Opinion
(AC 31408)
The plaintiff attorney brought an interpleader action to determine the rights to approximately $230,000 in attorney's fees he held in escrow that had been generated on a contingency basis from two personal injury actions. The defendant E's decedent, M, and the defendant J had been retained to represent the injured parties in those actions, and the plaintiff assisted in their representation. Prior to the conclusion of either action, M died and subsequently E was appointed administratrix of M's estate. In ordering distribution of the fees, the trial court determined that J was entitled to two-thirds of the fees in each case pursuant to an unwritten agreement between J and M, to which J and the plaintiff had testified and the court had credited their testimony, and that the remaining one-third from each case was to be apportioned between M's estate and the plaintiff according to the work performed by each attorney in each case. Accordingly, that court divided the remaining one-third fee from the first case equally between M and the plaintiff, and awarded 55 percent of the remaining one-third fee from the second case to M's estate and 45 percent to the plaintiff. On E's appeal to this court, held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in distributing two-thirds of the fees generated from each of the personal injury cases to J in accordance with the parties' agreement, the evidence presented by each party and the credibility determinations made by the trial court having provided ample support for its finding that M and J had an agreement regarding the division of attorney's fees; furthermore, this court declined to review E's claim that the trial court improperly divided the fees between M's estate and the plaintiff after M's death, the claim having been inadequately briefed.
Argued June 2, 2010
Officially released August 31, 2010
Action for interpleader to determine the parties' rights to certain legal fees held in escrow by the plaintiff, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford, where the court, Elgo, J., rendered an interlocutory judgment of interpleader; thereafter, the court, Graham, J., granted the plaintiff's motion to cite in Gordon S. Johnson, Jr., as a party defendant; thereafter, the matter was tried to the court, Miller, J.; judgment ordering distribution of the fees, from which the named defendant appealed to this court. Affirmed.
John R. Williams, for the appellant (named defendant).
David M. Poirot, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Gordon S. Johnson, Jr., pro hac vice, for the appellee (defendant).
Opinion
This case arises from a dispute over the appropriate distribution of approximately $230,000 in attorney's fees generated on a contingency basis from two personal injury actions. The defendant Eloise Marinos, administratrix of the estate of Steven F. Meo, appeals from the judgment of interpleader rendered by the trial court. She claims that the distribution of fees ordered by the court was an abuse of discretion. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
There are two defendants in this action. For clarity, we refer to all parties by name.
The following facts and procedural history are relevant to Marinos' appeal. In 2004, Marinos' husband, attorney Steven F. Meo, and the defendant, attorney Gordon S. Johnson, Jr., were retained to represent Christopher Higbie and Thomas DeWolfe in two personal injury actions involving traumatic brain injuries. Meo and Johnson were assisted in their representation of Higbie and DeWolfe by the plaintiff, attorney David M. Poirot, who was Meo's associate. On April 25, 2006, prior to the conclusion of either case, Meo died. On April 28, 2006, Poirot terminated his employment with the Law Office of Steven F. Meo. Thereafter, Higbie and DeWolfe retained Johnson and Poirot to handle their cases. The Higbie case was settled in November, 2007, and the DeWolfe case was settled in February, 2008. Together, the contingent attorney's fee was $231,868.05.
Johnson is a Wisconsin attorney who specializes in traumatic brain injury litigation.
Meo was the sole proprietor of the Law Office of Steven F. Meo. Poirot was an associate with the firm for twelve years and, at the time Meo died, was the only other attorney practicing with the firm. The firm closed shortly after Meo's death.
On August 6, 2007, the court rendered an interlocutory judgment of interpleader, and the disputed funds were placed in an interest bearing account pending the resolution of the dispute.
The parties could not agree on how the fees should be distributed, and, on October 31, 2008, by an amended bill of interpleader, Poirot sought a court order dividing the escrowed funds. Following a trial on March 31, 2009, the court concluded that Johnson was entitled to two-thirds of the contingent fee in each case pursuant to an agreement he had with Meo and that the remaining one-third fee derived from each case should be apportioned between Meo's estate and Poirot according to the work performed by each attorney in each case. See Cole v. Myers, 128 Conn. 223, 230, 21 A.2d 396 (1941) (attorney working on contingency basis who is discharged entitled to reasonable compensation for work done up to date of discharge). The court included the work performed by Poirot, while he was Meo's associate, in its calculation of Meo's contribution to each case. With respect to the DeWolfe case, the court found that Meo's "contributions to the eventual result were considerable but [that] . . . Poirot handled some of the most important aspects of the case involving defense experts and also did considerable post-settlement work. . . ." The court concluded that both attorneys made equal contributions and divided the DeWolfe fee equally between them. With respect to the Higbie case, the court found that both attorneys made substantial contributions to the result but that Meo "was responsible for finding other potentially responsible parties who contributed substantially to a settlement which was more than four times greater than appeared possible when he took over the matter." The court awarded 55 percent of the remaining one-third fee from the Higbie case to the estate and 45 percent to Poirot.
Marinos raises two claims on appeal. She first challenges the court's division of fees between the estate and Poirot after Meo's death as "simply irrational and amount[ing] to a confiscation. . . ." She appears to argue that Poirot was entitled only to a portion of Johnson's two-thirds fee. She does not cite, however, any evidence or law to support her claim. As a result, the claim is briefed inadequately; see Ruggiero v. Pellicci, 294 Conn. 473, 481 n. 5, 987 A.2d 339 (2010); and we decline to afford it review. Next, Marinos argues that the court's distribution of two-thirds of the fees generated in each case to Johnson was an abuse of discretion. We disagree.
There was no written fee agreement between Meo and Johnson with respect to either case. Marinos testified that Meo and Johnson had not agreed to a specific division of fees and argues that the contingency fee generated in each case should be divided between the estate and Johnson pursuant to the doctrine of quantum meruit. However, "[a] party may not recover the reasonable value of services rendered, pursuant to the doctrine of quantum meruit, when the actions for which it seeks relief were governed by an express contract." David M. Somers Associates, P.C. v. Busch, 283 Conn. 396, 408, 927 A.2d 832 (2007). In this case, both Johnson and Poirot testified that Meo and Johnson had an agreement that Johnson would receive two-thirds of the fees from each case.
There also was no written fee agreement between Johnson and Poirot, but both parties testified that they similarly had agreed that Johnson would receive two-thirds of any fee generated in each case.
"[T]he existence of a contract is a question of fact, which we review for clear error. . . . A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence in the record to support it . . . or when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. . . . Because it is the trial court's function to weigh the evidence and determine credibility, we give great deference to its findings." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dream-builders Construction, Inc. v. Diamond, 121 Conn. App. 554, 559-60, A.2d (2010).
The record reveals that the court credited the testimony of Johnson and Poirot. In contrast, it expressly stated that Marinos' testimony regarding Meo's fee agreement with Johnson, or alleged lack thereof, was "simply not credible." It is axiomatic that as the sole arbiter of credibility, the trial court is free to accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony offered by either party. See Saye v. Howe, 92 Conn. App. 638, 644, 886 A.2d 1239 (2005). The evidence presented by each party and the credibility determinations made by the court provide ample support for the court's finding that Meo and Johnson had an agreement regarding the division of attorney's fees. Therefore, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion when it apportioned fees in accord with that agreement, and we affirm the court's well reasoned decision.
The judgment is affirmed.