Opinion
2022 CU 0770
12-22-2022
ROBERT JAMES RAGLAND v. KATHERINE DIAMOND RAGLAND
Karen D. Downs Natalie C. Neale Baton Rouge, Louisiana Attorneys for Appellee Robert James Ragland Katherine Reznik Benoit Baton Rouge, Louisiana Attorney for Appellant Katherine Diamond Ragland
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
On Appeal from the The Family Court In and for the Parish of East Baton Rouge State of Louisiana No. 209479 "A" The Honorable Pamela J. Baker, Judge Presiding
Karen D. Downs Natalie C. Neale Baton Rouge, Louisiana Attorneys for Appellee Robert James Ragland
Katherine Reznik Benoit Baton Rouge, Louisiana Attorney for Appellant Katherine Diamond Ragland
BEFORE: McDONALD, McCLENDON, AND HOLDRIDGE, JJ.
HOLDRIDGE, J.
This is an appeal from a judgment granting a protective order under the Domestic Abuse Assistance statutes, La. R.S. 46:2131, et seq. For the following reasons, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Robert James Ragland and Katherine Diamond Ragland were married on June 28, 1997. Twins named W.R. and P.R. were born of the marriage on January 15, 2011. Mr. Ragland filed a petition for divorce and custody on June 6, 2017, and a judgment of divorce was signed on September 5, 2018. At the time of the matters giving rise to this appeal, the parties had been awarded joint custody with Mr. Ragland named as the domiciliary parent, pursuant to a judgment signed on July 16, 2019 based on the parties' stipulations. The judgment also provided that the children were to live primarily with Mr. Ragland during the school year with Ms. Ragland exercising custody every other weekend and overnight each Wednesday night.
The parties initially had been awarded joint custody with no designated domiciliary parent and alternating weekly physical custody.
On May 1, 2020, Mr. Ragland filed a Petition for Protection from Abuse on behalf of himself and the children, pursuant to La. R.S. 46:2131, etseq., naming Ms. Ragland as defendant In the initial Petition, under the heading "Defendant abused protected person(s) in the following manner," Mr. Ragland marked the following items: slapped, shoved, and stalked the protected persons; threatened the protected persons with bodily harm; and abused the petitioner's children. Under "Other," he added, "Put daughter in choke hold/horse collar hold." He then included the details as to the most recent alleged incident of abuse and stalking on April 30, 2020, and as to alleged past incidents. He sought a Temporary Restraining Order prohibiting Ms. Ragland from abusing, harassing, assaulting, stalking, following, tracking, monitoring, or threatening them; prohibiting her from contacting them; prohibiting her from going within 100 yards of their residence; and ordering her to stay away from his place of employment and the children's school. He also sought temporary custody of the children.
On June 16,2020, Mr. Ragland filed a rule to modify custody based partly on the matters alleged in the Petition for Protection from Abuse. He sought sole custody of the children with Ms. Ragland having supervised visitation, or alternatively, to maintain joint custody with him as the domiciliary parent and Ms. Ragland having supervised visitation.
In the "RULE TO SHOW CAUSE Why Protective Order Should Not Issue" section of the form, the items corresponding to those marked in Mr. Ragland's Petition were marked as the matters as to which Ms. Ragland was to show cause as to why the trial court should not grant a protective order. In the "Order of Protection Temporary Restraining Order" portion of the forms, the court granted a Temporary Restraining Order on May 1, 2020, that was effective through May 20, 2020, with the hearing on the Protective Order set for the latter date. Ms. Ragland was "restrained from committing further acts of abuse or threats of abuse [or] stalking," and the trial court granted the specific relief Mr. Ragland sought.
The minute entry for the May 20, 2020 rule to show cause hearing on the Protective Order states that Ebony Cavalier, the attorney on behalf of Iris Domestic Violence Intervention Center, Inc., was present and requested that the matter be passed and reassigned to June 17, 2020. Mr. Ragland had filed a request for a Temporary Restraining Order that the trial court granted on May 18, 2020, making it effective through June 17, 2020, and setting it for hearing on that date. The rule to show cause hearing was continued and reassigned numerous times. Each time Mr. Ragland would file a request for a Temporary Restraining Order seeking the same relief as in the initial Temporary Restraining Order. The Temporary Restraining Order signed by the trial court on June 17, 2020, added the provision that Ms. Ragland was permitted to visit the children for two hours weekly at the supervised visitation program provided by The Parenting Center of Family Services of Baton Rouge (The Parenting Center). The parties also entered into a written stipulation which provided that Ms. Ragland was to submit to a psychological and psychiatric evaluation before the visitation provisions were to be reviewed on August 26, 2020.
The rule to show cause hearing was set for August 26, 2020, but the minute entry for that date states that the court was closed due to a severe weather threat. Based on the record, the following numerous continuances and reassignments were not requested by Mr. Ragland, except for the hearing set for July 28, 2021, which Mr. Ragland did request be continued. However, his request was based upon a stay order the trial court granted at Ms. Ragland's request when she filed a notice of intent to seek writs from the trial court's July 6, 2021 ruling granting his motion to disqualify her counsel. On November 24, 2021, Mr. Ragland filed a motion to lift the stay order because Ms. Ragland had not filed a writ with this court; the hearing on the motion was set for November 30, 2021. On November 30,2021, Mr. Ragland filed another request for a Temporary Restraining Order, which the trial court granted the same date, with an expiration and hearing date of January 18, 2022. On December 14, 2021, the trial court signed a judgment lifting the stay order.
On January 18, 2022, Mr. Ragland filed another request for a Temporary Restraining Order, which the trial court granted on that date and which was effective through February 2, 2022, and set for hearing on the same date. Ms. Ragland filed a notice of intent to seek supervisory writs as to the January 18, 2022 Temporary Restraining Order. On February 10, 2022, this court denied the writ as moot because the order expired by its own terms on February 2, 2022. See Ragland v. Ragland, 2022-0112 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/10/22), 2022 WL 406708 (unpublished writ action).
On February 2, 2022, Mr. Ragland filed another request for a Temporary Restraining Order, which was granted by the trial court on the same date and which was to expire on February 3, 2022, the same date as the rule to show cause was set for hearing. The trial court held a hearing on February 2, 2022, and issued its oral reasons for judgment on February 3, 2022. On February 3, 2022, Mr. Ragland filed a request for a Protective Order which was granted by the trial court on the same date. The first page of the Protective Order, issued pursuant to La. R.S. 46:2131, et seq., states, "This order shall be effective through 11:59 PM on 08/03/2023. (month/day/year) NOTE: Some provisions of this order MAY NOT EXPIRE. See paragraphs 1-5." On pages 3 and 4 of the Protective Order, the trial court initialed paragraphs 1 -4 and marked boxes indicating that those provisions do not expire. In paragraph 1, Ms. Ragland was ordered not to "abuse, harass, assault, stalk, follow, track, monitor, or threaten the protected person(s) [Mr. Ragland and the children] in any manner whatsoever." The prohibition included the use, attempt use, or threatened use of physical force that would reasonably be expected to cause bodily injury. In paragraph 2, she was ordered not to contact Mr. Ragland and the children personally by any means except for necessary communication regarding the children. In paragraphs 3 and 4, she was ordered not to go within 100 yards of Mr. Ragland and the children without court permission, except for visitation at The Parenting Center. Paragraph 4 prohibited her from going within 100 yards of Mr. Ragland and the children's residence, and Paragraph 5 ordered her to stay away from Mr. Ragland's place of employment and the children's school. She was also ordered not to interfere with his employment or their school.
Ms. Ragland appeals from the judgment signed February 3, 2022. Ms. Ragland urges two assignments of error. In her first assignment of error, she contends that the trial court erred as a matter of law and abused its discretion by failing to adhere to La. R.S. 46:2131, et seq., by continuing to issue or extend "'temporary' orders of protection over a period of almost two years when there was only one petition for protection from abuse filed into the record" and no hearing on that Petition within the time period mandated by La. R.S. 46:2135. In her second assignment of error, she contends that the trial court erred in issuing the protective order without sufficient evidence and finding her guilty of abuse without affording her any constitutional protections.
DISCUSSION
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A trial court's decision to issue or deny a protective order is reversible only upon a showing of an abuse of discretion. Compton v. Chatman, 2021-0706 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/25/22), 341 So.3d 581, 586, writ denied, 2022-00527 (La. 5/3/22), 337 So.3d 154. We review the trial court's factual findings relating to a protective order under a manifest error standard of review. Id.
Moreover, if the fact finder's findings are reasonable in light of the record reviewed in its entirety, the court of appeal may not reverse, even though convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently. Barber v. Barber, 2015-1021 (La.App. 1 Cir. 4/15/16), 2016 WL 1535195 at *4, writ denied. 2016-0934 (La. 6/17/16). 192 So.3d 771. In matters of credibility, an appellate court must give great deference to the findings of the trier-of-fact, as the trial court is in the best position to view the demeanor and mannerisms of the witnesses. Compton , 341 So.3d at 586. When conflicting testimony exists, reasonable evaluations of credibility and reasonable inferences of fact made by the trial court are not to be disturbed. Stobart v. State through Dept. of Transp. and Development, 617 So.2d 880, 882-83 (La. 1993); Pierce v. Pierce, 2019-0689 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/21/20), 298 So.3d 902, 907.
DOMESTIC ABUSE PROTECTIVE ORDERS
Protective orders are issued in domestic violence matters pursuant to the Domestic Abuse Assistance statutes, La. R.S. 46:2131, etseq. The purpose of these statutes is to provide domestic violence victims a civil remedy to attain immediate and easily accessible protection. La. R.S. 46:2131. Upon good cause shown in an ex parte proceeding, the court may enter a temporary restraining order, without bond, as it deems necessary to protect a petitioner or any minor children from abuse. La. R.S. 46:213 5(A). Any person who shows immediate and present danger of abuse shall have shown good cause. See Id. Louisiana Revised Statutes 46:2135(A) provides, in pertinent part, "The court shall consider any and all past history of abuse, or threats thereof, in determining the existence of an immediate and present danger of abuse. There is no requirement that the abuse itself be recent, immediate, or present."
"Domestic abuse" is defined in pertinent part in the Domestic Abuse Assistance statutes as including, but not limited to, "physical or sexual abuse and any offense against the person, physical or non-physical, as defined in the Criminal Code of Louisiana, except negligent injury and defamation, committed by one family member, household member, or dating partner against another." La. R.S. 46:2132(3).
If a temporary restraining order is granted without notice, the matter shall be set within twenty-one days for a rule to show cause why a protective order should not be issued, at which time the petitioner must prove the allegations of abuse by a preponderance of the evidence. La. R.S. 46:2135(B). The defendant shall be given notice of the temporary restraining order and the hearing on the rule to show cause by service of process as required by law within twenty-four hours of the issuance of the order. Id. Louisiana Revised Statutes 46:2135(E) provides:
If the hearing pursuant to Subsection B or D of this Section is continued, the court shall make or extend such temporary restraining orders as it deems necessary. Any continuance of a hearing ordered pursuant to Subsection B or D of this Section shall not exceed fifteen days, unless good cause is shown for further continuance.
The Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure also contains articles pertaining to temporary restraining orders. Regarding the duration of a temporary restraining order, La. C.C.P. art. 3604(C)(1) states:
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 3603.1(A) states:
Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, and particularly the provisions of Domestic Abuse Assistance, Part II of Chapter 28 of Title 46, Post-Separation Family Violence Relief Act and Injunctions and Incidental Orders, Parts IV and V of Chapter 1 of Code Title V of Title 9, Domestic Abuse Assistance, Chapter 8 of Title XV of the Children's Code, and this Chapter, no temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction prohibiting a spouse or other person from harming or going near or in the proximity of another shall issue, unless the complainant has good and reasonable grounds to fear for his or her safety or that of the children, or the complainant has in the past been the victim of domestic abuse by the other spouse.
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 3604(C)(2) also provides for the extension of a temporary restraining order in the event that the hearing on the rule for the protective order is continued by the court because of a declared state of emergency made in accordance with R.S. 29:724.A temporary restraining order issued in conjunction with a rule to show cause for a protective order filed in an action pursuant to the Protection from Family Violence Act, R.S. 46:2121 et seq., and pursuant to the Protection From Dating Violence Act, R.S. 46:2151, shall remain in force until a hearing is held on the rule for the protective order or for thirty days, whichever occurs first. If the initial rule to show cause is heard by a hearing officer, the temporary restraining order shall remain in force for fifteen days after the hearing or until the judge signs the protective order, whichever occurs last. At any time before the expiration of a temporary restraining order issued pursuant to this Paragraph, it may be extended by the court for a period not exceeding thirty days.
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 3604(C)(2) provides, in pertinent part:
[A]ny temporary restraining order issued in the matter shall remain in force for five days after the date of conclusion of the state of emergency. When a temporary restraining order remains in force under this Paragraph, the court shall reassign the rule for a protective order for hearing at the earliest possible time, but no later than five days after the date of conclusion of the state of emergency. The reassignment of the rule shall take precedence over all matters except older matters of the same character.
In her first assignment of error, Ms. Ragland contends that the trial court issued a temporary order of protection on January 18, 2022, without Mr. Ragland having filed a "new" Petition for Protection from Abuse, allegedly in violation of statutory requirements. The hearing on Mr. Ragland's Petition for Protection from Abuse was continued numerous times, and was held about a year and nine months after the initial Temporary Restraining Order was issued. Ms. Ragland complains that the extension of the Temporary Restraining Orders over this time period was improper under La. R.S. 46:2135(B) and (E), and also partly because the trial court did not articulate "good cause" for the extensions.
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 3612(A) states, "[t]here shall be no appeal from an order relating to a temporary restraining order." This prohibition applies to temporary restraining orders granted under the Domestic Abuse Assistance statutes, particularly La. R.S. 46:2135. Cave v. Cave, 2020-0240 (La.App. 1 Cir. 3/25/21), 2021 WL 1134946 at *10; Lepine v. Lepine, 17-45 (La.App. 5 Cir. 6/15/17), 223 So.3d 666, 672. When a party is aggrieved by the granting of a temporary restraining order, that party may seek review by way of an application for supervisory writs to the court of appeal, as Ms. Ragland did in this case. Cave, 2021 WL 1134946 at *10; Lepine, 223 So.3d at 672. However, the Temporary Restraining Orders issued in this case have lapsed and have been rendered moot by the issuance of the February 3, 2022 protective order. Thus, any issues regarding the propriety of those Temporary Restraining Orders are moot. See Cave, 2021 WL 1134946 at *10; Lepine , 223 So.3d at 672; see also Harper v. Harper, 00-1425 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1/30/01), 777 So.2d 1275, 1278, writ denied. 2001-0768 (La, 5/11/01), 792 So.2d 736.
Ms. Ragland contends that the trial court could not use the Temporary Restraining Orders in this case over a nineteen-month period of time as the basis for its Protective Order, citing Keneker v. Keneker, 579 So.2d 1083 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1991). In Keneker , the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal, in considering a supervisory writ from the denial of the father's motion to dismiss a temporary restraining order, conducted a statutory analysis and stated that it concluded the legislature did not contemplate indefinite continuances or extensions of temporary restraining orders and protective orders issued under the Domestic Abuse Assistance statutes. Id. at 1085. However, the court also stated that even though the temporary restraining order in the suit had expired, the proceeding for a Domestic Abuse Assistance protective order was still viable. Id. Likewise, in this case, even though the Temporary Restraining Orders were extended numerous times because the rule to show cause hearings were passed and reassigned, Mr. Ragland's Petition for Protection from Abuse was still viable. Under La. R.S. 46:2135(E), the trial court clearly had the authority to extend the Temporary Restraining Order and continue the hearing for good cause. In this case, the trial court had good cause because many of the continuances were prompted by Ms. Ragland, including requests to continue from her or one of her many attorneys and her request for a stay in conjunction with her allegation that she intended to seek supervisory writs from the trial court's ruling disqualifying her counsel. Several of the continuances were also requested by counsel for the Domestic Violence Intervention Center, Inc., and one was due to severe weather. Therefore, Ms. Ragland's first assignment of error lacks merit.
Ms. Ragland also relies on State v. Miller, 47,432 (La.App. 2 Cir. 11/14/12), 107 So.3d 137, but this case does not support her contention as it involved a final protective order prohibiting the father from contacting his minor son for life, which was clearly in violation of La. R.S. 46:2136(F), which limits the duration of a protective order to eighteen months.
In Ms. Ragland's second assignment of error, she contends that the trial court erred in issuing the Protective Order because the evidence was insufficient. The trial court held a hearing on February 2, 2022, wherein Mr. Ragland and Ms. Ragland testified. Mr. Ragland introduced into evidence a flash drive containing a partial video recording of the April 2020 incident, recordings of phone calls between him and his children, transcripts he made of those conversations, two pages from W.R.'s diary, a photograph he took of a Facebook post, a photograph from the incident in April of 2020, and an affidavit setting forth his attorney's fees. Ms. Ragland introduced into evidence a photograph of a different Facebook post. The trial court took the matter under advisement, then reconvened on February 3,2022, to rule upon the matter and issue oral reasons for judgment. Mr. Ragland, his counsel, and Ms. Ragland's counsel were present in court. Ms. Ragland was unable to be present in court, so she joined the matter via Zoom. The trial court issued the following reasons for judgment, in pertinent part:
First, I'm going to start with the children. In Exhibit "Robert #2", there's a picture of [Ms. Ragland] with her arm around the neck of [P.R.]. [Ms. Ragland] testified that her arm is not around [P.R.'s] neck, but is around [P.R.'s] chest. In fact, the picture and also the video, show [Ms. Ragland's] arm is clearly around the neck, and then goes under one of [the] arms of [P.R.]. In both the picture-
MS. RAGLAND: Ma'am, you are completely incorrect. I'm leaving this meeting. You are completely incorrect. I did nothing to my children.
THE COURT: Ma'am, it's up to you if you want to leave. Okay. Anyway, I'm going to keep going then, Ms. Benoit [Ms. Ragland's counsel], because [Ms. Ragland] is gone.
MS. BENOIT: Okay.
THE COURT: All right. So, [Ms. Ragland] clearly has [P.R.] in a choke hold. I understand that children can be trying, but [Ms. Ragland] is not disciplining [P.R.], [Ms. Ragland] is abusing [P.R.]. [P.R.] can be heard to say help, at which case [W.R.] runs out of the car to try to pull [P.R.] away from [Ms. Ragland]. They both run back to the car while [W.R.] is yelling get off of [P.R.]. They both run back to the car, and both children are obviously shaken up, with [W.R.] telling [P.R.] to lock the door, and then yelling toward [Mr. Ragland] lock the doors, lock the doors. [Ms. Ragland's] response is to get her phone, and point it at the passenger side window, like, as if [Ms. Ragland's] recording. Mr. Ragland tells [Ms. Ragland] you can't grab them, [Ms. Ragland] smirks. I mean, [Ms. Ragland] actually smirks, and says yes, you can grab your children and make them go where they need to go.
Now, [Ms. Ragland's] explanation is that [P.R-] is running around the parking lot, and [P.R.] did not want to go with [Ms.
Ragland], Mr. Ragland testified that [Ms. Ragland] was holding the phone up when [P.R.] was talking to [Ms. Ragland] prior to the choke hold, and ~ as if [Ms. Ragland] was recording and [P.R.] reached out to move the phone out of the way, and [Ms. Ragland] grabbed [P.R.] by the neck, and at some point [P.R.'s] feet were off the ground.
The kids were fearful, the video [bears] this out. Mr. Ragland did not leave the truck, and there was some question about why didn't you get out of the truck? You know, the court's opinion, that was a wise choice. The picture and the video did not show a parent disciplining a child. They show a parent abusing a child, and certainly it's frustrating ~ certainly it's frustrating when children don't listen, but, you know, no worse way to react than the way [Ms. Ragland] did.
[W.R.] has in the past advised . . . [Mr. Ragland] that [Ms. Ragland] hits [W.R.], Mr. Ragland complained through his attorney to one of [Ms. Ragland's] prior attorneys, and this caused [Ms. Ragland] to hit [W.R.] again for telling [Mr. Ragland] what happens at [Ms. Ragland's] house.
There were [recordings] of phone conversations introduced into evidence as "Robert #7", [W.R.] is clearly upset and crying. [Ms. Ragland] continually grabs the phone from [W.R.], and starts talking to Mr. Ragland. Mr. Ragland clearly does not wish to speak to [Ms. Ragland], and keeps asking [Ms. Ragland] why do you keep grabbing the phone? [Mr. Ragland] has to hang up a few times. Finally, [Ms. Ragland] gives the phone to [P.R.] outside and makes [W.R.] go inside. [P.R.] tells [Mr. Ragland] that [W.R.] is screaming, that [W.R.] and [Ms. Ragland] had a fight, that - I mean, [W.R.] eventually comes out of the house and reports to [Mr. Ragland] that [Ms. Ragland] shoved him, would not let him out of the house, and was trying to not let him talk to [Mr. Ragland]. At one point during these recordings, you can hear [W.R.] say she's coming, and [W.R.] sounds truly terrified. [Ms. Ragland] does come, take the phone, and hang it up.
[W.R.] has reported to [Mr. Ragland] being slapped and shoved by [Ms. Ragland]. Pages from [W.R.'s] diary were introduced into evidence as "Robert #8 and #9". [W.R.] writes that [Ms. Ragland] hit him in the face, called him B words, and S word, for telling [Mr. Ragland] stuff. Said go live with [Mr. Ragland] if you don't live me, I think [she] probably meant love me. Reports that [Ms. Ragland] is constantly yelling, she aggressively drives, [W.R.] is a [f*#&*%], [P.R.] go to hell, you're a piece of [s*A&], [Mr. Ragland] is a [d*#&]. [W.R.] also writes in his diary that the house is nasty, there's bugs, dust, dog poop, dirty clothes, dirty dishes, and not one room is clean.
Mr. Ragland reports that since early 2020 [Mr. Ragland] had issues with [Ms. Ragland] hitting [W.R.]. The school has expressed concerns regarding the kids. They had such a reputation at St. James, those Ragland kids, that they actually changed schools to Our Lady of Mercy.
With regard to Mr. Ragland, he testified that [Ms. Ragland] has gone to and driven by his office, pulled in his parking lot, tried to enter his office. [Mr. Ragland's] had to block her. [Ms. Ragland] has caused issues at numerous exchanges at school. [Ms. Ragland] has approached [Mr. Ragland's] car, she's opened his door - car door, she has entered his car, she laid on top of his vehicle.
[Mr. Ragland] says ~ reports that he has observed [Ms. Ragland] in the courtroom go into rages, and he finds that to be scary. He is very fearful of her. [Mr. Ragland] is afraid that [Ms. Ragland] will harm him physically. [Mr. Ragland] is afraid that if she does not get what she wants, she will harm the kids physically.
[Ms. Ragland] has caused disturbances at The Parenting Center. We had to have a conference about this. The Parenting Center is reporting that they've never, since 2008, had anyone that caused as much disturbance as Ms. Ragland. This causes him and ~ Mr. Ragland and the children anxiety and stress. . . . Mr. Ragland reports that Ms. Ragland has stalked him .... [Ms. Ragland] has had people friend him on Facebook and send messages to him. [Ms. Ragland] has had people friend his mother on Facebook and send messages to [Mr. Ragland].
And let's talk about Ms. Ragland's behavior in court yesterday. Well, first let's talk about before court. On the day that Ms. Ragland is coming to court, [Ms. Ragland] makes a [Facebook] post, . . . and this is introduced into evidence as "Robert #3". [Ms. Ragland] posts a song called I don't like Mondays, as an explanation maybe she said she doesn't like Mondays, but I'd like to point out that yesterday was Wednesday. This song is about a mass shooting at an elementary school, and the lack of remorse that the shooter had. [Ms. Ragland] posts lyrics which include the inexplicable [nature] of evil's thirst for destruction, I want to shoot it all down, down, down, shoot it all down. Mr. Ragland testified that the two of them have discussed the song, and she does know what this song is about,
When questioned about it, [Ms. Ragland] responded that it was about Mr. Ragland's attorney trying to destroy her relationship with the children. I'm sorry, that's no less scary. That's no less scary. It shows a total - a total lack of self control, and lack of insight to come to court, on a day that you're having a hearing on domestic violence and post a very violent song, and then say it's about Mr. Ragland's attorney. The lack of self control that that shows is beyond comprehension, and let me just note that Ms. Ragland signed off the zoom the minute anything negative was said about her, because [Ms. Ragland] has zero self control.
[Ms. Ragland's] behavior in court was an example of her - an inability to control herself. [Ms. Ragland] started out being - smirking and smiling at the court, making faces. Then [Ms. Ragland] got on the stand, she was down right belligerent, argumentative. [Ms. Ragland] was argumentative with the court, talking over both [Mr. Ragland's] counsel, and over the court, despite numerous warnings. [Ms. Ragland] refused to stop talking when objections were made. [Ms. Ragland] talked over the court. [Ms. Ragland] talked - argued about rulings, she blurted out statements from the counsel table. [Ms. Ragland] was disturbingly staring unblinkingly daggers at - I couldn't tell whether it was Ms. Downs [Mr. Ragland's counsel] or [Mr. Ragland], but it was very uncomfortable to observe.
The range of emotions that Ms. Ragland . . . wears on her face for everyone to see, and her lack of control is quite astonishing to witness, 1 mean, it is astonishing to witness.
I'm very, very disturbed by Ms. Ragland .... [Ms. Ragland's]--I mean, fearfully disturbed. [Ms. Ragland's] a scary person, and I hope - I hope and pray that she gets the help that she needs.
In reviewing this matter, we find the trial court very carefully considered all of the evidence and testimony presented. Likewise, we have thoroughly reviewed the record and find that it does not demonstrate that the trial court's factual findings were manifestly erroneous. Moreover, while the trial court's reasonable evaluations of credibility and reasonable inferences of fact are accorded great deference, in this case the trial court described Ms. Ragland's behavior in the court room in great detail so as to give additional support for her findings. We conclude that the evidence in the record supports the trial court's extensive and detailed findings.
In reviewing Ms. Ragland's specific contentions that the trial court erred in its judgment, we first address Ms. Ragland's contention that there was no evidence in the record about why the children changed schools. This contention has no merit. Mr. Ragland responded affirmatively to the question, "Was there a reputation about the Ragland kids at St. James as a result of their mom?" He was then asked whether that was one of the factors leading to them changing schools, but Mr. Ragland was tendered as a witness before he answered the question.
As to Ms. Ragland's contention that the trial court improperly considered hearsay evidence in reviewing W.R.'s diary pages, Ms. Ragland failed to object at trial to that evidence. Louisiana Code of Evidence article 103 provides, in part, that error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits evidence unless a timely objection is made. To preserve an evidentiary issue for appellate review, it is essential that the complaining party enter a contemporaneous objection to the testimony and state the reasons for the objection. Landry v. Doe, 2019-0880 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/26/20), 307 So.3d 1064, 1075 n.6, writs denied. 2020-00952 (La. 10/20/20), 303 So.3d 313; 2020-00948 (La. 10/20/20), 303 So.3d 316. As to Ms. Ragland's contention that the trial court erred in considering the transcripts of the phone calls that Mr. Ragland prepared, Mr. Ragland was a participant in the conversation and a witness. Moreover, the trial court stated that it would listen to the flash drive recording simultaneously while reading the transcript.
After a careful review of the record and the parties' contentions, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the February 3,2022 protective order. The legislative purpose of the Domestic Abuse Assistance statutes is to afford the victims of domestic abuse immediate and easily accessible protection. See La. R.S. 46:2131. Although the parties' testimony conflicted, in matters of credibility, an appellate court gives great deference to the findings of the trier of fact as the trial court is in the best position to view the demeanor and mannerisms of the witnesses. An appellate court must be cautious not to reweigh the evidence or substitute its own factual findings for those of the trial court. Eisenhardt v. Snook, 2008-1287 (La. 3/17/09), 8 So.3d 541, 545. The trial court's evaluations of credibility and its inferences of fact were reasonable and we will not disturb them. In cases under the Domestic Abuse Assistance statutes, the trial court must determine the proper action that must be taken to protect parties from further and possibly more harmful incidents of abuse. Under the factual circumstances of this case, we find the trial court's issuance of the protective order was proper, and Ms. Ragland's second assignment of error has no merit.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, we affirm the February 3, 2022 protective order issued by the trial court and, pursuant to La. R.S. 46:2136.1(A), assess the costs of this appeal against Katherine Diamond Ragland.
AFFIRMED.