Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Super. Ct.No. RCV083784 Frederick A. Mandabach, Judge.
Law Offices of Gloria Dredd Haney and Gloria Dredd Haney for Plaintiff and Appellant.
No appearance for Defendant.
Liebert Cassidy Whitmore, Peter J. Brown, Ruth Graf-Urasaki and Jennifer R. Hong for Real Party in Interest and Respondent.
OPINION
McKinster, J.
James Powell, plaintiff and appellant (hereafter plaintiff), appeals from the judgment entered against him after the trial court denied his petition for writ of administrative mandamus filed under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. Plaintiff filed the writ petition after an administrative law judge upheld the decision of Chaffey Community College District, real party in interest and respondent (hereafter the District), to terminate plaintiff’s employment as a faculty member at Chaffey Community College because, among other things, plaintiff had sex with a student who was enrolled in one of his classes, lied about it, and then falsely implied that another faculty member was the person who had actually had sex with the student. The trial court considered the evidence that had been presented at the administrative hearing and found that it supported the District’s decision to terminate plaintiff’s employment because plaintiff’s actions constituted unprofessional conduct and dishonesty within the meaning of Education Code section 87732, subdivisions (a) and (b), and that plaintiff was unfit for service under subdivision (d) of Education Code section 87732. Despite the length of plaintiff’s opening brief, the only issue in this appeal is whether substantial evidence supports the trial court’s determination. We conclude that it does, and therefore we will affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
According to the trial court’s statement of decision, on December 18, 2001, plaintiff had sex with Ana Villalobos, a student in one of plaintiff’s classes. The trial court also found that plaintiff had been dishonest during the District’s investigation of the incident and also in his testimony at the administrative hearing. In addition, the trial court found that plaintiff tried to cover up his conduct by falsely accusing a fellow faculty member of having had sex with Ms. Villalobos.
According to the evidence presented at the administrative hearing, plaintiff’s relationship with Ms. Villalobos came to light toward the middle or end of January 2002, when she falsely reported both to Chaffey Community College personnel and to law enforcement that she had been raped by plaintiff. When contacted by a law enforcement officer who was investigating the rape claim, Ms. Villalobos immediately recanted the accusation and explained that after she had confessed to her husband that she had had sex with plaintiff, her husband forced her to make the rape claim. The truth, according to Ms. Villalobos, was that she and plaintiff had consensual sex on the desk in plaintiff’s office at Chaffey Community College. The encounter occurred while plaintiff was taking a break from a final examination he was giving in one of his classes.
To refute Ms. Villalobos’s claim, plaintiff among other things, submitted declarations from students who were taking the exam in question, all of whom saw plaintiff in the classroom at various times during the exam, but none of whom individually or collectively could account for plaintiff’s whereabouts for the entire time in question.
The District terminated plaintiff’s employment on November 21, 2002, after conducting a lengthy investigation and concluding that he had violated various provisions of the Education Code, including Education Code section 87732, subdivision (a) which proscribes immoral and unprofessional conduct. Plaintiff requested and obtained an administrative hearing to review the District’s decision to terminate his employment. After an 11-day hearing, at which Ms. Villalobos and others testified, the administrative law judge affirmed the District’s decision. Plaintiff then sought judicial review by filing a petition for writ of administrative mandamus in October 2004. The trial court denied plaintiff’s writ in July 2005, and issued its statement of decision in August 2005. Plaintiff appeals from the subsequently entered judgment.
The District challenges the timeliness of plaintiff’s appeal on both statutory and equitable grounds. First, the District asserts that the trial court’s July 2005 minute order denying plaintiff’s writ petition was an appealable order that started the time running on his appeal. An order denying a petition for writ of mandate that disposes of all the issues between the parties is in effect a judgment and as such is appealable, “unless the trial court contemplated further orders or action on the petition.” (Breslin v. City and County of San Francisco (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1064, 1073.) The trial court’s minute order in this case anticipated further action in that it directed counsel for the District to prepare a statement of decision. Consequently that minute order was not appealable. The District also claims that plaintiff’s appeal is barred under the doctrine of laches but Johnson v. City of Loma Linda (2000) 24 Cal.4th 61, the authority the District cites to support that argument, does not involve an appeal from a trial court’s order denying a petition for writ of mandate; it involves failure to file such a petition in order to challenge findings made in an administrative hearing. Because the District does not cite any authority to support its claim that this appeal is subject to the equitable principle of laches, we must reject the claim. In doing so we note that plaintiff initially purported to appeal from the statement of decision, an appeal we dismissed, without prejudice, in February 2006 because a statement of decision is not an appealable order. Apparently unaware that either party may request entry of a judgment, plaintiff’s attorney spent some number of months attempting to persuade the District to have the judgment entered in this case. Eventually, counsel learned, “after researching,” that plaintiff could submit the judgment and request that it be entered. The judgment was entered on October 11, 2006. This appeal was filed December 4, 2006, and therefore is timely.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s denial of the writ petition. In addressing plaintiff’s claim we begin with the settled principle that a trial court reviews an administrative decision under the independent judgment standard of review, but in doing so “must afford a strong presumption of correctness concerning the administrative findings, and the party challenging the administrative decision bears the burden of convincing the court that the administrative findings are contrary to the weight of the evidence.” (Fukuda v. City of Angels (1999) 20 Cal.4th 805, 817.) On appeal, we review the trial court’s determination under the substantial evidence test. (Id. at p. 824.) “The question on appeal is whether the evidence reveals substantial support—contradicted or uncontradicted—for the trial court’s conclusion that the weight of the evidence supports the [administrative agency’s] findings of fact.” (Breslin v. City and County of San Francisco, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at p. 1078.) Plaintiff does not dispute the standard of review, but in claiming that the weight of the evidence is insufficient to support the decision to terminate his employment, he cites only the evidence that supports his claim. In doing so, plaintiff has not met his burden on appeal of demonstrating that error occurred. For that reason alone we may reject his claim on appeal. More importantly, the evidence presented at the administrative hearing, and recounted in part above, supports the findings, set out in the trial court’s statement of decision, that plaintiff had a sexual relationship with a student who was enrolled in one of plaintiff’s classes, that plaintiff lied to cover up the relationship, and also falsely accused a fellow faculty member of having had sex with the student in question. Those facts support the conclusion that plaintiff engaged in dishonesty and unprofessional conduct, which in turn rendered him unfit for service, all of which constitute grounds for his dismissal from employment under Education Code section 87732, subdivisions (a), (b), and (d).
Despite the standard of review and the evidence that supports his dismissal, plaintiff persists in citing other evidence that supports his version of events, and also contends that in any case Ms. Villalobos is not credible because she admittedly lied when she initially claimed to have been raped by plaintiff. Those issues were resolved against plaintiff, first in the administrative hearing, and then again in the trial court. We may not reweigh the evidence and reach a different conclusion; instead we are limited on appeal to determining whether the trial court’s resolution of the issues is supported by substantial evidence. (Dart Industries, Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1059, 1076; Munoz v. Olin (1979) 24 Cal.3d 629, 635; Nestle v. City of Santa Monica (1972) 6 Cal.3d 920, 925; Breslin v. City and County of San Francisco, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1077-1078.) In this case the administrative law judge, as the trier of fact, was aware of the potential discrepancies and conflicts in the evidence, but nevertheless believed Ms. Villalobos’s testimony, and the testimony of other witnesses who appeared at the administrative hearing and recounted events that the District relied on in terminating plaintiff’s employment. The trial court reviewed the administrative record and independently found that the evidence supported the District’s decision to terminate plaintiff’s employment. Because we conclude the record includes evidence to support the trial court’s finding that the weight of the evidence supports the administrative law judge’s decision, we must affirm the judgment.
We will not recount the evidence plaintiff relies on and instead note that it is set out at great length and detail in plaintiff’s opening brief.
DISPOSTION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: Ramirez, P.J., Miller, J.