Opinion
No. 04-04-00701-CR
Delivered and Filed: July 27, 2005. DO NOT PUBLISH.
Appeal from the 175th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas, Trial Court No. 2003-CR-9910, Honorable Mary Román, Judge Presiding. Affirmed.
Sitting: Catherine STONE, Justice, Sarah B. DUNCAN, Justice, Karen ANGELINI, Justice.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In exchange for the State's recommendation of deferred adjudication for ten years, Zachary Joseph Peralta pleaded no contest to one count of indecency with a child by contact. When Peralta failed to report to his probation officer, the State moved to revoke. After Peralta pleaded true, the court imposed a six-year sentence. Peralta now appeals. We affirm. In his sole point of error, Peralta argues his sentence violates his federal and state constitutional rights against cruel and unusual punishment because it is grossly disproportionate to the crime. We disagree. By failing to lodge with the trial court a specific objection regarding the issue of cruel and unusual punishment, Peralta forfeited his opportunity to present this claim on appeal. See Tex.R.App.P. 33.1(a); Schneider v. State, 645 S.W.2d 463, 466 (Tex.Crim.App. 1983) (holding that defendant waived his constitutional claims of cruel and unusual punishment by failing to raise them in the trial court). Peralta's contention that his trial counsel's argument for probation preserved the specific error he now complains about on appeal is without merit. See Butler v. State, 872 S.W.2d 227, 237 (Tex.Crim.App. 1994) ("A reasonably specific and timely objection is necessary to preserve error for appellate review."). Accordingly, we overrule Peralta's point of error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Peralta's argument fails nonetheless. Punishment assessed within the statutory range is not unconstitutionally cruel and unusual. Kirk v. State, 949 S.W.2d 769, 772 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1997, pet. ref'd). Indecency with a child by contact is a second-degree felony with a punishment range of two to twenty years. Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 21.11(a)(1),(c), (d) (Vernon Supp. 2004), § 12.33(a) (Vernon 2003). Because Peralta's six-year sentence was thus within the statutory range, it is not unconstitutionally cruel or unusual.