Opinion
CV166059229S
11-01-2016
Maria Pereira v. Joseph P. Ganim, Mayor et al
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE PLAINTIFF'S APPLICATION FOR INJUNCTION, REQUEST FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF, AND QUO WARRANTO ACTION
Barbara N. Bellis, J.
I
FACTS
On September 12, 2016, the plaintiff, Maria Pereira, a member of the Bridgeport Board of Education (board), filed a complaint against the mayor of Bridgeport, Joseph P. Ganim; the city of Bridgeport; and the state of Connecticut. On September 22, 2016, and October 13, 2016, via amended writs and summonses, the plaintiff added Annette Segarra-Negron and Rafael Fonseca, Jr., respectively, as defendants to the action. Mayor Ganim had recently appointed both Segarra-Negron and Fonseca to fill vacancies on the board. This dispute arises out of the mayor's filling these vacancies, a power that the plaintiff argues lies exclusively with existing board members.
In their stipulation of facts filed on October 24, 2016, the parties agree to the following relevant facts. Under the Charter of the City of Bridgeport (charter), the board consists of nine members. The charter provides for minority representation, meaning that not more than six members of one party may be elected to the board. After the last municipal election, the board consisted of six Democrats, two Republicans, and one member of the Working Families Party. Under Chapter 15, § 1(d), of the charter, if a vacancy arises on the board, the remaining members are to elect a new member.
In November of 2013, Dave Hennessey, who was nominated for election by the Democratic party, was elected to the board. On January 5, 2016, Hennessey applied for erasure or transfer of his name from the enrollment list of Democrats to the enrollment list of Republicans. Later, on May 24, 2016, Hennessey filed a letter of resignation thereby creating a vacancy on the board. The board did not fill the vacancy in May, June, or July. On July 23, 2016, Mayor Ganim appointed Segarra-Negron, who is a resident of Bridgeport, an elector, and a Republican, to fill the vacancy created by Hennessey's resignation.
Later, on August 15, 2016, another board member, Andre Baker, resigned from his position. As per its published agenda, the board was scheduled to vote on filling Baker's vacancy at its September 12, 2016 meeting. Hours before the meeting was to begin, however, board chairman Dennis Bradley issued a press release indicating that the regular board meeting had been canceled and that he, Segarra-Negron, and board members Joe Larcheveque and Kevin McSpirit had agreed that they would " no longer, regularly attend Board of Education meetings" until Pereira resigned. The September 12 meeting was cancelled, and the vote to fill Baker's vacancy was not held. Subsequently, Bradley canceled a regular board meeting scheduled for September 26, 2016.
On September 28, 2016, Mayor Ganim appointed Fonseca, who is a resident of Bridgeport, an elector, and a Republican, to fill the vacancy created by Baker's resignation. The next day, board member McSpirit resigned. Subsequently, Bradley canceled a regular board meeting scheduled for October 11, 2016, and later, on October 20, 2016, submitted a notice purporting to cancel a regular board meeting scheduled for October 24, 2016.
In her third amended complaint, filed on October 17, 2016, the plaintiff alleges that Mayor Ganim has enacted a plan to usurp the board's sole authority, pursuant to the General Statutes and the charter, to fill vacant board seats. The plaintiff's reading of the General Statutes and the charter as granting the board exclusive power to fill vacancies, according to the plaintiff, is in accordance with the Home Rule Act, which prevents the state from acting in purely local affairs. The plaintiff further alleges that Mayor Ganim's appointment of SegarraNegron, a Republican, to fill the Democratic seat vacated by Hennessey, violated the General Statutes, the charter, and the state constitution. She alleges that Mayor Ganim's appointment of Fonseca was similarly unlawful. In addition to alleging that her constitutional rights have been violated, the plaintiff asserts a quo warranto action in which she states that the defendants have no valid claim to any authority for their actions and cannot show a valid title to the office in dispute.
The plaintiff seeks a declaratory ruling that the appointment of Segarra-Negron and any board decisions decided by a vote of Segarra-Negron are invalid, a temporary injunction preventing Mayor Ganim from taking any further action with regard to appointing board members, a writ of mandamus ordering the seat held by Segarra-Negron to be vacated, injunctive relief enjoining the defendants from preventing or hindering the plaintiff from performing the rights, privileges, powers and duties of her office, and damages.
On October 21, 2016, the city of Bridgeport and Mayor Ganim filed a memorandum in opposition to the plaintiff's application for a temporary injunction. On October 24, 2016, the plaintiff filed her memorandum in support of her application. On the same day, the court heard argument and rendered judgment for the defendants. This memorandum explains the basis for that judgment.
II
DISCUSSION
At oral argument, the parties framed the following two issues for the court to decide: (1) whether the mayor was authorized to fill the vacancy on the board pursuant to General Statutes § 7-107 and (2) whether the person whom the mayor appointed was qualified. The parties agreed that the court would first rule on the plaintiff's request for declaratory relief by answering these two questions and would then determine how the declaratory judgment decision would apply to the plaintiff's quo warranto action and request for injunctive relief.
General Statutes § 7-107 provides: " Except as otherwise provided by law, if any vacancy occurs on any town board or commission, and such board or commission has power by law to fill such vacancy but fails to do so within thirty days after it occurs, the board of selectmen or chief executive authority of such town may appoint a qualified person to fill such vacancy until the next municipal election."
In order to resolve these two issues, the court must answer the following three questions: (1) How do General Statutes § § 7-107 and 10-219 and Chapter 15, § 1(d), of the charter interact? (2) Does the Home Rule Act prevent the mayor from exercising a power pursuant to § 7-107? (3) How does General Statutes § 9-167a(g) apply in order to determine an individual's political party affiliation? There is no Connecticut case law, controlling or otherwise, directly addressing these issues.
General Statutes § 10-219 provides: " If a vacancy occurs in the office of any member of the local board of education, unless otherwise provided by charter or special act, such vacancy shall be filled by the remaining members of said board until the next regular town election, at which election a successor shall be elected for the unexpired portion of the term, the official ballot specifying the vacancy to be filled."
Chapter 15, § 1(d) of the charter provides: " If a vacancy arises for any reason in the membership of the Board of Education, the remaining members shall elect a new member to serve for the balance of the term vacated. The person so elected shall be a resident and elector and a member of the same political party as the member vacating such office."
General Statutes § 9-167a(g) provides: " For the purposes of this section, a person shall be deemed to be a member of the political party on whose enrollment list his name appears on the date of his appointment to, or of his nomination as a candidate for election to, any office specified in subsection (a) of this section, provided any person who has applied for erasure or transfer of his name from an enrollment list shall be considered a member of the party from whose list he has so applied for erasure or transfer for a period of three months from the date of the filing of such application and provided further any person whose candidacy for election to an office is solely as the candidate of a party other than the party with which he is enrolled shall be deemed to be a member of the party of which he is such candidate."
A
General Statutes § § 7-107 and 10-219 and Chapter 15, § 1 of the Charter of the City of Bridgeport
The plaintiff argues that, as demonstrated by its plain language, § 7-107 is a catchall provision intended to fill a vacuum where no other procedure for filling vacancies exists. Section 10-219, the plaintiff's argument continues, is more specific, supersedes § 7-107, and is subject to charter provisions that otherwise provide a procedure for filling vacancies. Accordingly, the plaintiff concludes, the court should look to Chapter 15, § 1 of the charter for the proper procedure to follow in this case.
The defendants contend that § 7-107 is a deadlock breaking statute meant to address a situation in which any board or commission, such as a school board of education, fails to act. They further argue that § § 7-107 and 10-219, Chapter 15, § 1 of the charter, and bylaws of the board of education may be read harmoniously because § 7-107 only applies when the board has failed to act pursuant to the other provisions.
Due to the dearth of appellate authority on this issue of how General Statutes § § 7-107 and 10-219 and Chapter 15, § 1 of the charter interact, the court must examine the language of the provisions at issue. Gonzales v. Langdon, 161 Conn.App. 497, 515-16, 128 A.3d 562 (2015). " [W]hen construing a statute, [the court's] fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature . . . [The court] seek[s] to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply . . . In seeking to determine that meaning . . . [General Statutes § ]1-2z directs [the court] first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of [the] text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Astoria Federal Mortgage Corp. v. Genesis Ltd. Partnership, 167 Conn.App. 183, 196, 143 A.3d 1121 (2016).
" It is an accepted principle of statutory construction that, if possible, the component parts of a statute should be construed harmoniously in order to render an overall reasonable interpretation . . . [T]he legislature is always presumed to have created a harmonious and consistent body of law . . . [T]his tenet of statutory construction . . . requires [a court] to read statutes together when they relate to the same subject matter . . . Accordingly, [i]n determining the meaning of a statute . . . [courts] look not only at the provision at issue, but also to the broader statutory scheme to ensure the coherency of our construction . . . [T]he General Assembly is always presumed to know all the existing statutes and the effect that its action or non-action will have upon any one of them." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. " If a court can by any fair interpretation find a reasonable field of operation for two allegedly inconsistent statutes, without destroying or preventing their evident meaning and intent, it is the duty of the court to do so . . . Therefore, [courts] must, if possible, read the two statutes together and construe each to leave room for the meaningful operation of the other . . . In addition, if two constructions of a statute are possible, [courts] will adopt the one that makes the statute effective and workable . . . Moreover, statutes must be construed, if possible, such that no clause, sentence or word shall be superfluous, void or insignificant . . ." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Nizzardo v. State Traffic Commission, 259 Conn. 131, 157-58, 788 A.2d 1158 (2002).
General Statutes § 7-107 is contained within the " General Provisions" chapter of Title 7 of the General Statutes, which governs municipalities. It is entitled " Vacancy appointments by selectmen" and provides: " Except as otherwise provided by law, if any vacancy occurs on any town board or commission, and such board or commission has power by law to fill such vacancy but fails to do so within thirty days after it occurs, the board of selectmen or chief executive authority of such town may appoint a qualified person to fill such vacancy until the next municipal election."
General Statutes § 10-219, entitled " Procedure for filling vacancy on local board of education, " is contained within the " Boards of Education" chapter of Title 10 of the General Statues, which governs Education and Culture. Section 10-219 provides: " If a vacancy occurs in the office of any member of the local board of education, unless otherwise provided by charter or special act, such vacancy shall be filled by the remaining members of said board until the next regular town election, at which election a successor shall be elected for the unexpired portion of the term, the official ballot specifying the vacancy to be filled."
These statutes relate to the same subject matter, namely filling vacancies on town boards. Therefore, the court is required to read them together. See Astoria Federal Mortgage Corp. v. Genesis Ltd. Partnership, supra, 167 Conn.App. 196. Based on a plain meaning interpretation, these statutes can reasonably be construed harmoniously; when there is a vacancy on a board of education, § 10-219, and not § 7-107, controls. Only after the thirty-day period set forth in § 7-107 has lapsed does that section provide an alternative appointment procedure by which the mayor may appoint a person to fill the vacancy.
Even if the statutes were in conflict, § 10-219, which is the more specific statute, would control. See Housatonic Railroad Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 301 Conn. 268, 301-02, 21 A.3d 759 (2011) (invoking the " well established principle of statutory interpretation that requires courts to apply the more specific statute relating to a particular subject matter in favor of the more general statute that otherwise might apply in the absence of the specific statute").
In Bridgeport, the mayor is the chief executive officer of the city. Charter of the City of Bridgeport, c. 3, § 1(a).
The mayor's authority to appoint a board member under § 7-107 when the board has failed to do so is not unfettered. That section allows the mayor to " appoint a qualified person." In light of the mandate that no word shall be deemed superfluous, void, or insignificant, the court must determine the meaning of the word " qualified" as used in that phrase. The charter sets forth the qualifications that the appointee must possess. Pursuant to Chapter 15, § 1(d), of the charter, " [i]f a vacancy arises for any reason in the membership of the Board of Education, the remaining members shall elect a new member to serve for the balance of the term vacated. The person so elected shall be a resident and elector and a member of the same political party as the member vacating such office ." (Emphasis added.) Accordingly, to be " qualified" to fill the vacancy, an appointee must be: (1) a resident; (2) an elector; and (3) a member of the same political party as the member vacating such office.
As discussed in part IIC of this decision, the parties agree that the political party affiliation of a board member is controlled by General Statute § 9-167a, which governs minority representation on boards and similar bodies.
B
The Home Rule Act
Connecticut's Home Rule Act is contained within General Statutes § § 7-187 through 7-201. See Board of Education v. Naugatuck, 70 Conn.App. 358, 362, 800 A.2d 517 (2002), rev'd in part on other grounds, 268 Conn. 295, 843 A.2d 603 (2004). The Home Rule Act " provides the parameters within which [a] borough may govern its affairs." Id. " The purpose . . . of Connecticut's Home Rule Act is clearly twofold: to relieve the General Assembly of the burdensome task of handling and enacting special legislation of local municipal concern and to enable a municipality to draft and adopt a home rule charter or ordinance which shall constitute the organic law of the city, superseding its existing charter and any inconsistent special acts . . . The rationale of the act, simply stated, is that issues of local concern are most logically answered locally, pursuant to a home rule charter, exclusive of the provisions of the General Statutes . . . Moreover, home rule legislation was enacted to enable municipalities to conduct their own business and [to] control their own affairs to the fullest possible extent in their own way . . . upon the principle that the municipality itself kn[ows] better what it want[s] and need[s] than . . . the state at large, and to give that municipality the exclusive privilege and right to enact direct legislation which would carry out and satisfy its wants and needs . . . Consistent with this purpose, a state statute cannot deprive cities of the right to legislate on purely local affairs germane to city purposes . . . Consequently, a general law, in order to prevail over a conflicting charter provision of a city having a home rule charter, must pertain to those things of general concern to the people of the state . . ." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Board of Education v. Naugatuck, 268 Conn. 295, 306-07, 843 A.2d 603 (2004). In the present case, the court must resolve whether the Home Rule Act bars the mayor from filling a vacancy on the board. More specifically, the court must determine whether the procedure for filling a vacancy on the board of education is a purely local concern and whether the general laws purporting to grant the mayor the authority to fill such vacancies conflict with the charter provision at issue.
In her brief, the plaintiff argues that the particular procedure pursuant to which a municipality fills vacancies on its board of education is not a matter of statewide concern. The plaintiff analogizes the procedure for filling vacancies on the board of education to procedures related to setting a town's budget. The plaintiff also points out that the Supreme Court, in Board of Education v. Naugatuck, supra, 268 Conn. 295, has stated that the organization of local government is a purely local concern. The defendants do not address the Home Rule Act in their brief. At oral argument, however, the defendants argued that education of Connecticut school children is a matter of statewide concern and involves a constitutionally protected right. They distinguished the present case from the decisions to which the plaintiff cites on the ground that those decisions were predicated on inconsistencies between charter provisions and state laws. In the present case, they maintained, such conflicts do not exist.
In the present case, the court concludes that the Home Rule Act does not bar the mayor from filling vacancies on the board of education. First, it is well established that public education is a matter of statewide concern. " [A] local board serves as an agent of the electorate and as an agent of the state, insofar as the local board performs the state's statutory and constitutional duty to furnish an education for the public. Cheshire v. McKenney, 182 Conn. 253, 257-58, 438 A.2d 88 (1980); see Connecticut Coalition for Justice in Education Funding, Inc. v. Rell, 295 Conn. 240, 314-15, 990 A.2d 206 (2010) (state has constitutional obligation to ensure that students receive suitable educational opportunities); Sheff v. O'Neill, 238 Conn. 1, 46, 678 A.2d 1267 (1996) (same); Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 649, 376 A.2d 359 (1977) (same); see also General Statutes § 10-4a ('the educational interests of the state shall include, but not be limited to, the concern of the state that (1) each child shall have . . . equal opportunity to receive a suitable program of educational experiences'); General Statutes § 10-220(a) ('[e]ach local or regional board of education shall maintain good public elementary and secondary schools, implement the educational interests of the state as defined in section 10-4a and provide such other educational activities as in its judgment will best serve the interests of the school district')." (Emphasis omitted.) Pereira v. State Board of Education, 304 Conn. 1, 113, 37 A.3d 625 (2012). Second, as is discussed in the preceding section, this case does not involve a situation in which a conflict exists between a statute and a city charter. Instead, § 7-107 operates only when the board fails to act pursuant to the charter. Accordingly, the statute and the charter can be construed harmoniously. For all of these reasons, the Home Rule Act does not bar the mayor from acting to fill vacancies on the board of education pursuant to § 7-107.
C
General Statutes § 9-167a(g)
As discussed previously in this decision, pursuant to § 7-107, the mayor has the power to appoint a qualified person to fill vacancies on town boards. According to Chapter 15, § 1(d) of the charter, to be " qualified, " an appointee must be: (1) a resident; (2) an elector; and (3) a member of the same political party as the member vacating such office. The parties agree that the political party of a board member is defined by General Statutes § 9-167a(g).
The plaintiff contends that, pursuant to this section, as long as a person has not applied for erasure or transfer from an enrollment list more than three months prior to his nomination as a candidate for election, for all relevant purposes, a person remains a member of the political party that he was affiliated with on the date of his nomination, even if that person later changes his party affiliation. The defendants read this section differently and aver that a person who has applied for erasure or transfer from a party's enrollment list remains a member of that party for three months. Once three months has passed, for all relevant purposes, the person is to be considered a member of his new party, regardless of his party affiliation at the time of his nomination or election.
Section 9-167a(g) provides in relevant part that " a person shall be deemed to be a member of the political party on whose enrollment list his name appears on the date of his appointment to, or of his nomination as a candidate for election to, any office specified in subsection (a) of this section, provided any person who has applied for erasure or transfer of his name from an enrollment list shall be considered a member of the party from whose list he has so applied for erasure or transfer for a period of three months from the date of the filing of such application and provided further any person whose candidacy for election to an office is solely as the candidate of a party other than the party with which he is enrolled shall be deemed to be a member of the party of which he is such candidate."
The court agrees with the defendants' interpretation of this statute. A member of the board who changes political party affiliation is only deemed to be a member of his or her prior party if less than three months has passed since he or she applied for the change.
III
CONCLUSION
In sum, pursuant to the charter and § 10-219, the Bridgeport Board of Education has the power to fill a vacancy on the board. After thirty days from the date of the vacancy, if the board has not yet filled the vacancy, § 7-107 permits the mayor to appoint a new member. The mayor's appointee must be a resident, an elector, and a member of the same political party, as defined by § 9-167a(g), as the vacated member at the time the member vacated office. In addition, such appointment cannot offend the minority representation requirements of § 9-167a. The mayor's power to appoint pursuant to § 7-107 is not precluded by the Home Rule Act because a board's actions in carrying out state statutory and constitutional duties are of statewide concern and because § 7-107 does not conflict with the charter. Accordingly, in making the subject appointments, the mayor acted in accordance with the General Statutes and the Charter of the City of Bridgeport.
At oral argument, the parties agreed that having found for the defendants on these issues, the court should enter judgment for the defendants on the plaintiff's request for declaratory relief, request for injunctive relief, and quo warranto action. The court agrees and, accordingly, enters judgment for the defendants.