Opinion
No. 5-108 / 03-1224
Filed April 28, 2005
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Paul R. Huscher, Judge.
Isidro Ramirez appeals the district court's denial of his postconviction relief application. AFFIRMED.
Frank Burnette, Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Richard Bennett, Assistant Attorney General, John Sarcone, County Attorney, and Steve Foritano, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Heard by Sackett, C.J., and Mahan and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
A jury found Isidro Ramirez guilty of first-degree murder. After the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed his judgment and sentence, Ramirez filed a pro se application for postconviction relief (PCR). The district court denied each of his seven listed grounds for relief and this appeal followed.
On appeal, Ramirez raises several arguments. We find it necessary to address only two: (1) Whether PCR counsel was ineffective in "failing to investigate, and produce evidence at trial in support of Ramirez pro se claims" and in failing to amend Ramirez's pro se application, and (2) whether the district court erred in telling the prosecutor to write the PCR ruling.
I. Ineffective Assistance of PCR counsel
To prevail on ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims, a postconviction relief applicant must show (1) counsel breached an essential duty and (2) prejudice resulted. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690-92, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2066-67, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 695-96 (1984). On our de novo review of this constitutional issue, we conclude Ramirez has not established either prong.
At the hearing, PCR counsel examined Ramirez and cross-examined trial counsel. He elicited testimony from both on the several viable grounds for relief raised in Ramirez's application. Although present counsel claims this work was inadequate, he does not specify how and why. Similarly, although he claims PCR counsel should have amended the application to state additional grounds for relief, he does not identify those omitted grounds. He also concedes that PCR counsel raised a ground at the hearing that was not set forth in the pro se application. In short, the present allegation that PCR counsel was ineffective is simply too general for us to address or preserve. Dunbar v. State, 515 N.W.2d 12, 15 (Iowa 1994).
II. Prosecutor Involvement in Ruling
At the PCR hearing, the district court dictated its ruling into the record and then asked the prosecutor to "prepare a written ruling in accordance with the Court's findings and conclusions." The written ruling, subsequently signed by the court, contains some factual and legal errors. Appellate counsel now contends the court's action in connection with the ruling deprived him of a fair trial.
Ramirez cites no authority for the proposition that the court's decision to have the prosecutor prepare a written ruling contravenes his Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial. Therefore, Ramirez has waived this issue. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.14(1)( c).
Our appellate courts have criticized the wholesale adoption of proposed findings and conclusions submitted by a party. See Care Initiatives v. Bd. of Review, 500 N.W.2d 14, 16 (Iowa 1993); Kroblin v. RDR Motels, Inc. 347 N.W.2d 430, 434-35 (Iowa 1984); In re Marriage of Siglin, 555 N.W.2d 846, 848 (Iowa Ct.App. 1996). Here, the district court exercised its independent judgment by apprising the parties of its ruling before requesting one party to memorialize it. There may nevertheless be an appearance of impropriety in asking a party to write the ruling. Siglin, 555 N.W. 2d at 848-49 (stating [a] judge[`s] written opinion enhances the quality of the decision, assures litigants their claims were fully and fairly considered, and allows appellate courts to readily ascertain the bases for the decision.").
III. Disposition
We affirm the district court's denial of Ramirez's postconviction relief application.
AFFIRMED.
Mahan, J., concurs; Sackett, C.J., dissents.
I would strike the ruling prepared by the prosecutor and remand to the district court to draft its own ruling. The district court's decision to have the prosecutor draft the written ruling deprives me of the judgment that the district court exercised in signing the ruling. It also impacted on Ramirez's right to a fair trial and gives the appearance of unfairness. I recognize the district court did dictate a ruling in the record, but I do not believe that this should relieve the district court of preparing its own ruling. What is even more troublesome is that the ruling prepared by the prosecutor contained factual and legal errors.
In saying this I recognize the majority has not approved the practice but has decided the issue on a failure to cite authority for Ramirez's position.