Opinion
Civil Action No. 2156-S
Date Submitted: May 28, 2002
Date Decided: June 21, 2002
Thomas Stephen Neuberger, of THOMAS S. NEUBERGER, P.A., Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for Plaintiff.
Gregg E. Wilson and Stephani J. Ballard, of THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorneys for Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Robert Reed is the Sheriff of Sussex County. He seeks declaratory and injunctive relief in this suit against M. Jane Brady, Attorney General of the State of Delaware, and James L. Ford, Jr., Secretary of Delaware's Department of Public Safety, who are both sued solely in their official capacities. The ultimate issue in this case is what powers, if any, are conferred on Sheriff Reed by Article XV, Section 1 of the Delaware Constitution of 1897. This opinion, however, addresses only the defendants' motion to dismiss under Court of Chancery Rules 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. The defendants contend that this Court lacks jurisdiction because the plaintiff's claims either present no justiciable case or controversy or can be remedied adequately at law. For the reasons stated below, I agree with the defendants and accordingly grant their motion to dismiss.
Article XV, Section 1 provides: "The Chancellor, Judges and Attorney-General shall be conservators of the peace throughout the State; and the Sheriffs shall be conservators of the peace within the counties respectively in which they reside."
I. FACTS
As with any Rule 12 motion to dismiss, the facts are taken from the allegations found in the complaint, which are assumed to be true.
The plaintiff was elected Sheriff of Sussex County in 1998. Accordingly, under Article XV, Section 1 of Delaware's Constitution, he is a "conservator of the peace" in Sussex County. This status, he contends, gives him the "authority, right and power to suppress all acts of violence and enforce all laws relating to the safety of persons and property within Sussex County." Sheriff Reed contends that the defendants have unconstitutionally limited his ability to exercise this authority.
In order to be a more effective conservator of the peace, the plaintiff has attempted to obtain permission from the Department of Public Safety to have emergency equipment, such as flashing lights, installed on his vehicles. He claims that this will increase public safety by protecting motorists at accident scenes, for example, or by allowing the Sheriff and his deputies to drive faster when necessary. The plaintiff has also attempted to have his deputies professionally trained by the Delaware State Police. In his view, this would allow him to provide better service to Sussex County and its citizens. He contends that some aspects of his and his deputies' jobs, including replevins and service of process, subpoenas, and court orders, can be dangerous, and that police training for sheriff deputies would ensure the safety of those deputies. These two issues — emergency lights and police training — are at the heart of this case.
Starting in 1995, sheriff's vehicles in Sussex County had emergency police equipment. Then, in 1999, Sussex County officials asked the Attorney General whether the emergency equipment was appropriate. She responded, in a December 27, 1999 letter to State Representative Benjamin Ewing, that the Sheriff did not have the authority to have emergency lights on his vehicles because he did not have the statutory authority to enforce the laws of the state.
Sheriff Reed took issue with this opinion for several reasons. He contends that it conflicted with an earlier opinion issued by the Attorney General's office in 1995. The 1999 opinion did not mention the 1995 opinion, allegedly because the Attorney General was acting in bad faith steaming from her desire to eliminate the office of Sheriff. As a result, the plaintiff contends, the 1999 opinion that he did not have the right to emergency lights was "slanted and biased."
In 1995, Deputy Attorney General Lawrence Lewis drafted an opinion, approved by State Solicitor Michael Rich, that said that in the absence of statutory law, Sheriffs retained some of their original common law powers, such as the transportation of prisoners.
The complaint alleges, briefly, that Brady acted in bad faith. Two specific allegations are made. First, in late summer of 1999, Reed and Brady both attended a meeting, and at the end of that meeting Brady told Sheriff Reed that he was "not law enforcement." Second, in March, 2001, Sheriff Reed's Chief Deputy, Lt. Jeff Christopher, attended a parole hearing in Dover at which Brady was also present. Reed contends that Brady told Christopher that, in her role as a member of the Council on Police Training, she would not permit Sussex County sheriff deputies to receive police training. She also allegedly said she would do everything in her power to abolish the office of Sheriff.
Several months later, on August 11, 2000, the plaintiff wrote to Brian Bushweller, Ford's predecessor as Secretary of Public Safety, requesting that Sussex County sheriff vehicles be "granted emergency vehicle status." The Department of Public Safety can, in its discretion, authorize the use of emergency lights on certain vehicles. A subsequent letter to Bushweller on August 16 noted that sheriff's vehicles in Sussex County had had emergency lights since 1995 and explained the public safety rationale for the lights. Bushweller apparently denied the plaintiff's request, because on October 3 he advised the Sussex County Administrator that the registrations on the sheriff's vehicles would be suspended on October 15 if the emergency equipment was not removed. The October 15 deadline passed without the removal of the equipment, and on October 20 the State of Delaware, on Bushweller's authority, suspended the registrations of several of the Sheriff's vehicles. Around the same time, on October 16, 2000, the Attorney General's office issued another opinion to Secretary Bushweller stating that the Sheriff was not a police officer and that vehicles operated by the Sheriff were not police vehicles. By November 2, the emergency equipment was removed from at least two of the Sheriff's vehicles.
Finally, in January, 2001, in connection with a proposal to make the Sheriff's office a full service law enforcement agency, the plaintiff requested that his deputies be allowed to attend the police academy. This request was denied by Captain Mergenthaler of the Delaware State Police. According to the amended complaint, this request was denied because deputy sheriff's are not within the jurisdiction of the Council on Police Training.
The plaintiff has now sued Attorney General Brady and Secretary Ford to vindicate his rights as a conservator of the peace. He seeks the following relief: (1) a declaration of the rights of the parties hereto; (2) injunctions to prevent the defendants and their agents from interfering with (a) the exercise of the plaintiff's powers to suppress all acts of violence and to enforce all laws relating to the safety of persons and property in Sussex County, (b) the display of emergency lights on his vehicles, and (c) enrollment of his deputies in the police academy; (d) further injunctive relief requiring Brady to "withdraw her two Opinions which are in conflict with her 1995 Opinion . . . and in any future Opinions to address the common law and Constitutional powers of the Sheriff;" (3) costs and fees; and (4) any other further relief that is proper. The defendants have moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Sheriff Reed's Request for Declaratory Relief
The basis for the plaintiff's request for declaratory relief is that the Attorney General has, allegedly in bad faith, refused to consider all of the various sources of law relating to the police powers of the Sheriff in her recent opinions. These opinions, which have been followed by Secretary Ford's predecessor, among others, and which allegedly reflect the Attorney General's personal bias against Sheriff Reed and his office, do not discuss certain legal arguments and precedent cited by the plaintiff. Consequently, Sheriff Reed asks this Court to determine his rights under Delaware's Constitution, statutes, and common law. The defendants have moved to dismiss under Court of Chancery Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Instead, the opinions simply answer the questions presented to the Attorney General by interpreting the relevant statutes. Reed offers a different statutory interpretation, with which the Attorney General is, of course, free to disagree, and he cites precedent not contained in the Attorney General's opinions. Specifically, he cites the 1995 opinion, which he says contradicts the later opinions, and he cites cases from Pennsylvania and Maryland.
I agree with the defendants that I cannot provide declaratory relief in this setting. The Court of Chancery lacks jurisdiction to determine "any matter wherein sufficient remedy may be had by common law, or statute, before any other court or jurisdiction of this State." In this case, Sheriff Reed is simply asking for an interpretation of Delaware law. He is neither seeking to vindicate an equitable right nor, in this context, pursuing an equitable remedy. Declaratory relief of the type sought here could certainly be obtained, if at all, in the Superior Court. Accordingly, because there is an adequate remedy at law, I cannot hear this portion of the case. This claim will be transferred to the Superior Court as provided in § 10 Del. C. § 1902 of Title 10.
Issues of statutory and constitutional interpretation are, beyond question, legal issues capable of resolution by the Superior Court, and declaratory relief is available there to the same extent as it is here. 10 Del. C. § 6501.
It is not entirely clear from the briefs whether the defendants moved to dismiss this portion of the complaint because there was an adequate remedy at law or because there was no justiciable case or controversy. I need not address this issue, however, because questions of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised sua sponte by the Court. Ct. Ch. R. 12(h)(3) ("Whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the Court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the Court shall dismiss the action."); see also IBM Corp. v. Comdisco, Inc., 602 A.2d 74, 77 n. 5 (Del.Ch. 1991) ("[J]udges in the Delaware Court of Chancery are obligated to decide whether a matter comes within the equitable jurisdiction of this Court regardless of whether the issue has been raised by the parties."). I also need not address this Court's so-called "clean-up" jurisdiction because no justiciable equitable claims remain after this opinion.
B. Sheriff Reed's Requests for Injunctive Relief
1. Interference with the Exercise of Sheriff Reed's Powers
The plaintiff, in his first request for injunctive relief, asks this Court to enjoin the defendants and their agents from interfering with the exercise of his powers to suppress all acts of violence and to enforce all laws relating to the safety of persons and property within Sussex County. Such an injunction would essentially effectuate any declaratory judgment establishing the rights of the parties. The defendants have again moved under Rule 12(b)(1) to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Once again, I agree with the defendants.
A litigant cannot gain access to the Court of Chancery simply by adding a claim for equitable relief to an otherwise legal claim. To allow such a result would be to render § 342 ineffective as a limitation on this Court's jurisdiction, because virtually all plaintiffs could simply add a request for prospective injunctive relief to their complaints. That is why well-settled law instructs me to look behind the "facade of prayers" to determine whether the relief sought is legal or equitable. Here, Sheriff Reed is not seeking to vindicate a right that is inherently equitable. Instead, he is seeking an equitable remedy for a claim that must be examined to determine its essential nature. An important factor in this determination, of course, is the adequacy of the available legal remedy.
Strickler v. Sussex Life Care Assocs., 541 A.2d 587, 589 (Del.Super.Ct. 1987).
Comdisco, 602 A.2d at 78.
Sheriff Reed's first claim for injunctive relief begs an important question by presupposing the outcome of the claim for declaratory relief. That claim seeks a declaration of the rights and powers of the Sheriff. This claim asks for an injunction to protect those rights and powers. Such relief would only be proper, if at all, after the extent of Sheriff Reed's Constitutional authority had been determined. Until then, an in protecting that authority would be meaningless.
As discussed above, the determination of the rights and powers of the Sheriff is a legal one rather than an equitable one, and can be made by the Superior Court. After the respective rights of the parties are determined in Superior Court, an equitable remedy will no longer be necessary. Declaratory judgments are self-executing and "have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree." Nothing in the complaint alleges or suggests that the defendants would take any actions to interfere with the plaintiff's rights after those rights are established by a court of competent jurisdiction. Accordingly, there is no claim requiring the exercise of this Court's equitable powers.
See Reese v. Hartnett, 74 A.2d 68, 69 (Del.Super.Ct. 1950).
10 Del. C. § 6501.
Cf. McMahon v. New Castle Assocs., 532 A.2d 601, 605-06 (Del.Ch. 1987) (refusing to allow a plaintiff to convert a claim for money damages into an equitable claim by seeking prospective injunctive relief in the absence of alleged facts creating a "reasonable apprehension of future wrong").
I must conclude that this claim is nothing more than a legal claim dressed in equitable clothing. It would be impossible to grant the desired equitable relief before resolving the plaintiff's legal claims, and the resolution of those legal claims would moot the claim for equitable relief. In such circumstances it cannot be said that the underlying claim is equitable in nature. The plaintiff's first request for injunctive relief, therefore, is dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
2. The Display of Emergency Lights
The plaintiff's second request for injunctive relief asks this Court to enjoin the defendants and their agents from interfering with his right to display emergency lights on his vehicles. It is unclear whether the plaintiff's argument is that the statute vesting the Secretary of the Department of Public Safety with discretion to deny the Sheriff's request abridges the Sheriff's constitutional powers and is therefore unconstitutional as applied to him, or that Secretary Ford's predecessor either abused his discretion or simply resolved the issue incorrectly when he denied Sheriff Reed the right to install emergency lights on his vehicles. In either case, the defendants have moved to dismiss because there is an adequate remedy at law.
The determination at issue was made under § 29 Del. C. § 4106 of Title 29 of the Delaware Code. That section defines the term "authorized emergency vehicles" to include "emergency vehicles of state, federal, county or municipal departments or public service corporations as are designated or authorized by the Secretary" of the Department of Public Safety. The plaintiff sought the authorization of the Secretary, and the attendant emergency vehicle status, because Delaware motor vehicle law prohibits the use of flashing lights except on, among other things, authorized emergency vehicles. The plaintiff's request was denied by former Secretary Bushweller in late 2000.
Id., § 4353(c).
To the extent that the plaintiff's argument is that he needs injunctive relief to protect his constitutional and common law powers, or that Secretary Ford must allow the plaintiff to install emergency lights on his vehicles because the Sheriff is a conservator of the peace, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. These, too, are legal claims about the interpretation of constitutional and statutory provisions, and adequate relief for these claims is available in the Superior Court.
To the extent, however, that the plaintiff is challenging the Secretary's determination, limited review by this Court may be available. Review of this type of determination is often governed by the Administrative Procedure Act, but by its terms the APA does not apply to the Department of Public Safety. The defendants contend that the Sheriff has, or had, an adequate remedy at law in the form of writs of certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition in the Superior Court. The plaintiff claims, to the contrary, that these writs are all inappropriate for various reasons, and I agree. Because no other relief appears to be available, I conclude that I can review this decision for an abuse of discretion. Such limited review could give rise, after trial, to the injunctive relief sought by the plaintiff if I were to conclude that Secretary Bushweller acted arbitrarily or capriciously in denying the plaintiff's request for emergency vehicle status.
See Holland v. Zarif, 794 A.2d 1254, 1269 n. 38 (Del.Ch. 2002) (discussing the limitations of review by writs of mandamus and certiorari).
Id. at 1269-70.
Ultimately, however, this request for injunctive relief as with the plaintiff's first request for injunctive relief, is secondary to his request for statutory interpretation. Secretary Bushweller was informed in his exercise of discretion by an opinion from the Attorney General. The plaintiff has challenged the validity of that opinion. Once the Superior Court rules on the legal issues, the jurisprudential landscape will change, an unclear area of law will almost certainly become clearer, and the relationship between the parties will change. Secretary Ford will have binding legal precedent to follow in the event that Sheriff Reed renews his petition for emergency vehicle status. In these circumstances, a ruling now from the Court of Chancery would be premature and advisory in nature. I therefore dismiss this claim, without prejudice, to allow Secretary Ford the first opportunity to exercise his authority in light of the Superior Court decision.
3. Enrollment of Deputies in the Police Academy
The plaintiff's third request for injunctive relief asks this Court to enjoin the defendants and their agents from preventing the Sheriff's deputies from enrolling in the police academy. It is not immediately clear what role, if any, the defendants have played in this denial, although the plaintiff has alleged that the Attorney General said she would use her position on the Council on Police Training to ensure that the Sheriff's deputies would not be enrolled in the police academy. The defendants have moved to dismiss this claim under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.
Again, I agree with the defendants. Police training in Delaware is regulated by statute and overseen by the Council on Police Training, of which the Attorney General is a member, and by the Delaware State Police Training Division. The authority and duties of those agencies are set forth in Chapter 84 of Title 11 of the Delaware Code. Chapter 84, by its own terms, expressly excludes any "sheriff regular deputy sheriff or constable" from the definition of the term "police officer" for purposes of the chapter on police training. Any actions taken by the defendants to exclude the Sheriff and his deputies from the statutory police training program were therefore well within their statutory authority. On the other hand, to the extent that the plaintiff is challenging the statutory scheme vesting the defendants with such authority, his claim is once again a legal one that can be resolved by the Superior Court. Accordingly, I also dismiss this portion of the complaint.
4. The Attorney General's Opinions
Finally, the plaintiff asks this Court to require the Attorney General to revoke two of her opinions and to address, in any future legal opinions, the common law and Constitutional powers of the Sheriff. Putting to one side the separation of powers issues raised by this request, the defendants have moved to dismiss all claims against Brady because there is no justiciable case or controversy involving the Attorney General. I conclude, instead, that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law.
The plaintiff's amended complaint alleges that the Attorney General issued two opinions with which the plaintiff disagreed and which he contends contradicted an earlier Attorney General's opinion, and that she did so in bad faith. Because the Attorney General has absolute immunity from any civil liability for actions taken in her official capacity, the only remedy that the plaintiff can hope for, again putting separation of powers issues to one side and assuming the existence of a justiciable claim, is a declaration from a court that her opinions were incorrect.
It would not be sufficient simply to accept the allegations that the Attorney General acted in bad faith. Before relief could be granted, the plaintiff would also have to establish that her opinions were incorrect, because otherwise he would have suffered no injury and he would have no standing.
In this case, however, such an opinion will likely be unnecessary. The opinions of the Attorney General do not have the force of law, and once the Superior Court rules in this case her opinions will be superseded. There will be no reason for her to withdraw her old opinions. There will also be no reason for her to issue any new opinions about the respective rights of the parties because those rights will be established clearly by the Superior Court. Moreover, no allegations before me create a "reasonable apprehension of future wrong" requiring any declaratory relief to be supplemented by injunctive relief. Because the plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under § 342. This claim is therefore dismissed.
Sullivan v. Local Union 1726, 464 A.2d 899, 901 n. 3 (Del. 1983) ("[A]n opinion of the Attorney General is advisory and not binding on those to whom it is given."); see also 29 Del. C. § 2504 (2) (empowering the Attorney General to provide legal advice and counsel but not to make binding pronouncements of law).
McMahon v. New Castle Assocs., 532 A.2d 601, 606 (Del.Ch. 1987).
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, I conclude that the amended complaint must be dismissed in part and transferred to the Superior Court in part, as described above. An Order has been entered that implements this decision.
ORDER
For the reasons assigned in this Court's Memorandum Opinion entered in this case on this date, it is
ORDERED:
(1) Plaintiff's request for declaratory relief shall be transferred to the Superior Court, pursuant to 10 Del. C. § 1902, within 30 days from the date of this Order; and
(2) Plaintiff's request for injunctive relief concerning the exercise of his powers as a conservator of the peace is dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; and
(3) Plaintiff's request for injunctive relief regarding display of emergency lights is dismissed without prejudice because this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction or, in the alternative, because such claim is premature and/or seeks relief that, at the present time, would be advisory in nature; and
(4) Plaintiff's request for injunctive relief regarding enrollment of deputies in the State Police Academy is dismissed either because this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction or because the request fails to state a claim for relief under Rule 12(b)(6); and
(5) Plaintiff's request for an Order directing the Attorney General to rescind earlier Attorney General opinions and to issue future Attorney General opinions that comport with plaintiff's understanding of constitutional and statutory law is dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.