Opinion
No. 994 C.D. 2012
11-30-2012
Justa M. Quinones v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, Appellant
BEFORE: HONORABLE DAN PELLEGRINI, President Judge HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge HONORABLE JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY PRESIDENT JUDGE PELLEGRINI
The Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing (Department) appeals the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County (trial court) sustaining the statutory appeal of Justa M. Quinones (Licensee) and rescinding the one-year license suspension imposed by the Department pursuant to Section 1543 of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa. C.S. §1543. We reverse.
75 Pa. C.S. §1543(a), (c)(1) states, in pertinent part:
(a) Offense defined.—Except as provided in subsection (b), any person who drives a motor vehicle on any highway or trafficway of this Commonwealth after the commencement of a suspension ... of the operating privilege and before the operating privilege has been restored is guilty of a summary offense and shall, upon conviction, be sentenced to pay a fine of $200.
* * *
(c) Suspension or revocation of operating privilege.—Upon receiving a certified record of the conviction of any person under this section, the department shall suspend ... that person's operating privilege as follows:
(1) If the department's records show that the person was under suspension ... on the date of violation and had not been restored, the department shall suspend the person's operating privilege for an additional one-year period.
On April 19, 2011, the Department sent Licensee notice that her driving privilege would be suspended effective May 10, 2011, pursuant to Section 1533(a) of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa. C.S. §1533(a), for failing to respond to a citation that was issued on March 8, 2011, based on her violation of Section 4703 of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa. C.S. §4703. The notice explained that Licensee would not be allowed to drive a motor vehicle on or after May 10, 2011, unless she was notified in writing by the Department that her driving privilege was restored. The notice also stated that it was a final order of suspension and explained that Licensee could avoid the one-year license suspension if she responded to the citation before the May 10, 2011 effective date of the suspension.
75 Pa. C.S. §1533(a) states:
(a) Violations within Commonwealth.—The department shall suspend the operating privilege of any person who has failed to respond to a citation or summons to appear before an issuing authority or a court of competent jurisdiction of this Commonwealth for any violation of this title, other than parking, or who has failed to pay any fine or costs imposed by an issuing authority or such courts for violation of this title, other than parking, upon being duly notified by an issuing authority or a court of this Commonwealth.
75 Pa. C.S. §4703(a) states, in pertinent part:
(a) General rule.—Except as otherwise provided in this section, no motor vehicle required to bear current registration plates issued by this Commonwealth ... shall be driven ... unless the vehicle displays a currently valid certificate of inspection issued under this chapter.
On May 17, 2011, Licensee went to the district justice's office and paid the fine and costs owed on the March 8, 2011 citation. On July 12, 2011, Licensee was cited with operating a motor vehicle while her license was suspended in violation of 75 Pa. C.S. §1543(a). On July 13, 2011, the Department sent Licensee notice that her driving privilege was restored effective on that date.
On October 19, 2011, Licensee was convicted of operating a motor vehicle while her license was suspended in violation of 75 Pa. C.S. §1543(a). On October 27, 2011, the Department sent Licensee notice that her driving privilege was suspended for one year effective December 1, 2011, based on her October 19, 2011 conviction for driving while her license was suspended. Licensee then appealed the one-year license suspension to the trial court.
Before the trial court, the Department entered into evidence a packet of documents under certification of cover and seal which included the Conviction Detail report of Licensee's July 12, 2011 conviction for driving while her license was suspended and her Certified Driving History which indicated that her operating privilege was suspended effective May 10, 2011, and that it was not restored until July 13, 2011. (Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 23a-38a.)
Licensee then testified that she paid the March 8, 2011 citation on May 17, 2011, at the district justice's office and that she was unaware that her license had been suspended until July 2011. She also testified that after receiving notice of the license suspension, she went to the district court and was told that everything had been taken care of, that the case was closed, and that the DL-38 form that was requested was canceled on May 17, 2011.
The trial court found Licensee's testimony credible and determined that it constituted "clear and convincing evidence" that the Department's records indicating that her operating privilege was suspended at the time that she violated 75 Pa. C.S. §1543(a) on July 12, 2011, were incorrect. Accordingly, the trial court sustained Licensee's appeal and rescinded the Department's 75 Pa. C.S. §1543 one-year license suspension. The Department then filed the instant appeal.
In this appeal, the Department claims that the trial court erred in sustaining Licensee's appeal and rescinding the 75 Pa. C.S. §1543 one-year license suspension because its records correctly show that she was convicted of driving while her license was suspended and that her operating privilege was suspended on July 12, 2011, when she was cited for this violation.
This Court's review is limited to determining whether the trial court's findings are supported by competent evidence, whether errors of law were committed, or whether the trial court's determination demonstrates a manifest abuse of discretion. Department of Transportation v. Renwick, 543 Pa. 122, 126 n.2, 669 A.2d 934, 936 n.2 (1996). By order dated October 25, 2012, we precluded Licensee from filing a brief because she failed to comply with this Court's September 24, 2012 order directing her to file a brief within 14 days.
When a one-year license suspension is imposed pursuant to 75 Pa. C.S. §1543(c)(1), it is the Department's burden to prove that it complied with the applicable law and to show that its records reflect that a licensee's operating privilege was under suspension at the time of the violation of 75 Pa. C.S. §1543(a) giving rise to the suspension. Department of Transportation v. Diamond[], 616 A.2d 1105, 1107 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992), appeal dismissed, 539 Pa. 382, 652 A.2d 826 (1995). The Department's submission of a certified conviction report and a certified driving history establishes a rebuttable presumption that the licensee was convicted of the 75 Pa. C.S. §1543(a) offense, and that his or her operating privilege was suspended at the time of the offense to support a one-year suspension under 75 Pa. C.S. §1543(c)(1). Id. at 1107. Once the Department establishes this rebuttable presumption, the burden then shifts to the licensee to present "clear and convincing evidence" that the Department's evidence is erroneous. Id. at 1107-08. "'[C]lear and convincing evidence' has been defined as 'evidence that is so clear and direct as to permit the trier of fact to reach a clear conviction, without hesitancy, as to the truth of the facts at issue.'" Mateskovich v. Department of Transportation[], 755 A.2d 100, 102 n.6 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000) (citation omitted).
The "clear and convincing evidence" upon which the trial court relied to determine that the Department's evidence was erroneous was Licensee's testimony that she went to the district court, paid her ticket, and was then told that everything had been taken care of and that the case was closed. However, Licensee's testimony is not "clear and convincing evidence" to establish that the Department's certified documents are erroneous because it does not challenge the Department's certified records, but only establishes that someone at the district court told her that the matter was closed. The Department properly established that Licensee was convicted of violating 75 Pa. C.S. §1543(a), and that her operating privilege was suspended at the time of the offense as required to support a one-year suspension under 75 Pa. C.S. §1543(c)(1).
See Mateskovich, 755 A.2d at 102 ("In this case, Licensee's testimony that the district justice did not find him guilty of the November 13, 1998 citation is not clear and convincing evidence that the certified record is erroneous. To meet this burden, Licensee would have to challenge the regularity of the record or provide other direct evidence as to why the court record was incorrect, i.e., testimony of court personnel that the records were incorrect and that the conviction was never entered by a district justice. See Diamond (a certified copy of an acquittal is sufficiently clear and convincing to rebut the presumption of a conviction which arises from the introduction of [DOT]'s certified record); Fine v. Department of Transportation[], 694 A.2d 364 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997) (certified copy of trial court order reversing Licensee's conviction was sufficiently clear and convincing to rebut presumption); Department of Transportation[] v. Emery, [580 A.2d 909 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1990)] (letter presented by Licensee that contained signature and official seal of district justice and stated that Licensee was found not guilty was clear and convincing evidence sufficient to rebut evidence of conviction); In the Matter of Appeal of Richard Michael George, [515 A.2d 1047 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1986)] (computer printout of driver's record that Licensee received from DOT that did not reflect one of the convictions upon which suspension was based did not rebut correctness of certified record). See also Fell v. Department of Transportation[], 925 A.2d 232, 239 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007) ("Fell failed to present any evidence that he maintained [the required insurance] coverage on the cancellation date of May 14, 2005 and continuously thereafter, and he has not satisfied any of the three defenses in Section 1786(d)(2)(i-iii) [of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa. C.S. §1786(d)(2)(i-iii)]. This Court has held that uncorroborated testimony is insufficient to meet the strict evidentiary standard required to overcome the statutory presumption. Fagan [v. Department of Transportation[], 875 A.2d 1195, 1199 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005)].").
See Diamond, 616 A.2d at 1108 ("[T]herefore, when Diamond was cited on March 15, 1988 (which resulted in the 1990 conviction), his operating privileges were still under indefinite suspension. Pursuant to section 1543(c)(1), DOT could properly suspend Diamond's operating privileges for an additional one-year period.") (emphasis in original). --------
Accordingly, the trial court's order is reversed.
/s/_________
DAN PELLEGRINI, President Judge ORDER
AND NOW, this 30th day of November, 2012, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County, dated April 24, 2012, at 2011-25119, is reversed.
/s/_________
DAN PELLEGRINI, President Judge