Opinion
No. 2 CA-JV 2018-0017
06-15-2018
RAYMOND U., Appellant, v. RAQUEL Y. AND J.U., Appellees.
COUNSEL E.M. Hale Law, Lakeside By Elizabeth M. Hale Counsel for Appellant Flores & Clark PC, Globe By Daisy Flores Guardian Ad Litem for Minor
THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c)(1); Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 28(a)(1), (f); Ariz. R. P. Juv. Ct. 103(G). Appeal from the Superior Court in Graham County
No. SV201700018
The Honorable D. Corey Sanders, Judge Pro Tempore
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL E.M. Hale Law, Lakeside
By Elizabeth M. Hale
Counsel for Appellant Flores & Clark PC, Globe
By Daisy Flores
Guardian Ad Litem for Minor
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge Eppich authored the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Vásquez and Judge Espinosa concurred. EPPICH, Judge:
¶1 In this private severance proceeding filed by Raquel Y., the mother of J.U., born in March 2009, the juvenile court terminated the parental rights of appellant Raymond U. on the grounds of abandonment and the length of his prison term, pursuant to A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(1) and (4). Raymond challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the termination of his rights on either ground. We affirm.
¶2 We will affirm an order terminating parental rights unless we can conclude as a matter of law that no reasonable person could find at least one statutory ground proven by clear and convincing evidence. See Denise R. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 221 Ariz. 92, ¶ 10 (App. 2009). Raquel Y. filed a pro se petition to terminate Raymond's parental rights in July 2017. The court held a severance hearing in December 2017. The evidence presented at the hearing consisted primarily of the parties' testimony and documents presented by J.U.'s guardian ad litem. Viewed in the light most favorable to upholding the court's ruling, see Manuel M. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 218 Ariz. 205, ¶ 2 (App. 2008), the evidence established Raymond has been incarcerated since 2009 and has been in custody for the majority of J.U.'s life; J.U. was eight at the time of the hearing and Raymond had been in prison for almost six years of those years. The last time he saw her was in 2011. Raymond and Raquel were never married to each other and although Raymond's name is on J.U.'s birth certificate, he never established custodial rights. Throughout J.U.'s life, he has never paid child support or provided any financial support while he was in prison. Raymond remained incarcerated at the time of the severance hearing in December 2017, but he was expected to be released in July 2018, when it appears his sentence expires.
Raquel has not filed an answering brief on appeal. But the child's guardian ad litem has, urging this court to affirm the termination order. --------
¶3 In its January 2018 order, the juvenile court found Raquel had sustained her burden of proving the termination grounds of abandonment and length of his incarceration, and established termination was in J.U.'s best interest. The court considered the six factors set forth in Michael J. v. Arizona Department of Economic Security, 196 Ariz. 246, ¶ 29 (2000), specifying as to each, the relevant evidence presented, entering related findings of fact. The ruling reflects that the court weighed the evidence and made credibility determinations in order to resolve conflicts in the evidence.
¶4 Raymond points to conflicts in Raquel's own testimony and conflicts between her testimony and his. He also points out that during a portion of J.U.'s life, the child had been placed in a guardianship with the maternal grandparents. Raymond argues there was "just cause" for his inability to parent J.U., claiming Raquel and her family thwarted his efforts to have contact with her while he was incarcerated. And he contends that, other than Raquel's testimony, there was no "credible" evidence supporting Raquel's claim that telephonic contact with him caused her distress because he cursed at her and threatened her family, and that J.U. fears him. He maintains the evidence was insufficient as to both abandonment and his prison term as grounds for severing his rights. With respect to the juvenile court's finding that termination of his rights was in J.U.'s best interest, Raymond again maintains the evidence was insufficient, and asserts there was no evidence that another potential father was waiting to adopt the child or that he posed a threat or danger to her.
¶5 Raymond is essentially asking this court to reweigh the evidence. But we will not reweigh the evidence on appeal. See Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, ¶ 12 (App. 2002). Rather, we defer to the juvenile court in this regard because it is "in the best position to weigh the evidence, observe the parties, judge the credibility of witnesses, and resolve disputed facts." Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec. v. Oscar O., 209 Ariz. 332, ¶ 4 (App. 2004).
¶6 Although we need only find one statutory ground sustainable to affirm the juvenile court's order, see Michael J., 196 Ariz. 246, ¶ 27, the grounds here were interrelated and we find both are supported by the evidence. Abandonment is defined as "the failure of a parent to provide reasonable support and to maintain regular contact with the child, including providing normal supervision." A.R.S. § 8-531(1). The statute further provides that a parent's "[f]ailure to maintain a normal parental relationship with the child without just cause for a period of six months constitutes prima facie evidence of abandonment." Id. A parent's imprisonment alone neither justifies nor precludes the court from terminating the parent's rights based on abandonment, but an incarcerated parent "must act persistently to establish the relationship however possible and must vigorously assert his legal rights to the extent necessary." Michael J., 196 Ariz. 246, ¶ 22, quoting In re Pima Cty. Juv. Action No. S-114487, 179 Ariz. 86, 97 (1994). With respect to the termination of a parent's rights based on the length of the parent's prison term under § 8-533(B)(4), a court may consider the length and strength of a relationship when the parent began the period of incarceration, and the pending release date. Jeffrey P. v. Dep't of Child Safety, 239 Ariz. 212, ¶ 6 (App. 2016), citing Michael J., 196 Ariz. 246, ¶ 29.
¶7 The juvenile court's ruling reflects that in making the findings related to both grounds for termination, it weighed the evidence based on its assessment of the parties' credibility and resolved the conflicts in the evidence. Under these circumstances, we see no purpose in restating the ruling here. See Jesus M., 203 Ariz. 278, ¶ 16, citing State v. Whipple, 177 Ariz. 272, 274 (App. 1993). Rather, contrary to Raymond's assertion, there is reasonable evidence in the record that supports the court's findings. We therefore adopt its ruling. Id.
¶8 The juvenile court's order terminating Raymond's parental rights to J.U. is affirmed.