Opinion
Record No. 0401-92-3
December 15, 1992
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FRANKLIN COUNTY BEVERLY A. DAVIS, III, JUDGE.
Barry M. Tatel (Neil E. McNally; Key and Tatel, on brief), for appellant.
David A. Melesco (Greer Melesco, P.C., on brief), for appellee.
Present: Chief Judge Koontz, Judges Moon and Willis.
Argued at Salem, Virginia.
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not designated publication.
The appellant, Benjamin D. Pinkard, Jr., sued for divorce from his wife, Nancy Hamlin Pinkard, on the ground of desertion. Mrs. Pinkard filed a cross-bill seeking a divorce on grounds of cruelty and constructive desertion. Each party sought spousal support and equitable distribution relief. By decree entered April 17, 1991, the trial court ruled that neither party had proven fault. It granted Mrs. Pinkard a divorce on the ground of a one year separation. The decree provided, in part:
The court does reserve all matters of equitable distribution and all matters of spousal support, specifically reserved that either party is allowed to litigate the issue of fault so much as it pertains to spousal support or the equitable distributions statutes.
Counsel for Mr. Pinkard endorsed the decree, "I have seen this: object to its entry for the reasons stated." No other reasons are advanced on the record. This decree was not appealed and became final.
The parties presented their evidence on spousal support and equitable distribution, and by order entered February 7, 1992, the trial court determined those issues. It denied Mr. Pinkard permanent spousal support and attorney's fees, but awarded him $2,500 lump sum spousal support.
On appeal, Mr. Pinkard contends that the trial court erred: (1) in bifurcating the spousal support and equitable distribution issues without the consent of both parties and without making the complexity finding required by Code § 20-107.3; (2) in failing to address each factor set forth in Code § 20-107.3 in determining issues of equitable distribution; and (3) in failing to consider fault on the issue of spousal support. We find no error and affirm.
On April 17, 1991, Code § 20-107.3(A) provided, in part:
The court, on the motion of both parties, may retain jurisdiction in the final decree of divorce to adjudicate the remedy provided by this section when the court determines that such action is clearly necessary because of the complexities of the parties' property interests. . . .
Pursuant to 1991 and 1992 amendments, the statute now reads, in pertinent part: The court, on the motion of either party, may retain jurisdiction in the final decree of divorce to adjudicate the remedy provided by this section when the court determines that such action is clearly necessary, and all decrees heretofore entered retaining such jurisdiction are validated. (emphasis added).
We do not have before us, and do not decide, the effect, if any, of these amendments on the trial court's action.
The bifurcation of issues, without joint motion and the required finding of complexity, violated the requirements of the statute. However, no cogent objection was lodged by Mr. Pinkard. See Lee v. Lee, 12 Va. App. 512, 515, 404 S.E.2d 736, 738 (1991) (en banc). Thus, the issue was not properly preserved for appeal.See Erickson-Dickson v. Erickson-Dickson, 12 Va. App. 381, 389-90, 404 S.E.2d 388, 393 (1991).
The trial court's letter opinion recited that it had considered the pleadings, evidence, memoranda, and the requirements of Code § 20-107.3. A trial court is not required to quantify or elaborate exactly what weight or consideration it has given to specific items of evidence or specific statutory factors.See Trivett v. Trivett, 7 Va. App. 148, 153-54, 371 S.E.2d 560, 563 (1988). The trial court's determinations pursuant to Code § 20-107.3 are supported by the evidence. We find no abuse of discretion in its equitable distribution award.
Where the record supports the conclusion that the trial judge gave due consideration to the factors set forth in Code § 20-107.1, its spousal support determination will not be disturbed on appeal except for a clear abuse of discretion.See Collier v. Collier, 2 Va. App. 125, 129, 341 S.E.2d 827, 829 (1986). Although the trial court's findings must be based on the evidence, it is not required to quantify or elaborate the exact weight or consideration that it has given to the several statutory factors. See Woolley v. Woolley, 3 Va. App. 337, 345, 349 S.E.2d 422, 426 (1986). Our review of the record supports the trial court's spousal support award. We find no abuse of discretion in that determination.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Affirmed.