Opinion
24A-DC-505
08-01-2024
Karinen Perez, Appellant-Petitioner v. Victor Dominguez, Appellee-Respondent
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Allison L. Martinez Wheeler Wheeler Law Firm, LLC Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court The Honorable Alicia A. Gooden, Judge The Honorable Jennifer J. Hubartt, Magistrate Trial Court Cause No. 49D14-2006-DC-17839
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Allison L. Martinez Wheeler Wheeler Law Firm, LLC Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Tavitas, Judge.
Case Summary
[¶1] The trial court issued a dissolution of marriage decree awarding Karinen Perez ("Wife") sixty percent and Victor Dominguez ("Husband") forty percent of the marital estate. Wife appeals and argues that, given the short duration of the parties' marriage, the trial court's distribution of the marital estate was an abuse of discretion. Given our highly deferential standard of review in such matters, we disagree and, accordingly, affirm.
Issue
[¶2] Wife presents one issue for our review, which we restate as whether the trial court abused its discretion by awarding Husband forty percent of the marital estate.
Facts
[¶3] Before their marriage in 2018, Husband and Wife were in a romantic relationship. In September 2015, Wife entered into an agreement to purchase a home on Inverness Drive in Indianapolis. Wife moved into the home in October 2015 with her children, and Husband moved in later that year. Wife subsequently spent money to remodel and update the home. Husband assisted Wife with some of the remodeling. Although all the utilities were in Wife's name, Husband sometimes contributed to the payment of the utilities. Husband, however, never contributed toward the mortgage payment. Wife paid the mortgage using money she received as child support from her two older children's father.
[¶4] Husband and Wife were married on September 17, 2018. The parties continued to remodel and update the home after their marriage. After their marriage, Husband adopted Wife's younger son ("Son"). Both parties contributed toward household expenses and considered the home to belong to both of them. Husband drove a 2002 Toyota Spyder, which was titled in Wife's name, and Wife drove a 2017 Honda Pilot, which was also titled in Wife's name. Apparently due to Husband's immigration status, however, none of the high value items were purchased in his name. Husband worked in restaurants and bars and earned $18 per hour; Wife also worked and netted $650 per week. Wife also had a 401K account.
[¶5] On June 2, 2020, Wife filed a petition to dissolve the parties' marriage. On February 15, 2022, the trial court stayed proceedings in the dissolution matter after Son's biological father filed a paternity action and sought to set aside Son's adoption by Husband. Son's biological father was ultimately successful, and Husband's adoption of Son was set aside.
[¶6] The trial court held a dissolution hearing on December 12, 2023, at which both parties presented evidence and argument. Wife argued that each party should retain whatever property and debt was in their names individually and the Toyota that was in Husband's possession but titled in Wife's name should be awarded to Husband. Husband requested that the trial court to include the Inverness Drive home, Wife's 401K, and the Honda as part of the marital estate and that he be awarded half of the marital estate.
[¶7] On January 2, 2024, the trial court entered a Final Dissolution Decree, which provides in relevant part:
12. Parties entered no stipulations regarding items which constitute assets of the marriage nor valuations of the same. Parties provided incomplete evidence to the Court regarding individual assets and dates of valuation. In determining both the marital assets and a just and reasonable division of the same, the Court is limited to consideration of the evidence which was presented.
13. The parties cohabitated at Inverness Drive from late 2015 until the date of separation on or about June 2, 2020. Parties presented financial information and evidence which were dated during both the period of cohabitation and marriage as opposed to exclusively during the period of marriage.
14. Wife solely signed a residential lease and option to buy Inverness Drive in late 2015 and she and Husband moved into the home at that time with [Son], then less than one year old, and Wife's two older children.
15. Wife bought Inverness Drive in 2016 in her name only after residing there for approximately three months, while she was "fixing her papers". The Court inferred that "fixing her papers" related to Wife's immigration status and ability [to] purchase a home with a mortgage. The purchase price was approximately $120,000.00 and, as of 2021, the monthly mortgage payment is approximately $1,500.00. Wife paid for all fees associated with the home purchase, including the closing costs and earnest money, the mortgage remained in her name, and she was responsible for the monthly payments.
16. The current fair market value of Inverness Drive is $210,000.00. No party offered evidence regarding the fair market value of Inverness Drive at the time of separation nor the mortgage balance at the time of separation. No party offered evidence regarding the current mortgage balance on Inverness Drive, however, there was an $85,000.00 mortgage balance in 2021. Wife has continued to pay for the mortgage and other household expenses exclusively since the date of separation and has exclusively resided in the home and enjoyed the benefit since that time. The Court determines the equity in Inverness Drive to be $125,000.00 ($210,000.00 - $85,000.00).
17. Wife purchased numerous home improvement items in her name only, including flooring, a cooktop and/or countertops, and an HVAC system for Inverness Drive during the time the parties cohabitated in the home. Parties worked together on several remodeling projects at Inverness Drive during both their period of cohabitation and the marriage.
18. Husband and Wife offered conflicting testimony regarding Husband's contributions to the household expenses during both the cohabitation and the marriage. Wife contends that Husband sporadically paid for utility bills and food while Husband contends that he was responsible for all household expenses except the mortgage, including utilities, food, and gasoline, and that Wife was permitted to use his funds to pay for the same. Husband testified that the parties viewed Inverness Drive as "their" home and each made contributions to the household.
19. Through testimony, the Court inferred that Husband's immigration status during both cohabitation and marriage precluded him from buying or owning vehicles or other higher value assets in his name.
20. Wife purchased the [Toyota] and the [Honda] in her name only during either the cohabitation and/or the marriage. Parties considered the [Toyota] to be Husband's vehicle and the [Honda] to be Wife's vehicle. The only current values of the vehicles were
offered through Husband's testimony and exhibits and he values the [Toyota] at $5,700.00 and the [Honda] at $25,000.00. The Court accepts Husband's valuations of the vehicles as it is the only evidence presented.... No evidence was offered regarding current loan notes on either the [Toyota] or the [Honda].
21. Wife has a 401K account through her employer. Wife offered exhibits which show the balance of the 401K at $1,850.76 at the time of marriage and at $4,786.72 at the time of separation, showing a net gain of $2,935.96 during the marriage. Wife requests that the Court consider only the net gain of the 401K in any property division computation. Husband values Wife's 401K at $7,620.00. The Court accepts Wife's valuations and request to consider only net gain during the marriage.
22. Each party maintained regular employment during both cohabitation and marriage. Husband at times worked two jobs. Parties had a pattern of maintaining separate financial accounts and did not file their taxes jointly during marriage due to Husband's tax debt. Husband conceded that Wife had good credit which enabled her to make purchases that he could not. No evidence was offered regarding current economic circumstance of either party or their current earnings or earning ability. Wife earned approximately $650 per week through employment in 2021. Husband worked at restaurants and bars during cohabitation and marriage and stated that he was a chef.
* * * * *
25. Wife has offered relevant evidence that an equal division of property would be unjust. Wife owned Inverness Drive prior to the marriage and consistently made the mortgage payments on the home. While she has remained in the home and enjoyed its benefit since the date of separation, she has also exclusively paid the mortgage and other associated expenses for the home. Wife solely purchased numerous remodeling items for Inverness Drive during both the cohabitation and the marriage. Wife purchased the [Toyota] and the [Honda] in her name during the
cohabitation and/or the marriage and was therefore responsible for the loan notes on the vehicles.
26. Despite Wife's contributions toward and ownership of all assets, Husband did contribute to the household expenses, worked on remodeling projects at Inverness Drive, and considered the home to be his, as well as Wife's, home.
27. The Court now finds that the total marital estate is valued at $158,635.76 as follows: equity in Inverness Drive $125,000.00 (fair market value $210,000 - mortgage balance $85,000); [Toyota] $5,700.00; [Honda] $25,000; Wife's 401K $2,935.76 (value at date of separation $4,786.72 - value at marriage $1850.96). The Court awards Wife 60% or $95,181.46 of the marital estate and Husband 40% or $63,454.30 of the marital estate. The Court finds this division to be just and reasonable.
28. The Court awards Inverness Drive ($125,000.00) and the [Honda] ($25,000.00) to Wife. 29. The Court awards the [Toyota] ($5,700.00) to Husband. Wife is ordered to execute all necessary documents needed to transfer the title of the vehicle to Husband within 14 days of this ordered.
30. The Court orders that Wife shall pay Husband $57,754.30 as an equalization payment ($63,454.30 - $5,700.00). Wife shall have 6 months from the date of this order to make the complete payment and may pay the amount in a lump sum, monthly installments, or as otherwise arranged and agreed to by the parties.Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 26-30. Wife filed a motion to correct error on February 2, 2024, and the trial court summarily denied Wife's motion to correct error on February 20, 2024. Wife now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
We note that Husband has not filed an appellee's brief. In such cases, we will not develop an argument for the appellee but instead will reverse the trial court's judgment if the appellant's brief presents a case of prima facie error. Hahn-Weisz v. Johnson, 189 N.E.3d 1136, 1140-41 (Ind.Ct.App. 2022) (citing Salyer v. Washington Regular Baptist Church Cemetery, 141 N.E.3d 384, 386 (Ind. 2020)). "This less stringent standard of review 'relieves [us] of the burden of controverting arguments advanced in favor of reversal where that burden properly rests with the appellee.'" Id. (quoting Jenkins v. Jenkins, 17 N.E.3d 350, 352 (Ind.Ct.App. 2014)). We remain obligated, however, to correctly apply the law to the facts in the record to determine whether reversal is required. Id. (citing Jenkins, 17 N.E.3d at 352).
[¶8] "'Appellate deference to the determinations of our trial court judges, especially in domestic relations matters, is warranted because of their unique, direct interactions with the parties face-to-face, often over an extended period of time.'" Hahn-Weisz v. Johnson, 189 N.E.3d 1136, 1141 (Ind.Ct.App. 2022) (quoting Best v. Best, 941 N.E.2d 499, 502 (Ind. 2011)). "'Thus enabled to assess credibility and character through both factual testimony and intuitive discernment, our trial judges are in a superior position to ascertain information and apply common sense, particularly in the determination of the best interests of the involved children.'" Id. (quoting Best, 941 N.E.2d at 502).
Additionally, there is a well-established preference in Indiana for granting latitude and deference to our trial judges in family law matters. Appellate courts are in a poor position to look at a cold transcript of the record, and conclude that the trial judge, who saw the witnesses, observed their demeanor, and scrutinized their testimony as it came from the witness stand, did not properly understand the significance of the evidence. On appeal it is not enough that the evidence might support some other conclusion,
but it must positively require the conclusion contended for by appellant before there is a basis for reversal.Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 124 (Ind. 2016) (citations and internal quotations omitted).
[¶9] The trial court here issued findings of fact and conclusions thereon pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 52(A), which prohibits a court on appeal from setting aside the trial court's judgment unless the judgment is clearly erroneous. Hoover v. Ferrell, 224 N.E.3d 968 (Ind.Ct.App. 2023) (citing Quillen v. Quillen, 671 N.E.2d 98, 102 (Ind. 1996)). A trial court's findings of fact are clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts to support them either directly or by inference. Id. A trial court's judgment is clearly erroneous only if its findings of fact do not support its conclusions of law or its conclusions of law do not support its judgment. Id. Wife does not challenge any of the trial court's factual findings, so we accept them as correct. See McIntosh v. McIntosh, 222 N.E.3d 998, 1003 (Ind.Ct.App. 2023) (citing Madlem v. Arko, 592 N.E.2d 686, 687 (Ind. 1992)).
II. Division of Marital Assets
[¶10] Decisions about the division of marital assets are within the trial court's discretion. Kearney v. Claywell, 181 N.E.3d 336, 339 (Ind.Ct.App. 2021). On appeal, we review the trial court's division of marital assets only for an abuse of that discretion. Id. Wife, as the party challenging the trial court's division of marital property, must overcome a strong presumption that the trial court considered and complied with the applicable statute. Id. "This presumption is 'one of the strongest presumptions applicable to our consideration on appeal.'" Id. On appeal, we neither reweigh evidence nor assess the credibility of witnesses, and we will consider only the evidence most favorable to the trial court's decision. Id.
[¶11] The division of marital property is a two-step process: first, the trial court must ascertain the property to be included in the marital estate. Id. Specifically, Indiana Code Section 31-15-7-4(a) provides:
In an action for dissolution of marriage under IC 31-15-2-2, the court shall divide the property of the parties, whether:
(1) owned by either spouse before the marriage;
(2) acquired by either spouse in his or her own right:
(A) after the marriage; and
(B) before final separation of the parties; or
(3) acquired by their joint efforts.
Second, the trial court must fashion a just and reasonable division of the marital estate. Kearney, 181 N.E.3d at 339; see also Ind. Code § 31-15-7-4(b) (requiring the trial court to divide the property of the parties "in a just and reasonable manner").
[¶12] Indiana Code Section 31-15-7-5 controls the division of marital property and provides:
The court shall presume that an equal division of the marital property between the parties is just and reasonable. This presumption "may be rebutted by a party who presents relevant evidence, including evidence concerning the following factors, that an equal division would not be just and reasonable:
(1) The contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of the property, regardless of whether the contribution was income producing.
(2) The extent to which the property was acquired by each spouse:
(A) before the marriage; or
(B) through inheritance or gift.
(3) The economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the disposition of the property is to become effective, including the desirability of awarding the family residence or the right to dwell in the family residence for such periods as the court considers just to the spouse having custody of any children.
(4) The conduct of the parties during the marriage as related to the disposition or dissipation of their property.
(5) The earnings or earning ability of the parties as related to:
(A) a final division of property; and
(B) a final determination of the property rights of the parties.
These statutory factors are to be considered together in determining what is just and reasonable, and no one factor is entitled to special weight. Kearney, 181 N.E.3d at 340. "The party . . . challenging the trial court's decision on appeal must overcome a strong presumption that the trial court acted correctly in applying the statute[.]" Id.
III. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by awarding Husband forty percent of the marital property.
[¶13] Wife argues that the trial court's division of the marital property was unjust and unreasonable. She first notes that the marriage did not last particularly long. It is true that "[a] short-lived marriage may rebut the presumption favoring equal division, especially if one party brought substantially more property into the marriage." Roetter v. Roetter, 182 N.E.3d 221, 227 (Ind. 2022). Still, Husband and Wife cohabitated since 2015. "A trial court 'may consider periods of cohabitation followed by marriage in determining a proper distribution of the marital estate.'" Bertholet v. Bertholet, 725 N.E.2d 487, 495 (Ind.Ct.App. 2000) (quoting Larkins v. Larkins, 685 N.E.2d 88, 91 (Ind.Ct.App. 1997)).
[¶14] The trial court here did not order an equal division of marital assets and instead awarded Wife sixty percent of the marital assets. The trial court was aware of the short duration of the parties' marriage, and we cannot say that the trial court abused its considerable discretion by not awarding Wife an even more unequal distribution of the marital assets based on the short duration of the marriage. See id.
[¶15] Wife also argues that she brought more assets to the marriage, specifically the marital residence on Inverness Drive, and contributed more toward expenses than Husband did. The trial court noted that, "[d]espite Wife's contributions toward and ownership of all assets, Husband did contribute to the household expenses, worked on remodeling [the marital residence], and considered the home to be his, as well as Wife's, home." Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 30. Again, the trial court accounted for Wife's greater financial contributions by awarding her the greater portion of the marital assets.
[¶16] Wife further contends that the trial court should have awarded her an even greater share of the marital estate because she and Husband kept their finances separate during the marriage. The statute, however, provides that the trial court should divide assets regardless of whether they were acquired by either spouse in his or her own right after the marriage. I.C. § 31-15-7-4(a). Although it may be relevant that assets were kept separate and distinct, the comingling of property is not an included component of the statutory analysis used when determining whether to deviate from the presumptive equal division of marital assets. Eye v. Eye, 849 N.E.2d 698, 703 (Ind.Ct.App. 2006). The decision to distribute marital property unevenly remains a matter of trial court discretion, and, here, the trial court here awarded Wife the greater share of marital assets.
[¶17] Lastly, Wife argues that it is unfair to award Husband a share of the marital assets worth $63,454.30 because he did not even earn this amount during the duration of the marriage. Our Supreme Court, however, has rejected a strict mathematical approach to the division of marital assets. "So long as it expressly considers all assets and liabilities, and so long as it offers sufficient findings to rebut the presumptive equal division, a trial court need not follow a rigid, technical formula in dividing the marital estate[.]" Roetter, 182 N.E.3d at 229. Here, the trial court expressly listed the parties' assets and liabilities, considered the relevant factors, and determined that an unequal 60/40 division of the marital estate was justified. Wife's argument that she should have received an even greater portion of the marital assets is simply a request that we reweigh the evidence and come to a different conclusion than did the trial court, which we may not do.
Conclusion
[¶18] Wife presented evidence that may have justified awarding her an even greater share of the marital estate, and, had we been in the trial court's position, we may have come to a different conclusion than did the trial court here. But given our highly deferential standard of review in such matters, we cannot say that the trial court abused its by awarding Wife only sixty percent of the marital assets. We, therefore, affirm the trial court's judgment.
[¶19] Affirmed.
Crone, J., and Bradford, J., concur.