Opinion
No. 156388
05-18-2018
PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. George William WINTERS, Defendant-Appellant.
State Appellate Defender (by Jeanice Dagher-Margosian ) for defendant.
State Appellate Defender (by Jeanice Dagher-Margosian ) for defendant.
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Defendant, George W. Winters, pleaded nolo contendere to one count of second-degree arson, MCL 750.73(1) ; and one count of attempted second-degree arson, MCL 750.92, as a third-offense habitual offender, MCL 769.11(1)(a). Defendant entered into a plea agreement with the prosecutor that, in exchange for the plea, his sentence on the charge of second-degree arson would be 8 to 40 years. The plea agreement did not set forth a sentence for the attempted-arson charge. The trial court subsequently sentenced defendant consistently with this plea agreement. During the plea colloquy, the trial court correctly advised defendant that his maximum possible term of imprisonment for second-degree arson was 40 years, but mistakenly informed him that his maximum possible term of imprisonment for attempted second-degree arson was 20 years, when in fact his maximum possible term of imprisonment for that conviction was 10 years. Defendant later sought to withdraw his plea, arguing that the trial court's misstatement regarding his maximum penalty for attempted second-degree arson violated MCR 6.302(B)(2). The trial court denied defendant's motion to withdraw, and the Court of Appeals affirmed in a published decision. People v. Winters , 320 Mich. App. 506, 904 N.W.2d 899 (2017). The Court of Appeals concluded that "a misstatement of the maximum possible sentence does not require reversal if no prejudice is shown" and that "[b]ecause defendant was not told that he was facing a shorter sentence than he actually was, he cannot show that he was prejudiced." Id . at 510-511, 904 N.W.2d 899.
The prosecutor also agreed to dismiss one count of maliciously burning personal property, MCL 750.78(1)(a)(i ), a second count of second-degree arson, MCL 750.73(1), and the fourth-offense habitual-offender notice, MCL 769.12.
The statutory maximum sentence for second-degree arson is 20 years in prison, MCL 750.73(3), and with the third-offense habitual-offender notice, MCL 769.11(1)(a), that maximum is doubled to 40 years in prison.
The statutory maximum sentence for attempted second-degree arson is five years in prison, MCL 750.92(2), and with the third-offense habitual-offender notice, MCL 769.11(1)(a), that maximum is doubled to 10 years in prison.
MCR 6.302 sets forth procedures for accepting a defendant's plea of guilty or nolo contendere. In relevant part, it provides:
Speaking directly to the defendant or defendants, the court must advise the defendant or defendants of the following and determine that each defendant understands:
* * *
(2) the maximum possible prison sentence for the offense....
While we agree with the Court of Appeals that "a misstatement of the maximum possible sentence does not require reversal if no prejudice is shown," Winters , 320 Mich. App. at 510, 904 N.W.2d 899, to the extent that the Court of Appeals has held that one who is mistakenly advised that he or she is eligible to serve a lengthier maximum sentence than he or she actually is can never show prejudice from this misstatement, this holding is in error. Specifically, we vacate the Court of Appeals’ statement that "[b]ecause defendant was not told that he was facing a shorter sentence than he actually was, he cannot show that he was prejudiced." Winters , 320 Mich. App. at 511, 904 N.W.2d 899, citing People v. Shannon , 134 Mich. App. 35, 38, 349 N.W.2d 813 (1984). In the instant case, however, defendant entered into a plea agreement that specifically informed him that he would be sentenced to 8 to 40 years on the charge of second-degree arson. Defendant was then sentenced consistently with this plea agreement after the trial court properly informed him of the maximum penalty for his second-degree arson conviction, which is lengthier than his maximum penalty for his attempted second-degree arson conviction. Consequently, defendant was accurately advised of the maximum possible term of imprisonment he was eligible to serve and did not suffer any prejudice as a result of the trial court's misstatement of his maximum penalty for attempted second-degree arson. For this reason, we vacate that portion of the Court of Appeals’ opinion holding that one who is mistakenly advised that he or she is eligible to serve a lengthier maximum sentence than he or she actually is can never show prejudice, but affirm its holding that defendant here is not entitled to withdraw his plea. In all other respects, leave to appeal is denied because we are not persuaded that the remaining questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.
To the extent that Shannon conflicts with our decision in this case, it is overruled.
Because it is clear that defendant here suffered no prejudice as a result of the trial court's misstatement, we need not articulate the precise standard for determining whether a defendant has been prejudiced by a court's misstatement of the "maximum possible prison sentence for the offense" to which he pleaded guilty. MCR 6.302(B)(2).
Markman, C.J., and Zahra, McCormack, Viviano, Bernstein, Wilder, and Clement, JJ., concurred.