Opinion
No. 1D21-892
03-23-2022
Patricia REA-MANNA, Wife, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. John Christopher MANNA, Husband, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
Carroll L. McCauley, Panama City, for Appellant/Cross-Appellee. Christina Diaz of Cordell Law, LLP, Miami, for Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
Carroll L. McCauley, Panama City, for Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
Christina Diaz of Cordell Law, LLP, Miami, for Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
Per Curiam.
This is an appeal and cross-appeal from a final judgment of dissolution of marriage. On former wife's appeal, we reverse and remand for further proceedings because the trial court's award of durational alimony was not supported by sufficient findings as to why permanent alimony was inappropriate in the parties’ long-term marriage. On former's husband's cross-appeal, we also reverse and remand for further proceedings because the trial court erred in determining the amount of former husband's accumulated annual leave that was subject to equitable distribution. However, as to the other claims raised on cross-appeal, we affirm without discussion.
"Permanent alimony may be awarded to provide for the needs and necessities of life as they were established during the marriage ... for a party who lacks the financial ability to meet his or her needs and necessities of life following a dissolution of marriage." § 61.08(8), Fla. Stat. (2017). In the case of a long-term marriage lasting at least seventeen years, the courts recognize a rebuttable presumption in favor of awarding permanent alimony. Schroll v. Schroll , 227 So. 3d 232, 237 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017) ; Gotro v. Gotro , 218 So. 3d 494, 497 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017) ; Keyser v. Keyser , 204 So. 3d 159, 160 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) ; Nolan v. Nolan , 188 So. 3d 977, 979 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016). "A trial court can overcome [the presumption] by making detailed findings of fact regarding a spouse's need and the other spouse's ability to pay, as well as by considering all the relevant statutory factors listed in section 61.08(2)." Hua v. Tsung , 222 So. 3d 584, 588 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) ; accord Keyser , 204 So. 3d at 160–61 ; Nolan , 188 So. 3d at 978–79. "If a court finds permanent alimony inappropriate because, based on the statutory factors under section 61.08(2), the recipient spouse has ‘no ongoing need for support on a permanent basis,’ durational alimony may be appropriate even in a long-term marriage." Speigner v. Speigner , 312 So. 3d 1289, 1291 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021). "It is an abuse of discretion to not award permanent periodic alimony in a long-term marriage unless the presumption favoring such an award is overcome by competent, substantial evidence." Frerking v. Stacy , 266 So. 3d 273, 275 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019). "[I]f supported by competent, substantial evidence, a trial court could find that the recipient spouse will attain a level of self-support commensurate with the marital standard of living by the time the durational alimony expires so as to rebut the presumption in favor of permanent alimony." Speigner , 312 So. 3d at 1291.
Former wife claims that the trial court's award of durational alimony of $1900 per month for ninety-six months constituted an abuse of discretion because the trial court did not make sufficient findings as to why permanent alimony was inappropriate in the parties’ long-term marriage. The trial court found that former wife had a monthly mortgage payment of $1900 and that durational alimony was "fair and reasonable" and "appropriate in this case to assist the wife with a current need for a defined period." While the amount of alimony awarded by the trial court was supported by competent substantial evidence, the court made no findings as to how it arrived at ninety-six months for the durational period where the mortgage had a principal balance of $286,414, indicating that the monthly mortgage payments would extend well beyond ninety-six months.
Although the trial court found that former wife would be entitled to receive a portion of former husband's federal pension when he retired, there was no finding as to when that would occur. At the final hearing, former husband testified that he had received extensions allowing him to work beyond the mandatory retirement age of fifty-seven. Moreover, the trial court noted in its final judgment that the mandatory retirement age did not apply to law enforcement officers like former husband who were hired before July 6, 2008. In short, the trial court did not identify any particular event or development that would occur at the end of ninety-six months or otherwise explain this expiration date.
The trial court was required to make a finding that at the end of the durational alimony period former wife would no longer require the assistance of alimony to fully support her needs and necessities of life as they were established during the marriage. Speigner , 312 So. 3d at 1291. The trial court's denial of permanent alimony in favor of durational alimony for eight years—without any explanation of how former wife's ongoing need for support will expire after eight years—requires this court to reverse and remand for reconsideration of the proper type of alimony. Id. If the trial court again concludes that durational rather than permanent alimony is appropriate, the trial court must support that determination with findings of fact regarding how the court arrived at the termination date and what change in former wife's need or former husband's ability to pay would take place by that date. Id.
On cross-appeal, former husband claims that the trial court erred in determining that he accrued 440 annual leave hours valued at $29,871 that were subject to equitable distribution. He correctly points out that as a federal employee stationed outside the United States during his career, he could accumulate no more than 360 hours of annual leave. 5 U.S.C.A. § 6304(b) ("Annual leave not used by an employee of the Government of the United States ... stationed outside the United States accumulates for use in succeeding years until it totals not more than 45 days [360 hours] at the beginning of the first full biweekly pay period, or corresponding period for an employee who is not paid on the basis of biweekly pay periods, occurring in a year ...."). Former wife concedes error. Accordingly, we reverse and remand with directions that the trial court recalculate the equalization payment to former wife to reflect the reduced value of 360 hours of accrued annual leave.
AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; and REMANDED .
Osterhaus, Kelsey, and Jay, JJ., concur.