Opinion
05-22-01080-CR
01-24-2024
ERIC GOODNER, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
Do Not Publish Tex.R.App.P. 47.2(b)
On Appeal from the 291st Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F22-33988.
Before Molberg, Reichek, and Smith, Justices.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AMANDA L. REICHEK, JUSTICE.
Eric Goodner appeals his conviction for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. Bringing three issues, appellant contends his guilty plea was involuntary and his sentence is grossly disproportionate to his crime. The State brings one cross issue requesting we modify the trial court's judgment. We agree the judgment should be modified and, as modified, we affirm.
Background
After choking a stranger with an LED light strip while high on methamphetamine, appellant was arrested and charged with aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. Appellant entered an open plea of guilty to the offense.
At trial, the court admonished appellant, asking if he understood the offense with which he was charged and the range of punishment he faced. Appellant stated that he did. When the court informed appellant he had an absolute right to a jury trial and asked if he wanted to waive that right, appellant hesitated before answering "yes." The court inquired about the hesitation and appellant responded, "I don't know what I'm doing. I don't." The court then reminded appellant that he had been admonished multiple times before and he was free to plead not guilty and go to trial before a jury. The court stressed to appellant that it was not going to make him do something he did not want to do. Appellant responded, "Yes, ma'am. I'm pleading guilty." He further acknowledged he was pleading guilty because he was guilty and for no other reason, and that he understood the court had broad discretion to sentence him to up to twenty years in prison.
Multiple witnesses, including appellant, testified at trial. Appellant acknowledged he was high on methamphetamine when the offense occurred, and he promised he would never use the drug again. He denied that he needed help with his drug issue, stating he could quit anytime he wanted.
Appellant additionally testified he had been diagnosed as manic bipolar. Appellant stated he took medication for his mental health regularly, but he conceded that, the time of the offense, he was not taking his medication because he had just been released from serving time in prison for a prior offense.
Before pronouncing appellant's sentence, the trial court asked appellant's counsel if she believed appellant was mentally competent. Counsel responded that she did. The trial court then asked if there was any reason appellant could not be sentenced at that time, and counsel responded there was not. The court found appellant guilty and sentenced him to eight years in prison. Appellant filed a motion for new trial arguing the verdict was contrary to the law and the evidence. The motion was overruled by operation of law, and this appeal followed.
Analysis I. Voluntariness of Plea
In his first issue, appellant contends his guilty plea was involuntary because he did not understand the consequences of his plea. When the record shows the defendant was properly admonished, it presents a prima facie showing that the defendant's guilty plea was knowing and voluntary. Soto v. State, 837 S.W.2d 401, 405 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, no pet.). The burden then shifts to the defendant to establish he did not understand the consequences of his plea. Id.
The record in this case shows, and appellant does not dispute, that he was properly admonished. Therefore, he bears the burden to show he lacked understanding. Id. Because appellant attested when he entered his guilty plea that he understood the nature of his plea and his plea was voluntary, this burden is a heavy one. Edwards v. State, 921 S.W.2d 477, 479 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no pet.).
Appellant argues the trial court should have sua sponte stopped the plea proceedings and gone forward with a jury trial when appellant hesitated during the admonishments and stated he did not know what he was doing. The trial court recognized appellant's hesitancy, however, and gave him every opportunity to choose to have a jury decide his guilt or innocence. The court made clear to appellant that he could not be forced to plead guilty. After this discussion, appellant confirmed he wished to plead guilty. Appellant's brief hesitancy before his clear and uncoerced decision to plead guilty does not meet the heavy burden of showing his plea was involuntary. See Peterson v. State, No. 05-10-00782-CR, 2011 WL 4792866, at *4 (Tex. App.-Dallas Oct. 11, 2011, pet. ref'd) (not designated for publication).
Appellant further argues that, at the time he entered his plea, he believed his offense was, at most, attempted strangulation. A defendant's plea can be involuntary if he has an incomplete understanding of the charge against him. Alexander v. State, 868 S.W.2d 356, 362 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, no pet.). While discussing the offense during his testimony at trial, appellant characterized his actions as merely a brief attempt to strangle the complainant. The record shows the court admonished appellant before he testified that he was charged with the second degree felony offense of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. In addition, appellant signed a judicial confession that tracked the applicable statutory language for the offense of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. Appellant, therefore, is presumed to have had notice of the charge against him. McGowin v. State, 912 S.W.2d 837, 839 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1995, no pet.). His attempt to downplay his actions at trial does not overcome this presumption or show he did not understand the offense with which he was charged.
Finally, appellant notes in his brief that he suffers from manic bipolar disorder. Appellant makes no argument, and cites no authority for the proposition that his mental illness rendered him unable to understand the consequences of his plea. See Peterson, 2011 WL 4792866, at *4 (claim of mental illness, standing alone, does not establish incompetence to enter plea). His attorney stated she believed he was mentally competent. We resolve appellant's first issue against him.
II. Disproportionate Sentence
In his second and third issues, appellant contends his sentence of eight years in prison is disproportionate to his crime and violates the prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment found in the United States and Texas constitutions. To preserve error, including an alleged violation of the constitutional right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, the record must show appellant made a timely request, objection or motion. Castaneda v. State, 135 S.W.3d 719, 723 (Tex. App.- Dallas 2003, no pet.). When appellant's sentence was pronounced, he did not object to the sentence as violating his constitutional rights. Nor did he raise the argument in a post-trial motion. Accordingly, appellant has not preserved this issue for appellate review. Id.; see also Forbit v. State, No. 05-19-00946-CR, 2021 WL 1884655, at *1 (Tex. App.-Dallas May 11, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). We resolve appellant's second and third issues against him.
III. Modification
In its sole cross issue, the State asks us to modify the judgment to show that appellant did not plead guilty pursuant to a plea bargain agreement. The record shows appellant's plea was an open plea. We have the power to modify a judgment to speak the truth when we have the necessary information to do so. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(b); Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27-28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Asberry v. State, 813 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, pet. ref'd) (en banc). Because the record shows there was no plea bargain agreement, we modify the judgment to delete the language "8 YEARS TDJC, CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS DIVISIONS" in the section of the trial court's judgment for "Terms of Plea Bargain."
As modified, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
JUDGMENT
Based on the Court's opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is MODIFIED as follows:
The phrase "8 YEARS TDJC, CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS DIVISIONS" in the section of the judgment entitled "Terms of Plea Bargain" is DELETED.
As REFORMED, the judgment is AFFIRMED.