Opinion
No. 03-05-00517-CR.
Filed: January 24, 2007. DO NOT PUBLISH.
From the District Court of Travis County, 147th Judicial District No. D-1-DC-2005-200538, Honorable Fred A. Moore, Judge Presiding.
Before Justices PURYEAR, PEMBERTON and WALDROP.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A jury found appellant Jerry Ramirez guilty of felony escape and assessed punishment at six years' imprisonment. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 38.06(a)(1), (c)(1) (West 2003). In his only point of error, appellant urges that the evidence is legally insufficient to sustain the guilty verdict. We will overrule this contention and affirm the conviction. When there is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a criminal conviction, the question presented is whether a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979) (legal sufficiency); Griffin v. State, 614 S.W.2d 155, 158-59 (Tex.Crim.App. 1981) (legal sufficiency); Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000) (factual sufficiency). In a legal sufficiency review, all the evidence is reviewed in the light most favorable to the verdict; it is assumed that the trier of fact resolved conflicts in the testimony, weighed the evidence, and drew reasonable inferences in a manner that supports the verdict. Griffin, 614 S.W.2d at 159 (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318-19). A person commits the offense of escape if he escapes from custody when he is under arrest for an offense. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 38.06(a)(1). "Escape" means an "unauthorized departure from custody," and "custody" means "under arrest by a peace officer or under restraint by a public servant pursuant to an order of a court." Id. § 38.01(1)(A), (2) (West 2003). Appellant contends that the evidence fails to show that he was in custody or under arrest when he fled from the officers. For the purposes of the escape statute, an arrest is complete when (1) a person's liberty of movement is successfully restricted or restrained, whether this is achieved by an officer's physical force or the suspect's submission to the officer's authority, and (2) a reasonable person in the suspect's position would have understood the situation to constitute a restraint on freedom of movement of the degree the law associates with formal arrest. Medford v. State, 13 S.W.3d 769, 773 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000). It is not sufficient that an officer has told the suspect that he is under arrest; there must be custody or detention and submission to the arrest. Id. at 772-73. A person commits the offense of escape if he escapes from custody when he is under arrest for an offense. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 38.06(a)(1). "Escape" means an "unauthorized departure from custody," and "custody" means "under arrest by a peace officer or under restraint by a public servant pursuant to an order of a court." Id. § 38.01(1)(A), (2) (West 2003). Appellant contends that the evidence fails to show that he was in custody or under arrest when he fled from the officers. For the purposes of the escape statute, an arrest is complete when (1) a person's liberty of movement is successfully restricted or restrained, whether this is achieved by an officer's physical force or the suspect's submission to the officer's authority, and (2) a reasonable person in the suspect's position would have understood the situation to constitute a restraint on freedom of movement of the degree the law associates with formal arrest. Medford v. State, 13 S.W.3d 769, 773 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000). It is not sufficient that an officer has told the suspect that he is under arrest; there must be custody or detention and submission to the arrest. Id. at 772-73. In Medford, the defendant had been stopped, frisked, and told he was under arrest when he ran from the officer. Medford v. State, 21 S.W.3d 668, 669-70 (Tex.App.-Austin 2000, no pet.) (opinion on remand). This Court concluded that this detention did not constitute a completed arrest for the purpose of a prosecution for escape because the officer was unable to successfully restrain the defendant before he fled. Id. at 670. In the instant case, appellant was initially stopped and handcuffed based on the officers' suspicion that he was guilty of shoplifting. While handcuffed, appellant was told that he was under arrest based on the outstanding warrant. At this point, the arrest was complete because appellant was already physically restrained. A reasonable person in appellant's position-in handcuffs and told by an officer that he was under arrest-would have understood himself to be restrained to the degree the law associates with formal arrest. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, a rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was in custody and under arrest for a felony when he fled from the officers. The evidence is legally sufficient to sustain the jury's verdict. The point of error is overruled and the judgment of conviction is affirmed. Affirmed