Opinion
NO: 99-0199 SECTION: "R"(3)
April 12, 2001
On January 20, 1999, plaintiffs, Terry Porter, Karen Robinson, and Eldridge Thompson filed this lawsuit against defendant Milliken Michaels, Inc., alleging race discrimination at their place of employment. On March 29, 2000, defendant filed a counterclaim against Karen Robinson alleging that she breached a non-compete agreement. Defendant dismissed its counterclaim without prejudice on June 20, 2000, but it refiled the counterclaim on December 13, 2000. On February 6, 2001, the U.S. District Judge dismissed Eldridge Thompson's claims by granting defendant's unopposed motion for summary judgment.
Rec. Doc. 1.
Rec. Doc. 14.
Rec. Doc. 27.
Rec. Doc. 46.
Rec. Doc. 49.
Before the Court are plaintiffs, Karen Robinson's and Terry Porters, motion to extend cutoff dates for amendments and motion for leave to file a supplemental and amended complaint. Plaintiffs are seeking to file their motion to amend the complaint more than nine months after the deadline for filing amendments to the pleadings.
Plaintiffs claim that they are seeking to add certain facts that were not alleged in the original complaint because they surfaced during the course of their investigation. Karen Robinson is also seeking to add a breach of contract claim to her complaint.
Defendant opposes this motion by stating that all of the allegations alleged in the amended complaint were known by plaintiffs when the lawsuit was filed. Furthermore, defendant argues that, "the case has dragged due to the irresponsibility of the individual plaintiffs" as demonstrated throughout discovery. Defendant also contends that plaintiffs are attempting to advance new theories of discrimination which would be prejudicial and unfair because plaintiffs are alleging new operative facts which will require additional discovery and further depositions.
Defendant's memorandum in opposition to plaintiffs' motion to extend cut-off dates for amendments, p. 2.
In determining whether the motion to amend should be granted, this Court considers the more liberal standards of Rule 15(a) only if the movant satisfies Rule 16(b). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b) states that a party seeking to modify a scheduling order must show good cause. As stated in Howell v. Standard Motor Products, Inc.:
Howell Standard Motor Products Inc. 2001 WL 196969, *1 (N.D.Tex. 2001); McCombs v. Allwaste Recovery Sys., 1999 WL 102816, *1 (N.D.Tex. 1999).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) provides that leave to amend pleadings "shall be freely given when justice so requires." Although Rule 15 "evinces a bias in favor of granting leave to amend," it is not automatic. Southmark Corporation v. Schulte Roth and Zabel, 88 F.3d 311, 314 (5th Cir. 1996)(quoting Wimm v. Jack Eckerd Corp., 3 F.3d 137, 139 (5th Cir. 1993)) A decision to grant leave is within the discretion of the trial court. Its discretion, however, is not broad enough to permit denial if the court lacks a substantial reason to do so. Louisiana v. Litton Mortgage Co., 50 F.3d 1298, 1302-03 (5th Cir. 1995). In deciding whether to grant such leave, the court may consider such factors as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party, and the futility of the amendment.Southmark, 88 F.3d at 314-15.
Howell v. Standard Motor Products. Inc. at *1 (N.D.Tex. 2001). The U.S. District Judge's preliminary conference order clearly states that deadlines may only be extended by the Court upon a proper and timely motion and upon showing of good cause. Rec. Doc. 26.
The "good cause" standard focuses on the diligence of the party seeking to modify the scheduling order. While relevant to an analysis under Rule 15(a), the absence of prejudice to the nonmoving party does not constitute "good cause" under Rule 16(b). Likewise, mere inadvertence by the movant does not satisfy the "good cause" requirement. Instead, the moving party "may demonstrate `good cause' only by showing that, despite his diligence, he could not have reasonably met the scheduling deadline."
Howell v. Standard Motor Products. Inc. at *1, (citations omitted).
Plaintiffs first argue that an extension should be granted because their attorney did not enroll until after the cutoff date. On August 5, 1999, the first preliminary conference was held before the courtroom deputy with plaintiffs' original attorney, Donald Lucas Hyatt, II, Esq., present. Because Mr. Hyatt withdrew from this lawsuit, the U.S. District Judge scheduled another preliminary conference for June 6, 2000.
Rec. Doc. 9.
Rec. Doc. 24.
Plaintiffs' current attorney, Alex Lewis, Esq., enrolled as counsel of record on June 2, 2000. The June 6, 2000, preliminary conference at which Cara Williams, Esq., participated for Alex Lewis, Esq., resulted in an order that all amendments to pleadings be filed no later than 30 days from that date. Therefore, plaintiffs' current counsel was enrolled before the amendment cutoff date.
Rec. Doc. 25.
Rec. Doc. 26.
Plaintiffs argue that "it took some time to completely investigate the case." Plaintiffs have not provided any factual support for their argument. Furthermore, according to defendant, plaintiffs have not taken a single deposition. Defendant states that plaintiffs did not serve it with any written discovery until approximately two weeks ago. Defendant argues that it will need additional time and discovery to address the new factual allegations and claims raised in plaintiff's amended complaint.
Plaintiffs' supplemental memorandum, p. 1.
As previously stated, this lawsuit was filed on January 20, 1999. At the second preliminary conference, July 6, 2000, was set as the new deadline to amend pleadings. Although plaintiffs obtained new counsel on June 2, 2000, plaintiffs had ample time to seek an extension of the amendment deadline.
The pretrial conference is set for June 28, 2001, and trial is scheduled on July 16, 2001. The Court notes that discovery ends on May 29, 2001, and trial is approximately three months away. Plaintiffs have not sought an extension until this late date.
But for the plaintiffs' lack of diligence, plaintiffs could have reasonably met the Court's scheduled deadlines. Plaintiffs have had ample time during the course of this lawsuit to amend their pleadings or seek an extension of the amendment deadline. Because plaintiffs have failed to show "good cause," the Court need not address whether plaintiffs satisfied Rule 15(a).
See Howell v. Standard Motor Products. Inc. at *2; see also Callais v. Vizier, Inc., 2000 WL 278097, *4 (E.D.La. 2000).
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that plaintiffs' motion to extend the cutoff deadlines to file an amended complaint is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs' motion to amend is DENIED.