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ruling that the repeat offender provision contained in § 18-18-405 is a sentence enhancer, not a substantive offense, and thus properly for the trial court to determine
Summary of this case from People v. GilmoreOpinion
No. 97CA1096
June 10, 1999 As Modified on Denial of Rehearing. September 23, 1999 Certiorari Granted May 1, 2000
Appeal from the District Court of El Paso County Honorable Richard V. Hall, Judge, No. 96CR2150.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
Gale A. Norton, Attorney General, Martha Phillips Allbright, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Richard A. Westfall, Solicitor General, Denver, Colorado (On the Briefs); Ken Salazar, Attorney General, Barbara McDonnell, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Michael E. McClachlan, Solicitor General, Robert M. Russel, First Assistant Attorney General, Heidi L. Beeson, Special Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
David F. Vela, Colorado State Public Defender, Anne Stockham, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant.
Defendant, Henry L. Whitley, appeals from the judgment of conviction entered on jury verdicts finding him guilty of one count of possession of a schedule II controlled substance (cocaine) with intent to distribute and one count of distribution or sale of a schedule II controlled substance. We affirm.
The evidence at trial established that defendant sold cocaine to an undercover police officer. Defendant was sentenced as a prior offender under 18-18-405(2)(a)(II), C.R.S. 1998.
I.
Defendant first argues that there was insufficient evidence presented to sustain the jury's verdict because, under 18-18-405(2)(a)(II), the question whether he had previously been convicted of possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell was an issue which had to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt and decided by the jury. We disagree and conclude that 18-18-405(2)(a)(II) is a sentence enhancement provision which was properly determined by the trial court.
Section 18-18-405(1)(a), C.R.S. 1998, provides that it is unlawful for any person knowingly to distribute, or possess with the intent to distribute, any controlled substance. Subject to certain exceptions not applicable here, 18-18-405(2)(a)(I), C.R.S. 1998, provides that the offense is a class four felony. However, 18-18-405(2)(a)(II) provides that the offense is a class two felony if the violation is committed subsequent to a prior conviction for a violation of 18-18-405(1)(a).
This statutory provision establishes a sentencing enhancer, and not a substantive offense, because: (1) the defendant may be convicted of the underlying offense without any proof regarding the sentencing enhancer; and (2) the sentencing enhancement provision increases the potential punishment. Vega v. People, 893 P.2d 107 (Colo. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 889, 116 S.Ct. 233, 133 L.Ed.2d 161 (1995).
There are three types of sentence enhancing provisions in Colorado.
The first includes those which increase the level of punishment based on the existence of statutorily specified factual circumstances that are connected to the commission of the crime itself. Although such sentence enhancement factors are not elements of the offense, they nevertheless must be determined by a jury and must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See People v. Leske, 957 P.2d 1030 (Colo. 1998) (in prosecution for child sexual abuse by one in a position of trust, proof that the victim was less than fifteen years of age is a sentence enhancement provision which raises the felony classification); Armintrout v. People, 864 P.2d 576 (Colo. 1993) (where statute raised second degree burglary from a class four felony to a class three felony if burglary was of a "dwelling," provision was sentence enhancer requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt); People v. Bowring, 902 P.2d 911 (Colo.App. 1995) (proof that child sexual assault was committed as part of a "pattern of abuse" is a sentence enhancement provision that elevates the felony classification and requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt); 16-11-309(5), C.R.S. 1998 (by its terms, statute requires a separate finding by the jury of whether defendant used or possessed and threatened to use a deadly weapon); see also Vega v. People, supra (discussing the due process limitations on the ability of states to reclassify factual components of existing crimes as sentence enhancers in order to evade the constitutionally-mandated burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt applicable to elements of a substantive offense).
The second type of sentence enhancing provision is that which requires that a convicted defendant's punishment be increased based on prior convictions and that those prior convictions, pursuant to statute, be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See 16-13-103(4)(b), C.R.S. 1998 (if a defendant charged as an habitual criminal denies prior convictions, then the prosecution must prove the existence of the convictions beyond a reasonable doubt in a separate proceeding after defendant is convicted of the new underlying offense); 18-4-202.1(5) (persons charged as habitual burglars shall be tried in accordance with procedures applicable to habitual criminal prosecutions).
The third type of sentence enhancement provision is that which increases the punishment based on a defendant's criminal history but which does not have a statutory burden of proof or hearing procedure applicable to the determination of the prior criminal conduct. See People v. Lacy, 723 P.2d 111 (Colo. 1986) (provision providing for aggravated range sentencing if the defendant was on probation at the time offense was committed is a sentence enhancer that need only be proven by a preponderance of the evidence); People v. Henderson, 729 P.2d 1028 (Colo.App. 1986) (defendant was subject to aggravated range sentencing because the prosecution met its burden, at post-trial sentencing hearing, of proving that defendant was on parole at the time he committed offense).
For this third type of enhancement provision, due process is satisfied so long as the defendant receives reasonable notice of the potential for an increased sentence and the prosecution meets its burden of proving the prior criminal conduct by a preponderance of the evidence. People v. Lacy, supra; see Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998) (typically, recidivism provisions have been classified as sentence enhancers, at least where the underlying conduct at issue, in the absence of the recidivism, is independently unlawful).
The provision at issue here, 18-18-405(2)(a)(II), increases the level of a defendant's punishment based on a prior conviction but does not prescribe a burden of proof. And, nothing in the language of the statute indicates by what means the existence of a prior conviction is to be determined. Thus, we conclude it is a sentence enhancer of the third type set forth above.
As such, the prosecution was only required to prove the existence of defendant's prior conviction by a preponderance of the evidence and the issue was properly determinable by the trial court. See People v. Vega, 870 P.2d 549 (Colo.App. 1993) (similar drug offender recidivism enhancement provision in statute now codified as 18-18-407(1)(a), C.R.S. 1998, should be determined by the trial court under a preponderance of the evidence standard because no bifurcated trial procedure is set forth in the statute) aff'd on other grounds, Vega v. People, supra.
Arguing for a contrary interpretation, defendant notes that at least one trial court has submitted to a jury the determination of a defendant's prior conviction under 18-18-405(2)(a)(II). See People v. Saint-Veltri, 945 P.2d 1339 (Colo. 1997) (jury found that defendant had a prior conviction in violation of 18-18-405(1)(a), apparently after a bifurcated trial). However, the fact that a single trial court may have acted out of an abundance of caution does not establish that such a procedure is required. See People v. Vega, supra (issue of special aggravating circumstance was submitted to the jury even though trial court was not required to do so).
In summary, we reject defendant's claim that the prosecution was required to prove the existence of his prior conviction to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, we reject defendant's claim that there is insufficient evidence to support a jury verdict with respect to the sentence enhancement provision. And, because defendant conceded the existence of his prior conviction at sentencing, we conclude the absence of a hearing on that issue did not violate his rights to due process.
II.
Defendant next argues that his waiver of his right to testify was not knowingly or voluntarily entered because the trial court neglected to advise him that, if he elected to testify, evidence of his prior felony conviction could be introduced only to impeach his testimony. We conclude this omission was not reversible error.
In People v. Curtis, 681 P.2d 504 (Colo. 1984), the supreme court outlined those elements that must be present in an on-the-record advisement in order to ensure defendant's knowing and voluntary waiver of his or her right to testify. However, in People v. Gray, 920 P.2d 787, 790 (Colo. 1996), the supreme court reaffirmed that Curtis did not require a "prescribed litany or formula which must be followed in advising the defendant of his right to testify." The court explained that:
A satisfactory Curtis advisement should inform the defendant that the defendant has the right to testify or not to testify; the decision to testify is personal; the prosecution would be able to cross-examine the defendant and thus prior felony convictions could be disclosed to the jury; the limited purpose for which such prior felony convictions would be admitted; and, the consequences of testifying.
People v. Gray, supra, 920 P.2d at 791. The court in Gray also held that failure to give a proper Curtis advisement constitutes reversible error.
In Gray, the supreme court concluded that the defendant was adequately advised concerning the limited admissibility of his prior felonies because the trial court had explained that, if he chose to testify, the district attorney would be allowed to ask about his prior convictions and "the six prior felonies would be admissible with respect to credibility." People v. Gray, supra, 920 P.2d at 791. Although the court in Gray acknowledged that the better practice would have been to advise defendant that his prior convictions were admissible only with respect to the issue of his credibility, the court was satisfied that the advisement given was adequate. This advisement in conjunction with defendant's on-the-record waiver of his right to testify in which he acknowledged that his attorney had advised him concerning his right to testify was sufficient competent evidence to uphold the trial court's determination that defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his right to testify.
Similarly, in People v. Deskins, 927 P.2d 368, 371 (Colo. 1996), the supreme court upheld the adequacy of a Curtis advisement in which the trial court had informed the defendant that he could be impeached with his prior felony convictions and told him that he "would be entitled to an instruction or the People would be entitled to an instruction on credibility with regard to prior criminal convictions."
Here, the trial court advised defendant concerning his right to testify before any evidence had been presented. The trial court first informed defendant that the decision whether to testify was a personal one. The court then told defendant:
[I]f you choose to testify, you must understand that you will be cross-examined by the District Attorney and not just answer your attorney's questions. You have the same protection as any others (sic) witness; that is, to be only asked questions that relate to the issues on trial. You must understand if you testify, one thing that then comes into a trial is whether the jury chooses to believe you or not. The law says that one thing that can be presented to a jury is prior felony convictions and what that conviction was for.
On the other hand, if you don't testify, you're believable, so it can't be presented to the jury.
Now, we all know that you do have a prior felony conviction, but the jury is not going to find out about that unless you testify. If you don't want the jury to find out about the other conviction, you can't testify. Because if you do testify, they are going to find out about it. (emphasis added)
The trial court then proceeded to provide defendant with additional information concerning the consequences of not testifying.
The next day, the court advised defendant that, if he testified:
You'll undoubtedly be cross-examined by the District Attorney and say (sic) anything that can hurt the case; that's just the way it goes. In particular the District Attorney can ask whether you have prior felony convictions, if so, what they were for. So that could draw some attention of the jury if you testify, but couldn't come to the attention of the jury if you didn't testify.
So you keep that in mind.
Soon thereafter, the court, noting that defendant had been informed by his attorney, accepted defendant's waiver of his right to testify without further discussing the admissibility of his prior felony conviction.
We conclude that the trial court's remarks were sufficient to apprise defendant that his prior conviction would be admissible to impeach the credibility of his testimony. While it is true that the court did not use the word "credibility," it adequately defined the concept by informing defendant that his prior conviction would "be presented" for the purpose of influencing whether "the jury chooses to believe you or not." The trial court's failure to mention the availability of a limiting instruction was not a fatal omission. See People v. Gray, supra; People v. Blecha, 940 P.2d 1070 (Colo.App. 1996), aff'd on other grounds, 962 P.2d 931 (Colo. 1998).
We conclude the Curtis advisement given to defendant complied with the minimum requirements and, in conjunction with defendant's on-the-record statement indicating that he had discussed the decision whether to testify with his attorney, constitutes sufficient competent evidence to uphold the trial court's determination that defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his right to testify. See People v. Gray, supra.
Judgment affirmed.
JUDGE ROY concurs.
JUDGE JONES dissents.