Opinion
May 3, 1999
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County (D'Emic, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is modified, on the law, by deleting the provision thereof providing that the terms of imprisonment imposed for criminal contempt in the first degree, attempted burglary in the first degree, and reckless endangerment in the second degree are to run consecutively to each other and substituting therefor a provision providing that those terms of imprisonment shall run concurrently with each other; as so modified, the judgment is affirmed.
As the People correctly concede, since the act underlying the convictions for attempted burglary in the first degree, criminal contempt in the first degree, and reckless endangerment in the second degree was the single act of using a firearm, the terms of imprisonment imposed for those crimes should be modified to run concurrently with each other ( see, Penal Law § 70.25; People v. Laureano, 87 N.Y.2d 640, 643; People v. Darvie, 224 A.D.2d 442, 443).
The defendant's remaining contentions are unpreserved for appellate review, and in any event, are without merit ( see, CPL 470.05; People v. Gray, 86 N.Y.2d 10, 20; People v. Gaines, 74 N.Y.2d 358, 360; People v. Chrysler, 85 N.Y.2d 413, 416).
Mangano, P. J., Santucci, Krausman and Feuerstein, JJ., concur.