Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kings County. Lynn C. Atkinson, Judge. Super. Ct. No. 07CM1011
Deborah Prucha, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
Before Levy, Acting P.J., Cornell, J., and Kane, J.
PROCEEDINGS
Appellant, Martin Garcia Villa, was charged in an information filed April 20, 2007, with possession of methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378, count one), possession of methamphetamine while armed with a loaded operable firearm (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.1, subd. (a), count two), and being a felon in possession of a firearm (Pen. Code § 12021, subd. (a)(1), count three). The information further alleged that appellant committed count one while being personally armed with a firearm (§ 12022, subd. (c)), appellant had ten prior felony convictions, appellant had three qualifying felony convictions within the meaning of the three strikes law (§ 667, subds. (b) through (i) & § 1170.12 subds. (a) through (d)), and appellant was subject to enhancements for serving prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).
Unless otherwise specified, all further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
On July 23, 2007, appellant entered into a plea agreement in which he would admit count one, the section 12022, subdivision (c) allegation, and a prior serious felony conviction within the meaning of the three strikes law. Appellant would receive a prison term of three years, the upper term, doubled pursuant to the three strikes law plus a consecutive prison term of three years for the section 12022, subdivision (c) enhancement for a total sentence of nine years.
Appellant admitted a prior serious felony conviction for causing serious bodily injury while evading a peace officer, a violation of Vehicle Code section 2800.3. Neither the information nor the probation report specifically indicated the subdivision of Vehicle Code section 2800.3 for which appellant was convicted. According to the probation report, appellant’s prison term for this offense (and other related convictions) was three years. The sentencing triad for causing “serious bodily injury” pursuant to subdivision (a) of this statute is three, five, or seven years. The triad for causing death pursuant to subdivision (b) of this statute is four, six, or ten years. We therefore conclude that appellant’s conviction was for a violation of Vehicle Code section 2800.3, subdivision (a).
The court reviewed the consequences of the plea with appellant. The court advised appellant of, and appellant waived, his constitutional rights pursuant to Boykin/Tahl. The parties stipulated to a factual basis for the plea that the prosecutor read into the record without objection by appellant. Appellant pled guilty to count one. Appellant admitted the enhancement and the prior serious felony conviction. The court dismissed the remaining allegations.
Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238; In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122.
Appellant agreed to be sentenced after entering his plea without the benefit of a probation report. The court sentenced appellant to the upper term of three years on count one, which it doubled pursuant to the three strikes law. The court imposed a consecutive term of three years for the gun enhancement for a total prison term of nine years. The court granted applicable custody credits and imposed a restitution fine. The trial court denied appellant’s request for a certificate of probable cause.
A post sentence probation report was filed on August 13, 2007.
The original abstract of judgment had the correct sentence, but incorrectly noted appellant’s sentence on count one was for the midterm. We received a corrected abstract of judgment on November 2, 2007.
Appellant’s appointed appellate counsel has filed an opening brief which summarizes the pertinent facts, raises no issues, and requests this court to independently review the record. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) The opening brief also includes the declaration of appellate counsel indicating that appellant was advised he could file his own brief with this court. By letter on October 16, 2007, we invited appellant to submit additional briefing. To date, he has not done so.
FACTS
Investigators with the Kings County Narcotic Task Force received information that “Martin” was selling methamphetamine from a trailer he lived in on Bethel Avenue. The investigators observed Villa from the trailer and learned he was on active parole with the California Department of Corrections. The investigators conduced a parole search of Villa’s trailer. Investigators Jason Bietz and Daren Kramer began searching the trailer. They found several clear plastic baggies and a small amount of a loose white crystal substance that weighed 4.1 grams. Villa had a loaded rifle in the trailer. In Bietz’s experience, the plastic bags are typically used for packaging controlled substances. There were five scales found in the trailer.
A presumptive test Bietz conducted on the substance was positive for the presence of methamphetamine. Villa admitted the trailer was his. Bietz, who was an experienced narcotics officer, opined the methamphetamine was possessed for sale. Villa admitted the scales, narcotic paraphernalia, and methamphetamine belonged to him. Villa further admitted that everything in the trailer was his except the rifle.
DISCUSSION
Villa failed to obtain a certificate of probable cause from the court’s judgment. We therefore cannot review any issue concerning the validity of Villa’s guilty plea. (People v. Mendez (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1084; People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68.)
We note, however, that there are no infirmities with the trial court’s advisement of rights or the consequences of Villa’s plea. There was a factual basis for the plea from the preliminary hearing transcript and the police reports. The parties stipulated that there was a factual basis for Villa’s plea. Villa received the sentence for which he bargained, as well as the dismissal of other felony allegations.
Villa’s plea establishes the elements of the possession of methamphetamine for sale offense he admitted. A guilty plea is, for most purposes, the legal equivalent of a jury’s guilty verdict. (People v. Valladoli (1996) 13 Cal.4th 590, 601.) A guilty plea serves as a stipulation that the People need not introduce proof to support the accusation. The plea ipso facto supplies both evidence and verdict and is deemed to constitute an admission of every element of the charged offense. (People v. Alfaro (1986) 42 Cal.3d 627, 636 [overruled on another ground in People v. Guerrero (1988) 44 Cal.3d 343]; People v. Chadd (1981) 28 Cal.3d 739, 748.)
After independent review of the record, we conclude there are no reasonably arguable legal or factual issues.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
Appellant’s conviction for a “serious bodily injury” offense is legally equivalent to an offense causing great bodily injury. (People v. Burroughs (1984) 35 Cal.3d 824, 831; People v. Arnett (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1609, 1613-1614.) Thus, appellant’s conviction of Vehicle Code section 2800.3, subdivision (a) qualifies as a prior serious felony conviction for application of the three strikes law under section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(8), which includes “any felony in which the defendant personally inflicts great bodily injury on any person, other than an accomplice.”