Opinion
Case No. CV 03-08169 DDP (Mcx)
April 15, 2004
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT [Motion filed on 03/05/04]
This matter comes before the Court on the defendant's motion for partial summary judgment that the plaintiff is not entitled to punitive damages. The plaintiff neither filed an opposition nor appeared at the hearing on this motion. After reviewing the defendant's submissions and analyzing the relevant case law, the Court grants the motion and adopts the following order.
I. Background
The plaintiff Marjan Razi (the "plaintiff") is a citizen of California. The defendant China Airlines is a Taiwanese corporation with its principal place of business in Taipei, Taiwan. (Lee Decl. ¶ 2.) The plaintiff alleges that, on October 10, 2002, while he was a passenger aboard China Airlines Flight No. CI006, he was injured by "excessively dangerous hot tea." (Compl. at 9, 11.) The flight was from Taipei, Taiwan to Los Angeles, California pursuant to a round-trip ticket from Los Angeles, California to Los Angeles, California. (See Lee Decl. ¶ 5, Ex. A thereto.)
A copy of the plaintiff's ticket is attached as Exhibit A to the declaration of Yen L. Lee. The ticket shows that the plaintiff purchased the ticket from China Airlines on September 25, 2002, that the place of origin and destination was the LAX airport in Los Angles, California, and that the ticket provided for stops in Taipei, Hong Kong, and Bangkok.
On October 8, 2003, the plaintiff filed the instant action in state court. The plaintiff alleges causes of action for negligence, products liability and premises liability, and prays for compensatory and punitive damages according to proof at trial. (Id. at 8.) On November 10, 2003, China Airlines removed this action to federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction and federal question jurisdiction. On March 5, 2004, China Airlines filed the instant motion for partial summary judgment. China Airlines moves this Court for an order finding that, pursuant to the Warsaw Convention, the plaintiff is not entitled to recover punitive damages.
II. Discussion
A. Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate where "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A genuine issue exists if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party," and material facts are those "that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). Thus, the "mere existence of a scintilla of evidence" in support of the nonmoving party's claim is insufficient to defeat summary judgment. Id. at 252. In determining a motion for summary judgment, all reasonable inferences from the evidence must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. Id. at 242.
Here, China Airlines's summary judgment motion is unopposed. Rule 56 does not permit a party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment to simply rest on that party's prior pleadings. Instead, "the adverse party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If the adverse party" does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the adverse party." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). The Local Rules of the Central District of California contain similar presumptions against a party that fails to oppose a properly supported motion for summary judgment.See C.D. Cal. L.R. 56-3 ("In determining any motion for summary judgment, the Court will assume that the material facts as claimed and adequately supported by the moving party are admitted to exist without controversy except to the extent that such material facts are (a) included in the `Statement of Genuine Issues' and (b) controverted by declaration or other written evidence filed in opposition to the motion."); see also C.D. Cal. L.R. 56-2 ("Any party who opposes the motion shall serve and file with his opposing papers a separate document containing a concise `Statement of Genuine Issues' setting forth all material facts as to which it is contended there exists a genuine issue necessary to be litigated."); C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-12 ("The failure to file any required paper, or the failure to file it within the deadline, may be deemed consent to the granting or denial of the motion.").
B. Analysis
The Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air (commonly and hereafter referred to as the "Warsaw Convention") is a comprehensive international treaty, signed in 1929, that governs air carrier liability for "all international transportation of persons, baggage, or goods." Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 3014, T.S. No. 876 (1934), Art. 1(1), reprinted at 49 U.S.C. § 40105; El Al Israel Airlines v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 160 (1999). In signing the Warsaw Convention, "[t]he contracting states in 1929 believed that limitations on liability would promote the development of the fledgling commercial air industry by allowing the airlines to predict their exposure to monetary damages and thereby obtain needed capital and adequate insurance coverage." In re Korean Air Lines Disaster, 932 F.2d 1475, 1484 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (citingEastern Airlines v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 544-45 (1991)).
The United States became a signatory to the Warsaw Convention in 1934, and it became effective as to the United States on October 29, 1934. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 246 (1984); In re Mexico City Aircrash, 708 F.2d 400, 408 n. 13 (9th Cir. 1983); Dunn v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 589 F.2d 408, 410 (9th Cir. 1978).
The Warsaw Convention defines "international transportation," in relevant part, as:
any transportation in which, according to the contract made by the parties, the place of departure and the place of destination, whether ot not there be a break in the transportation or a transshipment, are situated . . . within the territory of a single High Contracting Party, if there is an agreed stopping place within a territory subject to the sovereignty, suzerainty, mandate or authority of another power, even though that power is not a party to this convention.
Warsaw Conv., Art. 1(2).
Here, China Airlines has provided undisputed evidence that the alleged incident occurred while the plaintiff was aboard a flight in which the place of departure and the place of arrival was Los Angeles, California, with stops in Taipei, Hong Kong, and Bangkok. (See Lee Decl. ¶ 5, Ex. A thereto.) Thus, the Court finds that the provisions of the Warsaw Convention apply to the instant action.
As a treaty adhered to by the United States, the Warsaw Convention is the "supreme Law of the Land" U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2; see also Tseng, 525 U.S. at 167.
Only a few articles of the Warsaw Convention are pertinent to this action. Article 17 provides that a carrier "shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of the death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by a passenger, if the accident which caused the damage so sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking." Warsaw Conv., Art. 17. Article 24(2) provides in relevant part: "In cases covered by article 17 the provisions of the preceding paragraph shall also apply. . . ."Id. Art. 24(2). The preceding paragraph, Article 24(1), provides that ". . . any action for damages, however founded, can only be brought subject to the conditions and limits set out in this convention." Id. Art. 24(1). The Supreme Court has interpreted Article 24 as preempting local law and providing the exclusive cause of action for all personal injury claims arising from international air transportation. Tseng, 525 U.S. at 174-75. The Supreme Court stated: "We therefore hold that recovery for a personal injury suffered on board [an] aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking, if not allowed under the Convention, is not available at all." Id. at 161 (internal quotations marks and citation omitted). In light of the plain language of Article 24 and the Supreme Court's interpretation thereof, this Court finds that the Warsaw Convention provides the plaintiff in this action with his exclusive remedies.
Given that the Warsaw Convention governs the instant action and provides the plaintiff with his exclusive remedies, the only remaining issue to be determined is whether the Warsaw Convention precludes the recovery of punitive damages in personal injury claims. "Although this issue has not yet been directly decided by the Supreme Court or the Ninth Circuit, every court that has addressed this issue has held that the liability and remedy contemplated by Article 17 of the Convention is compensatory in nature and not punitive. . . . Therefore, courts uniformly have held that punitive damages are not available in cases of death or personal injury governed by the Warsaw Convention." In re Air Crash at Taipei, 219 F. Supp.2d 1069, 1070 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also In re Korean Air Lines Disaster, 932 F.2d at 1485-90; In re Air Crash Off Point Mugu, 145 F. Supp.2d 1156, 1161-62 (N.D. Cal. 2001); Jack v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 854 F. Supp. 654, 663 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
This Court, having reviewed relevant case law, finds no reason to depart from the well-established principle that punitive damages are not recoverable in a personal injury action governed by the Warsaw Convention. Accordingly, the Court finds, as a matter of law, that the plaintiff in this action is precluded from seeking punitive damages against China Airlines. The Court grants China Airlines's motion for partial summary judgment.
III. Conclusion
The Court grants the defendant's motion for partial summary judgment.
IT IS SO ORDERED.