Opinion
A-13921 0389
09-18-2024
GREGORY ALAN PINNEO, Appellant, v. STATE OF ALASKA, Appellee.
Quinlan Steiner, Steiner Law, LLC, under contract with the Public Defender Agency, and Terrence Haas, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Elizabeth T. Burke, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
This is a summary disposition issued under Alaska Appellate Rule 214(a). Summary dispositions of this Court do not create legal precedent. See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d).
Appeal from the Superior Court, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, Erin B. Marston, Judge. Trial Court No. 3AN-13-08014 CR
Appearances:
Quinlan Steiner, Steiner Law, LLC, under contract with the Public Defender Agency, and Terrence Haas, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant.
Elizabeth T. Burke, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Wollenberg, Harbison, and Terrell, Judges.
SUMMARY DISPOSITION
Gregory Alan Pinneo was convicted, following a jury trial, of felony driving under the influence, felony refusal to submit to a chemical test, fourth-degree weapons misconduct, driving without insurance, driving while his license was revoked, and felony failure to appear. Pinneo was arrested after a traffic stop conducted by an Anchorage police officer, who believed that Pinneo was driving recklessly and that Pinneo's car did not have mud flaps, which the officer believed were required under Alaska's anti-spray law.
AS 28.35.030(n), AS 28.35.032(p), AS 11.61.210(a)(1), AS 28.22.011, AS 28.15.291(a)(1), and former AS 11.56.730(a) & (c)(1) (2014), respectively. The underlying events in this case occurred in 2013. But following an evidentiary hearing on Pinneo's motion to suppress, Pinneo failed to appear for a court hearing in 2014. The trial court proceedings in this case did not resume until 2018, when Pinneo was arrested on a bench warrant. The case proceeded to trial in 2021.
See AS 28.35.253(a) ("A person may not drive a motor vehicle on a highway unless the vehicle is equipped with fenders, mud flaps, or other anti-spray devices adequate to prevent the vehicle from being a hazard to other users of the highway."). On appeal, the State does not renew its argument that the stop was justified due to a violation of the antispray statute.
On appeal, Pinneo argues that the officer lacked probable cause to stop him for reckless driving or for violating the anti-spray statute. We agree with the State that it is unnecessary to reach these issues because the officer had probable cause to stop Pinneo for two violations of the Anchorage Municipal Code: failing to drive at a speed that was reasonable and prudent under the existing conditions and careless driving.
Anchorage Municipal Code (AMC) 09.26.010 (stating that "[n]o person may drive a vehicle at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions and having regard to the actual and potential hazard then existing" and, in relevant part, that "every person shall drive at a safe and appropriate speed when approaching and crossing an intersection . . ., when approaching and going around a curve, . . . and when special hazards exist with respect to pedestrians or other traffic or by reason of weather or street conditions").
AMC 09.28.015 (defining "careless driving," in relevant part, as operating a motor vehicle "[w]ithout due regard for the width, grade, curve, corner, other traffic use or other attendant circumstance of the street or other area where the vehicle is being operated" or "[i]n a manner that is without due regard for or is inattentive or unresponsive to any other surrounding circumstance or hazard that may be present").
This Court has held that a police officer normally has probable cause to conduct a traffic stop when the officer directly observes a violation of the traffic code.We have also held that the State can rely on alternative legal grounds as justification for a traffic stop if the facts known to the officer at the time of the stop are sufficient to establish this alternative justification.
Nease v. State, 105 P.3d 1145, 1147 (Alaska App. 2005).
Hamilton v. State, 59 P.3d 760, 764 (Alaska App. 2002); see also Pruitt v. State, 829 P.2d 1197, 1199 n.1 (Alaska App. 1992) (explaining that an appellate court may affirm a trial court decision on alternative grounds revealed by the record).
The officer was the sole witness at an evidentiary hearing on Pinneo's motion to suppress. The officer testified that he and another officer had been dispatched to a call and that, while they were investigating the call, a red Chevy Blazer came around the corner at a "high rate of speed" and almost struck both officers' patrol cars. About twenty minutes later, the officer pulled up behind the same red Chevy Blazer at a stop light and, after briefly following the vehicle, initiated a traffic stop. Based on this testimony, the court concluded that Pinneo was driving recklessly.
As we noted, we need not reach that issue because we agree with the State that the officer had probable cause, based on his observations, to believe that Pinneo committed traffic violations under the Anchorage Municipal Code by failing to drive at a safe speed while making a turn and almost hitting two parked patrol cars.
In addition to his observations of unsafe driving, the officer ran the license plate of the Chevy Blazer prior to making the traffic stop and discovered that the vehicle was registered to Gregory Pinneo, who had a pending arrest warrant. The State argues that Pinneo's outstanding arrest warrant provided an additional justification for the stop. Because we find that there was probable cause to believe that Pinneo committed traffic violations under the Anchorage Municipal Code, we do not need to reach this issue.
The judgment of the superior court is AFFIRMED.