Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. NS017458. Kenneth A. Black, Judge.
Steven Marshall, in. pro. per, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
CHAVEZ, J.
Stephen Marshall (appellant) appeals from an order of the trial court granting an injunction against him under Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6 (section 527.6). The injunction restrains appellant from harassing or contacting respondent Melodye Ann Perez or her family members, and further requires appellant to stay at least five yards away from respondent, her family, her home and workplace, the family’s vehicles, and the schools of the protected children. Appellant contends that substantial evidence does not support the trial court’s decision. We affirm.
Respondent has not filed a responsive brief in this appeal.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Appellant moved into his residence at 324 Ximeno Avenue in Long Beach on August 3, 2005. Respondent and her family reside next door at 328 Ximeno Ave. Respondent runs a daycare out of her home.
Appellant’s landlord, Hazel Schubert, lives at 326 Ximeno Avenue, in a home which is located behind appellant’s home.
According to appellant, he was harassed by respondent since the day he moved in. Appellant states that respondent’s customers frequently blocked his driveway with their cars. Appellant testified that when he raised this problem with respondent, she responded that if appellant wasn’t using his driveway, her clients could and would park there. The situation escalated, and appellant claims that respondent insulted and threatened him. Appellant also accused respondent of throwing trash onto his property and complained of noise and crying from respondent’s daycare business.
According to respondent, her daycare parents do not park in his driveway or leave their cars in his driveway. She stated that appellant calls the police if a car is “an inch in the red.” Appellant yells at her clients and uses the “F-word” in front of the children. Respondent produced a witness who was a former client. The witness, Raquel Cameron-Bishop, testified that she worked 12-hour shifts at a hospital and dropped off her child with respondent very early and picked her up very late. Once when she was picking up her child, her car was parked “almost in the red of [respondent’s] house.” Appellant ran out of his house, screamed at her and used the “F-word” in front of her child. After three weeks, Ms. Cameron-Bishop terminated her childcare contract with respondent because of appellant’s behavior. Respondent’s 19-year-old daughter also provided testimony that appellant approached her at night in a frightening way and also used abusive language towards her. Respondent denied ever using insulting language towards appellant.
On February 7, 2007, appellant filed a request for a restraining order against respondent. Two days later, respondent filed a request for a restraining order against appellant. On February 20, 2007, the trial court held a hearing on appellant’s request for a restraining order against respondent. That order was granted, and is not a subject of this appeal. On February 27, 2007, the trial court held a hearing on respondent’s request for a restraining order against appellant. That order was also granted. On April 20, 2007, appellant filed a notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
“The trial court’s decision to grant a permanent injunction rests within its sound discretion and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of a clear abuse of discretion. [Citation.]” (Shapiro v. San Diego City Council (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 904, 912.) “However, to the extent that the trial court had to review the evidence to resolve disputed factual issues, and draw inferences from the presented facts, an appellate court will review such factual findings under a substantial evidence standard. Our power in this regard ‘begins and ends with the determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the finding of fact. [Citations]. [¶] When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, a reviewing court is without power to substitute its deductions for those of the trial court.’ [Citation].” (Ibid.)
With these principles in mind, we review the evidence supporting the trial court’s determination.
II. Substantial Evidence Supports the Trial Court’s Factual Findings
Appellant argues that the judgment should be reversed because the evidence was insufficient to support it. Specifically, appellant argues that (1) as to Mr. Perez and respondent’s son, there was no evidence at all; (2) as to respondent’s daughter, the evidence was “obviously” insufficient to support the injunction; (3) there was no evidence of violence, threat of violence, or substantial emotional distress; (4) evidence relied upon by the court that appellant used profanity is speech protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and cannot be the basis for an injunction under section 527.6; and (5) the clear and convincing standard was not met.
We reject each of appellant’s arguments. First, testimony from both appellant and respondent regarding various negative interactions between the two households included reference to respondent’s husband and son. In addition, respondent’s request for a restraining order contained a statement indicating that appellant “stalks” her children and anyone who enters her home from the sidewalk. On the basis of this evidence, the court was within its discretion to restrain appellant from harassing respondent’s husband and son, both of whom are residents of her household. Respondent’s request was that the court order appellant to “leave my family alone, let me run my business, and stay out of our lives.” Given the evidence before the court, it did not abuse its discretion in granting this request.
Second, we reject appellant’s argument that the evidence was “obviously” insufficient as to respondent’s daughter. Respondent’s daughter testified that appellant had approached her at night in a threatening way and scared her. She also testified that appellant had used abusive language towards her. Respondent’s daughter was also a witness to appellant’s use of profanity when speaking to the daycare parents. We find that this evidence is sufficient to support a finding under section 527.6, which is applicable where the perpetrator uses a “knowing and willful course of conduct” designed to alarm, annoy, or harass another individual, resulting in substantial emotional distress. (§ 527.6.)
Third, we reject appellant’s position that there was no evidence of violence, a threat of violence, or substantial emotional distress, as required by the statute. Respondent testified that appellant has verbally assaulted her family and her clients. Respondent also testified that appellant was “holding himself” such that she felt the need to check and see if he was a pedophile. She testified that she felt that appellant was dangerous, and her daughter testified to being afraid of appellant. In addition, the evidence showed that respondent had lost business because of appellant’s verbal assaults on her clients. This evidence, taken together, supports the trial court’s decision that respondent made a showing of substantial emotional distress.
Section 527.6 defines harassment as “unlawful violence, a credible threat of violence, or a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose. The course of conduct must be such as would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and must actually cause substantial emotional distress to the plaintiff.” (§ 527.6, subd. (b).)
As to appellant’s argument that profanity is protected speech and may not be the subject of a restraining order under section 527.6, we note that appellant has cited no law in support of this proposition. We need not consider an argument for which no authority is furnished. (Dabney v. Dabney (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 379, 384.) In any event, there was ample evidence in addition to appellant’s use of profanity which supported the trial court’s determination that a restraining order under section 527.6 was appropriate. Such evidence included appellant’s verbal assaults on respondent and her clients, and his threatening manner with respondent’s family.
Finally, appellant argues that the evidence did not meet the clear and convincing standard required under section 527.6, subdivision (d). The judge specifically found that “[s]he did meet her burden . . . [of] clear and convincing evidence within [section] 527.6.” As set forth above, we must uphold this finding absent a clear abuse of discretion. (Shapiro v. San Diego City Council, supra, 96 Cal.App.4th at p. 912.) No such abuse occurred here. As discussed above, the evidence showed that appellant had verbally assaulted respondent, her clients, and her family, and that appellant had behaved in such a way as to frighten respondent’s children and cause respondent to lose clients. Appellant’s position that “every single word in her complaint is a lie” is not something we may consider, as we are “‘without power to substitute [our] deductions for those of the trial court.’ [Citation].” (Shapiro, at p. 912.)
The statutes requires that “[i]f the judge finds by clear and convincing evidence that unlawful harassment exists, an injunction shall issue prohibiting the harassment.” (§ 527.6, subd. (d).)
In sum, the trial court’s finding that respondent presented clear and convincing evidence of harassment, as defined by section 527.6, is supported by the evidence. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting respondent’s request for a restraining order.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
We concur:
DOI TODD, Acting P. J., ASHMANN-GERST, J.