast about' for investigative leads" (In re A.M. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 303, 323), but as we explained in K.H., "the law demands more than merely inquiring of [the parents]" (K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 620). Although complying with the duty of inquiry and documentation under ICWA is unlikely to "prove onerous" in most cases (ibid.), in no event may we interpret the law to relieve the court, the court-connected investigator or the parties of complying with the plain directives imposed by statute and rule (ibid.; see § 224.2; rules 5.480-5.482). There may be cases in which there is no one else to ask beyond the parents, but, if that is so, the record must be developed to reflect that fact and supported by documentation. (Rule 5.481(a)(5).) Properly developed and documented, "the court has relatively broad discretion to determine [that] the ... inquiry was proper, adequate, and duly diligent on the specific facts of the case." (K.H., supra, at p. 589; accord, E.C., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 157.)

In this case, the record indicates that, at a minimum, J.C.'s paternal grandparents are alive and their addresses are known to father, who supplied that information on the ICWA-030 form. Further, mother and stepfather are in contact with several maternal relatives, as those relatives supplied personal reference questionnaires in support of the adoption petition, and the record reflects maternal grandmother and father exchanged messages concerning J.C.

As stated, father claims error based on the failure to inquire of his extended family and mother's extended family, and stepfather concedes error on both points. However, this proceeding pertains to freeing J.C. only from father's custody and control for the purpose of adoption by stepfather. (See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1)(ii); 25 C.F.R. § 23.103 (2023); Fam. Code, § 170, subd. (c); rule 5.480.) It is unclear if father's position is that this case may involve knowledge of his connection to a specific tribe held by maternal relatives or that state law requires an inquiry of the child's extended family irrespective of which parent's rights are at issue in the proceeding. Because we agree that the family court erred with respect to ensuring a reasonable inquiry of J.C.'s paternal extended family and we find the error prejudicial, discussed next, we leave further development of this specific issue, if any, to the parties and family court on remand. (Rule 5.481(a)(1).)

B. Prejudice

Father is entitled to a conditional reversal of the family court's ICWA finding only if the error complained of is prejudicial. Under California law, "'[n]o judgment shall be set aside ... for any error as to any matter of procedure, unless, after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence, the court shall be of the opinion that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.' (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.)" (K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 606; accord, E.C., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 151.) "California law generally interprets its constitutional miscarriage of justice requirement 'as permitting reversal only if the reviewing court finds it reasonably probable the result would have been more favorable to the appealing party but for the error' (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 60, citing [People v.] Watson [1956] 46 Cal.2d [818,] 836; accord, In re Christopher L. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 1063, 1073; [In re] A.R. [(2021)] 11 Cal.5th [234,] 252)." (K.H., supra, at p. 607; accord, E.C., supra, at p. 152.)

Courts "generally apply a Watson likelihood-of-success test to assess prejudice, [but] a merits-based outcome-focused test is not always appropriate because it cannot always adequately measure the relevant harm." (K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 609, citing In re A.R. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 234, 252-253 (A.R.); accord, E.C. supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at pp. 153-154.) "[W]here the injury caused by the error is unrelated to an outcome on the merits, tethering the showing of prejudice to such an outcome misplaces the measure, at the expense of the rights the law in question was designed to protect." (K.H., supra, at p. 609, citing A.R., supra, at p. 252; accord, E.C., supra, at p. 154.)

"'ICWA compliance presents a unique situation'" (K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 608, quoting In re K.R. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 701, 708; accord, E.C., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 152), because "ICWA is not directed at reaching, or protecting, a specific outcome on the merits" (K.H., supra, at p. 609; accord, E.C., supra, at p. 154). Rather, "'[t]he purpose of ICWA and related California statutes is to provide notice to the tribe sufficient to allow it to determine whether the child is an Indian child, and whether the tribe wishes to intervene in the proceedings' ([In re] N.G. [(2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 474,] 484, citing In re K.R., supra, at p. 708), and an adequate ... inquiry facilitates the information gathering upon which the court's ICWA determination will rest." (K.H., supra, at p. 608; accord, E.C., supra, at pp. 152-153.) Here, the appealing party is father and he does not bear the burden of complying with ICWA requirements. (Rule 5.481(a); see K.H., supra, at p. 608 [parents do not bear burden of compliance in dependency context]; E.C., supra, at p. 153 [same].) Further, the ultimate determination whether a child is an Indian child rests with the tribe. (K.H., supra, at p. 596; accord, E.C., supra, at pp. 139-140.)

As we recognized in K.H., "the duty of inquiry is a continuing one (§ 224.2, subd. (a)[; rule 5.481(a))] ., [but] if the inquiry is inadequate from the outset, the likelihood that the opportunity to gather relevant information will present itself later in the proceeding declines precipitously." (K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 609; accord, E.C., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 154.) "The relevant rights under ICWA belong to Indian tribes and they have a statutory right to receive notice where an Indian child may be involved so that they may make that determination. It necessarily follows that [in the context of ICWA and consistent with A.R.,] the prejudice to those rights lies in the failure to gather and record the very information the [lower] court needs to ensure accuracy in determining whether further inquiry or notice is required, and whether ICWA does or does not apply." (K.H., supra, at p. 591; accord, E.C., supra, at p. 154.) "[W]here the opportunity to gather the relevant information critical to determining whether the child is or may be an Indian child is lost because there has not been adequate inquiry and due diligence, reversal for correction is generally the only effective safeguard." (K.H., supra, at p. 610, citing A.R., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 252-254; accord, E.C., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 155.)

In this case, the inquiry extended no further than father, mother, and stepfather; father believes he has Indian ancestry, possibly with a Cherokee tribe; father provided that information to the court and the court-connected investigator; and the record reflects that there are at least several relatives who could have been asked to determine if they have knowledge or information on Indian ancestry. As previously stated, stepfather does not dispute the inadequacy of the inquiry under California law. Under these circumstances, the inquiry "fell ... short of that required to gather the information needed to meaningfully safeguard the rights of the tribes, as intended under ICWA and California law, and remand for correction is required." (K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 620, citing A.R., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 252-253; accord, E.C., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 156.) "A finding of harmlessness on this record would necessarily require speculation and 'is at odds with the statutory protections that ICWA and California law intend to afford Indian children and Indian tribes.'" (E.C., supra, at p. 155, quoting K.H., supra, at p. 611.)

We reiterate, as stated in K.H., that children have a critical interest in stability and permanency, which is undermined by unnecessary delay (Fam. Code, § 7800; In re Christopher L. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 1063, 1081), and we recognize that courts, court-connected investigators, and parties are laboring under a tremendous burden (K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 619). For all involved, the most efficient and "least burdensome option is simply to ensure that an adequate initial inquiry is made...." (Ibid.) We also reiterate that our decisions in K.H. and E.C. should not be interpreted as requiring the family court to ensure "an exhaustive search for and questioning of every living relative of [J.C.]" (K.H., supra, at p. 621; accord, E.C., supra, 85 Cal.5th at p. 157) "So long as the court ensures the inquiry is reasonable and of sufficient reach to accomplish the legislative purpose underlying ICWA and related California law, the court will have an adequate factual foundation upon which to make its ICWA finding." (K.H., supra, at p. 621, citing § 224.2, subd. (i)(2); accord, E.C., supra, at p. 157; rule 5.482(c).)

DISPOSITION

The family court's finding that ICWA does not apply is conditionally reversed, and the matter is remanded to the court for the limited purpose of ensuring compliance with the inquiry and documentation provisions set forth in section 224.2 and rule 5.481. If, after determining that an adequate inquiry was made, the court finds that ICWA applies, the court shall proceed in compliance with ICWA and related California law. If the court instead finds that ICWA does not apply, the court shall reinstate its ICWA finding.

[*] Before Franson, Acting P. J., Meehan, J. and Snauffer, J.


Summaries of

R.F. v. N.C. (In re J.C.)

California Court of Appeals, Fifth District
Aug 2, 2023
No. F085371 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 2, 2023)
Case details for

R.F. v. N.C. (In re J.C.)

Case Details

Full title:In re J.C., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. v. N.C.…

Court:California Court of Appeals, Fifth District

Date published: Aug 2, 2023

Citations

No. F085371 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 2, 2023)