Opinion
No. 05-07-00020-CV
Opinion Filed November 8, 2007.
On Appeal from the 134th District Court, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 06-07707-G.
Before Justices MORRIS, BRIDGES, and O'NEILL.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is a vexatious litigant case. Reeves, appearing pro se, asserts that the trial court erred when it dismissed his claims with prejudice after he failed to comply with the court's order declaring him a vexatious litigant. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Background.
Reeves is no stranger to litigation. Since March of 2005, Reeves, proceeding pro se, has filed at least 23 lawsuits in various district courts of Dallas County. He has not prevailed in a single case and at least ten have been decided against him. He has been barred from filing actions in forma pauperis in the Northern District of Texas without first obtaining leave from the court because of the frivolous nature of his lawsuits and his refusal to pay monetary sanctions imposed on him by the federal courts.
In the underlying suit, he sued the Texas Department of Insurance, Division of Worker's Compensation ("TDI") alleging discrimination and defamation. His case appears to be based on injuries he allegedly sustained when his doctor's appointment for a worker's compensation claim was canceled. TDI responded to Reeves' petition by filing a motion to declare Reeves a vexatious litigant. Following an evidentiary hearing, the court signed an order finding that Reeves was a vexatious litigant and requiring Reeves to furnish security in cash or in the form of an executed bond for $500.00 by December 1, 2006. When Reeves failed to furnish the required security, the court dismissed the case with prejudice. We construe Reeves' notice of appeal to complain that the trial court erred when it declared him a vexatious litigant.
Standard of Review.
We review the trial court's determination that Harris was a vexatious litigant under an abuse of discretion standard. Willms v. Americas Tire Co., Inc., 190 S.W.3d 796 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2006, pet. denied); Harris v. Rose, 204 S.W.3d 903, 906 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.); Nell Nations Forist v. Vanguard Underwriters Ins., Co., 141 S.W.3d 668, 670 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2004, no pet.). On an abuse of discretion challenge, we are not free to substitute our own judgment for the trial court's judgment. Bowie Memorial Hosp. v. Wright, 79 S.W.3d 48, 52 (Tex. 2002). We can only find an abuse of discretion if the trial court "acts in an arbitrary or capricious manner without reference to any guiding rules or principles." Bocquet v. Herring, 972 S.W.2d 19, 21 (Tex. 1998). The court's decision must be "so arbitrary and unreasonable as to amount to a clear and prejudicial error of law." BMC Software Belg. N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 801 (Tex. 2002). Applying these principles, we must determine whether the trial court's application of the vexatious litigant statute constitutes an abuse of discretion.
The Vexatious Litigant Statute.
Texas jurisprudence provides a mechanism for the restriction of frivolous and vexatious litigation. Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code Ann. § 11.051 et seq. (Vernon 2002). When Chapter 11 was enacted, the legislature was seeking to "strike a balance between Texans' rights to access their own courts and the public interest in protecting defendants from those who abuse our civil justice system." Leonard v. Abbott, 171 S.W.3d 451, 455 (Tex.App.-Austin 2005, pet. denied); Harris, 203 S.W.3d at 906; Willms, 190 S.W.3d at 804. This chapter provides, in pertinent part, a court may find that a plaintiff is a vexatious litigant if (1) the defendant shows that there is a reasonable probability that the plaintiff will not prevail in the litigation, and plaintiff, acting pro se, has prosecuted, maintained, or commenced at least five other litigations that have been determined adversely to him within the seven year period preceding the motion, or (2) the plaintiff has previously been declared to be a vexatious litigant by a state or federal court in an action or proceeding based on the same or substantially similar facts. Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code Ann. §§ 11.054 (1) (3) (Vernon 2002).
Based upon our review of the record, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion when it found that Reeves was a vexatious litigant. He was not likely to prevail in the underlying litigation. Reeves' original petition asserts generic claims in discrimination and defamation. As a governmental agency, TDI cannot be sued for intentional torts, such as defamation. Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code Ann. § 101.057(2) (Vernon 2005). Reeves' claim for discrimination is likely to fail because his original petition does not allege any act of discrimination by TDI or any legal basis for the assertion of a discrimination claim against the state agency. Finding no abuse of discretion, we resolve Reeves' issue against him. Although not raised in his notice of appeal, Reeves' brief also appears to argue that the trial court misapplied the law and disregarded the evidence. To the extent that Reeves is attempting to raise legal and factual sufficiency issues or any other issues, we conclude that the issues are inadequately briefed, and are therefore waived. See TEX R.APP. P. 38.1; Harris, 204 S.W.3d at 906; G.R.A.V.I.T.Y. Enters., Inc. v. Reece Supply Co., 177 S.W.3d 537, 544 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2005, no pet.).
Conclusion
Having resolved appellant's issue against him, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.