Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
San Francisco County Super. Ct. No. 311684
SIMONS, J.
This case arises out of a seismic retrofit project at Hastings College of the Law. Pinnacle Distribution Co., Inc. sued to enforce a stop notice and make claim on a payment bond, alleging nonpayment for materials supplied to the project. In an earlier appeal, we reversed a judgment in favor of Pinnacle and remanded for additional findings. Vahdani Construction Company, Inc. now appeals from the trial court orders after remand. Vahdani contends that the court erred in finding that Vahdani was not prejudiced by the lack of a substantially accurate materials description in Pinnacle’s preliminary notices and challenges the attorney fees and costs award. We affirm the order on the merits and modify the attorney fees award.
On February 5, 2007, we consolidated appeal numbers A115521, relating to the merits, and A116521, relating to the attorney fees and costs award, for purposes of briefing, argument, and decision.
Factual and Procedural Background
The underlying factual summary is largely drawn from our earlier decision, Pinnacle Distribution Co., Inc. v. Fidelity and Deposit Co. of Maryland (Jul 29, 2005, A104164 and A104255) [nonpub. opn.] (Pinnacle I).
On our own motion, we take judicial notice of the record in A104164 and A104255.
Appellant Vahdani entered into a contract with defendant the State of California Department of General Services (DGS) for the seismic retrofit of Hastings College of the Law. Vahdani was the general contractor on the project. Vahdani subcontracted with defendant Sanders Associates for the installation of acoustical ceiling tiles and acoustical wall panels. Sanders purchased the tiles and panels from Pinnacle. Defendant Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland (Fidelity) was the surety that issued a public works payment bond on behalf of Vahdani.
The DGS is named as a defendant in Pinnacle’s claim to enforce its stop notice.
Fidelity was an appellant in Pinnacle I, but it did not appeal from the trial court orders after remand.
Sanders began work on the project around February 1999. Over the next several months Pinnacle served Vahdani with several notices regarding materials furnished to Sanders for the project. In March, Pinnacle served a “PRELIMINARY 20-DAY NOTICE” referencing $8,000 of “Acoustical Materials and Supplies.” In June, Pinnacle served another preliminary notice referencing $40,000 “additional.” In August, Pinnacle served a notice referencing $120,000 of materials. In March 2000 and then again in May 2000, Pinnacle served stop notices claiming that it had not been paid for $124,873 in materials furnished to the project and notifying the DGS to withhold payments sufficient to cover its claims. In March 2000, Pinnacle served a “NOTICE TO SURETY/CONTRACTOR” on The Rule Co. and sent a copy to Vahdani. The notice claimed $124,873 for materials provided to the project. In June 2000, Pinnacle served an identical notice on Fidelity, again with a copy to Vahdani. On May 4, 2000, the DGS recorded the notice of completion for the project.
The trial court found that The Rule Co. is an agent of Fidelity.
Subsequently, Pinnacle filed suit seeking recovery against Sanders for the full amount on its account, recovery pursuant to the stop notice, and recovery under the payment bond. Pinnacle presented evidence that it had not been paid for $124,873 worth of materials supplied to Sanders for use on the project. In February 2003, following a nine-day bench trial, the trial court issued a detailed statement of decision; in May 2003, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Pinnacle. The court awarded Pinnacle $108,770.14 on the stop notice claim; that sum reflects an offset for extra labor costs borne by Sanders under an agreement with the DGS and Vahdani related to discolored panels supplied by Pinnacle. The trial court awarded Pinnacle $87,148.19, plus interest, on the payment bond claim, which reflects an additional offset for certain payments received by Pinnacle from Sanders but misapplied to other accounts.
On appeal, this court concluded that the trial court erred in disregarding the dollar amounts listed in Pinnacle’s preliminary notices in determining whether the notices were substantially accurate, a statutory requirement for enforcement of stop notice rights and claims on a payment bond. (Civ. Code § 3098.) We reversed the judgment in favor of Pinnacle and remanded for redetermination of whether the materials description in the March, 1999 notice was substantially accurate, taking into consideration the price estimate provided by Pinnacle as part of the description. (Pinnacle I, supra, at pp. 6-7.) We further directed the trial court to determine whether Vahdani was prejudiced by any lack of substantial accuracy in the description and whether Pinnacle could enforce its claim on the Fidelity bond under the alternate notice procedure of section 3252. (Pinnacle I, supra, at p. 7.)
All further statutory references are to the Civil Code unless otherwise indicated.
On remand, the trial court entered a “2006 Amendment to Statement of Decision.” The court found that Pinnacle’s notice was not substantially accurate, but Vahdani was not prejudiced thereby. The court also found that Pinnacle has an enforceable claim under section 3252. The trial court restated its February 2003 award in favor of Pinnacle, restated its earlier rulings on issues outside the scope of the remand, and awarded additional attorney fees and costs for the proceedings on remand.
Discussion
I. Appealability
Vahdani contends that the trial court’s “amendment” is not an appealable judgment but asks us to treat the decision as an appealable order or judgment because it constitutes the trial court’s final determination on the merits. (Solano County Employees’ Assn. v. County of Solano (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 256, 258, fn. 1.) We agree it is appropriate to do so and exercise our discretion to treat the decision as an appealable judgment. (Ibid.)
Despite its request that we treat the trial court decision as an appeal able judgment, Vahdani contends that the decision is ineffective to resolve all the issues in the case because the trial court did not have the power to reinstate the original judgment following this court’s reversal. The trial court’s decision expressly addresses the remanded issues and with regard to the remaining issues states, “All matters from the prior Statement of Decision (and the previous amendment thereto) not addressed in this 2006 Amendment to Statement of Decision stand as is, to the extent they are not inconsistent with the findings and determinations contained herein.” We do not construe the decision as reinstating the February 2003 judgment. Instead, we construe the decision as incorporating and restating its previous findings and conclusions. Vahdani presents no support for its argument that the trial court lacked authority to incorporate aspects of its prior decision not inconsistent with this court’s decision in Pinnacle I.
Our construction of the trial court’s decision disposes of Vahdani’s contention that there is no order on Pinnacle’s stop notice claim or on Vahdani’s cross-complaint against the DGS. Vahdani’s contentions relating to the DGS’ failure to release funds pursuant to a release bond and relating to compliance with an order in another case regarding interest on withheld funds are not properly before this court on appeal. Those contentions also are waived because they are not supported by reasoned argument and adequate citations to authority and to the record. (Badie v. Bank of America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 784-785 (Badie).)
II. Standard of Review
We review the trial court findings on disputed factual issues, including whether Vahdani was prejudiced by the lack of substantial accuracy in Pinnacle’s preliminary notices, according to the substantial evidence rule. (Winograd v. American Broadcasting Co. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 624, 632; see also Rental Equipment, Inc. v. McDaniel Builders, Inc. (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 445, 452.) We start “with the presumption that the record contains evidence sufficient to support the judgment; it is the appellant’s affirmative burden to demonstrate otherwise. [Citations.] The appellant’s brief must set forth all of the material evidence bearing on the issue, not merely the evidence favorable to the appellant, and must show how the evidence does not sustain the challenged finding.” (Garlock Sealing Technologies, LLC v. NAK Sealing Technologies Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 937, 951.)
“We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s determinations, resolve all evidentiary conflicts in favor of the prevailing party, and indulge in all reasonable inferences to uphold the trial court’s findings. [Citation.] We do not reweigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or resolve evidentiary conflicts.” (In re H.G. (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 1, 12-13.) We independently review the application of the law to undisputed facts. (McKinnon v. Otis Elevator Co. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1129.)
We are not obligated to ferret through the record looking for evidence to support appellant’s contentions (Friends of the Eel River v. Sonoma County Water Agency (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 859, 877; Duarte v. Chino Community Hospital (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 849, 856), and we treat as waived all arguments not supported by reasoned argument and citation of authority. (Badie, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at pp. 784-785.)
We decline Vahdani’s invitation to review its briefs below for refutation of Pinnacle’s arguments, which form the basis for the trial court’s decision. It was Vahdani’s obligation to present any relevant argument in its briefs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B).) To permit Vahdani to incorporate arguments from other briefs would result in circumvention of the word limitations for appellate briefs. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(c)(1).)
III. Prejudice from the Lack of a Substantially Accurate Materials Description
Vahdani has not met its burden of showing that the trial court erred in finding that it was not prejudiced by the lack of a substantially accurate materials description in Pinnacle’s preliminary notices.
A. Pinnacle I
In Pinnacle I, we considered Vahdani’s contention that Pinnacle provided inadequate notice to support its stop notice and payment bond claims. We explained that “On public works, the supplier must provide a notice ‘stating with substantial accuracy a general description of labor, service, equipment, or materials furnished or to be furnished, and the name of the party to whom the same was furnished.’ (§ 3098, subd. (a), italics added.) This statutory language parallels section 3097, applicable to private works, with the notable exception that the private works claimant must provide a price estimate. The notice must contain ‘[a] general description of the labor, service, equipment, or materials furnished, or to be furnished, and an estimate of the total price thereof.’ (§ 3097, subd. (c)(1), italics added.)” (Pinnacle I, supra, at p. 4.) Although Pinnacle was not required to provide a price estimate in the preliminary notices for this public project, we concluded that the trial court erred in disregarding the superfluous price estimates that Pinnacle did provide. (Id. at pp. 5-6.) We explained that “Although a claimant on a public works project is not required to include a price estimate in its notice, where it does provide such an estimate, the estimate is reasonably understood to be an indication of the quantity of materials furnished or to be furnished.” (Ibid.)
We reversed the judgment in favor of Pinnacle and remanded for redetermination of whether the materials description in the March notice was substantially accurate, taking into consideration the price estimate provided by Pinnacle as part of the description. (Pinnacle I, supra, at pp. 6-7.) We further directed that “[i]f the trial court finds on remand that the March notice did not contain a substantially accurate materials description, then it must determine whether Vahdani was prejudiced thereby. (See Blair Excavators, Inc. v. Paschen Contractors, Inc. (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1815, 1819-1820.)” (Pinnacle I, supra, at p. 7.) Finally, we explained that if Vahdani was prejudiced the trial court should determine whether Pinnacle can enforce its claim on the Fidelity bond under the alternate notice procedure of section 3252. (Ibid.)
B. The Trial Court’s Ruling on Remand
On remand, the trial court entered a “2006 Amendment to Statement of Decision.” The court found as follows: “First, the description within the notice provided by Pinnacle was not substantially accurate based upon the price information provided in the notice. Second, Vahdani was not prejudiced by the inaccurate notice. Third, even if Vahdani had suffered actual prejudice due to a materials description that was not substantially accurate, Pinnacle has a valid and enforceable claim on the Fidelity payment bond under the alternate notice procedure of California Civil Code section 3252.” The trial court restated its February 2003 award in favor of Pinnacle, restated its earlier rulings on issues outside the scope of the remand, and awarded additional attorney fees and costs for the proceedings on remand.
Vahdani repeatedly asserts that the trial court failed to make findings on the various issues in the case. We disagree. Notwithstanding Vahdani’s characterization of the trial court’s reasoning as “arguments,” the 38-page decision contains the necessary findings and appropriate citations to evidence in the record. The fact that the trial court adopted Pinnacle’s proposed decision does not mean that the decision is entitled to less deference on appeal. The California Rules of Court contemplate that a trial court may request that a party prepare a proposed statement of decision. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1590(e).)
C. The Trial Court’s Finding on the Prejudice Issue
The trial court found that the notices provided by Pinnacle did not contain substantially accurate descriptions of the materials to be provided, due to the superfluous dollar amounts listed in the notices. The primary issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in finding that Vahdani was not prejudiced by the notices provided by Pinnacle.
We do not address the trial court’s first and third findings. Although Vahdani suggests that the court’s reasoning regarding the accuracy of the notices is inadequate, it is undisputed that the notices lacked substantially accurate materials descriptions. We do not consider Vahdani’s challenges to the trial court’s section 3252 finding, because the court finding that Vahdani was not prejudiced by the superfluous cost estimates in the preliminary notices provides sufficient basis to affirm the judgment.
The lead case regarding the “substantial accuracy” requirement is Blair Excavators, Inc. v. Paschen Contractors, Inc., supra, 9 Cal.App.4th 1815 (Blair Excavators). In Blair Excavators, this district considered a bond claim for unpaid construction bills on a public project. A lower-tiered subcontractor provided preliminary notices under sections 3091 and 3098. (Blair Excavators, at p. 1817.) The court permitted the subcontractor to recover $335,000 as the reasonable value of unpaid work on the project, even though the subcontractor’s notices specified the amount due as slightly more than $200,000. (Id. at pp. 1817-1818.) The court acknowledged that “arguably a claim for about $200,000 does not state a claim for $335,000 with ‘substantial accuracy.’ ” (Id. at p. 1820, fn. 2.) Nevertheless, the court held that the statutory requirement of “substantial accuracy” in the amount claimed in a bond notice was “designed to avoid prejudice to the party claimed against and that, in the absence of any such prejudice, a plaintiff may recover an amount greater than that stated” in the initial notice. (Id. at p. 1817.) Blair Excavators placed the burden on the general contractor to show “actual prejudice by reliance on the amount stated as due in the claim.” (Id. at p. 1821; see also id. at p. 1819.) “For instance, a general contractor faced with such a claim might decide to withhold payments from its subcontractor, which would be sufficient to cover the claim, or might secure a bond in the amount of the claim. In those circumstances, the general contractor would plainly be prejudiced if it were called upon to litigate at trial an amount far greater than the amount it had secured itself against.” (Id. at p. 1820.)
The court considered the substantial accuracy requirement in former section 3091, now repealed, which related to 90-day preliminary bond notices. Vahdani makes no reasoned argument that Blair Excavators’ reasoning is inapplicable to section 3098.
We emphasize that the appropriate inquiry in this case is whether Vahdani was prejudiced by the receipt of notices including inaccurate cost estimates instead of notices with descriptions without cost estimates. The appropriate inquiry is not whether Vahdani would have performed differently had Pinnacle included an accurate estimate of the total value of goods to be provided, because Pinnacle was not obligated to provide any cost estimate at all.
Although the trial court relied on a number of different considerations in finding that Vahdani was not prejudiced by the notices, we focus on two of its reasons, which provide sufficient basis to affirm.
1. Effect of DGS Withholding
The trial court found that enforcing Pinnacle’s claims would not expose Vahdani to double payment for the materials furnished by Pinnacle because the money withheld by the DGS pursuant to Pinnacle’s stop notice is due to Sanders, and Sanders owes the money to Pinnacle. The trial court found that the total fixed contract amount owed to Sanders (including change orders) is $374,000, but Sanders received only $252,964.24, $121,035.76 short of the contract total. Pinnacle’s May 2000 stop notice sought a similar amount, $124,873, for materials furnished to the project for which it had not received payment (the court found that the actual unpaid amount was $119,561.55). The trial court ultimately awarded Pinnacle $108,770.14 on the stop notice claim, due to extra labor costs borne by Sanders because of discolored panels supplied by Pinnacle. The court concluded, “As a result of this factual and circumstantial evidence, it is quite clear that Vahdani is in no jeopardy of being forced to pay twice, since any payment made at this point would be the first such payment towards the outstanding balance due to Pinnacle. Once paid, Pinnacle’s claim would cease and no additional payments would be due. Based on the foregoing, there has never been, no will there ever be, any prejudice to Vahdani in upholding Pinnacle’s claim.”
Vahdani has not shown that the trial court erred in finding that the funds held by the DGS are owed to Sanders. Vahdani asserts in passing that the court’s finding regarding the Sanders contract price is contrary to the evidence, but it does not describe or cite the specific evidence. It also asserts in passing that it did not owe the total amount to Sanders because it “was entitled to withhold funds from Sanders to cover liens and defective work.” However, Vahdani fails to present any evidence or analysis supporting that assertion, which in any event was raised for the first time in its reply brief. (People v. Thomas (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1331, 1334, fn. 1.)
Vahdani contends that Pinnacle has no right to the funds withheld by the DGS because Sanders already paid Pinnacle project funds exceeding the value of the materials provided on the Hastings project. Vahdani points out that the evidence shows that Pinnacle took a large portion of the funds provided by Sanders and applied them to debts incurred by Sanders on past projects. The trial court recognized the evidence regarding how payments were applied but found that “to the extent any funds were actually applied to the detriment of third parties such as Vahdani and Fidelity, this court has made the necessary adjustments and credits.” The court then restated verbatim the relevant portion of its 2003 statement of decision, which decreased the award on the payment bond by $21,622.22 to account for “misapplied payments.” The trial court also concluded that “[a]pplying the non-designated funds in order to get lien releases on Sanders’ other projects was not improper given the relationship between Pinnacle and Sanders.”
Vahdani does not discuss the trial court’s finding that it “made the necessary adjustments and credits”; it does not dispute that any diverted funds were used to discharge legitimate debts of Sanders to Pinnacle; and it fails to adequately support its argument that it was improper for Pinnacle to apply Hastings project funds to satisfy Sanders’ debts for other projects. We need not resolve those undeveloped issues because they are ultimately immaterial to the narrow issue raised on appeal, which is whether Vahdani was prejudiced by the inaccurate dollar amounts listed in the preliminary notices. The court found that the withheld funds are owed to Sanders and ordered that the funds be directed to satisfy Sanders’ debts. Blair Excavators pointed out that a general contractor could avoid prejudice by withholding payments from a subcontractor in order to cover a material provider’s claim. (Blair Excavators, supra, 9 Cal.App.4th at p. 1820.) That, in effect, was accomplished by Pinnacle’s stop notice; monies due to Sanders under the contract were withheld by the DGS in order to cover Pinnacle’s claim.
Vahdani repeatedly emphasizes that Pinnacle applied payments to satisfy other debts but fails to adequately support its underlying assumption that such application of funds was improper. It addresses that issue in only general terms in a footnote in its opening brief and in a footnote and another passing reference in its reply brief. Vahdani fails to analyze the issue and authorities in the context of the unusual facts of this case, and it fails to explain how any impropriety undermines the trial court’s finding that Vahdani was not prejudiced by Pinnacle’s notices. The issue has been waived. (See Badie v. Bank of America, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at pp. 784-785.)
To rule that the funds being held by DGS should be delivered to Vahdani would, on the record before us, deny compensation to Pinnacle for materials delivered to the project and provide a windfall to Vahdani. This would be contrary to the principle that courts liberally construe the statutory remedies in order to provide adequate compensation for those providing materials or services to public works projects. (Blair Excavators, supra, 9 Cal.App.4th at p. 1819.)
2. Absence of Evidence of Reliance
The trial court found that Vahdani did not rely on the dollar amounts specified in Pinnacle’s releases. The evidence supports this finding.
By June 17, 1999, despite having received notices referencing only $48,000 in materials, Vahdani had paid Sanders (and at least on one occasion Sanders and Pinnacle together) and received releases from Pinnacle exceeding $126,000. Even then, Vahdani did not obtain a final release from Pinnacle, and there is no evidence that Vahdani raised any concerns about the disparity between the amount noticed by Pinnacle and the amount actually sought by the company. As the trial court reasoned, Vahdani’s failure to demand a final release from Pinnacle is circumstantial evidence that Vahdani expected that there would be further payments to Pinnacle and that Vahdani did not rely on the dollar figures in Pinnacle’s preliminary notices, which had already been greatly exceeded. The trial court reasonably inferred from the circumstantial evidence that Vahdani simply was not relying on the values listed in the notices as estimates of the total quantity of materials to be provided; rather, Vahdani disregarded those figures and simply paid the Sanders’ invoices as they were submitted, without regard to whether they corresponded to the amounts in Pinnacle’s preliminary notices. There simply is no evidence that Vahdani relied on the superfluous dollar values listed by Pinnacle. (Cf. Rental Equipment, Inc. v. McDaniel Builders, Inc. (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 445, 448, 451 [contractor on private work testified that had he received an accurate estimate he would have taken action because the claim exceeded the subcontractor’s contract price].)
Vahdani points out that it issued a joint check and obtained a lien release for the payments related to the $48,000 noticed by Pinnacle. This may suggest that it might have used joint checks for greater amounts had greater amounts been specified in Pinnacle’s notices, but the relevant issue is whether Vahdani was prejudiced by receiving notices including dollar amounts instead of a notice without a dollar amount. The evidence that Vahdani did not rely on the figures in the notices as an estimate of the total value of materials to be provided is dispositive.
Blair Excavators placed the burden of showing reliance and prejudice on the general contractor. (Blair Excavators, supra, 9 Cal.App.4th at p. 1821.) Vahdani points to no evidence showing reliance or other prejudice. There is no reason to believe that Vahdani would have done anything materially different had Pinnacle simply provided a materials description with no cost estimate. To the contrary, the circumstantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Vahdani did not rely on the dollar figures in Pinnacle’s notices as estimates of the total value of materials to be provided.
In sum, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Vahdani was not prejudiced by the lack of substantially accurate materials descriptions in Pinnacle’s preliminary notices.
IV. Attorney Fees and Costs
The trial court awarded Pinnacle $63,720 in attorney fees and $307.50 in costs for proceedings on remand. The court also reaffirmed the fees and costs awarded following its 2003 judgment and awarded interest on those fees and costs from the date of the original award.
Vahdani contends that Pinnacle’s costs memorandum was untimely because it was not filed within 15 days of the clerk’s mailing of notice of entry of the trial court decision. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1700(a)(1).) The clerk served the decision on July 21, 2006, but the costs memorandum was not filed until after August 18. The time limit is not jurisdictional (Sanabria v. Embrey (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 422, 426), and the trial court is authorized to extend the time for filing the memorandum for up to an additional 30 days. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1700(b)(3).) The trial court did so in this case, declaring the memorandum timely and citing former rule 870(b)(3), now rule 3.1700(b)(3).
Vahdani also contends that the trial court erred in holding it liable for the attorney fees awarded to Pinnacle. We agree that there is no statutory basis for an award of attorney fees from Vahdani to Pinnacle. The statutes provide for payment of attorney fees by the surety, here Fidelity. (§§ 3248, subd. (b); 3250; see also Walt Rankin & Associates, Inc. v. City of Murrieta (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 605, 629-630 [“The reference in Section 3250 to fees ‘in any action’ refers, in our view, to any action on the bond, as described in the preceding sentence”]; Liton Gen. Engineering Contractor, Inc. v. United Pacific Insurance (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 577, 592 [“The fee obligation under [section 3250] is a separate and primary obligation of the party (surety or claimant) who does not prevail in the action on the bond”].) Pinnacle does not offer any reasoned argument that the statutes authorize an award of attorney fees against the general contractor, here Vahdani. We will modify the order to clarify that Vahdani is not liable for the attorney fees award. (See American Enterprise, Inc. v. VanWinkle (1952) 39 Cal.2d 210, 219.)
Section 3248, subdivision (b) provides in relevant part, “The bond shall provide that if the original contractor or a subcontractor fails to pay . . . that the sureties will pay for the same, and also, in case suit is brought upon the bond, a reasonable attorney’s fee, to be fixed by the court.” (Emphasis added.) Section 3250 provides in relevant part, “The filing of a stop notice is not a condition precedent to the maintenance of an action against the surety or sureties on the payment bond… In any action, the court shall award to the prevailing party a reasonable attorney’s fee, to be taxed as costs.” (Emphasis added.)
Finally, Vahdani contends that the trial court could not award interest retroactively on the attorney fees and costs award related to the first judgment because that judgment was vacated by this court’s 2005 reversal. We have resolved the issue of attorney fees in favor of Vahdani. It has no liability to Pinnacle for attorney fees and the issue of interest on that award is moot. Vahdani is liable for interest on the cost award from the date of the new award and we modify the order accordingly. (Stockton Theaters, Inc. v. Palermo (1961) 55 Cal.2d 439, 442-443.)
We construe the trial court’s order as restating its prior attorney fees and costs award, which is appropriate because Pinnacle is the prevailing party in the litigation. The court awarded interest on the $87,148.19 awarded to Pinnacle on the payment bond from March 1, 2000, which is not the date of the 2003 judgment. Vahdani has presented no argument about the propriety of awarding interest from that date.
Disposition
The July 21, 2006 decision on remand is affirmed. The October 17, 2006 order of attorney fees and costs is modified to provide that Vahdani is not liable for the attorney fees award and that interest on costs runs from September 27, 2006. As so modified, the order is affirmed.
We concur. JONES, P.J. NEEDHAM, J.