Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Donald R. Alvarez, Judge, Super.Ct.Nos. SCV120616 & SCV121271
Law Offices of Gregory Richardson and Gregory Richardson for Plaintiff, Cross-Defendant and Appellant.
Mirau, Edwards, Cannon, Lewin & Tooke, William P. Tooke; and Gregory W. Brittain for Defendants, Cross-Complainants and Respondents.
OPINION
Gaut, J.
1. Introduction
This appeal involves a dispute about the governance of the Greater Bethel Missionary Baptist Church in San Bernardino (Bethel). Plaintiffs seek appellate review of three rulings of the trial court: an order sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend on wrongful termination claims involving Bethel’s former pastor, David Buffong; a judicial determination under Corporations Code section 9418 of the validity of an election of the church trustees; and an order granting defendants’ summary judgment motion on plaintiffs’ claims for forcible entry and detainer.
Based on our deferential or independent review, as appropriate, we affirm the trial court on all points.
We deny appellants’ pending “motion for findings of fact” filed in this court on March 5, 2007. (Code Civ. Proc., § 909.) The trial court decides questions of fact and the appellate court decides questions of law. The appellate authority to make factual findings should be exercised sparingly; “[a]bsent exceptional circumstances, no such findings should be made.” (In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 405, citing Tupman v. Haberkern (1929) 208 Cal. 256, 262-263; In re Glorianna K. (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1443, 1450-1451.)
2. Factual and Procedural Background
Bethel, a San Bernardino church, was incorporated in 1966. In November 2002, Bethel hired David Buffong as pastor. In August 2004, after a noticed special joint meeting of Bethel’s Board of Trustees and Board of Deacons, David Buffong was terminated as pastor by a unanimous quorum of four trustees, Lillie Willis, Aaron Haynes, John Brutus, and Ethel Jackson. The other two elected trustees, Mark Poole and Archie Cadell, did not attend the meeting and are plaintiffs and appellants here. One reason given for the termination was because Buffong was not ordained by the Baptist Church as required by Bethel’s bylaws. Buffong’s termination was ratified at a meeting of the general membership in January 2005.
Plaintiffs contend that, after Buffong’s termination, the locks at the church were changed and armed guards patrolled the church, denying plaintiffs access to and enjoyment of the church.
Buffong mustered his supporters to resist the termination. Together they filed legal action against Bethel and four individual defendants. Plaintiffs filed their initial complaint for forcible entry and detainer (SCVSS 120616) in November 2004. In December 2004, Buffong filed a separate complaint for wrongful termination. (SCVSS 121271) The cases were subsequently consolidated by stipulation. The second amended complaint, filed in June 2005, combined both sets of claims but omitted Buffong as a plaintiff.
Defendants and respondents are Willie Carter, Haynes, Willis, Pat Brown, and Bethel.
Defendants successfully demurred to the second amended complaint in September 2005. Plaintiffs filed their third amended complaint in October 2005, asserting only two causes of action for forcible entry and forcible detainer and omitting other prior claims, including Buffong’s wrongful termination claims.
In the meantime, in July and September 2005, defendants filed their cross-complaints, asking the court to determine, under Corporations Code section 9418, the validity of the special meeting to elect new trustees, which had been held in January 2005. Ultimately, in December 2005, the court issued its decision finding the meeting was properly noticed and the new trustees were validly elected.
Defendants filed a joint motion for summary judgment in November 2005. The court granted the motion in January 2006. The court entered judgment against plaintiffs and in favor of defendants in April 2006.
3. Analysis
Large portions of plaintiffs’ 125 pages of appellate briefing are not helpful because of the failure to focus particularly on the issues of the case, i.e., whether the trial court erred in any of the three subject rulings. We recognize that plaintiffs’ main argument is Bethel’s by-laws provide for governance by majority vote and that right was violated in this instance. But appellate counsel’s lengthy discourse on the general themes of religious freedom and separation of church and state does not assist in resolving the specific issues here.
Furthermore, we deem it inconsistent of plaintiffs to argue that, in deciding whether Bethel could properly terminate its pastor, Buffong, the civil court would only be applying neutral principles of law and would escape impermissible entanglement in ecclesiastical matters. (Singh v. Singh (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1264, 1275-1280; Schmoll v. Chapman University (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1434.)
With these introductory comments in mind, we discuss the trial court’s three pertinent rulings.
a. Demurrer to the Second Amended Complaint
The second amended complaint asserted 10 causes of action. The first two causes of action for forcible entry and forcible detainer concerned access to and control of the church. The third through seventh causes of action involved the termination of Pastor Buffong, although he was no longer a plaintiff. The eighth cause of action alleged violations of various Penal Code sections involving interference with religious freedom. (Pen. Code, §§ 302, 423.2, subds. (b) & (e), 11410, 11412.) Finally, the purported ninth and tenth causes of action sought the imposition of a constructive trust and removal of church directors or officers.
Defendants demurred to the five wrongful termination causes of action and to the ninth cause of action for a constructive trust. The trial court sustained defendants’ demurrer with leave to amend as to the former causes of action, holding they were all barred because of the ministerial exception, prohibiting judicial review of employment disputes between a religious organization and its clergy employee. (Schmoll v. Chapman University, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1438, 1445.) The ninth cause of action was actually a remedy and not a legal claim and was subject to demurrer for that reason. (Stansfield v. Starkey (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 59, 76.) Neither the eighth nor the tenth causes of action were addressed in the demurrer.
On appeal, plaintiffs challenge the authority of Schmoll and seem to argue their wrongful termination claims were not employment-based but instead constituted a lawsuit to enforce Bethel’s by-laws. Plaintiffs do not discuss the ninth cause of action and have waived any issue concerning that ruling.
We conduct an independent review of an order sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend. (Lazar v. Hertz Corp. (1999) (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1494, 1500-1501.) We hold the trial court did not err when it sustained without leave to amend defendants’ demurrer to the third through seventh causes of action.
Plaintiffs rely on two cases which involved the determination of property rights by a civil court between contending factions of a congregational or independent church, Singh v. Singh, supra, 114 Cal.App.4th 1264 and Bomar v. Mount Olive Missionary Baptist Church (1928) 92 Cal.App. 618. Those cases are factually and legally distinguishable because they involved property rights not an employment dispute and they did not address the ministerial exception. Additionally, plaintiffs lacked standing to sue for Buffong’s contract-based claims for wrongful termination. (California Emergency Physicians Medical Group v. PacificCare of California (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1127, 1137-1138; Jones v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1717, 1724; Southern California Gas Co. v. ABC Const. Co. (1962) 204 Cal.App.2d 747, 750.)
Any further argument plaintiffs might attempt regarding the eighth, ninth, and tenth causes of action was foreclosed by plaintiff filing a third amended complaint, omitting those causes of action. Only the first two causes of action are properly the subject of this appeal. We affirm the trial court’s ruling on the demurrer to the second amended complaint.
b. Judicial Determination of the Validity of Trustees’ Election
After the trial court sustained the demurrer to the second amended complaint and before it decided defendants’ summary judgment motion, the court heard and granted defendants’ cross-complaints seeking a judicial determination of the validity of Bethel’s special trustee election conducted in January 2005.
Corporations Code section 9418 provides:
“(a) Upon the filing of an action therefor by any director or member, or by any person who had the right to vote in the election at issue after such director, member, or person has exhausted any remedies provided in the articles or bylaws, the superior court of the proper county shall determine the validity of any election or appointment of any director of any corporation. [¶] . . . [¶] [and]
“(c) The court, consistent with the provisions of this part and in conformity with the articles and bylaws to the extent feasible, may determine the person entitled to the office of director or may order a new election to be held or appointment to be made, may determine the validity of the issuance of memberships and the right of persons to vote and may direct such other relief as may be just and proper.”
We adopt the mixed standard of review as expressed in Singh: “When . . . there is no conflict in the evidence, we review the ruling de novo. [Citation.] . . . we review the evidence . . . under the substantial evidence test. [Citation.] We must uphold any factual determination of the trial court, express or implied, so long as there is substantial evidence in the record to support it. [Citation.] If the evidence is conflicting, we must accept that which supports the trial court’s decision and make all reasonable inferences in support of the judgment. [Citation.] (Singh v. Singh, supra, 114 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1293-1294.)
The trial court determined the January 2005 special meeting complied with Corporations Code section 9411, governing notice for meetings of nonprofit religious corporations, and Article Six, section 2, of Bethel’s by-laws, allowing meetings to be called any time the Board of Trustees “deem[s] it necessary.” Therefore, the special January 2005 meeting was valid.
The evidence, both disputed and undisputed, supported the trial court’s ruling. The facts established by defendants included that: Bethel held a properly-noticed special meeting on January 23, 2005; a quorum was present; and 10 persons were duly elected as new members of the Board of Trustees.
In opposition, plaintiffs claimed they held their own conflicting membership meetings in August, September, and December 2004, during which Buffong’s termination was reversed and different people were elected as trustees.
But, according to the evidence presented by defendants, the plaintiffs did not give proper notice as required by Corporations Code section 9411, subdivisions (b) and (c), of the August special meeting held by plaintiffs. Similarly, plaintiffs did not give proper notice for the two meetings held by plaintiffs in September. Nor is there any evidence to support plaintiffs’ contention that they provided notice in compliance with Bethel’s by-laws, as purportedly amended on January 31, 2004. Although plaintiffs refer to such an amendment, the most recent version of the by-laws in the appellate record is dated July 20, 2002.
Based on the foregoing, we decide, based on either standard of review, that the trial court properly decided the special meeting and the election of the new trustees was valid.
c. Summary Judgment Motion
We independently review the grant of a motion for summary judgment: “We review the trial court’s decision de novo, considering all of the evidence the parties offered in connection with the motion (except that which the court properly excluded) and the uncontradicted inferences the evidence reasonably supports. [Citation.] In the trial court, once a moving defendant has ‘shown that one or more elements of the cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established,’ the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show the existence of a triable issue; to meet that burden, the plaintiff ‘may not rely upon the mere allegations or denials of its pleadings . . . but, instead, shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to that cause of action . . . .’ (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (o)(2); see Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 854-855.” (Merrill v. Navegar, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 465, 476-477.)
The third amended complaint retained two causes of action for forcible entry and forcible detainer. The substance of plaintiff’s claims is that defendants changed the church locks and stationed guards in the church to deprive plaintiffs of access.
The Code of Civil Procedure, section 1159, defines forcible entry as follows:
“Every person is guilty of a forcible entry who either:
“1. By breaking open doors, windows, or other parts of a house, or by any kind of violence or circumstance of terror enters upon or into any real property; or,
“2. Who, after entering peaceably upon real property, turns out by force, threats, or menacing conduct, the party in possession.
“The ‘party in possession’ means any person who hires real property and includes a boarder or lodger, . . .”
It is questionable whether plaintiffs could ever properly assert a claim for forcible entry against defendants because none of plaintiffs was a hirer of real property, a boarder, or a lodger. In an analogous case, the court has commented: “The statutory situations in which the remedy of unlawful detainer is available are exclusive and the statutory procedure must be strictly followed.” (Berry v. Society of Saint Pius X (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 354, 363.)
In consideration of plaintiffs’ alternative cause of action, the Code of Civil Procedure defines forcible detainer as follows:
“Every person is guilty of a forcible detainer who either:
“1. By force, or by menaces and threats of violence, unlawfully holds and keeps the possession of any real property, whether the same was acquired peaceably or otherwise; or, [¶] . . . [¶]
“The occupant of real property, within the meaning of this subdivision, is one who, within five days preceding such unlawful entry, was in the peaceable and undisturbed possession of such lands.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1160.)
To sustain a claim for forcible detainer, plaintiffs must show they were “entitled to the possession at the time of the forcible detainer.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1172.) Summary judgment may be used to resolve the claim. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1170.7.)
In their motion for summary judgment, defendants argued plaintiffs could not prove they were entitled to exclusive possession because all the parties claim membership in the church and an equivalent right to possess the church property. (Bittman v. Courington (1948) 86 Cal.App.2d 213, 215-216; Moldovan v. Fischer (1957) 149 Cal.App.2d 600, 608.) Additionally, defendants asserted plaintiffs were not threatened with force or violence. (Hodgkins v. Jordan (1866) 29 Cal. 577, 578; Jordan v. Talbot (1961) 55 Cal.2d 597, 607.)
In support of these contentions, defendant presented their own declarations and excerpts from plaintiffs’ depositions. In opposition, plaintiffs submitted an opposing separate statement but most of the evidence referred to in that document and in plaintiffs’ other submissions is not part of the record on appeal.
The court found there was no evidence that any of the parties was entitled to exclusive possession. Furthermore, defendants’ declarations and “the uniform testimony of plaintiffs” established “that despite the presence of alleged armed guards, they were allowed to attend church services, and that at most, plaintiffs possessed only an apprehension of violence and that no actual violence or threat of violence was committed by defendants.” Additionally, “plaintiffs’ deposition testimony supports defendants’ motion by showing that defendants did not commit violence. The court finds the declarations of plaintiffs to be unpersuasive in that it [sic] only generally contends that defendants acted with violence or threats of violence and is refuted by plaintiffs’ own deposition testimony . . . .”
Based on our independent review, we agree entirely with the trial court’s decision. The uncontradicted evidence presented in the appellate record establishes that plaintiffs and defendants were all members or attendees of Bethel. It is not disputed that Pastor Buffong was terminated, the church locks were changed, and guards were employed in an effort to maintain order. But, although plaintiffs subjectively believed they were excluded from the church, there was no evidence they were denied access to the church or that they were subjected to threats, force, or violence from defendants. Plaintiffs could have and did attend church services, even if ultimately they felt uncomfortable and decided to stop attending. In opposition to the summary judgment motion, plaintiffs failed to demonstrate, with competent evidence, any of the elements of forcible entry or forcible detainer, most notably that defendants deprived plaintiffs of possession of the church by violence, terror, force, threats, or menacing conduct. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1159, 1160, 1172.)
4. Disposition
We affirm the rulings of the trial court sustaining defendants’ demurrer to the second amended complaint without leave to amend, affirming the validity of the election pursuant to Corporations Code section 9418, and granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Hence, we affirm the judgment in favor of defendants who are also entitled to recover their costs on appeal.
We concur: Ramirez, P. J., King, J.