Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kings County No. 07CM0556, Thomas DeSantos, Judge.
David McNeil Morse, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, and Louis M. Vasquez, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
Before Levy, Acting P.J., Gomes, J., and Kane, J.
PROCEEDINGS
Appellant, Quiona Marie Watts, was charged in a criminal complaint on February 14, 2007, with murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a), count one), gross vehicular manslaughter (§ 191.5, subd. (a), count two), driving under the influence of alcohol (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (a), count three), driving with a blood alcohol level above .08 percent (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (b), count four), and driving with a suspended license (Veh. Code, § 14601.2, subd. (a), count five). Count five further alleged Watts had a prior conviction of Vehicle Code section 23153, subdivision (b).
Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory designations are to the Penal Code.
On March 29, 2007, Watts entered into a plea agreement in which she would admit count two and the remaining allegations would be dismissed. Watts executed an advisement of rights, waiver, and plea form acknowledging her constitutional rights and waiving them. The plea agreement was to a maximum sentence of 10 years. The trial court advised Watts of her constitutional rights pursuant to Boykin/Tahl, as well as of the consequences of her plea. Watts waived her constitutional rights as well as her right to a preliminary hearing The parties stipulated to a factual basis for the plea. Watts pled no contest to count two and the remaining allegations were dismissed.
Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238; In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122.
At the sentencing hearing on April 27, 2007, the trial court stated it had read the probation report and accompanying attachments. The court noted that Watts was on probation when she committed the instant offense. The court found that although Watts was remorseful for her actions, she had a prior conviction for driving under the influence. For that offense, Watts needed to be reinstated twice in a driving under the influence (DUI) school, failed to do her community service hours, and failed to pay fines. This ultimately led to termination of Watts’s probation in the first DUI conviction.
The probation report noted that Watts had a misdemeanor conviction in 2006 for using force or violence on a person of a past relationship (§ 243, subd. (e)(1)) and a prior driving under the influence misdemeanor conviction in 2003.
The court referred to the Supreme Court’s decision in Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270 [127 S.Ct. 856]. The court noted that concerning the imposition of an upper term, the Legislature had fixed the problem with the court exercising its sentencing discretion. (See § 1170; People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 843-858.) The court imposed the aggravated term on count two of 10 years. The court ordered Watts to pay a restitution fine of $500 (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)) and a $20 court security fee. Defense counsel waived his client’s right to a breakdown of the other penalty assessments and fines. Watts did not expressly waive the accounting of penalty assessment herself. The court ordered fines and penalty assessments totaling $1,200.
The probation report set forth the following penalties, assessments, fines, and surcharges: penal fine of $500; penalty assessment of $500 (§ 1464.7); county penalty assessment of $350 (Gov. Code, § 76000); construction penalty of $250 (Gov. Code, § 70372); DNA funding penal assessment of $100 (Gov. Code, § 76104.6); total fees of $1,200. The total sum of these fees is $1,800.
DISCUSSION
Appellant contends the trial court erred in failing to separately list all fines, fees, penalties, and assessments (hereinafter fines and assessments). Respondent argues that appellant waived a right to an accounting of the fines and assessments and lacks standing to raise the issue on appeal. Because an accounting of fines and assessments is mandatory under California law, we will reverse.
People v. High (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1192, 1200 (High), held that although a detailed recitation of fines and assessments “on the record may be tedious, California law does not authorize shortcuts.” All fees and assessments “must be set forth in the abstract of judgment.” (Ibid.; see also People v. Sanchez (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 1329, 1332 (Sanchez); People v. Hong (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 1071, 1080-1083 (Hong).) The High decision noted the abstract of judgment form created by the Judicial Council provides a number of lines for entry of financial obligations in addition to those already delineated on the form with statutory references. “If the abstract of judgment does not specify the amount of each fine, the Department of Corrections cannot fulfill its statutory duty to collect and forward deductions from prisoner wages to the appropriate agency.” (High, supra, 119 Cal.App.4th at p. 1200, citing to Hong, supra, 64 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1078-1079.) High further reasoned that “the inclusion of all fines and fees in the abstract may assist state and local agencies in their collection efforts.” (High, supra, 119 Cal.App.4th at p. 1200.)
We note that it was defense counsel, not appellant, who expressly waived the right to an accounting. Even if appellant could be held to have waived or forfeited her right to an accounting of fines and assessments, the trial court was not authorized to forego procedures mandated by our Legislature. The trial court’s failure to separately list fines and assessments, therefore, fits more properly within the category of an unauthorized sentence. An unauthorized sentence can be corrected at any time even if there has been no objection in the trial court. (People v. Burnett (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 257, 260-261.)
We further reject respondent’s argument that appellant lacks standing to raise this issue. As noted in High and Hong, fines and assessments are typically deducted from an inmate’s prison wages. The appellant, therefore, clearly has “standing” to raise this issue on appeal. The doctrine of standing, however, is applied not to the imposition of fines and assessments, but to defendants challenging the search and seizure of property. (See Rakas v. Illinois (1978) 439 U.S. 128, People v. Carvajal (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 487, 495; People v. Leonard (1987) 197 Cal.App.3d 235, 239.)
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order imposing fines and assessments without an accounting for each one in the abstract of judgment is reversed. The case is remanded for the trial court to identify the statutory bases of all fines and assessments imposed, to record them in its minutes and an amended abstract of judgment, and to forward the amended abstract of judgment to the proper authorities. The judgment is otherwise affirmed.