Opinion
01 Civ. 3578 (RWS).
September 15, 2005
KAPLAN GILMAN, Attorneys for Plaintiff, Woodbridge, NJ, JEFFREY I. KAPLAN, ESQ., Of Counsel.
ARENT FOX, Attorney for Defendant, New York, NY, STEVEN KIMELMAN, ESQ., DAVID N. WYNN, ESQ., DANIEL C. SAVITT, ESQ., Of Counsel.
ARENT FOX, Attorney for Defendant, Washington, DC, JAMES H. HULME, ESQ., Of Counsel.
OPINION
Both the plaintiff ResQNet.com, Inc. ("ResQNet") and defendant Lansa, Inc. ("Lansa") have moved pursuant to Local Rule 6.3 for reconsideration of the opinion of this Court entered January 26, 2005 (the "January 26 Opinion"). For the reasons set forth below, both motions are denied.
Prior Proceedings
The procedural history of this patent infringement action was set forth in the January 26 Opinion, familiarity with which is assumed. The January 26 Opinion concluded that ResQNet had violated Rule 11, Fed.R.Civ.P., a conclusion that ResQNet now seeks to have reconsidered. The January 26 Opinion also denied Lansa's motion for summary judgment of non-infringement of the `608 and `075 patents and noted the failure of Lansa to provide certain of its exhibits as part of the court record. Lansa seeks now to submit the exhibits and reconsideration of its motion for summary judgment.
Various motions have been submitted in connection with surreply submissions and will be denied in view of the conclusions reached below. The motions for reconsideration were considered fully submitted on March 9, 2005. The ResQNet Motion Is Denied
Local Civil Rule 6.3 for the Southern District of New York provides that parties may file motions for reconsideration of the court's decisions, accompanied by a memorandum that sets forth "the matters or controlling decisions which counsel believes the court has overlooked." To be entitled to reconsideration, the movant must demonstrate that the court overlooked controlling decisions or factual matters that were put before it on the underlying motion. See Ameritrust Co. Nat'l Ass'n v. Dew, 151 F.R.D. 237, 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); East Coast Novelty Co. v. City of New York, 141 F.R.D. 245, 245 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
It is well established that a motion for reconsideration is not the proper avenue for the submission of new material. See Local Rule 6.3; First American Corp. v. Price Waterhouse LLP, No. M8-85 (RWS), 1999 WL 148460 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 1999). In a motion for reconsideration, a party may not "advance new facts, issues or arguments not previously presented to the Court."Morse/Diesel, Inc. v. Fidelity Deposit Co. of Md., 768 F. Supp. 115, 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). See Kara Holding Corp. v. Getty Petroleum Mktg., Inc., No. 99 CV. 0275 (RWS), 2005 WL 53266, *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2005) (citing In re Houbigant, Inc., 914 F. Supp. 997, 1001 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)). Indeed, new material should be stricken and disregarded. See Quartararo v. Catterson, 73 F. Supp. 2d 270, 273 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
Furthermore, Local Civil Rule 6.3 is "narrowly construed and strictly applied so as to avoid repetitive arguments on issues that have been considered fully by the Court." Davidson v. Scully, 172 F. Supp. 2d 458, 462 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). The policy underlying these principles is to ensure finality and to prevent losing parties from raising matters that already have been rejected. See Range Road Music, Inc. v. Music Sales Corp., 90 F. Supp. 2d 390, 392 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
ResQNet bases its motion for partial reconsideration in order to provide "further explanation" of the letter which was the basis of the action giving rise to the sanction. In connection with the motion giving rise to the January 26 Opinion, complete copies of the 2001 letters between counsel for ResQNet and counsel for Lansa were provided. The Court, therefore, did not overlook the September 2001 letter.
Now with a ruling against it, ResQNet has stated that its motion for partial reconsideration is to provide "further explanation" regarding its admissions of non-infringement. (See Pl. Memorandum of Law, Jan. 27, 2005, n. 1.) Such "further explanation" of the letter presenting a new or expanded argument does not warrant reconsideration. See Local Rule 6.3;Morse/Diesel, 768 F. Supp. at 116.
In addition, ResQNet presents on its motion for reconsideration a claim chart to attempt to show that it had some basis for asserting infringement of the '127 and '608 patents. The claim chart, attached as exhibit A to ResQNet's Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Partial Reconsideration, is new material for ResQNet's reargument and should not be considered. See Quartararo, 73 F. Supp. 2d at 273. ResQNet's motion for partial reconsideration is denied.
Moreover, ResQnet has cited no controlling decisions as having been overlooked.
The Lansa Motion Is Denied
Basically, Lansa seeks not reconsideration but reargument of its summary judgment motion on the grounds that the missing exhibits, which were not overlooked but rather not provided, have now been supplied. No authority is submitted to support such relief under Local Rule 6.3 and the authorities cited above.
Even if reargument rather than reconsideration would be appropriate, which it is not, the reargument would be unavailing. A factual dispute remains between the experts and the parties as to whether or not the Lansa process employs an algorithm to generate a screen ID.
Whether the issue is definitional or a matter of process, there can be no question but that it remains an issue for the trier of fact. Footnote 4 of Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Opposition has captured the dispute:
Lansa urges that the screen ID is the input to the recognition algorithm in the Lansa system rather than the output as in the patent. As Dr. Dowling thoroughly explained, this terminology difference created some confusion. Dr. Dowling further explained that the screen recognition algorithm executed by the Lansa system, after scanning the downloaded screen, results in a number that depends upon the cited field attributes. (See, e.g., excerpts above). The '075 patent in suit also states that a number associated with the screen must be stored in advance of execution of the recognition algorithm (Ex. B. to Savitt Affidavit of August 20, 2004, '075 patent, Col. 3, describing that the screen Tags and Ids are stored prior to the system identifying the downloaded screens). Thus, both the patent in issue and the Lansa system store information in advance, examine the downloaded screen to generate a number, and compare that generated number to the prestored information to determine if there is a match. Lansa may not escape the patent claim merely by calling its prestored number the screen ID, rather than the number later generated by its screen recognition algorithm.
(Pl. Memorandum of Law, March 1, 2005, n. 4)
Summary judgment remains inappropriate under these circumstances and its denial in the January 26 Opinion will not be reconsidered. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, both motions for reconsideration are denied.
It is so ordered.