Opinion
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
CHARLES F. EICK, Magistrate Judge.
PROCEEDINGS
Petitioner filed a "Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus By a Person in State Custody" on November 30, 2012, accompanied by a supporting memorandum ("Pet. Mem.") and exhibits ("Pet. Ex."). On March 12, 2013, Petitioner filed a "Notice of Petition and Petition for Writ of Supercedeas [sic], etc., " seeking a stay of the orders and proceedings in the Los Angeles County Superior Court in Petitioner's pending juvenile court case.
On March 14, 2013, Respondent filed a "Motion to Dismiss Habeas Corpus Petition" ("Motion to Dismiss"), contending that the Court should dismiss the Petition as unexhausted and should abstain from adjudicating the petition pursuant to Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
On April 2, 2013, the Court issued an "Order Denying Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Supersedeas."
On April 15, 2013, Petitioner filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, inter alia seeking a stay of the Petition in the event the Court determined that the Petition contains unexhausted claims.
On April 25, 2013, Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court's "Order Denying Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Supersedeas." On May 8, 2013, the Court denied this motion for reconsideration.
On June 17, 2013, Respondent filed a "Reply to Respondent's Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Habeas Corpus Petition."
On August 6, 2013, the Court issued an "Order re Issues of Stay and Exhaustion, " deeming Grounds Two, Three and Five of the Petition to be unexhausted, denying Petitioner's request for a stay, and affording Petitioner the opportunity to dismiss the entire action without prejudice or to dismiss Petitioner's unexhausted claims without prejudice and proceed only on the merits of the exhausted claims. On August 26, 2013, Petitioner filed "Petitioner's Notice of Voluntary Dismissal of Unexhausted Claims Without Prejudice." The Court then issued a Minute Order deeming Petitioner's unexhausted claims to be dismissed without prejudice and ordering Respondent to file an Answer addressing the merits of Petitioner's remaining claims. See Minute Order, filed August 26, 2013.
In light of the dismissal of Petitioner's unexhausted claims, the Court need not and does not address any subsequent arguments made by either party regarding the merits of those dismissed claims.
On September 25, 2013, Respondent filed an Answer. On October 7, 2013, Petitioner filed "Petitioner's Notice of Motion and Motion to Strike Portions of the Government's Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Or, in the Alternative, for Reconsideration of the Court's Order Requiring Exhaustion of the Fifth Amendment Privilege Issues, etc." ("Motion to Strike"). On October 10, 2013, Petitioner filed a Traverse.
On October 18, 2013, Respondent filed an "Application for Lodging of Reporter's Transcript of Juvenile Court Proceedings of June 8, 2010 Under Seal" ("Application for Lodging Under Seal") and lodged with the Court a certified copy of the Reporter's Transcript in Petitioner's juvenile case ("R.T."). On October 22, 2013, Petitioner filed "Petitioner's Opposition to Motion to Lodge Trial Transcript; Request to Expand Record" ("Opposition to Application for Lodging Under Seal").
BACKGROUND
On June 8, 2010, a juvenile court judge declared Petitioner to be a ward of the court based on a finding that Petitioner committed an assault with a deadly weapon (Petition, p. 2; Pet. Mem., pp. 1-2; R.T. 108, 111). The court placed Petitioner on one year of home probation (Petition, p. 2; Pet. Mem., p. 2; R.T. 111-12). The California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment (Petition, p. 2; "Reply to Respondent's Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Habeas Corpus Petition, " filed June 17, 2013, second exhibit; see In re Morgan R., 2011 WL 4375608 (Cal.App. Sept. 21, 2011). The California Supreme Court denied Petitioner's petition for review summarily on November 30, 2011 (Petition, p. 2; "Reply to Respondent's Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Habeas Corpus Petition, " filed June 17, 2013, fourth exhibit).
Petitioner filed a habeas corpus petition in the Los Angeles County Superior Court on June 12, 2012, which apparently remains pending (see Petition, pp. 3-4; Pet. Ex. A).
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The following summary is taken from the opinion of the California Court of Appeal in In re Morgan R., 2011 WL 4375608 (Cal.App. Sept. 21, 2011). See Slovik v. Yates, 556 F.3d 747, 749 n.1 (9th Cir. 2009) (taking factual summary from state appellate decision).
Jeremy Bunch threw parties on two consecutive weekends while his parents were away. During the first weekend party, a fight had broken out. Morgan R. [Petitioner], who went to school with Bunch, was one of the people who caused trouble at the first party. At school the following week, Morgan R. threatened Bunch and gave him "hard looks."
At the second party, Bunch learned that some of the attendees were "affiliated" with the people who had been there the weekend before. He told them to leave the house, but they refused. Bunch picked up a shovel from the back of his truck and again instructed them to leave; they finally departed.
About 30 minutes later, Bunch was outside the house, in the alley near his truck, kissing a girl. He heard people rushing up behind him. When he turned, he saw Morgan R. lunge at him, swinging the shovel over his shoulder at Bunch's face. Bunch was hit in the face and lost consciousness.
Police responded to a call about the disturbance. On the way, an officer saw two male juveniles running in a direction away from the house. Based on the fact that they seemed to be running out of breath and the fact that the police had been called about a juvenile disturbance, he stopped the young men, one of whom was Morgan R. Morgan R. had bloody, scratched knuckles.
Bunch identified Morgan R. as his assailant to the police that evening. He could not identify the others who rushed him. At school, after the second party, Morgan R. admitted that he "probably hit" Bunch with a shovel.
Morgan R. was the subject of a section 602 petition alleging that he had assaulted Bunch with a deadly weapon, a shovel. A second count in the petition, relating to possession of false identification, was later dismissed.
[California Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 governs juvenile court proceedings whereby a minor adjudged to have committed a crime may be made a ward of the court.]
At the adjudication hearing, Bunch acknowledged that there was marijuana in his house and that he had two or three beers before the incident. He denied being drunk. Minor's counsel asked, "Had you been smoking any marijuana?" and the court intervened on Fifth Amendment grounds. The court told defense counsel, "Listen, you've established that there appears to be marijuana in the house. There was a party going on. There was beer there. He had been drinking. [¶] You can draw whatever reasonable inferences you want to, and it's the same thing, you know. Go ahead." Counsel objected on constitutional grounds, and the court responded, "You can draw a reasonable inference. I'm not dumb. I can put 2 and 2 together. You don't have to beat it down with a stick. Move on."
Defense counsel then asked Bunch, "[D]o you have a clear memory of everything that happened on the night of April 3rd, over a year ago?" Bunch responded, "Yes." Counsel asked, "Even though you're saying you had consumed alcohol on that night?" and Bunch again responded, "Yes."
One of the officers who responded to the incident at Bunch's house described Bunch as "dazed and confused" when he arrived on scene. Bunch was initially "disoriented" and so "incoherent" that police could not take a statement from him.
At the close of evidence, the juvenile court stated that it believed that Bunch was not "the greatest witness in the world." "And, you know, " the court continued, addressing defense counsel, "the point that you tried to make before, as far as I'm concerned, you made it. There's no doubt in my mind this was an underage party. There was underage drinking. And I believe that Mr. Bunch probably was smoking marijuana and drinking beer, or whatever. So I believe that. [¶] But over[]all, you know, I looked at him very carefully when he testified[, ] as I do all the witnesses. And I believe what he said, what he testified to, was true. So Count 1 is sustained." The court sustained the petition's assault with a deadly weapon allegation, declared Morgan R. a ward of the court under section 602, and placed him in the home of his parents on probation....
("Reply to Respondent's Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Habeas Corpus Petition, " filed June 17, 2013, second exhibit, pp. 2-4; People v. Morgan R., 2011 WL 4375608, at *1-2) (footnote added).
PETITIONER'S CONTENTIONS
Petitioner contends:
1. The trial court allegedly violated Petitioner's Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses and Due Process by preventing defense counsel from cross-examining Bunch concerning the source and effect of Bunch's alleged intoxication (Petition, Ground One; Pet. Mem., "Ground 1"); and
2. The trial court's restriction on defense counsel's cross-examination of Bunch concerning the nature and source of Bunch's alleged intoxication assertedly was not harmless (Petition, Ground Four; Pet. Mem., "Ground Five").
The numbering of the Grounds asserted in Petitioner's Memorandum in support of the Petition does not entirely correspond to the numbering of the Grounds in the Petition itself. In any event, the Ground described in numbered paragraph (2) above is not a ground for relief separate from Ground One, but simply an allegation that the alleged error identified in Ground One purportedly was not harmless.
PETITIONER'S MOTION TO STRIKE
In the Motion to Strike, Petitioner apparently seeks to strike portions of the Answer allegedly discussing the claim that the trial court purportedly violated the Fifth Amendment by limiting the cross-examination of Bunch. The Court previously determined that Petitioner had not exhausted his Fifth Amendment claim, and Petitioner voluntarily dismissed this claim. Because the Fifth Amendment claim has been dismissed, the Motion to Strike should be denied as moot. See footnote 1, supra.
To the extent that the Motion to Strike requests reconsideration of the Court's "Order re Issues of Stay and Exhaustion, " any such request should be denied. See Local Rule 7-18.
RESPONDENT'S APPLICATION FOR LODGING UNDER SEAL
Petitioner opposes Respondent's Application for Lodging Under Seal on the ground that "the entire state court file, and not merely the trial transcript, is relevant to the Court's determination of the instant Petition" (Opposition to Application for Lodging Under Seal, p. 1). Specifically, Petitioner seeks to "expand the record" to include the declarations of Petitioner and four other alleged witnesses (see id., p. 6).
The declarations to which Petitioner refers were submitted as exhibits to Petitioner's pending Superior Court habeas petition, filed on June 12, 2012, in support of the claims in that petition of alleged ineffective assistance of counsel and alleged prosecutorial misconduct (see Pet. Exs. A, A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, A-5). Four of the declarations bear dates of execution between April 7, 2012, and June 4, 2012 (see Pet. Exs. A-1, A-2, A-3, A-5). The copy of the fifth declaration, that of Petitioner's father Samuel Reese, appears incomplete and does not bear a signature page (see Pet Ex. A-4). However, the body of Samuel Reece's declaration refers to a communication Samuel Reece assertedly made to Petitioner's counsel in May of 2012 (see Pet. Ex. A-4, ¶ 7). Thus, Samuel Reese's declaration could not have been executed prior to May of 2012. Accordingly, it is evident that these declarations were executed well after the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner's habeas corpus petition on November 30, 2011, and hence could not have been before either the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeal.
This Court may not consider these declarations, or any other evidence that Petitioner did not present to the Court of Appeal or the California Supreme Court, the courts which ruled on the merits of the claims raised in the instant Petition. Federal habeas review under section 2254(d)(1) "is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits." Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011).
Additionally, to the extent Petitioner seeks expansion of the record to include other documents or evidence in the "entire state court file, " Petitioner has neither identified these documents nor shown their relevance to the issues raised in the Petition.
Finally, and in any event, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the aforementioned declarations or the unidentified contents of the "state court file" would materially affect this Court's analysis of the habeas claims adjudicated herein.
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner's request to expand the record should be denied. Contemporaneously herewith, the Magistrate Judge has issued a Minute Order granting Respondent's Application for Lodging Under Seal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under the "Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996" ("AEDPA"), a federal court may not grant an application for writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in state custody with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim: (1) "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States"; or (2) "resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24-26 (2002); Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-09 (2000).
"Clearly established Federal law" refers to the governing legal principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision on the merits. Greene v. Fisher, 132 S.Ct. 38, 44 (2011); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71-72 (2003). A state court's decision is "contrary to" clearly established Federal law if: (1) it applies a rule that contradicts governing Supreme Court law; or (2) it "confronts a set of facts... materially indistinguishable" from a decision of the Supreme Court but reaches a different result. See Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. at 8 (citation omitted); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 405-06.
Under the "unreasonable application prong" of section 2254(d)(1), a federal court may grant habeas relief "based on the application of a governing legal principle to a set of facts different from those of the case in which the principle was announced." Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. at 76 (citation omitted); see also Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. at 24-26 (state court decision "involves an unreasonable application" of clearly established federal law if it identifies the correct governing Supreme Court law but unreasonably applies the law to the facts). A state court's decision "involves an unreasonable application of [Supreme Court] precedent if the state court either unreasonably extends a legal principle from [Supreme Court] precedent to a new context where it should not apply, or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 407 (citation omitted).
"In order for a federal court to find a state court's application of [Supreme Court] precedent unreasonable, ' the state court's decision must have been more than incorrect or erroneous." Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520 (2003) (citation omitted). "The state court's application must have been objectively unreasonable.'" Id. at 520-21 (citation omitted); see also Waddington v. Sarausad, 555 U.S. 179, 190 (2009); Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 637-38 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. dism'd, 545 U.S. 1165 (2005). "Under § 2254(d), a habeas court must determine what arguments or theories supported, ... or could have supported, the state court's decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of this Court." Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770, 786 (2011). This is "the only question that matters under § 2254(d)(1)." Id . (citation and internal quotations omitted). Habeas relief may not issue unless "there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court's decision conflicts with [the United States Supreme Court's] precedents." Id. at 786-87 ("As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.").
In applying these standards, the Court looks to the last reasoned state court decision, here the decision of the California Court of Appeal. See Delgadillo v. Woodford, 527 F.3d 919, 925 (9th Cir. 2008).
Additionally, federal habeas corpus relief may be granted "only on the ground that [Petitioner] is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). In conducting habeas review, a court may determine the issue of whether the petition satisfies section 2254(a) prior to, or in lieu of, applying the standard of review set forth in section 2254(d). Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 724, 736-37 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
DISCUSSION
Petitioner contends the trial court improperly limited defense counsel's cross-examination of Bunch concerning Bunch's alleged marijuana use on the evening of the incident. According to Petitioner, had Bunch testified that he used marijuana that evening, that testimony would have discredited Bunch's identification of Petitioner as the assailant. The Court of Appeal ruled that, because the trial court inferred that Bunch had used marijuana, and because the trial court received other evidence of Bunch's condition and mental state, any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under the standard set forth in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) ("Chapman") ("Reply to Respondent's Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Habeas Corpus Petition, " filed June 17, 2013, second exhibit, pp. 4-5 see In re Morgan R., 2011 WL 4375608, at *2). For the reasons discussed below, the Court of Appeal's ruling was not "unreasonable" within the meaning of the AEDPA standard of review and, moreover, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate the existence of any harmful error of federal constitutional law.
In deeming any error harmless, the Court of Appeal cited People v. Cage, 40 Cal.4th 965, 991-92, 56 Cal.Rptr.3d 789, 155 P.3d 205 (2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1023 (2007) (applying Chapman harmless error to Confrontation Clause error).
In limited circumstances, the exclusion of crucial evidence may violate the Constitution. See Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 324 (2006) ("Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, or in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation Clauses of the Sixth Amendment, the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.") (citations and internal quotations omitted); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973); Ortiz v. Yates, 704 F.3d 1026, 1035 (9th Cir. 2012) (arbitrary or disproportionate restriction on a defendant's ability to cross-examine adverse witnesses as to the biases or motives for testifying can violate the Sixth Amendment). A Confrontation Clause violation occurs when the defendant is "prohibited from engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed to show a prototypical form of bias on the part of the witness, and thereby to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness." Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 680 (1986) (citation and internal quotations omitted). A violation occurs when a reasonable trier of fact "might have received a significantly different impression" of a witness' credibility if the court had not limited the cross-examination. See id. at 680; Slovik v. Yates, 556 F.3d 747, 753 (9th Cir. 2009). Confrontation Clause errors are subject to harmless error analysis. See Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1021-22 (1988); Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 684.
Unquestionably, Bunch was a key witness; he alone identified Petitioner as the assailant. On cross-examination, Petitioner's counsel elicited Bunch's testimony that: (1) at Bunch's house on the evening of the incident there were a large number of beer cans on the coffee table, beer cans outside the front door, an empty 24-pack of beer, and a baggie containing marijuana; and (2) there was drinking at the party, and Bunch had "2 or 3 beers" (R.T. 18, 20, 21). Defense counsel elicited Officer Droz' testimony that, when Droz arrived at the scene and contacted Bunch, Bunch was "dazed and confused, " "incoherent" and "kind of disoriented, " and that Droz was unable to ask Bunch what had happened (R.T. 58, 60). The defense also called partygoer Dylan Walker, who testified that there had been "a lot of drinking going on that night" (R.T. 67).
In precluding Petitioner's counsel from questioning Bunch concerning Bunch's purported marijuana use, the trial court stated that the existing evidence sufficed to support the inference that Bunch had used marijuana that night (R.T. 22-23). Even more significantly, in making its ruling, the court expressly drew the inference that Bunch had been using marijuana (R.T. 108). Despite the court's expressed belief that Bunch had been using marijuana on the night in question, the court found Bunch credible (R.T. 108). In light of the court's inference of Bunch's marijuana use, the challenged restriction on cross-examination did not deprive Petitioner of his right to adduce the facts from which the trier of fact "could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness." See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 680. Nor has Petitioner shown that the court "might have received a significantly different impression" of Bunch's credibility had the court allowed defense counsel to inquire concerning Bunch's alleged marijuana use. See Batchelor v. Cupp, 693 F.2d 859, 864-65 (9th Cir. 1982) (rejecting claim that court's limitation on cross-examination of prosecution witnesses' alleged drug use violated the Confrontation Clause, where jury heard evidence that witnesses were drug addicts and may have used heroin on the night of the murder; "[u]nder the circumstances, the jury had sufficient information to appraise the bias and motives of the witnesses").
Moreover, even assuming arguendo the existence of constitutional error, Petitioner nevertheless is not entitled to habeas relief under the AEDPA standard of review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The Court of Appeal's harmless error decision was not contrary to United States Supreme Court precedent, for the Court of Appeal correctly applied the Chapman standard to the alleged constitutional error. Furthermore, for the reasons discussed herein, the Court of Appeal's harmlessness determination was not objectively unreasonable.
To assess the impact of a Confrontation Clause violation, a court considers whether, "assuming that the damaging potential of the cross-examination were fully realized, a reviewing court might nonetheless say that the error was harmless...." Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 684. The court may consider such factors as the importance of the witness' testimony in the prosecution's case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the witness' testimony on material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and the overall strength of the prosecution's case. Id. at 684; see Whelchel v. Washington, 232 F.3d 1197, 1206 (9th Cir. 2000) (applying Delaware v. Van Arsdall factors under the harmless error standard on habeas review prescribed by Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993) ("Brecht")).
As mentioned above, the trial court not only stated that the existing evidence sufficed to show that Bunch used marijuana on the evening of the incident, the court also made the inference (and expressed the belief) that Bunch had done so. Despite that inference, and despite evidence that Bunch allegedly had been drinking and was "dazed and confused, " "incoherent" and "disoriented" after the incident, the court found Bunch to be credible. Even if the trial court had required Bunch to testify concerning his alleged marijuana use and Bunch expressly had admitted using marijuana, the trial court undoubtedly would have reached the same conclusion concerning Petitioner's guilt as the court did after inferring Bunch's marijuana use from the existing evidence. In these circumstances, this Court cannot conclude that the Court of Appeal's harmless error determination was objectively unreasonable. See United States v. Blackbird, 231 Fed.App'x 574, 575 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 925 (2007) (any Confrontation Clause error harmless where "all of the evidence that appellant wished to elicit through cross-examination was already admitted into the record through other means").
Moreover, for the same reasons, any alleged error was harmless under the harmless error standard set forth in Brecht. Under Brecht, federal habeas relief may not issue for an alleged trial-type error unless the alleged error had a "substantial and injurious effect or influence" on the outcome of the underlying state proceeding. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623; Merolillo v. Yates, 663 F.3d 444, 454-55 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 133 S.Ct. 102 (2012) (federal habeas court must apply the Brecht harmless error test regardless of the state court's harmlessness determination); Slovik v. Yates, 556 F.3d at 755 (applying Brecht to limitation of cross-examination in alleged violation of Confrontation Clause).
RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Court issue an Order: (1) accepting and adopting this Report and Recommendation; (2) denying Petitioner's request to expand the record; (3) denying Petitioner's Motion to Strike as moot; (4) denying Petitioner's request for reconsideration of the Court's "Order re Issues of Stay and Exhaustion"; and (5) denying and dismissing the Petition with prejudice.
In light of this recommended disposition, Petitioner's request for an evidentiary hearing is denied. Where, as here, the state court adjudicated the claims on the merits and such adjudication was not "unreasonable" under section 2254(d), habeas relief is unavailable regardless of the nature of any additional evidence Petitioner might present in federal court. See Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1400 (2011) ("if a claim has been adjudicated on the merits by a state court, a federal habeas petitioner must overcome the limitation of § 2254(d)(1) on the record that was before the state court, " even where the state court denied the petition summarily) (footnote omitted); Gulbrandson v. Ryan, ___ F.3d ___, 2013 WL 5779188, at *13 n.6 (9th Cir. Oct. 28, 2013) (Pinholster's preclusion of a federal evidentiary hearing applies to section 2254(d)(2) claims as well as to section 2254(d)(1) claims). Moreover, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that an evidentiary hearing would reveal anything material to the claims adjudicated herein.