Opinion
NUMBER 13-17-00254-CR
02-01-2018
JOSE ANGEL RAMIREZ JR., Appellant, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
On appeal from the 24th District Court of Jackson County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Contreras and Benavides
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Contreras
Appellant Jose Angel Ramirez Jr. appeals his conviction for driving while intoxicated (DWI), third offense or more, a third-degree felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 49.04, 49.09(b)(2) (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st C.S.). By one issue, appellant argues that his right to a presumption of innocence was violated because his trial was not bifurcated between the guilt-innocence phase and the punishment phase. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
On October 10, 2015, appellant was arrested for DWI and subsequently brought to trial. Before the trial judge, appellant: (1) knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial; (2) pled not guilty to the DWI charge; (3) pled "true" to the jurisdictional enhancement paragraphs, which alleged three prior DWI convictions; and (4) pled "true" to the felony enhancement paragraphs, which alleged six prior felony convictions. Appellant's case was then tried to the bench.
The trial judge heard all evidence and arguments of counsel, found appellant guilty of the charged offense of DWI, found the enhancement paragraphs to be true, and assessed punishment at thirty years' imprisonment in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice—Institutional Division. See Id. § 12.42(d) (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st C.S.) (enhancing a habitual felony offender's punishment to "any term of not more than 99 years or less than 25 years"). Appellant did not object to having his criminal trial in a unitary fashion at any time, and he did not file a motion for new trial. This appeal followed.
II. DISCUSSION
All persons are presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.03 (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st C.S.); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 2.01 (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st C.S.). Prior to conviction, an accused is shielded by this presumption of innocence, which is "the bedrock, axiomatic and elementary principle whose enforcement lies at the foundation of our criminal law." Betterman v. Montana, ___ U.S. ___ , ___ , 136 S. Ct. 1609, 1614 (2016) (quoting Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 4 (1984)); see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.03; TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 2.01.
The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides that criminal trials must be bifurcated between a guilt-innocence phase and a punishment phase when the trial is before a jury on a plea of not guilty, but not when the trial is before the bench. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.07, §2 (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st C.S.); Barfield v. State, 63 S.W.3d 446, 450 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (en banc) ("The [bifurcation] statute 'has no application to a trial before the court on a plea of not guilty.'") (quoting Courtney v. State, 424 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968)).
Appellant nevertheless argues that his right to a presumption of innocence was violated when the trial court tried his case in a unitary fashion due to a "blending [of the] issues relevant to guilt/innocence and sentencing, [because] a unitary trial to the court creates a scenario where [a] judge will have difficulty maintaining the presumption of innocence required under the due process clause, thus violating the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution." Appellant stresses that even an "experienced judge [may] have difficulty affording . . . the presumption of innocence to a defendant who is accused of felony DWI, but pleads 'true' to the [previous] DWI convictions alleged in his indictment, then pleads 'true' also to all the felony enhancement paragraphs in his indictment during a unitary trial."
Appellant pled 'true' to the felony enhancement paragraphs for two counts of burglary of a habitation, one count of burglary of a motor vehicle, one count of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, and one count of tampering/fabricating physical evidence.
However, appellant has failed to preserve this issue for our review. In order for an issue to be preserved on appeal, there must be a timely objection that specifically states the legal basis for the objection. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); see Layton v. State, 280 S.W.3d 235, 238-39 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). Here, appellant did not object at any time at trial on this ground or any ground that can be construed as preserving this issue, nor did appellant file a motion for a new trial raising this issue. Therefore, we conclude this issue has been waived. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a).
III. CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court's judgment.
DORI CONTRERAS
Justice Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b). Delivered and filed the 1st day of February, 2018.