Opinion
Nos. 5-925 / 05-1103, 5-926 / 05-1110
Filed March 1, 2006
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Thomas M. Horan, Judge.
Plaintiffs appeal the dismissal of their petitions against the State of Iowa for its negligence arising from the escape of two inmates. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Hugh G. Albrecht of Tom Riley Law Firm, P.L.C., Cedar Rapids, for appellants.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, William A. Hill, Assistant Attorney General, and Harold L. Denton, County Attorney.
Heard by Huitink, P.J., and Vaitheswaran and Eisenhauer, JJ.
In these appeals from the dismissal of two petitions, we are asked to decide whether (1) the State owes a duty to individuals injured by escaped inmates and (2) the public duty doctrine immunizes the State from liability. We reverse and remand.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
Mark Trunecek and Myron Raas sued the State of Iowa, alleging they were injured by two inmates who escaped from the Iowa Medical and Classification Center in Oakdale, Iowa. According to the petitions, the inmates attacked and carjacked Myron Raas in the parking lot of the facility and attacked Mark Trunecek outside the facility. The plaintiffs alleged the State was negligent in failing to (1) properly supervise the inmates, (2) properly maintain the Oakdale facility, and (3) provide proper security at the facility.
The State moved to dismiss the petitions on the ground that the claims were barred by the public duty doctrine. The district court granted the motions, finding the State owed Trunecek and Raas no statutory or common law duty to supervise its inmates or maintain its facility. The court also found the public duty doctrine applied to bar their claims. These appeals followed. II. Scope of Review
We grant the plaintiffs' motions to consolidate these appeals.
We review rulings on motions to dismiss for errors of law. Pennsylvania Life Ins. Co. v. Simoni, 641 N.W.2d 807, 810 (Iowa 2002). An order granting a motion to dismiss will be upheld only "if the petition on its face fails to state a cause of action upon which relief could be granted under any circumstances." Fitzpatrick v. State, 439 N.W.2d 663, 665 (Iowa 1989).
III. Duty
Whether the State owed the plaintiffs a duty is the first of several elements of their negligence claim. It is the only element at issue here. Kolbe v. State, 625 N.W.2d 721, 725 (Iowa 2001).
A. Statutory Duty
The plaintiffs assert the State owed them a statutory duty of protection under Iowa Code section 904.102(4) and another provision. Section 904.102(4) (2005) states:
The Iowa department of corrections is established to be responsible for the control, treatment and rehabilitation of offenders committed under law to the following institutions: . . .
(4) Iowa medical and classification center.
After reviewing this provision, the district court concluded:
[N]either legislative enactment provides or contemplates, neither explicitly nor implicitly, that a party may state a private claim for negligence against and/or recover money damages from the State. Plaintiff has failed to meet the requirements of the four-factor test relied on by the Iowa Supreme Court, and therefore, has failed to state a statutory basis for his negligence claim against the State.
The district court issued the same order in both cases.
We find no error in this conclusion. The district court accurately applied well-established principles for deciding whether a statutory duty exists. See Kolbe, 625 N.W.2d at 726. Nothing in Iowa Code chapter 904, titled "Department of Corrections," can be read to create a private cause of action in tort. That chapter simply defines the duties of this agency and the institutions it controls.
B. Common Law Duty
We turn to the plaintiffs' argument concerning a common-law duty. To support this duty, the plaintiffs rely on the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Specifically, they argue that "Section 315(a) in conjunction with Section 319 imposes a duty on the State of Iowa to exercise reasonable control over its prisoners to prevent those prisoners from doing harm to others, no matter who the victim may be." We will address each of these provisions.
1. Section 315(a).
Restatement (Second) of Torts section 315(a), at 122 (1965) states:
There is no duty so to control the conduct of a third person as to prevent him from causing physical harm to another unless
a. a special relation exists between the actor and the third person which imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third person's conduct.
The Iowa supreme court addressed this provision in Leonard v. State, 491 N.W.2d 508 (Iowa 1992). There, a psychiatrist discharged a patient from a mental health facility. Id. at 510. The patient subsequently injured a member of the public and that member sued the State. Id. Citing section 315(a), the court stated: "There can be little doubt that a special relationship existed between [the patient] and his treating physician." Leonard, 491 N.W.2d at 511. In light of the relationship, the court found that the facility "had a duty to control [the patient's] conduct, or at least not negligently release him from custody." Id. The court noted, however, that the provisions of section 315 did not answer the following question: "Does the duty to refrain from negligently releasing dangerous persons from custody run from the custodian to the public at large or only to the reasonably foreseeable victims of the patient's dangerous tendencies?" Id. On this question, the court held that "a psychiatrist owes no duty of care to an individual member of the general public for decisions regarding the treatment and release of mentally ill persons from confinement." Id. at 512. Although acknowledging that other jurisdictions have reached a contrary conclusion, the court reasoned that, "[i]n analogous cases in Iowa, this court has viewed the duties described in Restatement section 315 and 319 quite narrowly, guided by the principle that the scope of the duty turns on the foreseeability of harm to the injured person." Id. at 511. The court cited the "strong public policy concerns about the potential for limitless liability when an individual's decision might affect the general public." Id. at 512.
As in Leonard, we have no trouble concluding that a special relationship existed between the State and the inmates under its control, pursuant to section 315(a). We also have no trouble concluding that, by virtue of this special relationship, the State had a duty to control the inmates' conduct. By its terms, section 315(a) imposes a duty of control upon an actor (the State) having a special relationship with others (inmates). Cf. In re Votteler's Estate, 327 N.W.2d 759, 762 (Iowa 1982) (citing jurisdictions that have declined to dismiss allegations of failure to control).
The inquiry arguably could end here. In Leonard, however, the Iowa supreme court adopted an additional foreseeability requirement. Leonard, 491 N.W.2d at 511-12; see also J.A.H. ex rel. R.M.H. v. Wadle Assoc., P.C., 589 N.W.2d 256, 259 (Iowa 1999); cf. Cansler v. State, 675 P.2d 57, 65-66 (Kan. 1984) (finding duty to control inmates to prevent foreseeable injury). This requirement absolves the State of liability as a matter of law if it could not foresee the harm to the particular individuals who are suing. Leonard, 491 N.W.2d at 512.
Under Restatement section 315(a), a duty is established by identifying a special relationship between the actor and a third-party. Subsequent provisions specify relationships that will create a duty. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Torts § 319, at 129 (1965).
We concede foreseeability is key to resolving a negligence claim. Forseeability may relate more to the proximate cause element rather than the duty element. See Don F. Vaccaro, Annotation, Liability of Public Officer or Body for Harm Done by Prisoner Permitted to Escape, 44 A.L.R.3d 899, 901 (1972).
We turn to the plaintiffs' petitions to determine whether foreseeability was alleged. According to Trunecek's allegations, he was attacked while "fishing in the Iowa River near Salon Lake Road in Johnson County, Iowa." We cannot conclude as a matter of law that the State was unable to foresee the harm to Trunecek "under any circumstances." Fitzpatrick, 439 N.W.2d at 665. In Fitzpatrick, the court was able to affirm a dismissal in light of "the rather detailed allegations of the petition." Id. at 664. Similarly, Leonard was resolved on a summary judgment record. 491 N.W.2d at 509. Here, in contrast, we have a single allegation concerning the location of the incident. We are obliged to view this allegation in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Fitzpatrick, 439 N.W.2d at 665. Viewed in this light, the foreseeability question cannot be resolved against Trunecek as a matter of law.
Raas's petition alleges that Raas was "lawfully in the parking lot of the Oakdale Facility having gone to the Facility that day during regularly scheduled visiting hours to visit a family member incarcerated at the Facility." We conclude this allegation precludes dismissal as a matter of law on the ground the harm was unforeseeable. According to this allegation, Raas was in a location under the control of the State at a time when he was authorized to be there. Viewed in a light most favorable to Raas, this is an allegation that the State should have been able to foresee the harm that occurred to him on its premises.
Because we cannot conclude as a matter of law that the harm to the plaintiffs was unforeseeable, we conclude the district court erred in dismissing the petitions to the extent they sought to establish a common-law duty under section 315(a).
2. Section 319.
As noted, the plaintiffs also relied on Restatement section 319. They contend this provision defines the special relationship that exists under section 315(a). They are correct that section 319 together with certain other provisions "identify the special relationships and circumstances under which liability can be imposed on the actor." Hildenbrand v. Cox, 369 N.W.2d 411, 415 (Iowa 1985). They are also correct that section 319 bears on our discussion of duty. It provides:
One who takes charge of a third person whom he knows or should know to be likely to cause bodily harm to others if not controlled is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to control the third person to prevent him from doing such harm.
Section 319 imposes a duty "to exercise reasonable care to control the third person to prevent him from doing such harm." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 319, at 129 (1965). The following illustration from the Restatement is pertinent:
A operates a private sanitarium for the insane. Through the negligence of the guards employed by A, B, a homicidal maniac, is permitted to escape. B attacks and causes harm to C. A is subject to liability to C.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 319 illustration 2, at 130. This provision clarifies that a special relationship existed between the inmates and the State under section 315(a) and the State possessed a duty to control them. See Leonard, 491 N.W.2d at 511.
3. Section 315(b).
The State contends that the focus should not be on the relationship between the State and the inmates but on the relationship between the State and the plaintiffs. It argues that "there was no special relationship between the State of Iowa and [the plaintiffs] which would establish such negligence." The State's argument implicates section 315(b), which provides:
There is no duty so to control the conduct of a third person as to prevent him from causing physical harm to another unless. . . .
b. a special relation exists between the actor and the other which gives to the other a right to protection.
We agree with the State that section 315(b) addresses situations in which a special relationship exists between the State and the injured party. Leonard, 491 N.W.2d at 511. We disagree that the provision assists the State.
We begin with Trunecek's petition. He did not allege any relationship between himself and the State. Instead, he relied exclusively on the alleged dury of the State to control the inmates, a duty that implicates section 315(a). Because Trunecek was not required to allege a special relationship between himself and the State in order to state a claim for relief, the State could not rely on the absence of such a special relationship to obtain dismissal of the petition. Section 315(b) has no bearing on Trunecek's petition.
Section 315(b) does bear on Raas's petition. He alleged he was on State property at the time of the incident with the inmates. As an authorized visitor on State property, Ross arguably had a "special relation" with the State and was entitled to protection from the State under section 315(b). Therefore, Raas alleged a common-law duty under section 315(b), as well as section 315(a), which precludes dismissal of his petition.
In reaching this conclusion, we have considered Fitzpatrick v. State, 439 N.W.2d 663 (Iowa 1989), cited by the State. There, a police officer alleged he was shot and seriously injured by a parolee. Fitzpatrick, 439 N.W.2d at 663. The court held the plaintiff "failed to plead or establish a course of conduct between herself and the State which would create a relationship that would form the basis of a duty to her individually." Id. at 666-67. This holding is entirely consistent with our conclusions regarding Trunecek and Raas. Like Fitzpatrick, Trunecek did not plead a special relationship with the State that implicated a duty under section 315(b). Unlike Fitzpatrick, Raas pled a special relationship with the State, implicating a duty owing under section 315(b).
There may be some question as to whether the court relied on section 315(a) or section 315(b) in Fitzpatrick. We believe the court's framing of the issue and its holding implicate section 315(b) rather than section 315(a). Specifically, the court spoke of the relationship between public officials and third parties (section 315(b)) rather than the relationship between public officials and the persons they controlled (section 315(a)). Fitzpatrick, 439 N.W.2d at 667. The court also relied on an opinion that addressed the public duty to protect rather than the public duty to control. Id. (citing Hildenbrand v. Cox, 369 N.W.2d 411, 415 (Iowa 1985) (holding plaintiff did not show that officer and city had a special relationship with citizen that would give rise to common-law duty to protect him from harming himself)). Finally, the court addressed section 315(a) only to note that it had been cited in a prior case but was never formally adopted. Fitzpatrick, 439 N.W.2d at 666 (quoting Anthony v. State, 374 N.W.2d 662, 668 (Iowa 1985) (finding it unnecessary to decide "whether to recognize [section 315(a)] or whether it would apply in the present facts")). As Fitzpatrick was resolved on the ground that there was no relationship between the injured party and the public officials, it does not compel a different conclusion than we have reached here.
We have also considered Kolbe v. State, 625 N.W.2d 721 (Iowa 2001), cited by the State. There, the court framed the duty issue as follows: whether the Kolbes had a special relationship with the State that gave them the right of protection. Kolbe, 625 N.W.2d at 728. This language implicates section 315(b). The court found "no special relationship existing between the State and the victim." Id. at 730.
We have similarly concluded that Trunecek did not plead a special relationship between himself and the State. We have also noted that Raas did plead such a relationship between himself and the State. We are not persuaded that the court's holding in Kolbe is inconsistent with our disposition.
IV. Public Duty Doctrine
This brings us to the public duty doctrine. This doctrine provides that "if a duty is owed to the public generally, there is no liability to an individual member of that group." Kolbe, 625 N.W.2d at 729. Although the doctrine was called into question in earlier opinions, the Iowa supreme court has not "expressly abolished" it. Id. Instead, the Court has "narrowed its application." Id. Now, the doctrine mirrors "the rules of Restatement (Second) of Torts section 315." Id. Because the public duty doctrine is coextensive with section 315, that doctrine adds nothing to our analysis. Simply put, our analysis begins and ends with section 315, supplemented by section 319.
See Adam v. State, 380 N.W.2d 716, 724 (Iowa 1986); Wilson v. Nepstad, 282 N.W.2d 664, 667-68 (Iowa 1979).
V. Disposition
We reverse the dismissal of the petitions and remand for further proceedings.