From Casetext: Smarter Legal Research

People v. Williams

California Court of Appeals, Fourth District, First Division
Apr 14, 2009
No. D051859 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 14, 2009)

Opinion


THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. TINA WILLIAMS et al., Defendants and Appellants. D051859 California Court of Appeal, Fourth District, First Division April 14, 2009

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County No. SCE270936, Laura W. Halgren, Judge.

BENKE, Acting P. J.

The appellants in this case were two members of a three-member shoplifting crew. The evidence showed all three participated in the shoplifting of large quantities of digital versatile discs (DVD's) from Target stores. Thus contrary to defendant and appellant Tina Williams's contention, there was sufficient evidence to support Williams's grand theft and burglary convictions.

The record also shows that although defendant and appellant Darius Lauth had a number of tactical disputes with his attorney, his attorney performed competently and their relationship had not broken down. Thus the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Lauth's repeated requests for appointment of new counsel.

Finally, because there was evidence in the record Lauth may have been suffering from substance abuse and a psychological disorder which played a role both in his participation in the shoplifting and in his inability to acknowledge that role, we conclude the trial court had the power to require as a condition of probation any psychological evaluation and counseling directed by the probation department. Accordingly, we affirm appellants' convictions.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Extensive videotape evidence showed that Williams and her boyfriend Lauth, led by their confederate John Payne, stole several hundred DVD's from two Target stores in the spring of 2007. On April 13, 2007, Payne, Williams and Lauth entered a Target store in Mission Valley. Consistent with his previous modus operandi, Payne went to the luggage department of the store and put a red suitcase in a shopping cart. Payne then made his way to the DVD section of the store and put approximately $1,900 in DVD's in the suitcase. Payne then passed the shopping cart to Lauth.

While Payne was putting the DVD's in the suitcase, Williams went to another part of the store, selected two pillows, purchased them and stood by the exit. When the security guard at the exit left the area, Lauth approached Williams, she put the pillows on top of the suitcase and the couple left the store. This scheme was successful because in most instances the suitcase would defeat alarm sensors on the DVD's.

On May 1, 2007, the trio again stole DVD's from two Target stores. At about 12:30 p.m., while Williams waited on the eastside of the store with Lauth's car, Lauth and Payne entered the El Cajon Target store together. Once inside the store, Payne put a red suitcase with black trim in a shopping cart, went to the electronics section of the store and put $772 in DVD's inside the suitcase. Payne then proceeded to the Guest Services counter, where Lauth was waiting for him with two pillows Lauth had purchased. Lauth put the pillows on top of the suitcase and took the shopping cart out of the store, and went to his car. Lauth put the suitcase and pillows in the trunk of his car and Williams put the shopping cart away. Payne met Lauth and Williams at the car and the trio drove away.

After leaving the El Cajon Target, the three shoplifters made one stop at a nearby Music Trader store and Payne went into the store. The three then returned to the Target store in Mission Valley. Again, Williams waited in the car while Payne and Lauth went into the store. Again, Payne put a suitcase in a shopping cart, filled it with DVD's and passed the cart to Lauth, who had, once again purchased pillows. As before, Lauth put the pillows on top of the suitcase, left the store, and pushed the shopping cart to his car, where Williams helped Lauth put the suitcase and pillows in the trunk of his car. Payne then arrived at the car and the three drove away in Lauth's car.

Police had been alerted to the activities of the shoplifters and had obtained the license plate number of Lauth's car. Police stopped Williams while she was driving the car with her mother as a passenger and recovered a number of DVD's from the trunk. Police arrested Williams and then arrested Payne and Lauth at the apartment Payne shared with Williams's mother. At the police station, Williams admitted that she was Lauth's girlfriend, but denied participating in any of the thefts and stated that she did not know the DVD's were stolen until she arrived at Payne's apartment. Williams did concede she had helped Lauth put items in his trunk in Mission Valley.

Williams and Lauth were charged with multiple counts of burglary and grand theft. At trial Lauth took the stand and admitted that he been in the Target stores, but only to purchase pillows and to return a defective suitcase. In its rebuttal case, the prosecution presented testimony from a police detective who interviewed Lauth shortly after his arrest. According to the police officer, Lauth stated: "[A] grave mistake has occurred, I did not steal anything, I was not in a Target store, and my vehicle was not utilized in any the thefts."

The jury convicted both Williams and Lauth on three counts of burglary and two counts of grand theft. In addition, Williams admitted she had a prison prior. The court sentenced Williams to five years' probation on condition she serve 365 days in local custody; the court sentenced Lauth to three years' probation on condition he serve 270 days in local custody. As we indicated at the outset, the trial court also required that, as a condition of probation, Lauth submit to whatever psychological evaluation and treatment his probation officer believed was appropriate.

I Williams's Appeal

On appeal Williams argues there is insufficient evidence she aided and abetted Payne and Lauth in the burglaries and thefts from the Target stores. We find ample evidence of her participation in all three incidents.

Our standard of review with respect to the sufficiency of evidence is familiar: "In addressing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction, the reviewing court must examine the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053.) Where, as here, the defendant is prosecuted on a theory of aiding and abetting, the prosecutor need only show the defendant " 'act[ed] with knowledge of the criminal purpose of the perpetrator and with an intent or purpose either of committing, or of encouraging or facilitating commission of, the offense.' [Citation.]" (People v. Mendoza (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1114, 1123.) "The jury must find 'the intent to encourage and bring about conduct that is criminal, not the specific intent that is an element of the target offense....' " (Ibid.)

With respect to the April 13, 2007, theft from the Mission Valley Target, Williams actively participated by buying the pillows, waiting for the security guard to leave the area, putting the pillows on top of the suitcase and walking out of the store with Lauth. This of course is the same method Lauth and Payne later used in the May 1, 2007, thefts. Given the unusual nature of the modus operandi employed and its repeated use by the group, the jury could quite reasonably conclude Williams agreed in advance to buy the pillows, meet Lauth near the exit, cover the suitcase with the pillows and leave the store, all for the purpose of facilitating the theft.

Williams's active participation in the April 13, 2007, theft gave important context to her somewhat less active role in the May 1, 2007, thefts. Plainly, having in mind Williams's participation in the earlier use of the pillows to cover up the suitcase full of DVD's, the jury could quite reasonably conclude that on May 1, 2007, Williams was fully aware Lauth and Payne had gone into the two stores to steal DVD's and was waiting outside to help them unload the merchandise.

In short, the use of the same modus operandi in all three thefts, and Williams's varying participation in them, fully supports the jury's conclusion Williams was fully aware of what Lauth and Payne were doing and was present at all three thefts to assist them. Thus there was sufficient evidence to find her guilty of the burglaries and thefts.

II Lauth's Appeal

A. Marsden Motions

Lauth made a total of four Marsden motions in which he complained about various aspects of the defense being provided by his appointed trial counsel and asked that new counsel be appointed or permitted to represent him. The trial court denied each of the motions. We find no abuse of discretion.

See People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118, 124.

1. First Motion

On the second day of trial, during hearings on in limine motions, Lauth asked that new counsel be appointed because he believed his trial counsel had failed to "submit pertinent information regarding [Lauth's] background, character witness list, discovery demands and [had] failed to file appropriate motions." Lauth also complained his counsel had not obtained investigative services at government expense and that, in any event he had not "been able to connect with" his attorney.

Lauth's attorney responded to the motion by explaining he had tried to compile a list of character witnesses but that appellant had not provided him with contact information for the witnesses and had not had the potential witnesses contact counsel. Counsel stated he tried to contact one individual, but the individual had not returned counsel's call. Counsel further stated he had filed all the motions he believed were appropriate and that he did not believe a discovery motion was warranted. Finally, counsel stated he had had a number of conferences with appellant, each lasting in excess of an hour.

The trial court found that counsel was providing effective assistance and that there had not been a breakdown in the attorney-client relationship which made it impossible for counsel to represent appellant.

2. Second Motion

Later the same day, after counsel had made an opening statement on behalf of appellant, appellant made a second motion to have new counsel appointed. Appellant complained that the opening statement did not represent Lauth's objectives and did not reflect matters which he had discussed with counsel.

Counsel responded to the second motion by stating that his opening statement had been purposely broad because he and appellant had not made a decision as to whether Lauth was going to testify and counsel did not want to suggest anything in his opening statement he would not be able to support with evidence later during the trial.

The trial court found counsel had made a reasonable tactical decision and denied Lauth's second motion.

3. Third Motion

Lauth made his third motion on the third day of trial. Lauth argued counsel had failed to pursue discovery of relationships between Target and law enforcement agencies. Counsel responded by reiterating that he did not have a bad relationship with appellant and that he, his investigator and appellant had a number of discussions with respect to the potential relationship between Target and law enforcement. Counsel and his investigator had concluded that pursuit of any such relationship would not assist appellant's defense.

The trial court found counsel had made a reasonable professional decision and denied the third motion.

4. Fourth Motion

On the fourth day of trial, Lauth stated he had retained another attorney and he wanted appointed counsel relieved. Lauth stated that appointed counsel had made a number of misrepresentations to him with respect to character witnesses and in addition counsel had failed to provide appellant with a list of questions in preparation for his testimony.

Counsel responded by stating appellant had provided counsel with two character witnesses who were prepared to testify. Counsel further stated appellant was concerned that the prosecution might call an ex-girlfriend as a rebuttal witness; the ex-girlfriend had filed a complaint against appellant, but the district attorney had not pursued it. Counsel believed the complaint would not be admitted and that the prosecution had not been able to locate the ex-girlfriend. Finally, counsel noted that, in any event, they could withdraw the character witnesses and thereby prevent any potential rebuttal character witnesses.

The trial court found that counsel's approach to the problems posed by the character witnesses was reasonable and that two character witnesses was a reasonable number. With respect to whether counsel should have provided appellant with a list of questions, the trial court found that, since appellant was supposed to tell the truth, no such list was required.

5. Analysis

The principles governing our review of Lauth's Marsden motions were set forth by the court in People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 728-729: "Under the Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel ' " '[a] defendant is entitled to [substitute another appointed attorney] if the record clearly shows that the first appointed attorney is not providing adequate representation [citation] or that defendant and counsel have become embroiled in such an irreconcilable conflict that ineffective representation is likely to result.' " ' [Citation.] Furthermore, ' " 'When a defendant seeks to discharge appointed counsel and substitute another attorney, and asserts inadequate representation, the trial court must permit the defendant to explain the basis of his contention and to relate specific instances of the attorney's inadequate performance.' " ' [Citation.] 'We review the court's rulings for an abuse of discretion.' [Citation]."

Importantly, "[a] defendant does not have the right to present a defense of his own choosing, but merely the right to an adequate and competent defense. [Citation.] Tactical disagreements between the defendant and his attorney do not by themselves constitute an 'irreconcilable conflict.' 'When a defendant chooses to be represented by professional counsel, that counsel is "captain of the ship" and can make all but a few fundamental decisions for the defendant.' [Citation.]" (People v. Welch, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pp. 728-729.)

Here, appellant was given ample opportunity to fully air his complaints about his attorney's performance. In each instance his attorney was able to offer a more than reasonable explanation for what, in each instance, was a tactical choice. Moreover, it is also clear from the record that, notwithstanding appellant's complaints, counsel was able to maintain an effective professional relationship with appellant. Thus the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Lauth's Marsden motions.

B. Probation Condition

The probation report prepared for Lauth's sentencing contains the following statement: "The defendant is eligible for probation. His lack of a prior record and willingness to succeed on probation makes him a candidate for such. The extent of the defendant's role in the offense is not clear, but it is obvious he conspired with others to commit them. The case doesn't seem to rise to the level of a prison commitment yet, and probation is being recommended. During the probation interview, the defendant appeared evasive and long winded, and didn't answer the question asked. It is noted he said he hadn't used cocaine in 'years' and then said he tried it with Williams last year. He also said his father would say he thought he had a substance abuse problem but wouldn't tell the undersigned why his father would say that about him. The defendant also seemed obsessed with 'his record,' his defense attorney, and his past civil settlements. Given his demeanor and responses during the probation interview he may have some psychological problems that need to be addressed. Therefore, counseling and a psychological evaluation have been recommended if directed by the P.O."

Over Lauth's objection, the trial court imposed the psychological counseling and evaluation condition recommended by the probation department. The trial court stated: "And the other objection that had been raised was as to the psychological evaluation. And based on, number one, the nature of testimony at trial -- which it's one thing to take the stand and deny culpability, and defendants do that all the time, but in the face of just clear video evidence of what was happening, Mr. Lauth's inability to even acknowledge things that seemed quite obvious suggests there may be a psychological issue that is undiagnosed, so I think probation is quite reasonable in making that recommendation, for a possible evaluation if directed by probation." The trial court further stated: "I do think that, as I noted before, there are drug issues and psychological issues that can appropriately be addressed on probation, and should be, and I hope that the probation officer will be able to take enough time to evaluate what would be best for Mr. Lauth to have done while he is on probation. [¶]... [¶] I will just emphasize I do think it appropriate the psychiatric and substance abuse and psychological evaluation counseling occur if directed by probation."

As he did in the trial court, on appeal Lauth again contends the trial court erred in giving his probation officer the power to require psychological evaluation and counseling. We find no abuse of discretion. "A condition of probation will not be held invalid unless it '(1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality....' [Citation.] Conversely, a condition of probation which requires or forbids conduct which is not itself criminal is valid if that conduct is reasonably related to the crime of which the defendant was convicted or to future criminality." (People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486, fn. omitted.)

Here, the record strongly suggests Lauth is suffering from either substance abuse or a psychological condition which played a significant role in his participation in the shoplifting spree. Thus the trial court acted properly in addressing those potential problems by giving the probation department the power to require psychological evaluation and counseling.

Judgment affirmed.

WE CONCUR: NARES, J., AARON, J.


Summaries of

People v. Williams

California Court of Appeals, Fourth District, First Division
Apr 14, 2009
No. D051859 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 14, 2009)
Case details for

People v. Williams

Case Details

Full title:THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. TINA WILLIAMS et al., Defendants…

Court:California Court of Appeals, Fourth District, First Division

Date published: Apr 14, 2009

Citations

No. D051859 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 14, 2009)