Opinion
18-CV-8724 (LJL) (OTW)
10-23-2024
RODERICK REYES, Petitioner, v. SUPERINTENDENT LAMANNA, Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
ONA T. WANG, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
TO THE HON. LEWIS J. LIMAN
I. Introduction
Petitioner Roderick Reyes brings this habeas corpus proceeding in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 2254, seeking to challenge his convictions of second-degree weapon possession, third-degree drug sale, third-degree firearm sale, attempted second-degree weapon possession, and attempted third-degree firearm sale and his sentence as a violent predicate felony offender to an aggregate prison term of 17 to 19 years.
Petitioner asserts the following six claims:
1) the evidence of his guilt was insufficient;
2) the trial court improperly denied Petitioner's motion for a Wade hearing;
3) the trial court erred in instructing the jury regarding constructive possession;
4) the trial court erred in refusing to issue an adverse inference charge for Rosario material lost due to Hurricane Sandy;
5) the court erred when it denied his co-defendant's Batson challenge; and
6) Petitioner's sentence was excessive.See ECF 1, Petition; ECF 28, Petitioner's Reply.
Respondent argues that the state court reasonably rejected his sufficiency claim (Claim 1); that his Wade hearing, adverse inference, and excessive sentence claims are not cognizable on habeas review (Claims 2, 4, and 6); and that his constructive possession and Batson claims are procedurally barred (Claims 3 and 5). (ECF 12-1, Respondent's Memorandum of Law).
For the reasons below, I recommend that Petitioner's petition be dismissed.
II. Background
A. The Undercover Drug Delivery Service Investigation
In April 2011, the NYPD opened an investigation into a cocaine delivery service in Manhattan. (ECF 12-1 at 2). Undercover Officer 65 (“UC65”) had been given a phone number for “Freddie,” (Petitioner's co-defendant, Rodriguez) who operated the service. Id. “Freddie” facilitated a drug sale between UC65 and another individual. Id.
A week after the first sale, UC65 contacted Rodriguez to arrange another sale, and in this instance, Rodriguez sold the cocaine to UC65. (ECF 12-1 at 2). Over the next 5 months, Rodriguez sold cocaine to UC 65 ten times, netting between $180 and $3200 for each sale. Id. These sales were recorded by UC65. Id.
On October 25, 2011, Petitioner drove Rodriguez and another man to the intersection of Harrison and Greenwich Streets in Manhattan to meet UC 65 for another drug sale. (ECF 12-1 at 2-3). UC 65 entered the back of the car, a Chevy Impala, sitting with Rodriguez, while Petitioner drove through the local streets. (ECF 12-1 at 3). Near the intersection of Harrison and Hudson Streets, UC65 bought $3000 worth of cocaine. Id.
Nine days later, on November 3, 2011, Petitioner drove Rodriguez in the same car to East 33rd Street to sell cocaine to UC65. (ECF 12-1 at 3). The entire drug transaction took place inside the car, with the three men - Rodriguez, UC65 and Petitioner - present. (ECF 12-1 at 34). Nineteen days later, on or around November 22, 2011, Rodriguez and UC65 met again, without Petitioner present, and UC65 asked Rodriguez if he had any guns to sell. (ECF 12-1 at 4). Rodriguez indicated that he had a 9-millimeter gun and a Tec-9. Id. After further discussion, UC65 agreed to buy the 9-millimeter and $300 worth of cocaine. Id.
One week later, in the evening of November 29, 2011, Petitioner drove Rodriguez in the Impala to the corner of Houston and Ludlow Streets to sell the 9-millimeter gun to UC65. (ECF 12-1 at 4). When UC65 entered the car, he asked Rodriguez if he had the gun; Rodriguez said they had to pick it up. Id. Fearing a robbery by Petitioner and Rodriguez, UC65 insisted that Petitioner and Rodriguez pick up the gun without him and meet up later. The three men then discussed where they would meet later; Petitioner suggested Essex and Delancey Streets, which he described as “busy” and “safe enough.” (ECF 12-1 at 4-5). The men agreed to meet there in a few minutes. (ECF 12-1 at 5).
UC65 exited the car and walked over to Essex and Delancey Streets; Petitioner and Rodriguez drove there a few minutes later. (ECF 12-1 at 5). UC65 entered the car again, and Petitioner announced that he would “drive for a bit to make sure no one was following [them].” Id. Petitioner turned south onto Bowery and when they reached Pell Street, Rodriguez handed UC65 a plastic bag containing a 9-millimeter pistol, bullets, and cocaine in exchange for $850. Id.
A few days later, Rodriguez asked UC65 if he still wanted the Tec-9; UC65 replied that he did. (ECDF 12-1 at 5). On December 8, 2011, Petitioner drove Rodriguez in the Impala to the corner of Essex and Delancey to sell the Tec-9 to UC65. Id. UC65 again entered the Impala, and UC65 and Rodriguez conversed about the gun. (ECF 12-1 at 5-6). Rodriguez directed Petitioner's driving, and UC65 paid Rodriguez $850 for the gun, which turned out to be an inoperable 9-mm rather than a Tec-9. (ECF 12-1 at 6-7).
Over the next three months, UC65 and Rodriguez engaged in 6 more cocaine sales, but Petitioner was not present. (ECF 12-1 at 7).
During this time, the police tried to identify Petitioner by gathering records about the Impala. Police found that the Impala was registered to “Daniel Sandoval” at a Manhattan apartment. (ECF 12-1 at 7). Police went to the apartment, and Petitioner answered the door, identified himself, and said that he lived there, and confirmed that he drove the Impala. (ECF 12-1 at 7-8).
On March 7, 2012, police arrested Rodriguez after a drug deal. (ECF 12-1 at 8). Later that night, Petitioner was arrested after UC65 identified him. Id. Petitioner's phone was searched, and Rodriguez's phone number was in Petitioner's contacts under the name “Blaze.” Id. The call log also reflected recent calls between Petitioner and Rodriguez. Id.
B. Procedural History
At trial, Petitioner was convicted of the November 29, 2011 cocaine sale and possession and sale of the first 9-millimeter gun. (ECF 12-1 at 8). Petitioner was also convicted of attempted possession and attempted sale of the inoperable gun from December 8, 2011. Id. Petitioner was ultimately sentenced as a violent predicate felony offender to an aggregate prison term of 17 to 19 years and 5 years of post-release supervision. (ECF 12-1 at 9). The following sentences were to run concurrently: 15 years for second degree weapons possession, 14 years for third-degree drug sale; 7 years for third degree firearm sale; 7 years for the attempted second-degree weapons possession, and 4 years for the attempted third-degree firearm sale. Id. For the attempted third-degree weapon possession charge, the court imposed a 2 to 4 year prison term to run consecutively to the 15 year sentence. Id.
Rodriguez was sentenced as a persistent violent felony offender to an aggregate prison term of 30 years to life. (ECF 12-1 at 9).
On direct appeal, Petitioner alleged the following: 1) evidence of his guilt was legally insufficient; 2) the court improperly instructed the jury regarding constructive possession, and attempted possession; 3) the court improperly denied Petitioner's motion for a Wade hearing; 4) the court erred when it denied Rodriguez's Batson challenge; 5) the court erred by refusing to issue an adverse inference charge for Rosario material lost due to Hurricane Sandy; and 6) the sentence was excessive.
The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed, and the Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal. See ECF 12-3 at 140-43, Appellate Division Judgment; ECF 12-3 at 156, Order Denying Leave. Petitioner filed the instant habeas petition on September 21, 2018. (ECF 1). Respondent identified in its Answer two claims it argued were procedurally barred: the claims regarding the constructive possession instruction and the Batson challenge. See ECF 12-1. This Court gave Petitioner the option pursuant to Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 278 (2005) to elect to abandon the unexhausted claims or proceed with all claims at risk of dismissal if the Court were to find lack of exhaustion. (ECF 17 at 5). When Petitioner filed his reply in March 2020, he did not indicate his choice, but argued all of his claims, including the potentially unexhausted Batson and constructive possession charge claims. (ECF 28).
The Court construes Petitioner's filing a response that addressed all of his claims on the merits to mean that if the Court were to find either or both claims unexhausted, Petitioner would prefer that the unexhausted claim(s) be deleted so that the remainder of his claims could be considered on the merits.
III. Analysis
A. The Standard of Review
A habeas corpus petition is not a vehicle to relitigate every issue previously determined in state court. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 401 (1993). Instead, a state prisoner seeking habeas relief under § 2254 must show by a preponderance of the evidence that he is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1996). The petitioner thus has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that his rights have been violated. See Jones v. Vacco, 126 F.3d 408, 415 (2d Cir. 1997).
A federal court may grant a writ of habeas corpus to a state prisoner where the state court's adjudication of the petitioner's federal claim on the merits:
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1996).
A decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court, “if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme Court] on a question of law” or “if the state court confronts facts that are materially indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme Court precedent and arrives at a result opposite to [the Supreme Court's].” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404-405 (2000). A decision is an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law if a “state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme Court's] decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.” Id. at 413; accord Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 182 (2011); White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 415, 419-20 (2014) (defining “unreasonable application” as requiring an “objectively unreasonable” interpretation of federal law beyond “clear error”). “As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011). Moreover, a “federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 411; accord Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003).
The standard for relief under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) “is difficult to meet, because the purpose of AEDPA is to ensure that federal habeas relief functions as a guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, and not as a means of error correction.” Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 38 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Metrish v. Lancaster, 569 U.S. 351, 356-59 (2013); see Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 19 (2013) (“AEDPA erects a formidable barrier to federal habeas relief for prisoners whose claims have been adjudicated in state court[.]”). “ ‘Clearly established Federal law' for purposes of § 2254(d)(1) includes ‘only the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of this Court's decisions.' ” White, 572 U.S. at 419-20 (2014) (quoting Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 505 (2012)); accord Smith v. Artus, 610 Fed.Appx. 23, 26 (2d Cir. 2015) (summary order). “[R]eview under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the prisoner's claim on the merits.” Greene, 565 U.S. at 38 (citing Cullen, 563 U.S. at 181).
B. Exhaustion and Other Procedural Bars
Under AEDPA, a federal court may not consider a petition for a writ of habeas corpus by a prisoner in state custody unless the petitioner has exhausted all state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A); see Jackson v. Conway, 763 F.3d 115, 133 (2d Cir. 2014). To satisfy the exhaustion requirement, the petitioner must have “fairly presented” his claims to the state courts, thereby affording those courts the opportunity to correct the alleged violations of federal rights. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971). The exhaustion requirement is fulfilled once the federal claims have been presented to “the highest court of the state.” Galdamez v. Keane, 394 F.3d 68, 73 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal citation omitted). In New York, the petitioner must have presented each of his claims to the Appellate Division and then sought leave to appeal on the same grounds to the Court of Appeals. See id. at 74 (“one complete round” of New York's appellate review process involves appeal to Appellate Division and then application to Court of Appeals for certificate granting leave to appeal). Procedural default is broader, encompassing a failure to raise the claim at all.
Where a petitioner has not raised any federal claims to the state court, and raises only state law claims in his federal habeas petition, those claims are not likely cognizable in federal court. This is because “[f]ederal habeas relief ‘does not lie for errors of state law.' ” McCall v. Artus, 06-CV-365 (SAS), 2008 WL 4501834 at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2008) (quoting Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991)). In other words, “. . . a federal habeas court is limited to deciding whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States.” Id. at 67-68. Therefore, for Petitioner to sustain his cause of action, he must show that any error of state law-such as improper jury instructions, or denial of a hearing afforded under state law -“ ‘render[ed] petitioner's state trial fundamentally unfair' and thus violated his constitutional due process rights.” Herring v. Meachum, 11 F.3d 374, 377 (2d Cir.1993) (quoting Tribbitt v. Wainwright, 540 F.2d 840, 841 (5th Cir. 1976).
Respondent argues that two of Petitioner's claims - his constructive possession instruction claim and his Batson claim - are procedurally barred. Respondent argues that the constructive possession instruction was only raised by Petitioner as a state law claim, rather than as a federal law claim, on direct appeal. (ECF 12-1 at 20-21, 25). Accordingly, Respondent argues, the challenge to the constructive possession charge is “unexhausted and procedurally barred.” Id. at 21. See McCray v. Graham, No 14-CV-5983 (PKC)(AJP), 2014 WL 6790756 at *10-12 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2014) (Petitioner's failure to raise federal constitutional claims, cite to federal case law, or make any reference to federal rights resulted in finding that habeas claims are unexhausted, but then deeming claims unexhausted but procedurally barred due to inability to raise issues in state court). Respondent also argues that Petitioner's Batson claim is procedurally barred because Petitioner did not raise a Batson objection at trial and Petitioner cannot show cause for this procedural lapse. (ECF 12-1 at 25-27).
Respondent then argues the remaining claims on the merits.
Because it appears that Petitioner raised these remaining claims only as state law claims on direct appeal, and the Appellate Division denied them on the merits, relying only on state law, it is likely that all of Petitioner's claims are unexhausted, but should be deemed exhausted and procedurally barred. See McCray, 2014 WL 6790756 at *10-12.
C. Weight and Sufficiency of the Evidence
Petitioner's evidentiary claim - raised and rejected on direct appeal - is that the prosecution failed to prove Petitioner was guilty of the charges arising out of the December 8, 2011 sale of the inoperable weapon. Specifically, Petitioner argues, the prosecution failed to introduce any evidence that Petitioner had touched or otherwise had “actual possession of the said inoperable weapon or that he intended the weapon to be operable.” (ECF 1 at 12). Petitioner also asserts that there was no evidence that he was “even previously aware that the subject of the sale was a weapon, rather than drugs, which his co-defendant previously sold in the vehicle in petitioner[‘]s presence.” Id.
This claim can be read in one of two ways: first, as a “weight of the evidence” claim (i.e., that the jury incorrectly weighed the evidence of conduct and knowledge by Petitioner and Rodriguez); or second, as a sufficiency of the evidence claim (i.e., that the prosecution did not prove every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, specifically, Petitioner's intent to participate in a gun sale, and his constructive possession of the gun). Whether this claim is a weight or sufficiency of the evidence claim, for the reasons set forth below, it is without merit.
1. Weight of the evidence
Because Petitioner is pro se, the Court will interpret his sufficiency claim as also raising a weight of the evidence claim. “[A] habeas court must defer to the assessments of the weight of the evidence and credibility made by the jury . . . .”Frazier v. New York, 187 F.Supp.2d 102, 109 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2002) (citing Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 401 (1993)). See Robinson v. Mazzuca, 01-CV-0001 (LTS)(JCF), 2002 WL 31246535, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2002); Gutierrez v. Ricks, 02-CV-3780 (BSJ)(AJP) , 2002 WL 31360417, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2002) (“It is well established that ‘weight of the evidence' claims are not cognizable on federal habeas review, given the difference between such a challenge and that of a challenge based on the sufficiency of the evidence.”);Taylor v. Poole, 538 F.Supp.2d 612, 618 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2008) (citing Douglas v. Portuondo, 232 F.Supp.2d 106, 116 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 2002)).
2. Sufficiency of the evidence
The Appellate Division addressed Petitioner's challenges to the sufficiency and weight of the evidence on the merits, finding that “the evidence, including defendant's overall conduct in a series of transactions, supports the inference that he intended that [Rodriguez's] representations of operability, made to the undercover purchaser, would be true, so as to satisfy the customer and promote additional sales.” (ECF 12-3 at 141). Moreover, in finding that the constructive possession charge was warranted and the elements of constructive possession were satisfied, the Appellate Division referenced both Petitioner's and Rodriguez's “joint control of the contraband” in Petitioner's car. Id.
Accordingly, Petitioner has not shown that he is entitled to habeas relief on this claim.
D. Denial of Wade Hearing
Petitioner's claim that the state court erred in summarily denying him a Wade hearing is also procedurally barred from consideration. Moreover, Petitioner has not articulated a federal constitutional violation from the denial of a Wade hearing. On its merits, this claim also should be denied.
“The purpose of a Wade hearing is to determine before the trial whether pretrial identification procedures have been so improperly suggestive as to taint an in-court identification.” Lynn v. Bliden, 443 F.3d 238, 248 (2d Cir. 2006). Here, Petitioner challenges the confirmatory identification by UC65 upon his arrest on March 7, 2012, but Detective Badyna had already identified Petitioner through reviewing records relating to the Impala and going to Petitioner's residence on January 27, 2012. See ECF 12-1 at 7-8. Petitioner has not shown that the state court's determination that “[o]ver] the course of the series of transactions, [UC65] . . . developed a familiarity with defendant that rendered the identification confirmatory” was objectively unreasonable. (ECF 12-3 at 142). Finally, even if UC65's confirmatory identification of Petitioner before his arrest had been suppressed, it was not necessary for the identification of Petitioner because Detective Badyna had already determined, independently of UC65, that Petitioner had been the driver of the Impala.
E. Jury Charge Claims
Petitioner asserts that the trial court erred in its jury instructions in two ways. First, that the court should not have given the jury a constructive possession charge; and second, that the court should have given the jury an adverse inference charge for the loss of evidence stored in a police facility that flooded during Hurricane Sandy in 2012. Neither of these assertions can support habeas relief because the Appellate Division had already concluded that the jury instructions were correct (in including a constructive possession charge and excluding an adverse inference instruction), and Petitioner has not shown that these rulings were contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly-established federal law.
As discussed earlier, Petitioner has not referenced any violations of the United States Constitution nor cited any federal law. This omission is already sufficient basis to deny the claims. For the sake of completeness because this is a Report and Recommendation, I will address the merits of the claims briefly.
1. Constructive Possession Charge
As discussed above, the Appellate Division found that a constructive possession instruction was supported by the evidence: specifically, Petitioner controlled the car in which the firearms transactions occurred, and Petitioner and his codefendant were in joint control of the contraband. (ECF 12-3 at 141). The petition only recites that there was no evidence that Petitioner ever had “actual possession” of the gun, or that Petitioner had “[d]ominion and control” over the firearms and drugs (ECF 1 at 3), but says nothing about reasonable inferences that could be drawn from the evidence that was adduced at trial, including Petitioner's use and control of the Impala during the sales. See ECF 12-3 at 141-42.
2. Denial of Adverse Inference Charge
Petitioner also cannot succeed on his claim that the trial court should have given the jury an adverse inference charge for the loss of Rosario material due to flooding of a police facility during Hurricane Sandy in 2012. As the Appellate Division found, the loss of the materials was “undisputedly nonnegligent,” and “it would be illogical for a jury to draw an adverse inference against a party resulting from an event beyond that party's reasonable ability to control.” (ECF 12-3 at 140-141) (citing People v. Thompson, 143 A.D.3d 430 (1st Dept. 2016)). At best, Petitioner's argument boils down to a speculative claim that if the People had turned over the Brady or Rosario materials before Hurricane Sandy struck, they might not have been lost, and Petitioner might have been able to use some (again, speculative) inconsistencies to challenge some of the police officers' credibility. (ECF 1 at 5-7).
“Rosario material” refers to “any written or recorded statement made by a person whom the prosecutor intends to call as a witness at trial, and which relates to the subject matter of the witness testimony.” According to New York discovery rules, prosecutors must make this material available to the defendant. People v. Rosario, 9 N.Y.2d 286 (1961), as codified in CPL § 240.45(1)(a).
F. Derivative Batson Claim
Petitioner's derivative Batson claim asserts, essentially, that he should be able to relitigate his codefendant's unsuccessful challenge to the striking of “Blacks and Hispanics” from the jury. (ECF 1 at 8-12). The Appellate Division found that this claim was unpreserved, and alternatively found “that the record fails to support the codefendant's applications in any event.” (ECF 12-3 at 143).
It is undisputed that only Rodriguez's counsel raised the Batson challenge, which is reason enough to deny Petitioner's claim as unpreserved. The only assertion by Petitioner to suggest that he joined in Rodriguez's Batson challenge (and thus preserved the claim) was Rodriguez's counsel's use of the word, “we.” (ECF 1 at 12). Moreover, the Appellate Division was correct in its alternative holding that Petitioner's Batson claim, even if preserved, would have to be denied on the record before it. See ECF 12-1 at 28 n.13, 30-31 (noting races of jurors stricken and seated, if known; several jurors both seated and stricken were of unknown race).
G. Excessive Sentence Claim
Petitioner's last claim is that the trial court's aggregate sentence of "17 years" is "a death sentence" in light of his serious health concerns. (ECF 1 at 18). Although Respondent argues that the claim is not cognizable under 28 U.S.C. 2254(a), (ECF 12-1 at 35), the Court reads this to also raise an Eighth Amendment claim. Even raised as an Eighth Amendment claim, however, it cannot succeed.
"The term of a sentence does not violate the Eight Amendment if the sentence falls within the statutory range." Diaz v. Bell, 21-CV-5452(LGS)(JLC), 2022 WL 1260176, at *21 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, 21-CV-5452 (LGS), 2022 WL 2003461 (S.D.N.Y. June 6, 2022) (internal citations omitted). Even where a sentence of life in prison is mandatory, it is not a per se violation of the Eighth Amendment unless applied to juveniles. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012); United States v. Sierra, 933 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 2019) (the Eighth Amendment is not violated even where the defendant who had played lesser role was sentenced to a mandatory life term). Here, Petitioner does not allege that Justice McLaughlin's sentence exceeds the statutory maximum sentence allowed by law (see ECF 1; ECF 12-1 at 32) and thus the sentence does not violate the Eighth Amendment.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner's habeas petition should be denied. Furthermore, because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), a certificate of appealability should not be issued.
V. Objections
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and FED. R. Civ. P. 72(b), the parties shall have fourteen (14) days (including weekends and holidays) from receipt of this Report to file written objections. See also FED. R. CIV. P. 6 (allowing three (3) additional days for service by mail). A party may respond to any objections within fourteen (14) days after being served. Such objections, and any responses to objections, shall be filed with the Clerk of Court, Pro Se Intake Unit, United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, Room 200, New York, New York 10007. Any requests for an extension of time for filing objections must be directed to Judge Liman.
FAILURE TO FILE OBJECTIONS WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS WILL RESULT IN A WAIVER OF OBJECTIONS AND WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. (See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 155 (1985); lUE AFL-CIO Pension Fund v. Herrmann, 9 F.3d 1049, 1054 (2d Cir. 1993); Frank v. Johnson, 968 F.2d 298, 300 (2d Cir. 1992); Wesolek v. Canadair Ltd., 838 F.2d 55, 58 (2d Cir. 1988); McCarthy v. Manson, 714 F.2d 234, 237-38 (2d Cir. 1983)).
The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a copy of this Report and Recommendation to Petitioner.