Opinion
C/A 3:21-2488-MGL-PJG
01-26-2022
Crystal Pettigrew, Plaintiff, v. South Carolina Department of Mental Health, Defendant.
ORDER AND REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
PAIGE J. GOSSETT, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
Plaintiff Crystal Pettigrew filed this employment case in the Richland County Court of Common Pleas. Defendant South Carolina Department of Mental Health (“the Department”) removed the action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This matter is before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.) for a Report and Recommendation on the Department's motion to dismiss Pettigrew's supplemental state law claim for defamation. (ECF No. 5.) The motion has been fully briefed (ECF Nos. 5-1, 11, 12), and the court held a hearing on the motion on October 27, 2021 (ECF No. 20). Having reviewed the record presented and the applicable law, the court concludes that (1) federal court jurisdiction lies over Pettigrew's defamation claim because the Department has failed to show that it is immune from suit on that claim under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act; and (2) the Department's motion should be granted under Rule 12(b)(6) because Pettigrew's defamation claim is insufficiently pled. The court further grants Pettigrew's request to amend her Complaint to cure the pleading deficiencies.
Pettigrew's Complaint was filed in state court and thus was not required to meet federal pleading standards. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 81(c)(1) (“These rules apply to a civil action after it is removed from a state court.”).
BACKGROUND
The following allegations are taken as true for purposes of resolving the Department's motion to dismiss. Pettigrew began working for the Department as an administrative specialist for its Vehicle Management Division in July 2014. The Department is an agency of the State of South Carolina. Pettigrew took leave under the Family Medical Leave Act in May 2020 due to work-related stress and anxiety. When she returned to work in August 2020, Pettigrew had to correct some of the work that had been done in her absence, including some work by her supervisor. Pettigrew's supervisors told Pettigrew that she was inadequate and not performing up to their expectations, even though they knew that Pettigrew did not perform the work. Pettigrew's supervisors also accused her of falsifying documents, even though Pettigrew was just correcting work that was not properly performed.
Pettigrew filed this action asserting claims pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq.; the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. and the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601 et seq. Pettigrew also raises a state law claim of defamation, the claim challenged by the instant motion.
DISCUSSION
A. Applicable Standards
The parties analyze the Department's assertion of immunity under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Because assertions of sovereign immunity speak to federal courts' power to hear the claim, the court analyzes this issue pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). See Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277, 284 (2011) (“Sovereign immunity principles enforce an important constitutional limitation on the power of the federal courts. For over a century now, this Court has consistently made clear that federal jurisdiction over suits against unconsenting States was not contemplated by the Constitution when establishing the judicial power of the United States.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); Cunningham v. Gen. Dynamics Info. Tech., Inc., 888 F.3d 640, 649 (4th Cir. 2018) (“[S]overeign immunity deprives federal courts of jurisdiction to hear claims, and a court finding that a party is entitled to sovereign immunity must dismiss the action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.”) (quoting Ackerson v. Bean Dredging LLC, 589 F.3d 196, 207 (5th Cir. 2009)).
Dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) examines whether the complaint fails to state facts upon which jurisdiction can be founded. It is the plaintiff's burden to prove jurisdiction, and the court is to “regard the pleadings' allegations as mere evidence on the issue, and may consider evidence outside the pleadings without converting the proceeding to one for summary judgment.” Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 765, 768 (4th Cir. 1991).
To resolve a jurisdictional challenge under Rule 12(b)(1), the court may consider undisputed facts and any jurisdictional facts that it determines. The court may dismiss a case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on any of the following bases: “(1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts.” Johnson v. United States, 534 F.3d 958, 962 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 413 (5th Cir. 1981)).
A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) examines the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged on the face of the complaint. Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A claim is facially plausible when the factual content allows the court to reasonably infer that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. When considering a motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
B. The Department's Motion to Dismiss
1. Sovereign Immunity
The South Carolina Tort Claims Act (“the Act”) reinstates the State's sovereign immunity from suit and liability for any tort, except as provided for under the Act. S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-20(b). The Act is the exclusive remedy for any tort committed by an employee of a governmental entity “while acting within in the scope of his official duty.” S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-70. The Act provides that the State, its agencies, political subdivisions, and other governmental entities are “liable for their torts in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances, ” subject to certain limitations and exceptions provided in the Act. S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-40. “The governmental entity asserting the Act as an affirmative defense bears the burden of establishing a limitation upon liability or an exception to the waiver of immunity.” Hawkins v. City of Greenville, 594 S.E.2d 557, 563 (S.C. Ct. App. 2004); see also Hutto v. S.C. Ret. Sys., 773 F.3d 536, 543 (4th Cir. 2014) (“[S]overeign immunity is akin to an affirmative defense, which the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating.”).
The State of South Carolina has not waived its immunity from suit in state court for claims that are exceptions to its liability under the Act. Thus, the Department's voluntary removal of this case to federal court has not, in this instance, effected a waiver of the State's immunity from suit for these claims. See Stewart v. North Carolina, 393 F.3d 484, 490 (4th Cir. 2005) (holding that the State did not waive sovereign immunity by voluntarily removing the action to federal court for resolution of the immunity question); see also S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-20(e); cf. Lapides v. Bd. of Regents, 535 U.S. 613, 622 (2002) (holding that a State that voluntarily invokes the jurisdiction of the federal court waives immunity for claims in which it has consented to suit in its own courts).
The Department argues that it is immune from Pettigrew's defamation claim pursuant to express exceptions to South Carolina's limited waiver of its sovereign immunity via the South Carolina Tort Claims Act, SC Code Ann. §§ 15-78-10 et seq. Under the Act, the State is expressly not liable for a loss resulting from “employee conduct . . . which constitutes actual fraud, actual malice, intent to harm, or a crime involving moral turpitude.” S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-60(17) (emphasis added).
To succeed on her defamation claim, Pettigrew must show: “(1) a false and defamatory statement was made; (2) the unprivileged publication was made to a third party; (3) the publisher was at fault; and (4) either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm or the existence of special harm caused by the publication.” Fountain v. First Reliance Bank, 730 S.E.2d 305, 309 (S.C. 2012) (quoting Erickson v. Jones St. Publishers, LLC, 629 S.E.2d 653, 664 (S.C. 2006)). How the plaintiff satisfies the fourth element of defamation depends on whether the defamatory statement is “actionable per se, ” which turns on the type of act or characteristic that makes up the substance of the purportedly defamatory statement. See Erickson, 629 S.E.2d at 664-65. South Carolina Supreme Court precedent plainly states that where the defendant's defamatory statement is “actionable per se, ” “the defendant is presumed to have acted with ‘common law malice' and the plaintiff is presumed to have suffered general damages.” Fountain, 730 S.E.2d at 309 (quoting Erickson, 639 S.E.2d at 664). By contrast, if the statement is not actionable per se, to prove the fourth element of defamation, the plaintiff must plead and prove both “common law malice” and special damages. Id. Erickson defines “common law malice” as meaning that “the defendant acted with ill will toward the plaintiff, or acted recklessly or wantonly, i.e., with conscious indifference of the plaintiff's rights.” Erickson, 629 S.E.2d at 665 (quoting Padgett v. Sun News, 292 S.E.2d 30, 34 (S.C. 1982)).
The distinction based on whether malice is presumed or must be proven has long been recognized in South Carolina defamation jurisprudence, which refers to those two types of malice as “implied malice” and “actual malice, ” respectively. As explained in the seminal case of Jones v. Garner:
For clarity, to distinguish “actual malice” in this context from the constitutional standard of “actual malice” used in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), the court refers herein to implied malice as “malice in law” and to common law malice that is not presumed and therefore must be proven as “malice in fact.”
Malice, in actions for libel or slander, is of two kinds: implied malice or malice in law, and actual malice or malice in fact.
‘Malice in law, or legal malice, is a presumption of law and dispenses with the proof of malice when words which raise such presumption are shown to have been uttered. This form of malice is not necessarily inconsistent with an honest or even laudable purpose and does not imply ill will, personal malice, hatred, or a purpose to injure.' [citing 33 Am. Jur., Libel and Slander, § 111; 53 C.J.S. Libel and Slander [§] 2.] ...
Actual malice or malice in fact is not presumed and must be proved. Actual malice means that the defendant was actuated by ill will in what he did, with the design to causelessly and wantonly injure the plaintiff; or that the statements were published with such recklessness as to show a conscious indifference toward plaintiff's rights. [citing Rogers v. Florence Printing Co., 106 S.E.2d 257 (S.C. 1958).]Jones v. Garner, 158 S.E.2d 909, 913-14 (S.C. 1968) (citations cleaned up); see also Holtzscheiter v. Thomson Newspapers, Inc., 506 S.E.2d 497, 502 n.3 (S.C. 1998) (“When a publication is actionable per se there arises a common law presumption of implied malice, sometimes called ‘malice in law', ‘legal malice' or ‘presumed malice' which substitutes for common law actual malice. If the defamation is not actionable per se, then the plaintiff must plead and prove common law actual malice, that is ‘the defendant was [actuated] by ill will in what he did, with the design to causelessly and wantonly injure the plaintiff; or that the statements were published with such recklessness as to show a conscious indifference toward plaintiff's reports.' ”) (quoting Jones, 158 S.E.2d at 913-14). Thus, case law instructs that where a defamation claim is actionable based solely on the content of the statement, malice of the type that can be consistent with an honest or laudable purpose suffices. Indeed, it is presumed.
“ ‘Malice' in the law of defamation denotes merely the absence of lawful excuse or privileged occasion.” 53 C.J.S. Libel and Slander; Injurious Falsehood § 8 (Nov. 2021).
For purposes of this motion, the parties agree that Pettigrew's defamation claim is actionable per se because she alleges that the defamatory statements concern Pettigrew's fitness to perform her job. Erickson, 629 S.E.2d at 664 n.7. Malice and special damages are therefore presumed, id., and Pettigrew's claim is actionable based on the content of the defendant's statement without regard to the defendant's state of mind or intent to injure. See Holtzscheiter, 506 S.E.2d at 502. Consequently, her claim does not imply recklessness, wantonness, ill will, or intent to injure. See Jones, 158 S.E.2d at 913-14 (stating that malice in law “does not imply ill will, personal malice, hatred, or a purpose to injure”); Castine v. Castine, 743 S.E.2d 93, 97 (S.C. Ct. App. 2013) (“[T]he presumption of common law malice [(malice in law)] does not mean the defendant's conduct evidenced common law actual malice, which is defined as acting with ‘ill will toward the plaintiff,' or acting ‘with conscious indifference of the plaintiff's rights.' ”) (quoting Erickson, 629 S.E.2d at 665); 53 C.J.S. Libel and Slander; Injurious Falsehood § 8 (Nov. 2021) (“Implied malice is presumed to exist by fiction of law. It does not impute motives of ill will with intent to injure[.]”). Therefore, the court concludes that at this stage of proceedings Pettigrew's defamation claim does not require proof of recklessness, wantonness, ill will, or intent to harm for her to prevail. See Seaton v. City of N. Charleston, No. 2:10-cv-03186-DCN, 2012 WL 6186158, at *2 (D.S.C. Dec. 12, 2012) (rejecting the defendant's argument that a claim for defamation per se brought by a private figure plaintiff requires a showing of “actual malice” as that term is used in the Act); see also Moise & Nichols, The South Carolina Law of Torts § 7.A.2.a(2) (“[T]he presumption of common law malice does not mean that the defendant's conduct evidenced common law actual malice. . . .”) (Lexis Nexis 2018) (citing Castine, 743 S.E.2d 93). At this time, the Department has failed to carry its burden to show that it is immune from Pettigrew's defamation claim under the Tort Claims Act.
The parties also agree that Pettigrew need not satisfy the constitutional malice standard as enunciated by the United States Supreme Court, confusingly also referred to as “actual malice.” New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (providing that a public official may not recover damages “for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with ‘actual malice'-that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not”). Here, the First Amendment constraints discussed by New York Times v. Sullivan and its progeny are not implicated. See Erickson, 629 S.E.2d at 666 (describing how proof requirements change based on First Amendment constraints on common law defamation claims when a plaintiff is a public official or public figure, or when the statements involve a matter of public concern by a media defendant).
The court notes that the Department has pled in its Answer filed contemporaneously with its motion to dismiss that the statements at issue were privileged. Even where the law presumes malice because the alleged defamatory statement is actionable per se, a plaintiff may still have to prove malice in fact if the statement is privileged. See, e.g., Swinton Creek Nursery v. Edisto Farm Credit, ACA, 514 S.E.2d 126, 134 (S.C. 1999). But at this stage, the record is not sufficiently developed to determine whether the statement was privileged, and the Department does not rest on that defense in the instant motion.
The plaintiff relies on the holdings of two South Carolina Court of Appeals cases recognizing that “actual malice” as used in the Tort Claims Act encompasses constitutional malice-that is, knowledge that the statement is false or reckless disregard for its falsity. See Cruce v. Berkeley Cty. Sch. Dist., 865 S.E.2d 391, 399 (S.C. Ct. App. 2021) (holding that Cruce was a public official, which required him to prove constitutional malice, so the Tort Claims Act “actual malice” exception barred his claim); see also Kennedy v Richland Cty. Sch. Dist. Two, 833 S.E.2d 414, 425 (S.C. Ct. App. 2019) (addressing whether individual employees of the school district could be held liable for defamation and finding that the term “actual malice” in the Tort Claims Act refers to “constitutional malice” when the defamation claim “involves the First Amendment, a public official, or an issue of public concern”). However, contrary to Pettigrew's argument, neither of these cases suggests that the “actual malice” exception in the Tort Claims Act is limited to the constitutional malice standard required in defamation claims implicating the First Amendment. Nothing in those cases precludes a finding that the “actual malice” exception in the Tort Claims Act cannot also include common law malice-that is, “the defendant acted with ill will toward the plaintiff, or acted recklessly or wantonly, i.e., with conscious indifference of the plaintiff's rights.” Erickson, 629 S.E.2d at 665. In fact, in the context of determining whether torts other than defamation are barred by the South Carolina Tort Claims Act, the South Carolina Court of Appeals has stated that “actual malice” as used in the Act refers to “common law actual malice.” See McBride v. Sch. Dist. of Greenville Cty., 698 S.E.2d 845, 855 (S.C. Ct. App. 2010) (defining “actual malice” under the Act as acting out of “spite, revenge, or with a malignant disposition, ” and finding that a malicious prosecution claim is not barred by the Act because it includes an element of implied or inferred malice); Swicegood v. Lott, 665 S.E.2d 211, 214 (S.C. Ct. App. 2008) (concluding that the “ulterior purpose” element of an abuse of process claim does not equate to “actual malice” as it is used in the Tort Claims Act, and stating that “[a]ctual malice in this situation refers to common law actual malice, and has been defined by situations where ‘defendant was actuated by ill will in what he did, with the design to causelessly and wantonly injure the plaintiff ”) (quoting Jones, 158 S.E.2d at 914)).
See supra note 5.
Significantly, Kennedy is not actually a Tort Claims Act case, as the defamation claim discussed there was against only the individual employees, not the school district. The defendant individuals appear to have argued, however, that the constitutional malice standard had to be met to prevail against them based on the “actual malice” language in the Tort Claims Act. The Kennedy Court agreed with them that the Tort Claims Act exception refers to constitutional malice when the First Amendment is implicated. Pertinent here, however, and contrary to Pettigrew's argument, the Kennedy Court did not apparently foreclose the Department's argument in the instant case that, outside the First Amendment context, the Tort Claims Act “actual malice” exception can also encompass malice in fact.
Other federal courts have reached this same conclusion when addressing the question of defendants' immunity under the Act. Those courts declined to find certain defamation claims by private figures to be barred by the Act because they recognized that actionable defamation can include behavior that does not rise to the level of malice in fact. See Seaton, 2012 WL 6186158, at *5; Yost v. City of Charleston, Case No. 2:09-cv-2024-RMG, 2010 WL 11643356, at *6 (D.S.C. Oct. 22, 2010) (differentiating between “implied or inferred malice” and “actual malice” and concluding that the private figure plaintiff's defamation claim was not necessarily barred by the Act if plaintiff amended his pleading to assert a claim based on implied or presumed malice) (citing McBride, 698 S.E.2d at 855). Notably, Yost, Seaton, and McBride all specifically differentiated between the term “actual malice” used in the Tort Claims Act and malice that is presumed or implied.
Although the Department relies on Yost and another case, Yates v. Zumalt, C/A No. 2:11-02289-CWH, 2015 WL 12910629 (D.S.C. Apr. 23, 2015), to support its argument that Pettigrew's claim is barred by the “intent to harm” exception in the Tort Claims Act, those cases are readily distinguishable. Contrary to Pettigrew's Complaint, the complaints in those cases both expressly alleged that the statements were made with the intent to harm the plaintiff. Compare Yates, 2015 WL 12910629, at *3, and Yost, 2010 WL 11643356, at *4, with (Pl.'s Compl., ECF No. 1-1 at 910).
The court therefore concludes that to fall within the South Carolina Tort Claims Act's “actual malice” exception to the state's limited waiver of sovereign immunity, a plaintiff's claim, to succeed, must require proof of conduct that is at least reckless. Plaintiff's defamation claim does not include allegations of conduct constituting ill will, intent to injure, or even recklessness, and her claim currently does not demand such a showing for her to prevail. Consequently, in the instant motion, the defendant has failed to carry its burden to show that Pettigrew's defamation claim is barred by the Act.
2. Failure to State a Claim
Having determined that federal jurisdiction lies over Pettigrew's defamation claim, the court turns to the Department's argument that she fails to aver facts to plausibly state a claim for defamation. Specifically, the Department argues that Pettigrew fails to plausibly allege that a false or defamatory statement was made, the statement was published to a third party, or that the speakers knew or should have known that the statement was false or acted with reckless disregard to their falsity. The court agrees that Pettigrew fails to plausibly allege that the statements were published.
The court disagrees with the Department's argument that Pettigrew fails to plausibly allege that the statements were false or that the speaker knew they were false or acted recklessly. Pettigrew asserts that the alleged statements were false and known to be, (Compl. ¶ 46, ECF No. 1-1 at 9), and Pettigrew need not make specific allegations about the speakers' state of mind. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) (“Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person's mind may be alleged generally.”).
To refresh, the elements for a defamation claim brought by a private figure plaintiff are: “(1) a false and defamatory statement was made; (2) the unprivileged publication was made to a third party; (3) the publisher was at fault; and (4) either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm or the existence of special harm caused by the publication.” Fountain, 730 S.E.2d at 309.
Here, Pettigrew alleges that her supervisors “frequently told her she was inadequate and not performing up to expectations, ” and that the Department “publicly stat[ed] that Plaintiff had falsified the documents and that she was being unprofessional and unethical.” (Compl. ¶¶ 15, 47 ECF No. 1-1 at 5, 10.) Thus, Pettigrew specifically alleges that the purported defamatory statements were made to her and then generally alleges that the statements were “publicly state[d].” (Id.) Pettigrew's assertion that the statements were made “publicly, ” without identifying a specific person or persons to whom the statements were made, fails to plausibly allege that the Department published the statements to a third party. See Colleton v. Charleston Water Sys., 225 F.Supp.3d 362, 369 (D.S.C. 2016) (finding that the plaintiff's allegation that the defamatory statement “was heard, ” even drawing the inference that it was heard in the workplace, is insufficient for notice pleading, and stating that the defendants “cannot be expected to defend against an allegation” that the plaintiff was defamed by the defendant “making a statement heard by unknown persons at an unknown place at an unknown time.”); Campbell v. Int'l Paper Co., C/A No. 3:12-CV-03042-JFA, 2013 WL 1874850, at *4 (D.S.C. May 3, 2013) (finding that the plaintiff's allegation that the defendants made statements “publicly known, ” without alleging specifically to whom the statements were published, failed to plausibly allege a defamation claim upon which relief can be granted); cf. Alford v. Wang, Inc., 11 F.Supp.3d 584, 596 (D.S.C. 2014) (finding that the plaintiff's allegation that the defendant told other employees that the plaintiff was demoted because the plaintiff was stealing and was a racist was sufficient to state a plausible defamation claim to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim). Other than a conclusory assertion that the purported defamatory statements were “publicly” made, Pettigrew identifies no specific third party that heard or received the statements; nor does she plead facts to show where and when the statements were made. See Colleton, 225 F.Supp.3d at 369 (allegations of statements by unknown persons at unknown time and place were insufficient); Campbell, 2013 WL 1874850 at *4 (allegations that the statements were “publicly known” were not enough). In the Complaint's only other reference to the publication element, Pettigrew specifically alleges that the statements were made to her. (Compl. ¶ 15, ECF No. 1-1 at 5.) Therefore, Pettigrew fails to allege facts to plausibly show that the alleged defamatory statements were published to a third party. The Complaint therefore fails to state a defamation claim upon which relief can be granted. See Dickson v. Microsoft Corp., 309 F.3d 193, 213 (4th Cir. 2002) (providing that, to avoid dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must “set forth facts sufficient to allege each element of his claim”) (citing Iodice v. United States, 289 F.3d 270, 281 (4th Cir. 2002)).
RECOMMENDATION
The court recommends that the defendant's motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) be grantedbased on Pettigrew's failure to plausibly plead a defamation claim upon which relief can be granted. (ECF No. 5.)
Pettigrew asks that she be given leave to amend the Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2). The Department opposes Pettigrew's request for leave to amend, arguing it would be futile based on its immunity argument. Because the Department has failed to establish immunity at this time, the court concludes that Pettigrew should be given leave to amend the Complaint as to her defamation claim. Any amended complaint must be filed no later than fourteen days after the assigned district judge's ruling on the instant motion.
The parties' attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.' ” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).