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People v. Vallier

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION THREE
Jan 19, 2012
B232644 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 19, 2012)

Opinion

B232644

01-19-2012

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CARL ANTHONY VALLIER, Defendant and Appellant.

Vanessa Place, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.


NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BA379062)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, William Ryan, Judge. Affirmed.

Vanessa Place, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Carl Anthony Vallier appeals from the judgment entered following a jury trial which resulted in his conviction of willfully, unlawfully and lewdly exposing his person, and the private parts thereof, in a public place after having been twice previously convicted of lewdly exposing his private parts (Pen. Code, § 314(1)) (count 1), and willfully and unlawfully violating a requirement of the Sex Offender Registration Act by failing to register or re-register upon release from incarceration (§§ 290.015, subd. (a), 290, subd. (b)) (count 2). The jury further found that Vallier previously had been convicted of robbery (§ 211) and bank robbery (18 U.S.C. § 2113(a)) within the meaning of the Three Strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)) and had served two separate prison terms for lewd conduct (§ 314(1)) within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b). The trial court sentenced Vallier to seven years four months in prison. We affirm.

All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

1. Facts.

Rodolfo Torres works for Securitas, a division of the Figueroa Corridor Partnership, a private public safety business. As a security guard for the firm, he patrols the area surrounding Figueroa between Martin Luther King Boulevard and 17th Street, a "business improvement district."

On December 10, 2010, Torres was working with a partner, Juan Arana. He was wearing a Figueroa Corridor uniform and was riding as a passenger in a car with the Figueroa Partnership and Securitas logos on it. At approximately 9:45 that evening, Torres and his partner were driving north on Figueroa at 20th Street when Torres saw Vallier in the bus lane, approximately two feet from the curb, at the southeast corner. Vallier was wearing a black hat which had " 'Living Single' " printed on it, no shirt and dark pants which were down around his ankles. He was "masturbating [as he stood in] the street." Vallier, who was facing Torres, had "[h]is hands . . . on his [penis]" and was making a "back and forth motion with his hands."

Torres and his partner stopped their car approximately 15 feet from Vallier. The street lights were on and Torres was able to see Vallier clearly. Torres had no trouble seeing Vallier's face. The security guards then drove past Vallier, coming within approximately four feet of him, turned right onto 20th Street and pulled into a parking lot. From the car, Torres used his cell phone to call 911. While they waited for the police to arrive, Torres and his partner continued to watch Vallier from the parking lot.

While Torres and Arana were waiting for the police officers, Vallier stopped masturbating for a moment, pulled his pants up approximately half way and walked to the northeast corner of Figueroa and 20th Street. He "jumped" up onto the sidewalk and, while facing oncoming traffic, resumed masturbating. Torres and his partner decided to move their car and they drove to the northeast corner of Figueroa and 20th Street. They parked on 20th, facing west. Vallier, who was by then standing approximately 15 feet in front of Torres and his partner, continued to masturbate. As he was doing so, a "couple of pedestrians" walked past him on the sidewalk and several young people, who Torres referred to as "juveniles," rode by on bicycles and skateboards.

Police officers arrived at the scene approximately 10 minutes after Torres called 911. During that 10 minutes, Torres never lost sight of Vallier.

Torres and his partner had received a call regarding Vallier earlier that evening. The owner of a nearby Panda Express restaurant had called and complained that Vallier was bothering his customers. However, by the time Torres and his partner arrived at the restaurant, Vallier had left the premises and was walking north on Figueroa. Later, Torres received another call regarding Vallier. This time it was the owner of a nearby 7-Eleven who indicated that Vallier was drinking in front of the store. When Torres approached Vallier and told him that "he shouldn't be drinking in public," Vallier "poured out his alcohol," told Torres that he was going home, then began walking north on Figueroa. Approximately 20 minutes later, Torres and his partner saw Vallier masturbating at the corner of Figueroa and 20th Street.

Maria Valdovinos is a Los Angeles police officer who works on the Registration Enforcement and Compliance Team. She and other officers on the team "register convicted sex offenders. . . . [S]ex offenders come into the office and update [their] registration. [The officers] help them complete the form, . . . make sure that they understand the requirements," then provide the offenders with a copy of the registration form.

Officer Valdovinos indicated that sex offenders are required to register within five days of their release from incarceration and must update their registration every year on their birthday. If an offender is going to move, or have a change of address, he or she must come in and register within five working days of the change. If an offender is homeless, he or she must update their registration every 30 days. Sex offenders are told about these requirements while they are in prison or at the police station. They are given a form which indicates all of the registration requirements. As part of her duties as a registration enforcement officer, Valdovinos will sometimes read to, or go through the form with an offender and explain to the individual what each requirement entails.

At some point after December 10, 2010, Valdovinos was contacted by a detective from the Newton Division about the registration status of Vallier. Valdovinos was provided with Vallier's date of birth and C.I.I., or identification number, and asked to verify whether he was in compliance with registration requirements. Valdovinos checked a data base called the Violent Crime Information Network which contains current and historical information regarding sex offenders and obtained a document indicating that Vallier had last registered on May 9, 2005 and had last been notified of the requirement that he register in August of 2009. Valdovinos found a state form entitled " 'Notice of Sex Offender Registration' " with the name Carl Anthony Vallier on it. The form indicated that on August 24, 2009, Vallier was notified of the requirement that he register as a sex offender with the Los Angeles Police Department. Valdovinos had also obtained a document from the California Parole data base indicating that Vallier had been paroled in case No. BA297958 on November 22, 2010 and had been released in "Mid-city," or the City of Los Angeles.

In addition, the People presented as an exhibit an abstract of judgment indicating that, on August 22, 2006 in case No. BA297958, Vallier was found guilty of indecent exposure in violation of section 314.

In addition to those from the Los Angeles Police Department, Valdovinos had access to documents filed with the California Department of Corrections, or C.D.C., which give a chronological history of an inmate's time in prison and on parole. In that data base, Valdovinos found a three-page document which also indicated that Vallier had been released from prison on November 22, 2010. Accordingly, he should have registered as a sex offender within five working days of that date. He had, however, failed to comply with the registration requirement. He "had not registered" after being released from custody. Valdovinos noted, however, that she had not checked the log at the station to determine whether Vallier had, at some point, come into the station and made an attempt to register.

Wuliang Huang is a fingerprint identification expert for the City of Los Angeles assigned to the section designated as the Los Angeles Department of Criminal Identification. Before he testified, Huang had taken Vallier's fingerprints. He had previously fingerprinted Vallier on January 18, 2011. When Huang compared the prints, he determined they had been taken from the same individual. Huang also compared the fingerprints he had taken from Vallier at the time of trial to fingerprints on other documents, such as the August 22, 2006 abstract of judgment from case No. BA297958. Huang determined that those prints, too, had been made by the same individual.

2. Procedural history.

Prior to trial, on February 1, 2011, Vallier indicated to the trial court that he wished to represent himself. He had done so at a previous proceeding where similar charges had been alleged and wished to do so again. After he filled out a "pro-per request form," the trial court advised Vallier of the "dangers and disadvantages of representing" himself. The court indicated that he would be "opposed by an attorney from the District Attorney's Office who is licensed to practice law" and "is a specialist in criminal law," that he would "receive no special treatment from the court" and that if he were to be convicted of the crimes alleged, he could not "complain on appeal that [he was] not competent and not appropriately represented." After Vallier indicated he understood the risks inherent in self-representation, the trial court found he had "voluntarily, intelligently and knowingly waived [his] right to counsel in [the] matter" and would be allowed to proceed in propria persona.

After the trial court relieved defense counsel, it informed Vallier of the charges pending against him. The court indicated that, in information No. BA379062, the prosecutor had charged Vallier with indecent exposure with a prior conviction for indecent exposure in violation of section 314(1), a felony. In count 2, Vallier had been charged with the felony of failing to provide true registration information pursuant to section 290.015, subdivision (a). As to counts 1 and 2, the prosecutor alleged Vallier had suffered two prior felony convictions pursuant to the Three Strikes law and had served prison terms for two offenses pursuant to section 667.5, subdivision (b). Vallier entered pleas of not guilty to the charged offenses and denied the "special allegations."

At proceedings held on March 30, 2011, the trial court indicated that the People were willing to settle the matter if Vallier would accept a sentence of six years in prison. The court informed Vallier that his "maximum exposure," if the People were to treat the matter as a second strike case, would be nine years four months. If the People were to "prove up two strikes," Vallier would be looking at a sentence of 27 years to life. After the trial court informed Vallier that he would not be granted probation, Vallier asked to speak with his "stand-by counsel." After consulting with counsel and discussing his sentencing options with the trial court, Vallier decided to go to trial.

Before a panel of jurors was called to the courtroom, Vallier asked the trial court for civilian clothes. The court explained to Vallier that, since he had chosen to represent himself, it was his responsibility to obtain clothing. When Vallier informed the court that he did not have clothing, the court indicated the jurors would be told they were "not to draw any conclusions about [his] guilt based on how [he was] dressed."

Following a hearing regarding Vallier's prior convictions, the trial court determined the People would be required to "prove them up in [their] case-in-chief." With regard to the two prior convictions for indecent exposure, the prosecutor argued they amounted to "crimes of moral turpitude." The trial court agreed and ruled that the People could use them to impeach Vallier should he decide to testify at trial.

Prior to trial, Vallier made a motion to set aside the information pursuant to section 995. During his argument, Vallier, referred to events and statements made outside the record. The trial court, however, determined the "transcript [of the preliminary hearing was] sufficient" to sustain the information and denied Vallier's motion.

Just before jury selection was to begin, it was determined that Vallier had not received any discovery. After attempting to contact Vallier's former public defender and his investigator, the trial court asked Vallier what he wished to do. Vallier responded, "I want the case to be dismissed." The following colloquy then occurred: "The Court: I'm not going to dismiss it. Do you want to continue it so we can get you the discovery and you can look at it? [¶] [Vallier]: No. I don't want to continue it. [¶] The Court: Okay. Then we're going forward with jury selection—okay?—but I'm telling you, just so the record is clear, I'm willing to give you a continuance, see that you get the discovery and give you sufficient time to prepare. . . . [¶] Do you understand that, sir? [¶] [Vallier]: I've stated my position on that. [¶] The Court: I'll take that as a yes, you do understand. You could have a continuance if you request it, and that is noted for the record. So that anything that happens hereafter and it doesn't go well for you, it's not because you didn't have a chance to prepare adequately because I would give you that time."

Stand-by counsel suggested that the jury panel be excused until after the lunch hour, during which the district attorney could copy the documents in question and provide them to both Vallier and stand-by counsel. The trial court and district attorney agreed to this procedure and, at approximately 11:45 a.m., the panel was dismissed and ordered to return at 1:30 p.m.

In the meantime, Vallier indicated that his private investigator had gone to the police station with a subpoena intending to obtain records showing Vallier had attempted to register as a sex offender. Vallier had, however, never received the records although the subpoena had been "signed and everything." Vallier then indicated that the subpoena had been returned to the trial court; he had given it to the court clerk. The trial court responded: "Well, this is the kind of thing you don't get from subpoenaing. You have to ask the district attorney to get it for you, the discovery. [¶] If you read the code, . . . [you would know that] this is the kind of stuff you request from the district attorney. The police won't respond to these subpoenas."

Jury selection commenced at 1:30 p.m. on Monday, April 4, 2011. After a panel had been chosen, Vallier asked the trial court, "[H]ow [it was] going to go with the two cases being tried at the same time[.]" The trial court responded: "They're not two cases. I think what you're concerned about is [the bifurcation of] your prior convictions, the strikes. Here's how it works. [¶] [The prosecutor] will put on his case to the two charges, the indecent exposure and the failure to register. The jury will be asked to return verdicts. If they find you guilty of either of those, then . . . [the prosecutor] has to prove up the strikes, and that will start immediately after [the jury] return[s] a verdict."

On April 6, 2011, after all of the evidence had been presented, Vallier made a motion to dismiss the matter pursuant to section 1118 for "lack of evidence." The trial court denied the motion, then asked Vallier if he approved of the proposed jury instructions. Vallier indicated that he wished to make an "ongoing objection" to all further proceedings in that there was insufficient evidence to convict him. The trial court took note of the objection, then instructed the jury on the law applicable to Vallier's case.

During argument, Vallier asserted, among other points, that he had attempted to register as a sex offender on a number of occasions, but had been unable to do so. He went to several police stations, only to be told that they were not the stations at which he was required to register.

In response to Vallier's assertion, the prosecutor indicated that Officer Valdovinos has testified that, "if someone comes in and tries to register and then has to come back later, even if it's after the five days, she's going to let him register. She's not going to . . . arrest anybody for making an attempt and then having to come back later, but [Vallier] never [went] back. He never performed the duty that he knew he had to register."

The jury commenced their deliberations at 2:50 p.m. on April 6, 2011. During a discussion between Vallier, the prosecutor and the trial court regarding proof of Vallier's prior convictions, the jury indicated that it had reached verdicts on the alleged charges. The trial court determined that, depending upon the verdicts, there would be a trial on the priors. The court clerk then read the verdicts as follows: "[W]e, the jury, in the above-entitled action find the defendant, Carl Anthony Vallier, guilty of the crime of willfully, unlawfully and lewdly exposing his person and private parts thereof in a public place, in violation of . . . section 314(1), as charged in Count 1 of the [i]nformation. [¶] Furthermore, we, the jury, in the above-entitled case, find . . . the allegation that as to Count 1 said defendant, Carl Anthony Vallier, has previously been convicted of a violation of . . . section 314(1) on August 22, 2006 . . . . [¶] Furthermore, we, the jury, in the above-entitled cause find the allegation that as to Count 1, said defendant, Carl Anthony Vallier, has previously been convicted of a violation of . . . section 314(1) on April 20, 2004 . . . ." The court clerk continued: "In the same title and cause, we, the jury, in the above-entitled action find the defendant, Carl Anthony Vallier, guilty of the crime of willfully and unlawfully violating a requirement of the Sex Offender Registration Act, in violation of . . . section[s] 290.15(a) and 290(b) by failing to register or re-register upon release from incarceration, a felony, as charged in Count 2 of the Information[.]"

With regard to Vallier's prior convictions, the People called as a witness John Helbling. However, before Helbling had the opportunity to testify, Vallier addressed the court and stated, "I'm giving up my pro per rights and will ask for this [stand-by] attorney to represent me from this point on." The trial court called for a meeting of the parties at side bar. There, he addressed Vallier and stated that "[t]his late in the game, [the court was] not required to let [Vallier] have an attorney and give up [his] pro per rights." The court indicated that there was case law directly on point and that it could require Vallier to go forward in propria persona. When stand-by counsel then advised Vallier "simply to admit the priors[,]" Vallier decided to continue "on [his] own."

The People's witness, John Helbling, testified that he is a paralegal with the Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office. He identifies documents from the Federal Bureau of Prisons which show an individual's prior convictions. The particular documents shown to Helbling by the prosecutor indicated that Vallier had been convicted of bank robbery in violation of section 2113 of title 18 of the United States Code on June 16, 1980. Documents from the Californian judicial system, including an "[A]rrest [Disposition [R]eport," indicated that Vallier had been convicted of robbery in violation of section 211 on May 10, 1968. Helbling also identified a section "969(b) packet," or "prison package," which shows an individual's chronological history within the California prison system. According to the packet, Vallier was first sentenced to prison on October 28, 2004. He was paroled on April 18, 2005 and was returned to prison on June 11, 2007. Vallier was again paroled on November 22, 2010.

After hearing further instructions by the trial court and argument by the parties, the jury determined that Vallier had previously been convicted of "a violation of . . . section 211, robbery, on May 10, 1968," had previously been convicted of "a violation of section 2113(a) of [t]itle 18 of the United States Code, robbery of a national bank on June 16, 1980," and had previously been convicted of a violation of section 314(1), indecent exposure, on April 24, 2004. With regard to the April 24th conviction, the jury found that Vallier had served a term in prison for the offense and did not remain free of prison custody for a period of five years subsequent to the conclusion of that term. The jury further found that Vallier had "previously been convicted of a violation of . . . section 314(1) on February 27, 2007 . . . and served a prison term for [the] offense and did not remain free of prison custody or convict[ion] of [a felony] offense," for which he was sentenced to prison "during a period of five years, subsequent to the conclusion of" the term served for that offense.

At proceedings held on April 22, 2011, the trial court indicated that the People were "requesting that the court strike one of the strikes and impose a sentence of 7 years 4 months." When asked if he wished to be heard, Vallier indicated that he objected to the entire proceeding. Vallier continued: "The whole court is a sham and a farce, the whole court proceedings. The jury was incorrect. I never read the verdict, never got the verdict."

After the People indicated they were submitting the matter on the basis of their sentencing memorandum, the trial court struck the 1975 conviction for federal bank robbery in the interest of justice pursuant to People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497. Then, as to count 1, the trial court selected the mid-term of four years in prison and imposed it as the "base term." The trial court indicated that the term was being "imposed . . . pursuant to . . . section[s] 667(b) through (i) and 1170.12 (a) through [(d)], the Three-Strike[s] law." The trial court imposed an additional, consecutive term of two years for the prison term served pursuant to section 667.5, subdivision (b). With regard to count 2, the trial court imposed a consecutive term of one year four months, or "the mid[-]term double[d] due to the strike," for a "total aggregate term [of] imprisonment" of seven years four months.

Vallier was ordered to pay a $200 restitution fine (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)), a stayed $200 parole revocation restitution fine (§ 1202.45), a $60 criminal conviction assessment (Gov. Code, § 70373), and an $80 court security assessment (§ 1465.8, subd. (a)(1)). He was awarded presentence custody credit for 133 days actually served and 133 days of conduct credit, for a total of 266 days.

Vallier filed a timely notice of appeal on April 22, 2011.

This court appointed counsel to represent Vallier on appeal on June 28, 2011.

CONTENTIONS

After examination of the record, appointed counsel filed an opening brief which raised no issues and requested this court to conduct an independent review of the record. By notice filed September 15, 2011, the clerk of this court advised Vallier to submit within 30 days any contentions, grounds of appeal or arguments he wished this court to consider. On September 30, 2011, October 6, 2011 and October 17, 2011, Vallier filed briefs in which he asserted: (1) his Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated because he was not provided with discovery until the day of trial; (2) his right to a speedy trial was violated as he was not brought to trial within 60 days of his arraignment; (3) his constitutional rights were violated when the trial court denied his request to poll the jury and to see the verdict forms; (4) he was denied his constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him when "the arresting officers did not show up" at the preliminary hearing or trial; (5) the trial court was negligent when it lost a subpoena ordering records which indicated he went to the police department to register as a sex offender; and (6) his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise these and other issues.

REVIEW ON APPEAL

1. Vallier contends his Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when he was not provided with discovery until the day of trial. The contention is without merit.

Just before jury selection was to begin, it was determined that Vallier had not been provided with discovery. After unsuccessfully attempting to contact Vallier's former public defender and investigator, the trial court asked Vallier if he wished to continue the matter until he could be provided with discovery and properly prepare for trial. When Vallier refused the offer of a continuance, the trial court stated: "Okay. Then we're going forward with jury selection . . . . [B]ut I'm telling you, just so the record is clear, I'm willing to give you a continuance, see that you get the discovery and give you sufficient time to prepare." "You could have a continuance if you request it, and that is noted for the record. So that anything that happens hereafter and it doesn't go well for you, it's not because you didn't have a chance to prepare adequately because I would give you that time."

In view of the trial court's offer to grant Vallier a continuance and to see that he was provided with discovery, Vallier cannot now complain his failure to be provided with timely discovery caused him prejudice.

2. Vallier's contention he was denied his right to a speedy trial in that he was not brought to trial within 60 days of his arraignment is also without merit. The record established that Vallier was arraigned on February 1, 2011. Trial proceedings began 58 days later, on March 30, 2011. There was no error.

3. Vallier asserts his constitutional rights were violated when the trial court refused his request to poll the jury and to allow him to see the verdict forms. This contention, too, has no merit.

A review of the record indicates that, after the clerk read the verdicts, the trial court asked the clerk to "please poll the jurors individually." The court clerk then asked each of the 12 jurors if "these [were the juror's] verdicts" and "special findings." Each of the 12 jurors individually answered "yes" to both questions.

With regard to his contention the trial court denied his request to see the verdict forms, a review of the record indicates the trial court assured Vallier he would be allowed to view the verdict forms if he so desired.

4. Vallier next contends he was denied his constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him when "the arresting officers did not show up" at the preliminary hearing or trial. We first note that the prosecution "ha[s] the burden of proof by sufficient evidence to establish [the] defendant's guilt, and that defendant ha[s] no duty or burden to produce any evidence." (People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1340, citing People v. Ratliff (1986) 41 Cal.3d 675, 681.) Here, the prosecutor obviously believed he could establish Vallier's guilt without calling as witnesses the arresting officers and, accordingly, had no duty to do so. Vallier was not denied his right to cross-examine the witnesses against him as the arresting officers never testified.

5. Vallier contends the trial court was negligent when it lost records indicating he went to the police department to register as a sex offender. He states: "On the 25th of November[,] a day after [Thanksgiving,] I attempted registration at a down town L.A. Police Station on 6th and Wall. I logged in on this date. A subpoena was given. The judge lost[] it."

A review of the record indicates that, apart from whether Vallier served a subpoena on the police department ordering them to provide him with a copy of their "sign-in log," it was not the department's usual custom to honor such subpoenas. According to the trial court, Vallier should have requested such information from the district attorney. Moreover, it is not altogether clear that the trial court "lost" the subpoena. Vallier asserts he served it on an officer at the police station. He does not indicate that he retrieved it. Finally, even if the trial court had a record showing a subpoena was issued for the sign-in log at the police station, the log, or a copy thereof, would not have been sufficient to show Vallier registered. Section 290.015, subdivision (a) provides in relevant part: "A person who is subject to the Act shall register, or reregister if he or she has previously registered, upon release from incarceration, placement, commitment, or release on probation pursuant to subdivision (b) . . . . The registration shall consist of all of the following: [¶] (1) A statement in writing signed by the person, giving information as shall be required by the Department of Justice and giving the name and address of the person's employer, and the address of the person's place of employment if that is different from the employer's main address. [¶] (2) The fingerprints and a current photograph of the person taken by the registering official. [¶] (3) The license plate number of any vehicle owned by, regularly driven by, or registered in the name of the person. [¶] (4) Notice to the person that, in addition to the requirements of the Act, he or she may have a duty to register in any other state where he or she may relocate. [¶] (5) Copies of adequate proof of residence, which shall be limited to a California driver's license, California identification card, recent rent or utility receipt, printed personalized checks or other recent banking documents showing that person's name and address, or any other information that the registering official believes is reliable. . . ."

6. Vallier contends his appellate counsel was ineffective for filing a Wende brief. The contention fails.

People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.
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An indigent defendant has the right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal. (In re Spears (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 1203, 1210.) "The duties which appointed appellate counsel must fulfill to meet his or her obligations as a competent advocate include the duty to 'argue all issues that are arguable.' " (Ibid.) "[F]or an issue to be an arguable issue on appeal it must be reasonably arguable that there is prejudicial error justifying reversal or modification of judgment." (Id. at p. 1211.) "[I]t is not the duty of appellate counsel to 'contrive arguable issues.' " (Ibid.) Here, appellate counsel appropriately found no arguable issues.

We have examined the entire record and are satisfied that Vallier's counsel has complied fully with counsel's responsibilities. (Smith v. Robbins (2000) 528 U.S. 259, 278-284; People v. Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 443.)

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

KLEIN, P. J.

We concur:

CROSKEY, J.

KITCHING, J.


Summaries of

People v. Vallier

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION THREE
Jan 19, 2012
B232644 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 19, 2012)
Case details for

People v. Vallier

Case Details

Full title:THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CARL ANTHONY VALLIER, Defendant…

Court:COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION THREE

Date published: Jan 19, 2012

Citations

B232644 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 19, 2012)