Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. CC320304
ELIA, J.In a 17-count information, appellant John Shaw was charged with offenses related to a series of real estate transactions. His wife, Hsiu Mei Wu, was charged in three of the counts. The jury found Shaw guilty of three counts of grand theft, two counts of forgery, three counts of using personal identifying information without authorization, three counts of recording a false instrument, one count of conspiracy, one count of attempting to dissuade a witness, and one count of false application for a driver's license. (Pen. Code, §§ 484-487, 470, 530.5, subd. (a), 115, 182, 136.1,118.) The jury also found true excessive taking enhancements. (Pen. Code, §§ 12022.6, subd. (a)(3), 186.11, subds. (9)(a)(1) and (a)(2).) The jury was unable to reach a verdict as to one count of grand theft and one count of forgery. The jury found Wu guilty of one count of using personal identifying information without authorization. (Pen. Code, § 530.5, subd. (a).) The jury found Wu not guilty of one count of forgery and one count of recording a false instrument. (Pen. Code, §§ 115, 470.) The trial court sentenced Shaw to a state prison term of 14 years eight months and ordered him to pay restitution and a $20 court security fee. Wu was placed on probation with various terms and conditions including restitution and community service. Shaw challenges the sufficiency of the evidence as to two counts, conspiracy and attempting to dissuade a witness. Wu challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support her conviction for using personal identifying information without authorization. Shaw also contends that the court committed sentencing error. We affirm.
Background
John Shaw (aka John Shia Hsiu) was a real estate agent. Most of the charges against him had to do with real estate transactions in which he bought or sold property, and obtained loans, using the identities of partners or associates who testified that they had not authorized these transactions. The charges against Wu arose from her participation in one of these transactions. Our summary is brief as to those counts which are not at issue in this appeal and more detailed as to those counts for which the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged.
Hui Min Li met Shaw when Shaw was a customer in Li's restaurant. Shaw became Li's real estate agent. In October 2000, Shaw was involved in the recording of a fraudulent deed transferring title of property at 3030 Santa Maria Avenue in Santa Clara from Kevin and Debra Phillips to Hui Min Li and his wife, Dond Mei Cai, without their permission or knowledge. Shaw obtained a new loan in the names of Li and Cai from Washington Mutual Bank. Because of this, Shaw was convicted of one count of recording a false instrument, one count of using personal identifying information without authorization, and one count of grand theft. (Pen. Code, §§ 115, 530.5, subd. (a), 484-487, counts 14, 15, and 16.)
Kuang-Yeu Feng was from Taiwan and had a graduate degree in computer science from New York University. When he lived at 1681 Los Padres Boulevard, Shaw was his landlord. When Feng expressed an interest in buying some real estate, Shaw said that he had knowledge of the real estate market but bad credit. Because Feng had good credit and money, but no knowledge of the real estate market, Shaw said that they could purchase property together and rent it out. The first property Feng purchased was the Los Padres Boulevard one. In May 2002, Feng and Shaw bought some property at 343 America Avenue in Feng's name, with Feng's name on the loan, Shaw paying the down payment, and Feng making payments and paying taxes. Apparently, the escrow was over-funded, and Wells Fargo issued an escrow refund check for $4,620.77 made out to Feng. Feng never saw the check. It was deposited into Shaw's personal account. Shaw was charged with grand theft and forgery in connection with this, but the jury was unable to reach a verdict as to these counts. (Pen. Code, §§ 484-487, 470, counts 1 and 2.)
In August 2002, Shaw completed an application to obtain a duplicate California driver's license in the name of Kuang-Yeu Feng. For this, Shaw was convicted of one count of false application for a driver's license. (Pen. Code, § 118, count 17.)
In mid-September 2002, Wu acted as a witness to a notary act in which Kuang-Yeu Feng granted title of 717 South Baywood Avenue, San Jose, to Kejian Zhang. Shaw presented himself to the notary as Feng. Jayesh Patel, the notary public, testified that someone purporting to be Feng identified himself to him as Feng using a Department of Motor Vehicles printout with a driver's license number, a temporary driver's license. Patel told him that this was not a proper identification and that he needed two credible witnesses to establish his identity. Shaw soon returned with two witnesses. One witness was identified by a United States passport in the name Phuong Thi Vo. Vo testified that she was a United States citizen and had applied for a passport but that she did not receive it. She testified that she did not sign Patel's notary book and did not act as a credible witness before Patel.
Shaw testified that he had obtained Vo's passport from Kejian Zhang, an associate who lived a few blocks away from Vo and had a similar address. Shaw testified that when Patel would not accept the temporary driver's license as identification, he drove Wu to Patel's office and brought along another relative. Shaw said that when they arrived in Patel's office, Shaw had Vo's passport and handed it to Patel. Shaw testified that he told Wu to sign Vo's name on Patel's notary journal. He testified that he did not explain to Wu the nature of the transaction and did not explain to her that she did not have permission to sign Vo's name. Wu signed the notary journal "Phoung Thi," without the "Vo."
Shaw testified that Wu was from Taiwan, had not completed high school, spoke Mandarin Chinese, and did not speak or read English when Shaw, at age 41, brought her, at age 23, to the United States as his wife in 1999. She was a homemaker, received a grocery allowance from Shaw, and did not drive. She gave birth to three children. Shaw testified that Wu knew that he bought and sold real estate, but that he never discussed specific business deals with her. He did, however, involve her in certain transactions by putting her name on some properties. He would tell her to sign documents that she could not read and that he did not translate for her. Shaw testified that when he took Wu to Patel's office she was sleep deprived from caring for their one-month old baby and two other young children. Shaw told Wu to sign the name Phoung Thi Vo on the notary journal. Wu did not handle the passport. Shaw testified that when Wu signed Vo's name Wu trusted that this transaction was legitimate. Wu did not testify.
An escrow officer at Stewart Title testified that in April 2003 she notarized the signatures of Wu and Shaw on various documents, including one giving Wu power of attorney for Zhang. Shaw, posing as Zhang, obtained loans to purchase property at 2390 Gabriel. One loan showed Wu and Zhang as the borrowers. The escrow officer testified that Wu spoke rudimentary English but that she spoke to Wu and had her sign the documents and was convinced that Wu could understand her. An escrow officer at Fidelity National Title testified that in May 2003, Wu came to his office alone and signed loan papers on behalf of Zhang related to 2390 Gabriel. Wu wrote on an attachment to the deed of trust, "Kejian Zhang by Hsui [sic] Mei Wu, his attorney in fact" and initialed many documents "KZ by HW." The escrow officer testified that Wu seemed to understand what he was saying to her.
In connection with the transfer of the Baywood property from Feng to Zhang, including the events in Patel's notary office, Shaw was convicted of forgery, using personal identifying information without authorization, and recording a false instrument. (Pen. Code, §§ 470, 530.5, subd. (a), 115, counts 5, 6, and 7.) The jury found Wu not guilty of forgery and recording a false instrument. (Counts 5 and 7.) The jury found Wu guilty of one count of using personal identifying information without authorization for signing the notary journal with Vo's name. (Count 8.)
In late September 2002, Shaw wrote a check for $151,050.44 from an escrow account with Comerica Bank. The check was made out to Feng, and Feng's name was forged on the back of the check which was then deposited into Shaw's bank account. Shaw was convicted of grand theft and forgery. (Counts 3 and 4.)
Kejian Zhang met Shaw when he rented property at 3030 Santa Maria in Santa Clara from Shaw. They invested in real estate together using only Zhang's name to obtain a loan. Zhang remodeled the property. In early May 2003, Shaw had a deed transferring title of 423 Clifton Avenue, San Jose, from Wu to Zhang, characterizing this transfer as a sale of the property. Shaw obtained a loan in Zhang's name from Downey Savings and Loan. The jury found Shaw guilty of recording a false instrument, using personal identifying information without authorization, and grand theft. (Counts 11, 12, and 13.)
Eventually, Zhang found out that Shaw had real estate dealings in which he used Zhang's name without Zhang's permission. Although Zhang did not say that he was going to go to the police about this, he did tell Shaw that he did not trust him any more and that he wanted his investment back. Shaw made "veiled threats" to Zhang. Zhang testified that Shaw told Zhang, "you don't have a license, you don't have a company and your passport expired." Zhang testified that Shaw "said he has a lot of friends in the Bay Area. He said he had a friend just came back from Beijing and that friend was a convicted criminal."
Around this time, Shaw attended some informal settlement negotiations in a civil suit brought by Feng against Shaw in connection with some of the properties. James Cai, Feng's attorney, testified that Shaw was accompanied by a man in his 40's who refused to give Cai his name. The man was dressed all in black, wore sunglasses, and looked "pretty mean." Shaw told Cai that the man was his friend. Cai was under the impression that the man was Shaw's bodyguard. The man was later identified as Cheng Guo.
In June 2003, Zhang received a telephone call from someone who arranged to meet him at 1003 Bryant Way in Sunnyvale about some remodeling work. There Zhang met a man later identified as Cheng Guo. Guo had a "Beijing accent." They walked around inside the house as Guo described work he was considering having done on the house. Zhang testified that as he was measuring the kitchen floor, Guo suddenly kicked him in the groin and punched him. Zhang fainted, then retreated to the living room. There, Guo took a metal poker from the fireplace and pushed Zhang. Guo raised the poker up and told Zhang to "be careful in the Bay Area" and "don't do anything stupid." Zhang understood that "it was John Shaw who had sent somebody to come and hit me or strike me."
Shaw testified that he did not have Guo assault Zhang. Shaw denied telling Zhang not to investigate his real estate dealings and denied threatening Zhang by saying that he had "a lot of friends in the Bay Area." Shaw said that he had referred a friend to Zhang for some remodeling work and that Shaw later found out that Zhang was not a licensed contractor. Shaw said that he told Zhang that he could not refer any more work to him because of this, although Zhang could work on projects in which he was part owner. Shaw testified that Zhang became "pissed off."
Shaw testified that Guo was a close friend of his who was in the security business. Guo came back from Beijing, "after serving his sentence," about two months before Zhang was assaulted. Shaw estimated that "thousands" of people in the Bay area have Beijing accents. In connection with Guo's assault on Zhang, the jury found Shaw guilty of conspiracy to commit the crime of dissuading a witness and one count of attempting to dissuade a witness. (Pen. Code, §§ 182, (a)(1), 136.1, subd. (b)(1).)
Other evidence showed that Shaw's fraudulent acts involved $1,742,671.11, most of which was attributable to fraudulent mortgages.
Counsel for Shaw argued that this matter was essentially a series of disputes among business partners and should be handled through civil litigation. He argued that written and oral partnership agreements authorized Shaw to act as he did, or at least gave Shaw an honest, good faith belief that he was so authorized which would negate the specific intent to defraud element of most of the charges. Counsel for Wu argued that Wu lacked the specific intent to defraud and that she had been "duped" by Shaw into accompanying him to the notary and signing the journal.
In rebuttal, the prosecutor said that Wu's counsel had "some real good arguments" on the forgery count that would "merit some thought and discussion" by the jury. He said, however, that Wu's counsel's "arguments fall short on the I.D. theft."
Sufficiency of the Evidence
Wu contends that the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction for using personal information without authorization. Shaw contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions for conspiracy and attempting to dissuade a witness.
When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged on appeal, the court reviews the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence--that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value--from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 758.) We presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence, including reasonable inferences based on the evidence and excluding inferences based on speculation or conjecture. (People v. Tran (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 759, 771-772.)
Appellant Wu – Penal Code Section 530.5
Appellant Wu contends, "The evidence is insufficient to support the conviction because the prosecution failed in its burden to prove that Wu had ever 'obtained' any personal identifying information."
The trial court instructed the jury on Penal Code section 530.5 in the language of CALJIC No. 15.60 as follows, "Every person who willfully obtains personal identifying information of another person without the authorization of that person, and uses that information for any unlawful purpose . . . without the consent of that person, is guilty of a violation of Penal Code section 530.5, a crime. [¶] The phrase, 'personal identifying information' means the name, address, telephone number . . . of an individual person. [¶] In order to prove this crime, each of the following elements must be proved: [¶] 1. A person willfully obtained personal identifying information of another person; [¶] 2 The person used that information for any unlawful purpose, including the obtaining, or attempted obtaining of credit, goods, services, or medical information in the name of the other person without the consent of that person." During deliberations, the jury asked to use a dictionary, and when told that one would not be provided, asked for the definitions of "willfully [and] obtained as used in the context of instruction 15.60." The trial court referred the jury to the definition of willfully in the instructions. The trial court told the jury that " '[o]btain' means to gain possession of, acquire, get, or possess."
CALJIC 1.20 states, "The word 'willfully' when applied to the intent with which an act is done or omitted means with a purpose or willingness to commit the act or to make the omission in question. The word 'willfully' does not require any intent to violate the law, or to injure another, or to acquire any advantage."
Appellant Wu argues that "there is absolutely no evidence in the record that Wu herself had ever obtained Vo's passport or any other information." Appellant uses definitions of "obtain," "gain," and "get" to argue that because "Wu did not gain possession of Vo's personal identifying information through her own efforts, there is not sufficient evidence that Wu 'obtained' any personal information of another person." Citing Scheidler v. National Organization for Women, Inc. (2003) 537 U.S. 393, 403-404, footnote 7 (123 S.Ct. 1057), appellant states that "the word 'obtain' means 'to gain possession.' " Citing Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1993, p. 928), appellant asserts that " 'gain' . . . means 'to get or attain possession, control, use, or benefit of (as an advantage) by industry, initiative, merit, or craft.' " Citing that same source, appellant states that "get" means "to gain possession of through one's own efforts." From these definitions, appellant Wu argues, "The evidence adduced to support the element of 'obtain' is insufficient." Appellant points out that respondent "concede[s] that Shaw, Wu's husband, 'obtained' Vo's passport from Zhang, admitted he had used Vo's passport, and did not have permission to use Vo's identification. Moreover, it is undisputed that, at the notary public's office, Shaw was the one who had Vo's passport in his possession. . . . Wu did not handle that passport."
The discussion in Scheidler as to the definition of obtain arose in a very different type of case than this one. In Scheidler, the petitioners were individuals and organizations who engaged in pro-life, anti-abortion protests. The respondents were health care clinics that performed abortions and a pro-choice organization. The respondents filed suit against the petitioners based on the premise that the petitioners tried to disrupt abortion activities using violence and other unlawful activities. The respondents sought damages and an injunction prohibiting petitioners from engaging in such activities anywhere in the United States. Respondents based their legal argument on the RICO Act, 18 U.S.C. §1962, arguing the petitioners' activities constituted extortion. The court held that the predicate acts under RICO had not been met. The court noted that the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. §1951(b)(2), defines extortion as the improper "obtaining of property from another." The court rejected the respondents' argument that the "property," for purposes of extortion, was the right to obtain and perform medical services free of threats, violence, coercion, and fear.
Wu seems to argue that, for purposes of Penal Code section 530.5, one cannot obtain the personal identifying information of another person without somehow asserting control over an object containing the information. Appellant's proposed interpretation of "obtain" in Penal Code section 530.5 would exclude from the statute's reach personal information that is transmitted orally from one person to another. We read no such limitation into the statute. If A tells B her telephone number, and B tells the number to C, who hears it and remembers it, C has obtained the personal information of A's telephone number. That obtaining this information did not require any particular industry, initiative, merit, or craft on C's part other than remembering what was said does not mean that the information was not obtained by C. If C then uses that information for an unlawful purpose without A's consent, C has violated the statute. Had Wu not "obtained" Vo's personal information, Wu would not have been able to write Vo's name in the notary journal. In other words, Wu obtained, acquired, gained, or got the information when she listened to Shaw tell her the name and she retained it in her memory to use in signing the journal. We agree with respondent that "by signing Vo's name in the notary's journal in a real estate transaction, Wu 'intentionally obtained' Vo's personal identifying information and used it to pose as Vo for an unlawful purpose – obtaining the services of the notary public." Sufficient evidence supports Wu's conviction for using personal identifying information without authorization.
Wu also argues that "the conviction is not supported by any evidence based on alternative factual theories." Wu notes that the trial court did not instruct on the theory of aiding and abetting or a conspiracy theory as to that count. We find sufficient evidence to support Wu's conviction without considering the alternative theories.
Appellant Shaw – Penal Code Sections 182 and 136.1
Appellant Shaw contends, "There is insufficient evidence of a conspiracy; therefore, the convictions on counts nine and ten must be reversed."
"A criminal conspiracy exists where it is established that there was an unlawful agreement to commit a crime between two or more people, and an overt act in furtherance of the agreement. (See [Penal Code,] § 182, subd. (a)(1).) To sustain a conviction for conspiracy the prosecution must show not only that the conspirators intended to agree but also that they intended to commit the elements of the offense. (People v. Swain (1996) 12 Cal.4th 593, 600 . . . .) In proving a conspiracy, however, it is not necessary to demonstrate that the parties met and actually agreed to undertake the unlawful act or that they had previously arranged a detailed plan. The evidence is sufficient if it supports an inference that the parties positively or tacitly came to a mutual understanding to commit a crime. Therefore, conspiracy may be proved through circumstantial evidence inferred from the conduct, relationship, interests, and activities of the alleged conspirators before and during the alleged conspiracy." (People v. Prevost (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1382, 1399.)
Shaw was charged in count 9 with conspiracy and in count 10 with attempting to dissuade a witness. The conspiracy count alleged two overt acts. The first was that Shaw "told the victim not to investigate any of the houses [Shaw] had purchased and threatened the victim stating that he has 'a lot of friends in the Bay Area.' " The second overt act was that Cheng Guo "[a]ssaulted the victim in an attempt to intimidate him into not investigating or reporting the crimes committed by [Shaw] and uncharged co-conspirators."
Appellant argues, "Although appellant was associated with Guo, who actually assaulted Zhang, there is no evidence of any agreement between appellant and Guo regarding commission of the assault/dissuasion. No one saw or heard them meet and discuss an assault or an attempt to dissuade a witness. No writing exists regarding any such agreement. Appellant may have been upset with Zhang, may have said something that Zhang found threatening, and may have mentioned this concern to Guo. But, there is no evidence of an agreement between appellant and Guo that Zhang should be assaulted." "For all the evidence shows, Guo acted on his own, albeit with the probable intent of helping appellant."
Few conspiracy convictions are obtained through evidence that someone outside of the conspiracy saw or heard the conspirators making their agreement. Rarely is there evidence of a written agreement in a conspiracy prosecution. Appellant "concedes that the evidence may give rise to a suspicion that appellant was somehow involved in the assault." Actually, it gives rise to more than that. Evidence of the relationship between Shaw and Guo showed that Guo and Shaw were close friends, that they were in frequent, regular contact, and that Guo was Shaw's bodyguard. There was evidence of Shaw's interest in the dissuasion in that Zhang was upset with Shaw for his real estate deals using Zhang's name without his permission, and Shaw was concerned enough about this to issue veiled threats to Zhang about his friend who had just come back from Beijing and was a convicted criminal. The evidence further showed that Guo was a convicted criminal who had just come back from Beijing, had a Beijing accent, and assaulted Zhang after arranging their meeting on a pretext. After assaulting Zhang, Guo warned him, "don't do anything stupid." The evidence showed no motive for the assault by Guo on Zhang other than dissuasion, and, as respondent points out, "Guo would not know without Shaw's input how to identify or contact Zhang." Zhang understood that "it was John Shaw who had sent somebody to come and hit me or strike me." The conduct, relationship, interests, and activities of Shaw and Guo leading up to and including the assault permit the reasonable inference that Shaw positively or tacitly came to a mutual understanding with Guo to have Guo assault and threaten Zhang to dissuade Zhang from reporting Shaw's fraudulent real estate transactions to the authorities. Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence to support Shaw's convictions for conspiracy and attempting to dissuade a witness.
Sentencing Issues
Excessive Taking Enhancements
Appellant Shaw contends, "The trial court abused its sentencing discretion by not striking one of the excessive taking enhancements."
The jury found true an enhancement that Shaw took property of a value exceeding $1 million in the commission of counts 1 through 16. (Pen. Code, § 12022.6.) The jury also found true the enhancement that counts 1 through 16 involved the taking of more than $500,000. (Pen. Code, § 186.11, subds. (a)(1) and (a)(2).) Although Shaw declined to discuss his case in detail with the probation officer before sentencing, he "essentially denied any wrongdoing." The probation report outlined two sentencing scenarios. In both, the recommendation was that these enhancements be imposed, and be imposed consecutively, "considering the overall egregious nature of the defendant's behavior." Counsel for Shaw filed a sentencing memorandum arguing that the court "should only sentence Mr. Shaw on either the [Penal Code section] 12022.6(a)(3) allegation or the [Penal Code section] 186.11(a)(1) and (2) allegation, for an additional term of three years, and not consecutively on both allegations." At the sentencing hearing, Shaw's counsel told the court that there was now a written settlement agreement between Shaw and Feng in the civil case. Counsel argued, that, as to the enhancements, "I believe the court should only sentence on one of those and not on both. And the reason again is that they are different statutes but they are obviously aimed at the same kind of conduct." The trial court said that it had read and considered the sentencing memorandum and imposed the sentencing enhancements consecutively.
Essentially reiterating his argument at the time of sentencing, Shaw contends that the trial court abused its discretion by not striking one of the excessive taking enhancements. Although appellant recognizes that the white collar crime enhancement of Penal Code section 186.11 is not subject to Penal Code section 654's prohibition against double punishment, he argues against the consecutive imposition because "both enhancements were based on the same conduct and the same common plan and/or scheme." He further argues that "[t]he instant matter involved appellant's first convictions; he had no prior record. He settled the Feng civil case and had agreed to pay a significant sum for restitution. And, finally, had one of the enhancements been stricken, appellant still would have received a lengthy sentence."
The trial court has discretion under Penal Code section 1385, subdivision (c), to strike an enhancement "in furtherance of justice." (People v. Meloney (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1145, 1155; People v. Rivas (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 565, 574.) The abuse of discretion standard is a deferential one. (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 162.) The question is whether the trial court's action " 'falls outside the bounds of reason' under the applicable law and the relevant facts." (Ibid.) That is, discretion is not abused unless the trial court's decision is so arbitrary or irrational that no reasonable person could agree with it. (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 377.)
Furthermore, " '[t]he burden is on the party attacking the sentence to clearly show that the sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary. [Citation.] In the absence of such a showing, the trial court is presumed to have acted to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives, and its discretionary determination to impose a particular sentence will not be set aside on review.' [Citation.] Concomitantly, '[a] decision will not be reversed merely because reasonable people might disagree. "An appellate tribunal is neither authorized nor warranted in substituting its judgment for the judgment of the trial judge." [Citations.]' [Citation.]" (People v. Superior Court (Alvarez) (1997) 14 Cal.4th 968, 977-978.)
Although Shaw asserts that "all sentencing objectives in this case would have been fully satisfied had the trial court struck one of the enhancements," the trial court was free to disagree with this assessment. The decision to sentence on these enhancements consecutively reflected a determination that Shaw had engaged in a pattern of fraudulent activity against many victims that resulted in a large amount of accumulated takings from both individuals and institutions. Most white collar criminals have insignificant prior records, and many find themselves in civil proceedings and ordered to pay restitution. The court had before it two recommended sentences from the probation department, one for 15 years and one for 19 years, and Shaw's counsel's "suggested revision" to these sentences called for a sentence of nine years eight months. The trial court's sentence of 14 years four months, including the consecutive sentences for the enhancements, could hardly be called irrational or arbitrary, and was well within the bounds of its discretion.
Court Security Fee
Appellant Shaw was ordered to pay a $20 court security fee pursuant to Penal Code section 1465.8, subdivision (a)(1). Appellant Shaw contends, "Application to appellant of Penal Code section 1465.8 regarding the $20 court security fee violates the retroactivity proscriptions of Penal Code section 3." Appellant further contends, "The court security fee violates constitutional ex post facto proscriptions."
The California Supreme Court recently addressed these issues in People v. Alford (Dec. 3, 2007, S142508) --- Cal.4th ---- [2007 Cal. Lexis 13744] and concluded that Penal Code section 3 is not implicated and does not prohibit retroactive application of the Penal Code section 1465.8 court security fee to cases involving convictions that occurred after the operative date of the statute. (Id. at pp. ---- [*2, 3-8].) The Court also held that "the fee does not violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws." (Id. at p. ----[*2].) We therefore conclude the court did not err in imposing the $20 court security fee pursuant to section 1465.8.
Disposition
As to both appellants, the judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: RUSHING, P. J., PREMO, J.