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Revere Financial Corporation v. Goldstein

The Court of Appeals of Washington, Division One
Nov 15, 2004
124 Wn. App. 1015 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004)

Opinion

No. 54087-4-I

Filed: November 15, 2004 UNPUBLISHED OPINION

Appeal from Superior Court of King County. Docket No: 04-2-02091-3. Judgment or order under review. Date filed: 03/11/2004. Judge signing: Hon. James A. Doerty.

Counsel for Appellant(s), Mark Goldstein (Appearing Pro Se), 7683 SE 27th Street #352, Mercer Island, WA 98040.

Marcia Goldstein (Appearing Pro Se), 7683 SE 27th Street, #352, Mercer Island, WA 98040.

Counsel for Respondent(s), John D. Ostrander, Elliott Ostrander Preston PC, 707 SW Washington St Ste 1500, Portland, OR 97205-3532.


Mark and Marcia Goldstein appeal the trial court's denial of their motion to vacate Revere Financial Corporation's judgment against them. The Goldsteins claim that the judgment against them expired before Revere filed it in Washington. But Revere extended the judgment in California before filing it in Washington, and the California court had the authority to grant the extension. We affirm.

Facts

In August 1988, Palos Verdes National Bank (PVNB) obtained a judgment against Mark and Marcia Goldstein in Los Angeles Municipal Court. Before collecting the judgment, the bank went into receivership and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) became the judgment creditor. Later, the FDIC assigned the judgment to Revere Financial Corporation.

The Goldsteins moved to Washington in 1991. In 1996, Revere renewed the judgment against the Goldsteins in the Los Angeles Municipal Court. Revere renewed the judgment a second time in the California court in October 2003. Then, in January 2004, Revere filed the judgment in King County Superior Court.

The Goldsteins responded to the King County filing by moving the court to require Revere to show why the judgment should not be vacated. In the show cause motion, the Goldsteins claimed that they did not learn about the judgment against them until the judgment was renewed for a second time in 2003. They asserted that the judgment should be vacated because: (1) the California judgment expired in 1998, ten years after it was originally entered in California; (2) Revere did not exercise due diligence in executing the judgment; (3) Revere affronted the sovereignty of the State of Washington by renewing the judgment in California after the Goldsteins moved to Washington; (4) judgment against them should not have been entered in the first place because PVNB's records, which were excluded as evidence at trial, would have showed that the Goldsteins did not owe the bank any money; (5) PVNB knowingly provided the court with an old address, which prevented the Goldsteins from learning about the judgment in time to appeal the decision; and (6) Revere continued to use the incorrect address when it renewed the judgments in California.

Revere opposed the Goldsteins' motion to vacate the judgment, and the superior court denied it. This appeal followed.

The Judgment Filed In Washington Was Valid

The Goldsteins argue that the California judgment expired in August 1998, ten years after it was first entered. Therefore, they contend, the judgment filed in Washington was not valid. The relevant authority, however, does not support their argument.

If a foreign judgment grants recovery of a sum of money and is final, conclusive, and enforceable where it was rendered, that foreign judgment is enforceable in Washington. RCW 6.40.020 and RCW 6.40.030. A foreign judgment is conclusive unless

RCW 6.40.020 provides:

`This chapter applies to any foreign judgment that is final and conclusive and enforceable where rendered even though an appeal therefrom is pending or it is subject to appeal.'

RCW 6.40.030 states:
`Except as provided in RCW 6.40.040, a foreign judgment meeting the requirements of RCW 6.40.020 is conclusive between the parties to the extent that it grants or denies recovery of a sum of money. The foreign judgment is enforceable in the same manner as the judgment of a sister state which is entitled to full faith and credit.'

(a) the judgment was rendered under a system which does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the requirements of due process of law;

(b) the foreign court did not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant; or

(c) the foreign court did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter.

RCW 6.40.040(1). A foreign judgment need not be recognized if

(a) the defendant in the proceedings in the foreign court did not receive notice of the proceedings in sufficient time to enable him to defend;

(b) the judgment was obtained by fraud;

(c) the claim for relief on which the judgment is based is repugnant to the public policy of this state;

(d) the judgment conflicts with another final and conclusive judgment;

(e) the proceeding in the foreign court was contrary to an agreement between the parties under which the dispute in question was to be settled otherwise than by proceedings in that court; or

(f) in the case of jurisdiction based only on personal service, the foreign court was a seriously inconvenient forum for the trial of the action.

RCW 6.40.040(2).

An action upon a judgment or decree of any federal, state, or territorial court must be commenced within ten years unless that period is extended under RCW 6.17.020 or a similar provision from another jurisdiction. RCW 4.16.020.

The actual language of RCW 4.16.020(2) is as follows:

`The period prescribed for the commencement of actions shall be as follows: Within ten years:

`(2) For an action upon a judgment or decree of any court of the United States, or of any state or territory within the United States, or of any territory or possession of the United States outside the boundaries thereof, or of any extraterritorial court of the United States, unless the period is extended under RCW 6.17.020 or a similar provision in another jurisdiction.'

Revere's judgment was entered in California in August 1988. The California court extended the judgment once in 1996 and again in 2003. The Goldsteins argue that, because they moved to Washington in 1991, the extensions in California were not valid because California no longer had jurisdiction over them.

But if a state has jurisdiction over a party to an action, jurisdiction continues throughout subsequent proceedings that arise out of the original cause of action. Restatement (Second) of Conflicts, sec. 26 (1988); Anderson Middleton Lumber Co. v. Quinault Indian Nation, 79 Wn. App. 221, 226, 901 P.2d 1060 (1995). Once jurisdiction attaches, a party's change of residence does not defeat jurisdiction. See Anderson Middleton, 79 Wn. App. at 227, (citing Clarke v. Mathewson, 37 U.S. 164, 9 L. Ed. 1041 (1838)); In re Marriage of Rassier, 96 Cal. App. 4th 1431, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 113, 116 (2002). The California court, therefore, did not lose jurisdiction over the Goldsteins when the couple moved to Washington. The Goldsteins contend, however, that Revere submitted to the State of Washington's jurisdiction in 1995 when it attempted to collect the judgment in Washington by notifying them that PVNB's judgment had been assigned to Revere. In support of that contention, the Goldsteins cite RCW 4.28.185(1)(a), which indicates that a person may submit to the jurisdiction of Washington courts by transacting business in this state. But whether or not Washington had jurisdiction over Revere is not at issue in this case. RCW 4.28.185 also is not relevant because a person submits to Washington's jurisdiction by transacting business in this state only if the cause of action arises from the doing of business within the state, and Revere's action against the Goldsteins did not arise from Revere's doing business in this state.

Restatement (Second) of Conflicts, sec. 26 provides:

`If a state obtains judicial jurisdiction over a party to an action, the jurisdiction continues throughout all subsequent proceedings which arise out of the original cause of action. Reasonable notice and reasonable opportunity to be heard must be given the party at each new step in the proceeding.'

RCW 4.28.185(1)(a) provides as follows:

`Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who in person or through an agent does any of the acts in this section enumerated, thereby submits said person, and, if an individual, his personal representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to any cause of action arising from the doing of any of said acts:

`(a) The transaction of any business within this state[.]'

The Goldsteins also contend that former RCW 6.17.020 prevents Revere from executing its judgment against them, but that statute also is not relevant to this case. RCW 6.17.020 relates to limitations on the time for collecting both domestic and foreign judgments. But as the Goldsteins implicitly acknowledge in their reply brief, RCW 6.17.020 is relevant only if we agree that Washington courts had jurisdiction over Revere's collection efforts in 1995 after the Goldsteins moved to Washington. We have rejected that assertion, and therefore, the Goldsteins' arguments based upon former RCW 6.17.020 are not persuasive.

Revere's Use of a Stale Address Does Not Require The Judgment to be Vacated

In their opening brief, the Goldsteins argue that PVNB committed fraud by providing the California court with a stale address, which prevented them from learning that the court had entered a judgment against them and denied them the ability to file a timely appeal. They abandon that argument in their reply brief, however, acknowledging not only that they knew of the judgment, but that they in fact appealed the judgment.

Nevertheless, the Goldsteins assert that Revere should not be allowed to collect its judgment because Revere used the same stale address for the Goldsteins when it renewed the judgment in California. They claim that their address in Washington was a matter of public record after 1991 when they registered their vehicles, driver's licenses, and voter's registration here. The Goldsteins argue that Revere had an obligation to use due diligence to discover their new address in Washington. But none of the authorities that the Goldsteins cite supports their contention that a judgment may be vacated if a creditor fails to use due diligence to collect the judgment. In fact, RCW 6.17.020(1) and (3), which establish a ten-year statute of limitations for executing judgments and allow for extensions of the time for executing domestic and foreign judgments, suggest to the contrary. Nothing in those provisions indicates that collection of a judgment is contingent upon the creditor exercising due diligence to discover the debtors' new address, and we decline to so hold.

The relevant portions of RCW 6.17.020 state:

`(1) Except as provided in subsections (2), (3), and (4) of this section, the party in whose favor a judgment of a court has been or may be filed or rendered, or the assignee or the current holder thereof, may have an execution, garnishment, or other legal process issued for the collection or enforcement of the judgment at any time within ten years from entry of the judgment or the filing of the judgment in this state.

`. . . .
`(3) After June 9, 1994, a party in whose favor a judgment has been filed as a foreign judgment or rendered pursuant to subsection (1) or (4) of this section, or the assignee or the current holder thereof, may, within ninety days before the expiration of the original ten-year period, apply to the court that rendered the judgment or to the court where the judgment was filed as a foreign judgment for an order granting an additional ten years during which an execution, garnishment, or other legal process may be issued. . . .'

In addition to asking this court to vacate the judgment against them, the Goldsteins ask this court to require creditors of both foreign and domestic judgments in the future to certify the age of the debtor's last known address, to exert a good faith effort to find debtors by consulting public records, and to annually provide debtors with statements of the existing debts. This court, however, does not have the authority to write new laws.

Conclusion

The Goldsteins left California without paying the judgment they owed to Revere. The judgment did not expire before Revere filed it in Washington. The trial court, therefore, did not err when if refused to vacate the judgment. The decision of the trial court is affirmed.

COLEMAN, BECKER and KENNEDY, JJ.


Summaries of

Revere Financial Corporation v. Goldstein

The Court of Appeals of Washington, Division One
Nov 15, 2004
124 Wn. App. 1015 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004)
Case details for

Revere Financial Corporation v. Goldstein

Case Details

Full title:REVERE FINANCIAL CORPORATION, Respondent, v. MARK P. GOLDSTEIN, an…

Court:The Court of Appeals of Washington, Division One

Date published: Nov 15, 2004

Citations

124 Wn. App. 1015 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004)
124 Wash. App. 1015