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People v. Woodruff

California Court of Appeals, Fourth District, First Division
Mar 25, 2008
No. D049822 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 25, 2008)

Opinion


THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. EDDIE EARL WOODRUFF, Defendant and Appellant. D049822 California Court of Appeal, Fourth District, First Division March 25, 2008

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Super. Ct. No. SCD198809 Robert P. Ahern, Judge.

McDONALD, J.

A jury convicted defendant Eddie Woodruff of selling cocaine base (Health & Saf. Code, § 11352, subd. (a)), and possessing cocaine base for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351.5). In a bifurcated proceeding, Woodruff admitted three prison prior allegations (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)), a prior conviction allegation within the meaning of Health and Safety Code section 11370.2, subdivision (a), and a prior strike conviction allegation (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 668, 1170.12). On appeal, Woodruff asserts (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions, (2) the court abused its discretion by ruling in limine that Woodruff could be impeached with certain prior convictions if he elected to testify, and (3) the court erred by refusing to hear his request for a new trial.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On May 2, 2006, Officer Jesse Zaldivar was working undercover as part of a narcotics sting when he encountered Mr. Johnson near Fourth Avenue and C Street in downtown San Diego. Zaldivar told Johnson he was looking for a "dub" (a street term for $20 worth of cocaine base), and Johnson led Zaldivar to a location on C Street near the Civic Center. Zaldivar gave Johnson a prerecorded $20 bill, which Johnson put into his pocket. When they arrived at Third Avenue and C Street, Zaldivar saw Woodruff get out of a taxicab. Johnson stopped and looked at Woodruff, appeared to recognize him, and then walked to Woodruff and appeared to be talking to him. Zaldivar stayed back 10 to 15 feet from Woodruff and Johnson and could not hear their conversation.

At one point both Johnson and Woodruff turned and looked over at Zaldivar, and the two then began walking west on C Street toward Second Avenue. Zaldivar followed but stayed back approximately 15 feet. Woodruff and Johnson continued to talk as they walked, although Zaldivar could not hear their conversation. Johnson pulled out the prerecorded $20 bill and gave it to Woodruff. After the money was exchanged, Johnson and Woodruff continued walking until they reached Second Street, where they turned left and walked south on Second Street until they reached the entrance to the Westgate Hotel. Johnson stopped there, but Woodruff continued walking south past some concrete pillars along the front of the Westgate Hotel. When Woodruff reached the last pillar, he stepped behind it and concealed himself. Zaldivar joined Johnson and waited with him at a stone planter box outside the entrance to the Westgate Hotel. There was no one else in the area where Woodruff stopped.

Woodruff was behind the pillar out of Zaldivar's view for 15 to 20 seconds. Woodruff then stepped into view and looked over at Johnson and Zaldivar; they immediately began walking to Woodruff's location. It took about 10 seconds to get to Woodruff. When they arrived, there were three off-white rock-like substances lying on the concrete behind the pillar. Johnson picked them up, placed two of the rocks in his mouth, and gave the third one to Zaldivar. Zaldivar then made a second purchase from Johnson, paying with two prerecorded $5 bills for a second rock, which Johnson removed from his mouth and gave to Zaldivar.

Zaldivar gave a signal to his team, which moved in and arrested Woodruff and Johnson. Officer Tagaban arrested and searched Johnson. The search found the marked $5 bills, a cellular telephone, and walkie talkie. Officer Bernard, in full uniform, arrested Woodruff. Bernard approached Woodruff and told him to stop and place his hands behind his back. Although Woodruff initially complied, he tried to run when Bernard was about to place handcuffs on him. Bernard tackled Woodruff, and arrested and searched him. Bernard found a black container containing 12 pieces of rock cocaine (along with a loose piece in Woodruff's pocket), the prerecorded $20 bill Zaldivar had given to Johnson, and a cellular telephone. A subsequent check of the cellular telephone showed Woodruff had answered three calls that day placed from Johnson's cellular telephone.

Zaldivar testified the drugs found on Woodruff were possessed for sale. Zaldivar's opinion was based on the amount Woodruff possessed (enough for approximately 60 "hits" or doses), their value (when broken down they would net approximately $300 on the street), the way the drugs were being carried (most were in a single container), the absence of any signs Woodruff was under the influence, and the absence of any device for ingesting the drugs.

The sole defense witness was a drug and alcohol counselor who was a former rock cocaine user. He testified the amount of drugs carried by Woodruff could have been for personal use, and could have represented a mere single day's supply for someone heavily addicted to the drugs.

ANALYSIS

A. The Substantial Evidence Claim

Woodruff argues the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions for selling, and possessing for sale, the cocaine base. "To determine the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether it contains evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid value, from which a rational trier of fact could find that the elements of the crime were established beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations.] We need not be convinced of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; we merely ask whether ' "any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." [Citation.]' [Citation.] [Quoting People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 576.] We must draw all reasonable inferences in support of the judgment. [Citation.] It is not our function to reweigh the evidence, reappraise the credibility of witnesses, or resolve factual conflicts, as these are functions reserved for the trier of fact. We may not reverse a conviction for insufficiency of the evidence unless it appears that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support the conviction. [Citation.] [¶] This standard of review also applies to circumstantial evidence. [Citation.] If the circumstances, plus all the logical inferences the jury might have drawn from them, reasonably justify the jury's findings, our opinion that the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment." (People v. Tripp (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 951, 955.)

There is substantial direct and circumstantial evidence that Woodruff sold and possessed the cocaine base for sale. Shortly after Zaldivar told Johnson he wished to purchase the drugs, Johnson led him to a spot where Woodruff (with whom Johnson had an existing relationship based on the cellular telephone records) was arriving. Johnson immediately approached Woodruff and, after some conversation, Woodruff took Zaldivar's prerecorded money and secreted himself behind a pillar where no one else was present. When Woodruff emerged 10 to 15 seconds later, there were three pieces of rock cocaine lying at the foot of the pillar. Johnson led Zaldivar to that spot, picked up the pieces, and gave one to Zaldivar. A jury could reasonable infer that these rocks did not fall like manna from heaven, but instead came from the same black container that contained 12 additional pieces of rock cocaine later found in Woodruff's possession. Moreover, the jury could infer (from the amount carried and the absence of any apparatus for him to consume the drugs) Woodruff possessed the drugs to sell rather than consume.

On appeal, Woodruff argues that because there were alternative inferences that reasonably could be drawn from this evidence consistent with Woodruff having possessed the drugs for consumption rather than sale, the jury's contrary finding must be reversed. However, we need not chronicle each of Woodruff's arguments because, as long as the inferences the jury might have drawn from this evidence are logical and reasonably justify the jury's findings, the fact that the circumstances "might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment." (People v. Tripp, supra, 15 Cal.App.4th at p. 955.)

B. The In Limine Ruling

Woodruff argues the trial court abused its discretion by ruling that, if Woodruff elected to testify, the prosecutor would be permitted to impeach Woodruff with two prior convictions for selling cocaine base and possessing cocaine base for sale.

Factual and Procedural Background

Prior to trial, the prosecution moved in limine to admit evidence of Woodruff's prior offenses involving sale of cocaine base. The prosecution argued the evidence was admissible in its case-in-chief on whether Woodruff possessed the cocaine base with the intent to sell. The prosecution also argued that, if Woodruff elected to testify, his prior convictions for possessing for sale and selling drugs were admissible to impeach his credibility. The court ruled the prosecution could not refer to Woodruff's prior offenses during their case-in-chief. The court further ruled, however, that if Woodruff elected to take the stand, the prior crimes would become admissible both for impeachment purposes (because the prior crimes involved moral turpitude) and would also become relevant to the issue of his intent (because his counsel suggested Woodruff's defense would be that he possessed the drugs for personal use) under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b).

Legal Framework

The trial court's rulings on the provisional admissibility of the evidence in question will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. (See People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1113 [abuse of discretion standard of review applies to any ruling by a trial court on the admissibility of evidence and is particularly appropriate for questions regarding relevance and undue prejudice]; People v. Lenart (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1107, 1123 [admission of uncharged crime evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion].)

"Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (a) generally prohibits the admission of [an uncharged] criminal act against a criminal defendant 'when offered to prove his or her conduct on a specified occasion.' Subdivision (b), however, provides that such evidence is admissible 'when relevant to prove some fact (such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity . . .).' " (People v. Harrison (2005) 35 Cal.4th 208, 229.) In People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380 (Ewoldt), the Supreme Court explained the theory underlying the admissibility of evidence of an uncharged offense to prove a defendant's intent in committing the charged offense: " '[T]he recurrence of a similar result . . . tends (increasingly with each instance) to negative accident or inadvertence or self-defense or good faith or other innocent mental state, and tends to establish (provisionally, at least, though not certainly) the presence of the normal, i.e., criminal, intent accompanying such an act. . . .' [Citation.] In order to be admissible to prove intent, the uncharged misconduct must be sufficiently similar to support the inference that the defendant ' "probably harbor[ed] the same intent in each instance." [Citations.]' [Citation.]" (Ewoldt, at p. 402.) Ewoldt went on to state, "The least degree of similarity (between the uncharged act and the charged offense) is required in order to prove intent. [Citation.]" (Ibid.)

The courts have ruled that evidence of a defendant's commission of prior narcotics-related offenses or use of narcotics may be admissible to prove a defendant's knowledge and intent with respect to a charged narcotics-related offense. (See, e.g., People v. Thornton (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 44, 49-50 [evidence of defendant's use of heroin admissible to show knowledge of its narcotic character]; People v. Pijal (1973) 33 Cal.App.3d 682, 691 (Pijal) ["evidence of [defendant's] prior narcotic offenses was clearly admissible to show his guilty knowledge, motive and intent"].)

However, even where a defendant's commission of other crimes may be relevant for some purpose under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b), to be admissible, the evidence " 'must not contravene other policies limiting admission, such as those contained in Evidence Code section 352. [Citations.]' [Citation.]" (Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 404.) Evidence Code section 352 authorizes a trial court to "exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury." " ' "The prejudice which [Evidence Code section 352] is designed to avoid is not the prejudice or damage to a defense that naturally flows from relevant, highly probative evidence." [Citations.] "Rather, the statute uses the word in its etymological sense of 'prejudging' a person or cause on the basis of extraneous factors. [Citation.]" [Citation.]' [ Citation.]" (People v. Mullens (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 648, 658.)

Analysis

The decision to allow introduction of other crimes evidence if Woodruff decided to testify was not an abuse of discretion because Woodruff's testimony would have rendered the other crimes relevant to two separate issues. First, Woodruff's credibility could have been subject to impeachment by his prior crimes involving moral turpitude (People v. Harris (2005) 37 Cal.4th 310, 337), and the crimes of possession of drugs for sale and sale of drugs qualify as crimes of moral turpitude. (Ibid.; People v. Navarez (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 936, 949.) Second, because Woodruff was found in possession of the drugs, the only significant matters about which Woodruff could testify would be either to deny that he was aware of the narcotic nature of the drugs or to claim he held them with the intent to consume rather than to sell them. In either case, Woodruff's prior offenses would be admissible under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b), as relevant to his knowledge of their narcotic nature or to the intent with which he held the drugs. (Pijal, supra, 33 Cal.App.3d at p. 691.)

Woodruff alternatively asserts the trial court abused its discretion by overruling Woodruff's objection under Evidence Code section 352 to the proposed use of the prior crimes evidence. The trial court expressly found the probative value of the evidence outweighed its prejudicial impact, noting that his probable testimony would have been that he did not possess the intent to sell. Because his prior conviction was relevant to showing his intent (Pijal, supra, 33 Cal.App.3d at p. 691), and the prosecution's offer of proof was that Woodruff's prior conviction for selling employed a similar methodology (i.e. using an intermediary to accomplish the exchange of money for drugs between Woodruff and the buyer), we cannot conclude the trial court abused its discretion when it found the probative value of the evidence outweighed its prejudicial impact.

C. The Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim

Woodruff asserts he is entitled to a new trial because he implicitly moved for a new trial based on ineffective assistance of trial counsel but the court never formally ruled on his motion.

Procedural Background

At the October 11, 2006, sentencing hearing, Woodruff announced he was moving under Marsden for a new attorney. At the closed hearing, Woodruff asserted the grounds for his motion were his belief his trial attorney, Mr. Mohun, had been ineffective because Mohun was not prepared for trial, had not introduced exculpatory evidence at trial, and had not attempted to file (on Woodruff's behalf) a handwritten petition created by Woodruff seeking a writ of mandate on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. At the Marsden hearing, Mohun explained the reasons for each of the actions about which Woodruff complained.

People v Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118.

The purportedly exculpatory evidence cited by Woodruff was a CAD tape that recorded the events surrounding his arrest and the testimony of Johnson.

Specifically, Mohun explained he had listened to the CAD tape and did not believe it was helpful to present it because it appeared "confirmatory of the detective's testimony" and therefore was not helpful to Woodruff's defense. Regarding the decision not to call Johnson for the defense, Mohun explained he had spoken to Johnson's attorney on whether Johnson would provide exculpatory (or even helpful) testimony and "was led to believe by [Johnson's attorney] that [Johnson's testimony] would not be helpful" and "I didn't think it would be a sound strategy to present Mr. Johnson's testimony given the rulings excluding basically all of his . . . statements to the police officers." Finally, Mohun explained that he had not filed Woodruff's writ petition because it was procedurally inappropriate and "it just would [have been] sent back."

The court then asked Woodruff whether there was anything else he wished to raise in connection with his Marsden motion, and Woodruff stated he wanted "more time to file the motion he failed to file." The court explained it would "address [that motion] separately," and then denied the Marsden motion. The court then immediately reconvened in open court and asked whether Woodruff was "alleging at this time that [Mohun] failed to adequately represent you?" When Woodruff responded "yes," the court ordered appointment of an independent attorney to represent him on the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, and the following day the court appointed attorney Wilson to represent Woodruff on that claim and continued the sentencing hearing to permit Wilson to investigate the claim and bring any appropriate motions.

On November 8, 2006, the court reconvened to hear further proceedings on Woodruff's ineffective assistance of counsel claim. At that time, Mr. Wilson reported he had investigated the matter by reviewing the trial transcripts, Mohun's trial notebook, and the court file, and had also spoken with Mohun, Woodruff and the prosecutor. He stated that, "[p]ursuant to that investigation of the matter, I have determined that there's no grounds for a motion for new trial either predicated upon incompetency of counsel or any other issue." Accordingly, the court excused Wilson and proceeded to sentencing.

Analysis

Woodruff argues, under Penal Code section 1202, the failure of the trial court to hear or rule on his new trial motion entitles him to a new trial. However, Woodruff was represented by attorney Wilson for purposes of possibly pursuing a new trial motion based on ineffective assistance of counsel, and Wilson expressly declined to seek a new trial on that (or any other) ground. Because "[m]otions and briefs of parties represented by counsel must be filed by such counsel" (People v. Clark (1992) 3 Cal.4th 41, 173; accord, People v. Harrison (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 780, 788 [party represented by counsel not entitled to be heard personally]), and the attorney representing Woodruff for the specific purpose of determining whether to seek a new trial expressly declined to move for a new trial, there was no new trial motion upon which the court could act and Penal Code section 1202 is therefore inapplicable.

Although we conclude no new trial motion was made, we also note Woodruff has not demonstrated he was prejudiced by the failure to rule on his nascent motion. Although Woodruff argues he is entitled to automatic reversal under People v. Sarazzawski (1945) 27 Cal.2d 7, 11, that aspect of Sarazzawski was expressly overruled in People v. Braxton (2004) 34 Cal.4th 798, 816-817.

Woodruff appears to assert that because he articulated a desire to move for a new trial, but Wilson abandoned the motion contrary to Woodruff's desires (and allegedly without fully investigating the grounds for the motion), Wilson's actions should be disregarded and Woodruff should be deemed to have made a new trial motion. To the extent Woodruff claims Mohun did not provide effective representation at trial, and/or that Wilson did not provide effective representation when determining whether to move for a new trial, Woodruff's remedy is not under Penal Code section 1202, but is instead by way of an appeal or writ raising and demonstrating Mohun or Wilson was ineffective. However, Woodruff has made no effort in this appeal to satisfy his obligation to show either counsel was in fact ineffective or to show a reasonable probability that a more favorable result would have occurred but for counsel's errors. (See, e.g., People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 216-218.) We therefore decline Woodruff's implied invitation to order a new trial based on a vague assertion that both his trial and special counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

WE CONCUR: HUFFMAN, Acting P. J., HALLER, J.


Summaries of

People v. Woodruff

California Court of Appeals, Fourth District, First Division
Mar 25, 2008
No. D049822 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 25, 2008)
Case details for

People v. Woodruff

Case Details

Full title:THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. EDDIE EARL WOODRUFF, Defendant…

Court:California Court of Appeals, Fourth District, First Division

Date published: Mar 25, 2008

Citations

No. D049822 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 25, 2008)