Opinion
No. CV 02 0069396
May 19, 2003
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
On December 6, 2002, the pro se plaintiff, Gloria Porter, commenced this action by filing a complaint against the defendant, North Grosvenordale Restoration L.P. On February 4, 2003, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint on the ground that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Specifically, the defendant argues that the plaintiff filed her complaint in the wrong division of the Superior Court. The defendant contends that several of the claims raised in the plaintiff's complaint address housing issues, pursuant to General Statutes § 47a-68, and, therefore, should have been made returnable to the housing court located at Windham at Danielson at Geographical Area 11. The defendant further argues that the remainder of the plaintiff's claims are not civil causes of action recognized in Connecticut. The plaintiff did not file a memorandum of law in opposition to the defendant's motion to dismiss.
The defendant argues in its brief that it is difficult to determine what the plaintiff is specifically alleging in her complaint. Specifically, the defendant is unclear as to whether each paragraph of the plaintiff's complaint should be construed as separate counts, or if all eight paragraphs constitute a single count complaint. While the defendant's concerns with pro se plaintiff's complaint are perhaps valid, the defendant has not taken the appropriate procedural steps to cure its confusion. See Rowe v. Godou, 209 Conn. 273, 279, 550 A.2d 1073 (1988) ("[T]he proper way to cure any confusion [in the plaintiff's complaint] is to file a motion to revise . . .").
A housing matter is defined as the following: "All actions for back rent, damages, return of security deposits and other relief arising out of the parties' relationship as landlord and tenant or owner and occupant." General Statutes § 47a-68 (h). Because Connecticut General Statutes § 47a-68 is a venue statute and not a jurisdictional statute, "[n]o cause shall fail on the ground that it has been made returnable to an improper location." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) 320 Elm Street Ltd. v. Stark Ltd. Home Ctr., Superior Court at Housing Session, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk at Norwalk, Docket No. CV 95 084146 (March 22, 1996, Tierney, J.) ( 16 Conn.L.Rptr. 356). Thus, pursuant to General Statutes § 51-351, "[e]ven if the appeal were brought to the wrong location, an action is no longer dismissed because of improper venue based on returning it to an improper location." Lantos v. Newtown Planning Zoning Commission, Superior Court, judicial district of Danbury, Docket No. CV 306607 (November 21, 1991, Fuller, J.) ( 6 Conn.L.Rptr. 1130). Accordingly, pursuant to §§ 47a-68 and 51-351, the defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint on the ground that the housing division of the Superior Court has jurisdiction over this matter is without merit.
The defendant further argues that the plaintiff alleges perjury in paragraph four of her complaint. It is the defendant's contention that a cause of action for perjury does not exist in Connecticut. The defendant argues that General Statutes § 53a-156 governs perjury within the criminal context and, therefore, the criminal division has jurisdiction. The defendant concludes that this court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over a cause of action sounding in perjury. Similarly, as an alternative argument to paragraph eight of the complaint, the defendant argues that the plaintiff alleges harassment, and that a cause of action for harassment does not exist in Connecticut. The defendant argues that because neither harassment nor perjury exist under Connecticut law in a civil context, this court, "which is a part of the civil division of the Superior Court" lacks subject matter jurisdiction.
General Statutes § 53a-156 provides: "A person is guilty of perjury if, in any official proceeding, he intentionally, under oath, makes a false statement, swears, affirms or testifies falsely, to a material statement which he does not believe to be true."
"Subject matter jurisdiction involves the authority of the court to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the action before it." Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 485, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003). Despite the defendant's assertion that an unrecognized cause of action in a complaint somehow implicates the court's subject matter jurisdiction, the defendant is essentially attacking the legal sufficiency of the allegations in the plaintiff's complaint. As such, a motion to dismiss is not the appropriate vehicle. See generally, Practice Book §§ 10-31 and 10-39. Moreover, the defendant has not provided the court with any analysis or case law to demonstrate that subject matter jurisdiction is implicated with respect to this claim. Connecticut National Bank v. Giacomi, 242 Conn. 17, 44-45, 699 A.2d 101 (1997) (finding that claims not properly briefed are deemed abandoned).
For the above mentioned reasons, the defendant's motion to dismiss is denied.
Foley, J.