Opinion
November 4, 1985
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Jaspan, J.).
Judgment affirmed.
The issue of whether the affirmative defense of entrapment was established was an issue of fact for the jury (see, e.g., People v McGee, 49 N.Y.2d 48, 61, cert denied sub nom. Waters v New York, 446 U.S. 942; People v Tucker, 96 A.D.2d 893). Sufficient evidence was adduced at the trial from which the jury could properly conclude that defendant was predisposed to commit the offenses charged (see, People v Isaacson, 44 N.Y.2d 511; People v Joyce, 47 A.D.2d 562).
In addition, while the confidential informant employed by the police during their undercover investigation had been a close personal friend of defendant for many years, the record does not contain evidence of police brutality, coercion or deception, nor does it "reveal a brazen and continuing pattern in disregard of fundamental rights" (People v Isaacson, supra, at p 523; People v Archer, 68 A.D.2d 441, affd 49 N.Y.2d 978, cert denied 449 U.S. 839; People v Smith, 106 A.D.2d 670). Therefore, defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment on the ground that his due process rights were violated by the government's misconduct was properly denied by the trial court.
This is not one of those rare cases which on its particular facts impels the conclusion that the mandatory sentencing statutes have been unconstitutionally applied (see, People v Broadie, 37 N.Y.2d 100, cert denied 423 U.S. 950; People v Mackle, 105 A.D.2d 848).
We have reviewed defendant's remaining contentions and find them to be without merit. Niehoff, J.P., Lawrence, Eiber and Kooper, JJ., concur.