Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. 62064881
RAYE, J.Law enforcement received a report of a drunk driver. The car driven by defendant Shane Frederick Vierra matched the description of the car driven by the reported drunk driver, and an officer pulled defendant over. Defendant had a blood-alcohol level of 0.15 or 0.16 percent and was driving with a suspended license. He had twice been convicted of driving under the influence during the past 10 years.
Defendant was charged by information with driving under the influence (DUI) with two prior DUI convictions (Veh. Code, §§ 23152, subd. (a), 23550.5); driving with a blood-alcohol level of 0.08 percent or higher with two prior DUI convictions (Veh. Code, §§ 23152, subd. (b), 23550.5); and driving with a suspended license, a misdemeanor (Veh. Code, § 14601.2, subd. (a)). It was also alleged defendant had served six prior prison terms. (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b).)
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
Defendant pled guilty to all three counts and admitted the prior prison term allegations. The trial court struck one of the prior prison term enhancements in the interest of justice; denied defendant’s request for probation; and sentenced him to an aggregate term of seven years in prison, consisting of the middle term of two years for the DUI, and one year for each of the five remaining prior prison terms, with credit for 411 days (274 actual days and 137 good conduct). The court stayed defendant’s sentence pursuant to section 654 for driving with a blood-alcohol level of 0.08 percent or higher. Defendant was ordered to pay a $2,000 restitution fine (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)) and an additional $2,000 restitution fine, suspended unless parole is revoked (§ 1202.45).
Defendant was sentenced to a concurrent six months in jail on the misdemeanor.
Defendant appeals. He did not obtain a certificate of probable cause.
We appointed counsel to represent defendant on appeal. Counsel filed an opening brief that sets forth the facts of the case and requests this court to review the record and determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Defendant was advised by counsel of the right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days of the date of filing of the opening brief. More than 30 days elapsed, and we received no communication from defendant. Having undertaken an examination of the entire record, we find no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant.
We do, however, note the trial court erred in calculating defendant’s presentence conduct credits. Defendant was in custody from October 26, 2006, until his sentencing on July 26, 2007, for a total of 274 days. Presentence conduct credit for the time defendant spent in custody is calculated under section 4019 “‘by dividing the number of days spent in custody by four and rounding down to the nearest whole number. This number is then multiplied by two and the total added to the original number of days spent in custody. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Williams (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1157, 1176, fn. 14.) The number 274, divided by four and rounded down to the nearest whole number, equals 68; 68 multiplied by two equals 136, not 137 as calculated by the trial court; 274 actual days plus 136 conduct days totals 410 days of presentence custody credit. We will modify the judgment accordingly. (People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 354 (Scott) [unauthorized sentence may be corrected at any time].)
The trial court also failed to impose the mandatory court security fee pursuant to section 1465.8. Section 1465.8, subdivision (a)(1) provides for the imposition of a $20 court security fee “on every conviction for a criminal offense, including a traffic offense, except parking offenses . . . .” The statute unambiguously requires a fee to be imposed for each of defendant’s convictions. (People v. Schoeb (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 861, 865.) We will modify the judgment accordingly. (Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 354.)
The trial court also failed to impose a mandatory fine as required by Vehicle Code section 23550.5, subdivision (a). We will modify the judgment to impose the statutory minimum fine of $390. (Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 354.)
Vehicle Code section 23550.5, subdivision (a) provides, in pertinent part: “[I]f [a] person is convicted of a violation of [Vehicle Code] Section 23152 . . ., and the offense occurred within 10 years of . . . [¶] . . . [a] prior violation of [Vehicle Code] Section 23152 that was punished as a felony under [Vehicle Code] Section 23550 or this section, or both” that “person is guilty of a public offense, punishable by imprisonment in the state prison or confinement in a county jail for not more than one year and by a fine of not less than three hundred ninety dollars ($390) nor more than one thousand dollars ($1,000).”
Finally, the trial court failed to impose the mandatory fine as required by Vehicle Code section 14601.2, subdivision (d). We will modify the judgment to impose the statutory minimum fine of $300. (Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 354.)
Vehicle Code section 14601.2, subdivision (d) provides, in pertinent part that upon a first conviction for violating that section, a person shall be punished “by imprisonment in the county jail for not less than 10 days or more than six months and by a fine of not less than three hundred dollars ($300) or more than one thousand dollars ($1,000) . . . .”
In the interest of judicial economy, we have addressed these errors without first requesting supplemental briefing. Any party claiming to be aggrieved may petition for rehearing. (Gov. Code, § 68081.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is modified by reducing the number of days of conduct credit from 137 to 136 days, for a total of 410 days of presentence custody credit, and imposing a $60 court security fee pursuant to Penal Code section 1465.8; a $390 fine pursuant to Vehicle Code section 23550.5, subdivision (a); and a $300 fine pursuant to Vehicle Code section 14601.2. As amended, the judgment is affirmed. The trial court is directed to amend the abstract of judgment to reflect the reduction in presentence custody credits and the imposition of the court security fee and fines, and is further directed to send a certified copy of the amended abstract to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
We concur: SCOTLAND, P.J., CANTIL-SAKAUYE, J.