Opinion
No. C 00-39 17 SI (pr)
August 16, 2001
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
INTRODUCTION
David Codell Pride, an inmate currently housed at the California State Prison in Corcoran, filed this pro se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his safety and to his medical needs. Defendants now move to dismiss or, alternatively, for summary judgment and Pride opposes the motion. The court finds no triable issues of material fact exist and defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court therefore will grant defendants? motion for summary judgment.
BACKGROUND
Pride alleged in his complaint that he slipped and fell on October 26, 1998 while returning from a shower at Salinas Valley State Prison ("SVSP"). Pride allegedly fell while wearing handcuffs and shower slippers. He alleged that correctional officer Mulkern was his escort officer at the time and was following Sgt. Hooker's orders that all inmates be escorted to the shower in handcuffs. Pride further alleged that he did not receive adequate medical care from Dr. Wittenberg after his fall.
The following facts are undisputed: Pride filed two inmate appeals concerning his fall after the shower and filed one inmate appeal concerning a medical issue. Pride received a second level review of his inmate appeals, but did not obtain a third level review of his inmate appeals in the prison administrative appeal process. Plaintiffs Opposition, Exh. 2; Hill Reply Decl., Exh. 1. Pride filed two tort claim with the California State Board of Control and that both of these claims were rejected by the California State Board of Control. Plaintiffs Opposition, Exh. 1.
VENUE AND JURISDICTION
Venue is proper in the Northern District of California under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 because the events or omissions giving rise to the claims occurred at Salinas Valley State Prison in Monterey County, which is located within the Northern District. This court has federal question jurisdiction overthis action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
LEGAL STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The court will grant summary judgment "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial . . . since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (a fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law, and a dispute about a material fact is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.") The moving party bears the initial burden of identifying those portions of the record which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to "go beyond the pleadings, and by his own affidavits, or by the "depositions, answers to interrogatories, or admissions on file,' designate "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."' Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (citations omitted). The court's function on a summary judgment motion is not to make credibility determinations or weigh conflicting evidence with respect to a disputed material fact. See T.W. Elec. Serv. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving Party, and the inferences to be drawn from the facts must be viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See id. at 631.
DISCUSSION
The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub.L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) ("PLRA"), amended 42 U.S.C. § 1997e to provide that "[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [ 42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Until recently, the law had been that exhaustion was not required for California prisoners who sought only damages. See Rumbles v. Hill, 182 F.3d 1064, 1068-69 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 787 (2000), overruled by Booth v. Churner, 121 S.Ct. 1819 (2001). Rumbles determined that the California prison administrative grievance and appeal system was not an "available remedy" within the meaning of § 1997e(a) to a prisoner who sought money damages because monetary relief was not available in the administrative grievance and appeal system except for claims for lost or damaged personal property. See Rumbles, 182 at 1068-69. Rumbles, is no longer good law in light of Booth v. Churner, in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that even if an inmate sought only money damages, he had to complete the prison administrative grievance process that could provide some sort of relief on the complaint stated. See Booth v. Churner, 121 S.Ct. at 1825.
Even though Booth was decided after Pride filed this action, it applies to him. When the Supreme Court applies a rule of fedral law to the parties before it, as it did in Booth, that rule is the controlling interpretation of fedral law and must be given full effect in all cases still open on direct review and as to all events, re ardless of whether such events predate or postdate the announcement of the rule. Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 94-99 (1993).
The State of California provides its inmates and parolees the right to appeal administratively "any departmental decision, action, condition or policy perceived by those individuals as adversely affecting their welfare." See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.1(a). In order to exhaust available administrative remedies within this system, a prisoner must proceed through several levels of appeal: (1) informal resolution, (2) formal written appeal on a CDC 602 inmate appeal form, (3) second level appeal to the institution head or designee, and (4) third level appeal to the Director of the California Department of Corrections. See id. § 3084.5; Barry v. Ratelle, 985 F. Supp. 1235, 1237 (S.D. Cal. 1997). Some relief is available under the California prison administrative grievance system for aggrieved prisoners.
It is undisputed that Pride did not file a third level appeal to the Director ofthe California Department of Corrections and did not obtain a decision therefrom on his claims that defendants had been deliberately indifferent to his medical needs and safety. Pride did not pursue his administrative grievance to the highest level available under the prison administrative grievance and appeal system before filing this action as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The plain language of § 1997e(a) makes exhaustion a precondition to filing in federal court: "No action shall be brought . . . until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted."
Pride's presentation of his claims to the California State Board of Control does not affect the outcome. Presentation of a claim to the State Board of Control does not exhaust remedies within the prison appeal system because the State Board of Control is not part of the prison appeal system. In passing Section 1997e, while "Congress certainly intended to require prisoners to exhaust available administrative grievance procedures, there is no indication that it intended prisoners also to exhaust state tort claim procedures." Rumbles v. Hill, 182 F.3d at 1070.
Pride's case suffers from a failure of proof on the essential requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Pride and drawing the inferences therefrom in his favor, no reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of Pride and against any defendant. Defendants are entitled to summary judgment.
This action is being decided on the summary judgment motion rather than the motion to dismiss because it is necessary to go beyond the pleadings to consider the parties' evidence regarding the exhaustion of administrative remedies. Nonetheless, the decision in this action does not forever terminate Pride's ability to seek redress for the wrongs he allegedly suffered. Pride may return to court to file a new action and pursue his legal remedies after he exhausts his administrative remedies, subject to any applicable statute of limitations or other defenses.
CONCLUSION
Defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED (Docket #11). This action is dismissed without prejudice to Pride filing a new action after he exhausts the available administrative remedies.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
JUDGMENT
This action is dismissed without prejudice because plaintiff did not exhaust his administrative remedies before filing his complaint.
IT IS SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED.