Nos. 05-10-00782-CR, 05-10-00783-CR
Opinion Filed October 11, 2011. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex. R. App. P. 47.
On Appeal from the 265th Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause Nos. F08-58710-R F09-71219-R.
Before Justices MORRIS, O'NEILL, and FILLMORE.
Opinion By Justice FILLMORE.
Cedrick Demond Peterson pleaded guilty to murder and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon with no agreement about punishment. The trial court sentenced Peterson to ninety-nine years' imprisonment for the murder conviction and twenty years' imprisonment for the aggravated assault conviction and assessed a $10,000 fine in each case. On appeal, Peterson argues in two issues that he did not enter the guilty pleas knowingly and voluntarily and the trial court erred by denying his motion to withdraw the guilty pleas. We affirm the trial court's judgments.
Background
Peterson was charged with murder and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and the cases were set for trial before a jury. On the day of trial, Peterson pleaded guilty to both charges. At the plea hearing, the trial court admonished Peterson both in writing and orally about the consequences of his pleas and the range of punishment for each offense. Peterson confirmed to the trial court that he was entering the pleas freely and voluntarily. He also stated he had made the decision to plead guilty and no one forced him to do so. Peterson indicated he understood that he did not have an agreement with the State about punishment. Peterson's trial counsel stated that, in his opinion, Peterson was mentally competent to enter the pleas. The State offered into evidence judicial confessions signed by Peterson admitting he committed each offense exactly as alleged in the indictment. The trial court accepted Peterson's guilty pleas, but deferred a finding of guilt and took the cases under advisement. Approximately three weeks later, Peterson sent two letters to the trial court. In the first letter, Peterson stated he was "forced into [his] plea" and that he believed he had not been adequately represented by trial counsel. Peterson specifically complained that trial counsel had not filed any motions and he had not received an examining trial. Peterson indicated he wanted "everything to be fair" and requested "proper" legal representation and to withdraw his guilty pleas. Peterson stated he was not guilty and had not wanted to enter the pleas, but his trial counsel told him that "[trial counsel] had talked with [the trial court], and [the trial court] said that it will probably be better for [Peterson] to come before [the trial court] and enter a guilty plea." In his second letter, Peterson requested he be allowed to withdraw his guilty pleas because he was "improperly represented by counsel," was scared and nervous when he entered the guilty pleas, and did not "feel that it's in my best entrest [sic] to say I did something that I didn't." Peterson obtained new trial counsel. Three months after Peterson entered the guilty pleas, his new trial counsel filed a formal motion to withdraw the pleas on the grounds that (1) Peterson did not knowingly and voluntarily enter the pleas due to "lack of sufficient advice of appointed counsel," (2) Peterson felt pressured into entering the pleas because his first trial counsel had been appointed shortly before the trial date and could not have been ready for trial, and (3) Peterson was not receiving his psychiatric medications when he entered the pleas and, therefore, was not competent to knowingly and voluntarily enter a guilty plea. The trial court appointed Dr. Michael Pittman to perform a competency evaluation on Peterson. Dr. Pittman filed a handwritten letter with the trial court stating he had examined Peterson and, in his opinion, Peterson was competent to stand trial. The trial court held a hearing on Peterson's motion to withdraw the guilty pleas. When asked why he pleaded guilty, Peterson responded that his first trial counsel did not explain the entire situation, "got on [his] case," and "didn't have enough time to go over everything." In Peterson's opinion, his trial counsel was "rushing," was not adequately prepared, and "just enticed" him to "go open plea." When asked what information trial counsel failed to provide, Peterson responded "[h]e just didn't give me all the proper documents and stuff." When asked specifically about his psychiatric medications, Peterson stated in either 2006 or 2007, he was prescribed medication for depression, difficulty sleeping, and "hearing voices." After his arrest, the jail provided the medications. About six months before the hearing on his motion to withdraw the pleas, the jail stopped giving him the medications. He was not receiving the medications when he entered the guilty pleas and was not receiving them at the time of the hearing on the motion to withdraw the pleas. Peterson's first trial counsel testified he was appointed to represent Peterson two or three months prior to the scheduled trial date. An investigator assisted trial counsel with trial preparation by locating and interviewing witnesses. Trial counsel stated he received, and reviewed, discovery from the State and met with Peterson several times regarding how to proceed with the cases. Trial counsel believed he was ready to go to trial, and Peterson never expressed any concern to trial counsel about whether they were ready to proceed to trial. Trial counsel had discussions with Peterson about whether to plead guilty and whether to testify against Peterson's co-defendant. Trial counsel testified he did not force Peterson to plead guilty and, although Peterson had some hesitation, it was Peterson's decision to plead guilty. Peterson never told trial counsel that he was not receiving his psychiatric medications, and trial counsel did not believe Peterson needed any medication that he was not receiving. In trial counsel's opinion, Peterson understood the proceedings. The trial court denied Peterson's motion to withdraw the guilty pleas. After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found Peterson guilty of each offense and imposed a sentence in each case. Voluntariness of Guilty Pleas
In his first issue, Peterson asserts he did not knowingly and voluntarily enter the guilty pleas because (1) he was not receiving his psychiatric medication when he entered the guilty pleas, (2) trial counsel was not prepared to go to trial and forced him to plead guilty, and (3) trial counsel did not provide him with all the information he needed prior to entering the guilty pleas. A trial court may not accept a plea of guilty "unless it appears that the defendant is mentally competent and the plea is free and voluntary." Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.13(b) (West 2009). A defendant is incompetent to stand trial if he does not have a sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding or a rational, as well as factual, understanding of the proceedings against him. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46B.003(a) (West 2006); Luna v. State, 268 S.W.3d 594, 598 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). The defendant is presumed competent to stand trial unless proved incompetent by a preponderance of the evidence. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46B.003(b). To be "voluntary," a guilty plea must be the expression of the defendant's own free will and must not have been induced by threats, misrepresentations, or improper promises. Kniatt v. State, 206 S.W.3d 657, 664 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). In considering the voluntariness of a guilty plea, we examine the record as a whole. Martinez v. State, 981 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (per curiam). When the record reflects the defendant was duly admonished by the trial court before entering a guilty plea, it presents a prima facie showing the plea was both knowing and voluntary. Id.; McGill v. State, 200 S.W.3d 325, 333 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.). The burden then shifts to the defendant to show he entered the plea without understanding the consequences of his actions and was harmed as a result. Martinez, 981 S.W.2d at 197; McGill, 200 S.W.3d at 333. Once a defendant attests that he understands the nature of his plea and that it was voluntary, he has a heavy burden in a subsequent proceeding to prove the plea was involuntary. Kniatt, 206 S.W.3d at 664 (stating such attestations constitute "a formidable barrier in any subsequent collateral proceedings"); Labib v. State, 239 S.W.3d 322, 333 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.). A plea is not involuntary because the defendant did not correctly assess every relevant factor entering into his decision. Ex parte Evans, 690 S.W.2d 274, 277 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (citing Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 757 (1970)). The record shows the trial court delivered comprehensive written and oral admonishments to Peterson. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.13(a). Peterson signed the written admonishments, acknowledging he understood them. During the plea hearing, Peterson orally assured the trial court he understood the charges and the range of punishment attached to each offense and stated he had discussed the offenses with his attorney, had made the decision to plead guilty, was entering his pleas freely and voluntarily, and understood he did not have a plea bargain regarding punishment. The trial court's admonishments to Peterson, coupled with Peterson's assurances of his understanding, create a prima facie showing that he entered his pleas knowingly and voluntarily. See Martinez, 981 S.W.2d at 197; Kirk v. State, 949 S.W.2d 769, 771 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1997, pet. ref'd). Peterson first asserts the pleas were involuntary because his trial counsel failed to provide him all necessary information to assist him in making the decision to plead guilty. However, when asked what information trial counsel failed to provide, Peterson stated only "proper documents and stuff." Peterson failed to point to any specific information not provided by trial counsel that Peterson needed in reaching the decision to plead guilty. We conclude Peterson failed to establish his pleas were involuntary based on his assertion that trial counsel failed to provide any necessary information. Peterson next contends the pleas were involuntary because trial counsel was not prepared to go to trial and forced him to plead guilty. Peterson testified at the hearing on the motion to withdraw the pleas that he did not believe his trial counsel was prepared to take the case to trial and, therefore, "enticed" him to plead guilty. Peterson's trial counsel, however, testified he was ready to go to trial and that Peterson never expressed any concern to him about whether they were ready to proceed to trial. Trial counsel further testified he had discussions with Peterson about whether to plead guilty and whether to testify against Peterson's co-defendant, he did not force Peterson to plead guilty and, although Peterson had some hesitation, it was Peterson's decision to plead guilty. The evidence was disputed as to whether trial counsel was prepared to proceed to trial, and the trial court was entitled to believe Peterson's trial counsel. See Ulloa v. State, No. 14-10-00102-CR, 2011 WL 1283115, at *5 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 5, 2011, pet. ref'd). Accordingly, Peterson failed to establish his plea was involuntary based on his assertion that trial counsel forced or coerced him to plead guilty. Peterson finally argues he was not competent to enter the pleas because he was not receiving his psychiatric medications. Peterson testified at the hearing on the motion to withdraw the guilty pleas that he had been prescribed psychiatric medication for depression, to help him sleep, and for hearing voices and he was not receiving the medications at the time he entered the pleas or at the time of the hearing on the motion to withdraw the pleas. Peterson's claim that he has a mental illness, standing alone, does not establish he was incompetent to enter the pleas. Lingerfelt v. State, 629 S.W.2d 216, 217 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1982, pet. ref'd) (diagnosis of schizophrenia was no more than speculation that appellant was unable to consult with attorney); see Grider v. State, 69 S.W.3d 681, 684 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002, no pet.); Townsend v. State, 949 S.W.2d 24, 27 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, no pet.) (despite evidence of suicidal tendencies and depression, record did not support finding of incompetency). Further, Peterson did not testify that he was hearing voices, was depressed, or having difficulty sleeping at the time he decided to plead guilty. At both the plea hearing and the hearing on the motion to withdraw the pleas, Peterson's answers to the trial court's, the prosecutor's, and trial counsel's questions were articulate and responsive. At the plea hearing, Peterson's trial counsel indicated he believed Peterson was competent to enter the plea and, at the hearing on the motion to withdraw the plea, testified Peterson understood the proceedings and never said that he was not receiving any psychiatric medication that he needed. There is simply nothing in the record to suggest Peterson did not have sufficient present ability to consult meaningfully with his lawyer or did not have a rational, as well as factual, understanding of the proceedings against him. We conclude Peterson failed to carry his heavy burden of showing he did not enter the guilty pleas voluntarily. Accordingly, we overrule Peterson's first issue. Motion to Withdraw Guilty Pleas
In his second issue, Peterson argues the trial court erred by denying the motion to withdraw the guilty pleas because his pleas were not voluntary, his competence was not determined as of the date of the plea was entered, the evidence showed he did not fire the weapon, and he received the same sentence for the murder conviction as the actual shooter received. Texas has a liberal practice concerning the withdrawal of guilty pleas. Jackson v. State, 590 S.W.2d 514, 515 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1979). A defendant may withdraw his guilty plea as a matter of right without assigning a reason until judgment has been pronounced or the case has been taken under advisement. Murray v. State, 302 S.W.3d 874, 883 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (citing DeVary v. State, 615 S.W.2d 739, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1981)). However, where the defendant decides to withdraw his guilty plea after the trial court takes the case under advisement or pronounces judgment, the withdrawal of the plea is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Jackson, 590 S.W.2d at 515. A case is under advisement after each side has concluded its case-in-chief, the defendant has entered a plea of guilty, the plea has been accepted, and the necessary admonishments have been given, even though the issue of punishment remains. Washington v. State, 893 S.W.2d 107, 108-09 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1995, no pet.). In this case, the trial court took the cases under advisement following Peterson's pleading guilty to the charges. Accordingly, we review the trial court's decision to deny Peterson's motion to withdraw the pleas for an abuse of discretion. A trial court abuses its discretion if its decision is so clearly wrong as to lie outside the zone within which reasonable persons might disagree. State v. Dixon, 206 S.W.3d 587, 590 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Peterson first argues the trial court erred by denying the motion to withdraw the pleas because the pleas were involuntary. Peterson specifically asserts his pleas were involuntary because (1) he was not receiving his psychiatric medications, and (2) his first trial counsel's testimony that Peterson was hesitant to enter the pleas "establishes his pleas were not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered into but rather were enticed by" trial counsel. As discussed above, Peterson failed to establish the pleas were involuntary. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion to withdraw the pleas on this ground. Peterson also contends the trial court abused its discretion by relying on Dr. Pittman's opinion that Peterson was competent to stand trial because Dr. Pittman's evaluation of Peterson took place after Peterson had pleaded guilty to the charges. Peterson did not object to the trial court's considering Dr. Pittman's opinion and, therefore, may not complain on appeal about the trial court doing so. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a); Ex parte Harris, 618 S.W.2d 369, 371 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (defendant waived objection to psychiatrist's testimony regarding retroactive competency evaluation by failing to object to testimony in trial court). Peterson next argues the trial court abused its discretion by denying the motion to withdraw the pleas because the facts developed at the sentencing hearing show he lacked the necessary culpability to have been convicted of the charged offenses. A trial court is not required to withdraw a defendant's guilty plea after the defendant has waived a jury trial, even if the evidence fairly raises an issue as to the innocence of the defendant. Aldrich v. State, 104 S.W.3d 890, 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (citing Moon v. State, 572 S.W.2d 681, 682 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (op. on reh'g)); McGill, 200 S.W.3d at 330. As the trier of fact, the trial court's duty is to consider all of the evidence submitted, and may find the defendant guilty as charged, guilty of a lesser-included offense, or not guilty, as the evidence requires. Aldrich, 104 S.W.3d at 893; McGill, 200 S.W.3d at 330. Therefore, the trial court had no duty to withdraw Peterson's guilty plea after hearing evidence at the sentencing hearing and did not err by not doing so. Peterson finally asserts the trial court erred by denying the motion to withdraw the guilty pleas because he received the same sentence on the murder conviction as the person who actually fired the weapon. Peterson did not request, either in the motion to withdraw the guilty pleas or in a motion for new trial, that the trial court allow him to withdraw his pleas based on the sentence he received. Accordingly, he has not preserved this argument for appellate review. See Reyna v. State, 168 S.W.3d 173, 177, 179 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (party's argument on appeal must comport with his objection in trial court). We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Peterson's motion to withdraw the guilty pleas. We resolve Peterson's second issue against him. We affirm the trial court's judgments.