Opinion
No. CV09 5027372
May 10, 2010
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO STRIKE
The defendant Stamford Hospital has moved to strike the Fourth Count of the plaintiff's Revised Complaint for the failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Fourth Count alleges a violation of General Statutes § 31-72 for the refusal of both named defendants to make wage payments to the plaintiff. The defendant, in filing the motion to strike, argues that contractual damages are not "wages" under General Statutes § 31-71a(3). Additionally, the defendant claims that the plaintiff is no longer an "employee" pursuant to General Statutes § 31-71a(2).
General Statutes § 31-71a(3) states:
(3) `Wages' means compensation for labor or services rendered by an employee, whether the amount is determined on a time, task, piece, commission or other basis of calculation.
General Statutes § 31-71a(2) states:
(2) "Employee" includes any person suffered or permitted to work by an employer.
I Standard of Law: Motion to Strike
"The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498 (2003) "[T]he motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading . . . and, consequentially, requires no factual findings by the trial court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Batte-Holmgren v. Commission of Public Health, 281 Conn. 277, 294 (2007). In ruling on a Motion to Strike the trial court examines the complaint "construed in favor of the (plaintiff), to determine whether the (pleading party has) stated a legally sufficient cause of action." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dodd v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., 242 Conn. 375, 378 (1997).
"In ruling on a motion to strike, the Court is limited to the facts alleged in the complaint." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 580 (1997). "Grounds other than those specified should not be considered by the Trial Court in passing on a Motion to Strike . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gazo v. Stamford, 255 Conn. 245, 259 (2001). "If facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the Motion to Strike must be denied." Violano v. Fernandez, 280 Conn. 310, 318 (2006). In resolving this motion the Court will consider the plaintiff's legal claims.
II Summary of Allegations in Count Four
A summary of The Fourth Count of the Revised Complaint reveals that the plaintiff is a prominent cardiothoracic surgeon who was recruited by the Stamford Hospital to start and lead a new cardiac surgery program in 2007. Stamford Hospital is a teaching affiliate of the Columbia University College of Physicians and Surgeons in New York City, which is operated by the Trustees of Columbia University in the City of New York, Inc.
Prior to joining the Stamford Hospital, Dr. Poa was the Chief of Cardiovascular and Thoracic Surgery at a medical center in California. The Revised Complaint alleges that to induce Dr. Poa to leave his California medical position and to move his family to Connecticut, the defendants Stamford Hospital and Columbia University offered Dr. Poa a five-year employment contract. The contract promised to pay Dr. Poa a base salary of $1,100,000 per year for five years, as long as Dr. Poa did not leave voluntarily, and he was not terminated for "Cause" within the first five years of his employment.
"Cause" is defined in the employment agreement. There is no claim that Dr. Poa was terminated for "cause."
The plaintiff accepted the offer of the defendants and entered into a written employment agreement with the defendants, including what is termed a "Primary Agreement." The "Primary Agreement was signed by the plaintiff and representatives of the defendants on August 1, 2007. Pursuant to the terms of this agreement, the plaintiff's employment was to commence on August 1, 2007 and continue through July 31, 2012, unless either party terminated the agreement before July 31, 2012. The Revised Complaint alleges that in the event the defendants terminated the plaintiff's employment without "cause" prior to July 31, 2012, the defendants expressly agreed to continue to pay the plaintiff his salary through the end of the contract term "on a month to month basis, funded by Stamford Hospital, but without the accompanying benefits."
The plaintiff, thereafter, commenced employment with the defendants and performed his duties "to the best of his abilities." Notwithstanding his performance in accordance with the terms of the contract, on May 4, 2009, the defendants notified the plaintiff that they had decided to terminate his employment, no later than Labor Day, 2009. They stated they would like for him to continue working until the effective date of his termination to assist with the transition to a successor. They also instructed him to begin seeking new employment elsewhere, as soon as, possible. The primary reason stated on May 4, 2009, for the plaintiff's termination on Labor Day, 2009, was a lack of referrals from cardiologists. The plaintiff states that the termination was not for "cause" as defined in the employment agreement.
Thereafter, the plaintiff notified his family and friends that he was being terminated by the defendants and commenced seeking new employment. On or about June 1, 2009, the plaintiff accepted employment with a medical center in Los Angeles, California. The defendant Stamford Hospital then requested that the plaintiff submit a letter of resignation to Stamford Hospital and Columbia University. The plaintiff responded by stating a willingness to submit letters of resignation, "so long as they would not jeopardize his entitlement to continue to receive his salary through July 31, 2012. The plaintiff then had his attorney send a letter to Dr. Rodis, Senior Vice-President for Medical Affairs for Stamford Hospital on June 5, 2009, attempting to confirm that Stamford Hospital would honor its alleged obligation to pay the plaintiff's salary through July 31, 2012.
Subsequently, the defendant Stamford Hospital responded by letter dated July 2, 2009. The letter: (1) disputed that the defendants on May 4, 2009, had notified the plaintiff of his termination; (2) asserted that the plaintiff agreed to leave his position of employment voluntarily; (3) offered to allow the plaintiff to remain employed subsequent to Labor Day, 2009; and (4) admitted that Stamford Hospital had previously been informed that the plaintiff had accepted the new position in Los Angeles, California. On July 17, 2009, the plaintiff, through his legal counsel responded and disputed the factual contentions contained in Stamford Hospital's letter, and again, requested that the Stamford Hospital agree to make the salary payments through July 31, 2012. To date, the defendant Stamford Hospital has not responded.
The plaintiff alleges that the salary continuation payments provided for in the Primary Agreement are compensation for the services provided by the plaintiff to the defendants and constitute "wages" within the meaning of General Statutes § 31-71a(3), and therefore, the defendants' refusal to make said payments constitutes a violation of General Statutes § 31-71. The defendants are alleged to have acted arbitrarily, capriciously and in bad faith. The plaintiff seeks double damages and attorneys fees pursuant to General Statutes § 31-72.
Sec. 31-72 reads as follows:
When any employer fails to pay an employee wages in accordance with the provisions of sections 31-71a to 31-71i, inclusive, or fails to compensate an employee in accordance with section 31-76k or where an employee or a labor organization representing an employee institutes an action to enforce an arbitration award which requires an employer to make an employee whole or to make payments to an employee welfare fund, such employee or labor organization may recover, in a civil action, twice the full amount of such wages, with costs and such reasonable attorneys fees as may be allowed by the court, and any agreement between him and his employer for payment of wages other than as specified in said sections shall be no defense to such action. The Labor Commissioner may collect the full amount of any such unpaid wages, payments due to an employee welfare fund or such arbitration award, as well as interest calculated in accordance with the provisions of section 31-265 from the date the wages or payment should have been received, had payment been made in a timely manner. In addition, the Labor Commissioner may bring any legal action necessary to recover twice the full amount of unpaid wages, payments due to an employee welfare fund or arbitration award, and the employer shall be required to pay the costs and such reasonable attorneys fees as may be allowed by the court. The commissioner shall distribute any wages, arbitration awards or payments due to an employee welfare fund collected pursuant to this section to the appropriate person.
III
CT Page 12922
Discussion
General Statutes § 31-71a(3) defines wages as "compensation for labor or services rendered by an employee, whether the amount is determined on a time, task, piece, commission or other basis of calculation." "Wages are defined in the statutes . . . and the definition conforms to the classic or dictionary definition. Wages are payment for services on a weekly, daily or hourly basis or by the piece." The American Heritage Dictionary (2d Ed. 1991). Morales v. Pentec, Inc., 57 Conn.App. 419, 428-29 (2000) 749 A.2d 47 (2000). "The principal canon of statutory construction is that where the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we interpret the statute to mean what it says. Winchester Woods Associates v. Planning Zoning Commission, 219 Conn. 303, 310, 592 A.2d 953 (1991)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fulco v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 27 Conn.App. 800, 804, 609 A.2d 1034 (1992); appeal dismissed 226 Conn. 404, 672 A.2d 931 (1993); see also, General Statutes 1-2z. Although the definition seems straightforward, our Supreme Court observed in Mytych v. May Department Stores Co., 260 Conn. 152; 159 (2002), that "it fails to set forth a specific formula by which wages must be calculated or determined." The Appellate Court further stated in Ziotas v. Reardon Law Firm, P.C., 111 Conn.App. 287, 312 (2008): "Accordingly, whether compensation may be considered a wage and the method of calculating the amount of wages are derived from the employer-employee agreement." Id.The defendant argues that General Statutes § 31-72 concerns an employer's failure to pay wages during, but not after, an employment relationship. Mangiofico v. McKelvey, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain of New Britain, Docket Number CV04-4000609S (April 18, 2005, Burke, J.). Wages, therefore, cease when employment ceases. Ebbesmeyer v. Red Line Med Supp., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford at Hartford No. CV 94-0542008-S (Nov. 20, 1995, Corradino, J.), 15 Conn. L. Rptr. 466. Therefore, as Dr. Poa's employment was terminated and the compensation he claims is owed, is owed only because of his termination, he is not seeking money due him as an employee. The defendant states that this is not the situation addressed by General Statutes § 31-72. The defendant proposes that Dr. Poa's salary continuation payments are not wages, but rather they are payments more properly considered as liquidated damages.
General Statutes § 31-72 "lists certain non-exclusive factors that may assist in the computation of an employee's wage, [but] it fails to set forth a specific formula by which wages must be calculated or determined." Mytych v. May Dept. Stores Co., 260 Conn. 152, 159, 793 A.2d 1068 (2002). "[T]he wage statutes, as a whole, do not provide substantive rights regarding how a wage is earned; rather, they provide remedial protections for those cases in which the employer-employee wage agreement is violated." (Emphasis in original.) Id., 162. Accordingly, whether compensation may be considered a wage and the method for calculating the amount of wages are derived from the employee-employer agreement. See Id. "Section 31-71a(3) merely requires that wages be paid as compensation to an employee for services rendered. The determination of the proper amount to be tendered purposely is left vague by reference to `or other basis of calculation' . . ." (Emphasis added.) Id., 159. "It has been stated expressly that statutes do not dictate the manner in which wages are calculated." Id., 161. Instead, courts are to focus on the agreement between the employer and employee. Id., 159.
In Count Four, the plaintiff alleges that the employment agreement provides that the plaintiff was entitled to continued salary calculated at a rate of $1,100,000 per year for a five-year term regardless of whether he remained at the Stamford Hospital for five years. In essence, the defendants agreed to pay the plaintiff a sum of $5,500,000 regardless of whether he worked for them for five years, so long as he did not leave voluntarily or was not terminated for cause. He alleges he was not terminated for cause and did not voluntarily leave his employment with the defendants. The plaintiff was informed he would be terminated, and it was subsequent to his being notified of his pending termination that he sought new employment. The plaintiff alleges he is entitled to these wages pursuant the agreement, and that the defendants refused to pay him.
"As previously noted, parties to an employment contract may determine the time in which a wage payment accrues, and the employment contract, if enforceable, is controlling in determining whether a party has violated § 31-72." Selander v. Soundview Technology Corp., Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, No. CV02 0189753 (Feb. 10, 2003, Adams, J.); see Mytych v. May Dept. Stores Co., supra, 260 Conn. 163-65. "Subsection § 31-71a(3) of the General Statutes defines wages as "compensation for labor or services rendered by an employee, whether the amount is determined on a time, task, piece, commission or other basis of calculation . . ." Selander v. Soundview Technology Corp., supra. "This definition [31-71a(3)] expressly leaves the determination of the wage to the employer-employee agreement . . ." Mytych v. May Dept. Stores Co., supra, 260 Conn. 163. "In Connecticut, there is no . . . settled doctrine regarding the time at which an employee's rights to his wages vest, and, in fact, we have concluded herein that our wage payment statutes expressly leave the timing of accrual to the determination of the wage agreement between the employer and employee." Id., 164-65; Selander v. Soundview Technology Corp., CT Page 12924 supra. "The normal rule on an employment contract is that when the employee is prevented from fully performing because the employer wrongfully fires him, the employee can recover the wages he would have earned under the contract . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Torosyan v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 234 Conn. 1, 32-33, 662 A.2d 89 (1995).
IV Conclusion and Order
Given the remedial nature of this statute; the broad statutory definition and judicial interpretation of what constitutes wages, coupled with the allegations contained in the Fourth Count of the complaint, the court concludes that the plaintiff has pleaded a valid cause of action for the wrongful withholding of wages. (Internal citation omitted.) Ziotas v. Reardon Law Firm, P.C., supra, 111 Conn.App. 311. Accordingly, the motion to strike the Fourth Count is denied.