Opinion
No. 2012BX022072.
2012-06-27
The PEOPLE of the State of New York v. Crystal YOUNG, Defendant.
Penal Law § 240.50.
RALPH A. FABRIZIO, J.
The question before the Court is whether the People's accusatory instrument properly alleges that Bronx County has geographic jurisdiction over two counts of the four counts in this information charging defendant with falsely reporting an incident in the third degree (PL §§ 240.50[1], [3][c] ). According to the People, the person wrongly accused was incarcerated for a period of nine days as a result of defendant's false accusation. The motion to dismiss these two charges is granted.
The accusatory instrument contains four separate counts charging defendant with falsely reporting an incident. The first two counts, which are not the subject of this motion, allege that on January 10, 2012, defendant was inside the 40th Precinct located within Bronx County and made a report accusing a particular individual of a crime which resulted in that individual being arrested and charged with assault in the first degree. The second two counts, which are the subject of the motion to dismiss, allege that on “March 30, 2012 ... at Mt. Sinai Hospital, County of Manhattan (sic),” defendant spoke with a detective assigned to the Manhattan Special Victim's Unit and “filed a criminal complaint” which accused the same individual of a crime; that same individual was arrested for assault in the first degree. The accusatory instrument further alleges that on April 12, 2012, at the Bronx County District Attorney's Office, defendant, in substance, admitted she lied about being assaulted by that particular individual, and said that in fact both assaults were committed by a completely different person.
At a bench conference, the People acknowledged that they believed they knew the true identity of the individual who assaulted defendant, and it was neither the first person named by defendant, nor a second individual named by defendant in a subsequent report made to a Bronx County ADA admitting to the initial false reports. The People may have been able to charge defendant with falsely reporting an incident in Bronx County to a Bronx ADA based on the recanted statements. That is not the theory of prosecution in the accusatory instrument. Only the first report alleged is charged to have been falsely made, in identifying the wrong individual.
In order for defendant to be guilty of falsely reporting an incident in the third degree, as charged in this case, the People must prove that, “knowing the information reported, conveyed or circulated to be false or baseless,” the defendant
(1) Initiates or circulates a false report or warning of an alleged occurrence or impending occurrence of a crime, catastrophe or emergency under circumstances in which it is not unlikely that public alarm or inconvenience will result;
(3) Gratuitously reports to a law enforcement officer or agency ... (c) false information relating to an actual offense or incident or to the alleged implication of some person therein.
Penal Law § 240.50.
In terms of geographic jurisdiction to preside over these charges, CPL § 20.40(1)(a), provides in pertinent part:
A person may be convicted in an appropriate criminal court of a particular county, of an offense ... when: 1. Conduct occurred within such county sufficient to establish: (a) An element of such offense; or ... 2. Even though None of the conduct constituting such offense may have occurred within such county: (a) the offense committed was a result offense and the result may have occurred in such county ...
As a preliminary matter, the People argue that they do not need to allege facts to show how a court has geographic jurisdiction over a case where the case is being prosecuted by an information. They cite to People v. Patterson, 185 Misc.2d 519 (Crim Ct. Bx Cty 2000) to support this argument. In that case, charging the defendant with failing to register as a sex offender, that defendant had been convicted of a sex crime committed within Bronx County, and had been ordered, as a part of that case, to register as a sex offender. It was obvious that Bronx County would have jurisdiction over any case alleging that he failed to register, or re-register, as a sex offender. However, to the extent that dicta in Patterson can be read to say that the People do not have to allege the basis for the court's geographic jurisdiction to preside over a criminal prosecution brought within that forum, this Court respectfully declines to follow it.
Geographic jurisdiction of a given county within the State over an alleged crime is an essential prerequisite for a legal prosecution, the existence of which must be established by the People by a preponderance of the evidence at trial. (People v. McLaughlin, 80 N.Y.2d 466 [1992];People v.Ribowski, 77 N.Y.2d 284, 292 [1991];Matter of Steingut v. Gold, 42 N.Y.2d 311 [1977] ). “Although it is not an element [of a crime], geographic jurisdiction must be alleged in [an] accusatory instrument,” including an information. McKinney's Practice Commentaries to CPL § 20.20 by Peter Preiser. CPL § 170.35(1)(b) provides that a defendant may move to dismiss an information charging a misdemeanor where “[t]he allegations demonstrate that the court does not have jurisdiction of the offense charged.” CPL § 1.20(24) provides that a court has “trial jurisdiction of an offense when an indictment or an information charging such offense may be properly filed with such court, and when such court has authority to accept a plea to, try, or otherwise finally dispose of such accusatory instrument.” Notably, under both common law and the New York State Constitution, a defendant has a right to be tried in a court in a county where the crime was committed, absent a direction by the legislature that the prosecution can take place in a different forum ( see People v. Moore, 46 N.Y.2d 1, 6 [1978] ). If the court lacks geographic jurisdiction to preside over a case, the charges brought in that court must be dismissed. ( See People v. Fea, 47 N.Y.2d 70 [1979] ).
Thus, when a motion to dismiss a charge in a misdemeanor information based on an allegation that the court lacks geographic jurisdiction to preside over the case is made, the court must be able to determine from an examination of the information whether such application has merit, just as it would for any other jurisdictional issue. Here, the information fails to allege in any manner how Supreme Court, Bronx County, has geographic jurisdiction to preside over the counts accusing defendant of falsely reporting an incident to a Manhattan detective where the report was made in New York County. Of course, the accusatory instrument itself pleads that the crime occurred “on or about March 30, 2012 at approximately 3:54 pm at Mount Sinai Hospital, County of Manhattan (sic)” Thus, by its own terms, the People have alleged that this false-report based crime occurred in a different county. Moreover, the facts pled about the details of that particular report do not demonstrate that Bronx County would have geographic jurisdiction.
The crime of making a false report is complete when the report is made.
Since the report relating to these two counts was, according to the accusatory instrument, made in a hospital located in New York County, all of the elements necessary for the commission of that crime occurred in that county, and not in Bronx County. Defendant's subsequent admission to a Bronx County prosecutor that the allegations made to the New York County detective were false does not give Bronx County geographic jurisdiction over the prosecution, since this admission is not an element of the crime. Thus, the accusatory instrument does not demonstrate that Bronx County Supreme Court has geographic jurisdiction pursuant to CPL § 20.40(1)(a).
Although defendant does not claim that either count of the Manhattan report is facially insufficient for any other reason, it may well be that the count charging a violation of Penal Law § 240.50(3) is factually insufficient. The pleading must contain sufficient facts to show that the report was “gratuitously made,” in that it was not in response to police-initiated questioning. See People v. Li, 192 Misc.2d 380, 382 [Dist Ct. Nassau Cty 2002]. It is unknown whether defendant herself asked for the police to come to the hospital, or if the hospital summoned them as part of their duty to report instances or purported domestic abuse. The two counts alleging a false report made to a Bronx County detective state that the reports were made “inside the 40th Precinct.” For pleading purposes, absent a challenge from defendant, the Court infers that defendant went to the precinct to “file the criminal compliant,” therefore this report was not “gratuitously made.”
Nor are there any facts pled in this accusatory instrument to indicate that this Manhattan report would have a “result” in Bronx County sufficient to convey jurisdiction under CPL § 20.40(2)(a). Once again, the facts in the accusatory instrument do not allege that the statements made by the defendant to the Manhattan detective would result in the Bronx County District Attorney's Office commencing a prosecution in this county based on believing the defendant's allegations were true.
The People argue that the accusatory instrument is sufficient to allege that Bronx County Supreme Court has “particular effect” jurisdiction under CPL § 20.40(2(c) In their affirmation in response to the motion, the People claim that “defendant reported” to the Manhattan detective “that she was a victim of a crime inside an apartment at 710 East 138th Street in Bronx County.” That well may be the case. In fact, defendant and the People concede that this record was made before a different judge on April 18, 2012, and that this judge, pursuant to an application to release defendant from custody pursuant to CPL § 170.70, ruled that the complaint was not an information, released defendant, and advised the People to redraft the accusatory instrument to allege these facts. They never did so. Had those facts been pled, the outcome of this motion might be different. It would not, however, result in a finding of “particular effect” jurisdiction.When a claim of geographic jurisdiction is made based on a “particular effect” theory, the Court of Appeals has held that the “particular effect” must be specific to the particular county in which the prosecution is brought. (People v. Zimmerman, 9 NY3d 421, 426 [2007]. In this case, both New York County and Bronx County could assert “particular effect” jurisdiction for the charge of falsely reporting an incident, assuming that the accusatory instrument charged correctly that defendant made an intentional false report to a Manhattan detective in New York County about a crime alleged to have happened in the Bronx. Therefore, neither county could properly claim “particular effect” jurisdiction. Id.
The People chose not to file a superseding information despite the CPL § 170.70 ruling that these counts did not allege proper jurisdiction and therefore the information was jurisdictionally defective. That is, of course, a ruling relating to custody alone, and not a ruling which can result in actual dismissal of the accusatory instrument. See People ex rel Ortiz v. Commissioner, 253 A.D.2d 688, 689 (1st Dept 1998). The People demanded that defendant file a written motion to dismiss these counts on the ground that geographic jurisdiction was improperly placed in Bronx County, which is their right. (People v. Mezon, 80 N.Y.2d 155, 160 [1982];People v. Lawrence, 64 N.Y.2d 200, 206–07 [1984]}. Although this Court indicated that it agreed with the prior judge's position, and that the result of such a written motion would be dismissal of these two counts for failing to sufficiently allege geographic jurisdiction in Bronx County, the People, as is also their right, did not consent to litigating this on an oral application. Id. The law requires that an application to dismiss a misdemeanor accusatory instrument based on a facial insufficiency can only be heard after arraignment (CPL § 170.30[1] ) and upon a formal motion made in writing and upon reasonable notice to the People. (CPL §§ 170.45, 210.45[1], 210.2091)(g)); see People v. Parker, 223 A.D.2d 179, 182 (1st Dept 1996); People v. Cook, 193 A.D.2d 366, 369–70 (1st Dept 1983)).
Upon review of the motion and the accusatory instrument, the two counts alleging that defendant made a false report in Bronx County on January 10, 2012 are facially sufficient. However, the two counts alleging that on March 30, 2012, defendant made a false report to a Manhattan detective well within the boundaries of New York County are dismissed because “the allegations [in the information] demonstrate that the court does not have jurisdiction of the offense(s) charged” relating to those counts. CPL § 170.35(1)(b).
This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.