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People v. Valdes

California Court of Appeals, Fourth District, Second Division
Jan 27, 2012
No. E053090 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 27, 2012)

Opinion

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County No. FVI900542, Jules E. Fleuret, Judge.

James Kehoe, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Scott C. Taylor and Marissa Bejarano, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.


OPINION

RAMIREZ P. J.

Defendant and appellant Julio Lazard Valdes appeals from his conviction after pleading guilty to operating a chop shop (Veh. Code, § 10801) and attempting to unlawfully drive or take a vehicle (Pen. Code, § 664; Veh. Code, § 10851). The trial court sentenced defendant to two years four months in prison. Defendant contends the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress evidence. He argues the search of his property was illegal because it was preceded by an illegal trespass onto his property, which made his wife’s consent to the search involuntary. As discussed post, we conclude that the consent was validly obtained and affirm the judgment. We also order the sentencing minute order and abstract of judgment to be amended to reflect that the trial court actually imposed a $200 restitution fine rather than a $30,000 restitution fine under Vehicle Code section 10801.

All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.

FACTS AND PROCEDURE

On March 12, 2009, about 12:30 p.m., three plainclothes peace officers from the San Bernardino County Auto Theft Task Force went to defendant’s home to investigate a tip about vehicle thefts. The property consisted of several acres surrounded by a chain-link and chicken wire fence. From the public road adjacent to the property, the officers observed that “the property was littered with vehicles, vehicle parts.... And all the vehicles were in different states of being dismantled or in disrepair.” The officers observed several vehicles that were missing license plates. Both gates to the property were locked, so the officers honked their horn and shouted to the mobilehome that served as the residence, which was at least 40 to 60 feet inside the gate. No one answered. After about 15 minutes, two of the officers walked through a V-shaped gap in the chain-link fence toward the residence. They did not obtain a search warrant because there was not enough evidence, but they wanted to continue their investigation.

Two of the officers walked directly to the residence. As they approached, defendant’s wife, Ms. Valdes, called out to them from inside. The officers identified themselves and asked her to meet them at the front door. Ms. Valdes did so. The officers explained the reason for their presence and asked for her consent to search the property. Ms. Valdes gave her consent. One officer began to search the property while the other remained on the front porch of the residence with Ms. Valdes. A uniformed officer arrived in a marked squad car. The purpose of the marked car was to put Ms. Valdes at ease and reassure her that the men on her property were indeed law enforcement officers.

The officers were able to determine that two vehicles on the property were stolen. They asked Ms. Valdes to open the gates to the property, which she did. One of the officers spoke with defendant on his wife’s cellular phone. Defendant also told the officers that they could search the property. The officers arrested defendant several hours later when he returned home from work.

On April 6, 2009, the People filed an information charging defendant with one count of operating a chop shop (Veh. Code, § 10801), five counts of receiving stolen vehicles (Pen. Code, § 496d, subd. (a)), and four counts of receiving stolen property (Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a)). As to the chop shop count, the People alleged that defendant destroyed more than $65,000 worth of property. (Pen. Code, § 12022.6, subd. (a)(1).) The People further alleged that defendant had suffered a prior prison term. (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b).)

On December 2 and 3, 2010, the trial court held a hearing on defendant’s section 1538.5 motion to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of the March 12, 2009 search. At the hearing, two of the officers testified consistent with the statement of facts above. However, Ms. Valdes testified that she never gave the officers consent to search the property. Defendant testified similarly. The trial court stated that it found the officers more credible and consistent than defendant and Ms. Valdes, and accepted as true the officers’ version of events. The court concluded that, although the officers had committed a technical trespass in entering the property, the homeowners’ subsequent consent to search the property vitiated the trespass. In addition, no observations of stolen cars or car parts were made as a result of the trespass, but rather only as a result of viewing them from the public area outside the fence and after receiving consent to search.

On January 20, 2011, defendant pled guilty to operating a chop shop and to a new count of attempting to unlawfully drive or take a vehicle. (Pen. Code, § 664; Veh. Code, § 10851.) The trial court sentenced defendant under the plea agreement to two years four months in prison. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

1. Validity of Consent to Search after Technical Trespass

Defendant argues we should reverse the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence because the initial entry and warrantless search of his property were illegal and any subsequent consent granted by Ms. Valdes was ineffective. The People counter that the trespass by the officers did not result in a Fourth Amendment violation because their entry into defendant’s fenced yard was reasonable—they observed from the street cars with missing license plates and car parts on the property, they entered the property through an opening in the fence, and they walked directly to the residence, where they made contact with Ms. Valdes and obtained her consent to search. We agree with the People and the trial court that, although there was a technical trespass, this was followed by a consensual encounter with Ms. Valdes and her valid consent to search.

“[T]he ‘physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.’ ” (Payton v. New York (1980) 445 U.S. 573, 585 [100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639].) Accordingly, “[i]t is a ‘basic principle of Fourth Amendment law’ that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.” (Id. at p. 586, fn. omitted.) Therefore, the People must establish that a warrantless search was justified by some exception to the warrant requirement. (People v. Camacho (2000) 23 Cal.4th 824, 830.)

In reviewing the propriety of the denial of defendant’s suppression motion (§ 1538.5), we are bound by the trial court’s factual findings, including credibility determinations, if they are supported by substantial evidence. (People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114, 1140.) However, we review questions of law independently to determine whether the challenged conduct meets constitutional standards of reasonableness. (Ibid.)

The touchstone of all Fourth Amendment determinations is reasonableness. (United States v. Knights (2001) 534 U.S. 112, 118 [122 S.Ct. 587, 151 L.Ed.2d 497] [finding a warrantless search authorized by a probation condition satisfied the Fourth Amendment because it was supported by “reasonable suspicion”]; United States v. Ramirez (1998) 523 U.S. 65, 71 [118 S.Ct. 992, 140 L.Ed.2d 191] [failure to knock and give notice during execution of a search warrant]; Ohio v. Robinette (1996) 519 U.S. 33, 39 [117 S.Ct. 417] [consent]; Maryland v. Garrison (1987) 480 U.S. 79, 87-89 [107 S.Ct. 1013, 94 L.Ed.2d 72 ] [error during the service of search warrant]; Oliver v. United States (1984) 466 U.S. 170, 177-178 [104 S.Ct. 1735, 80 L.Ed.2d 214] [search of open field].)

In Ohio v. Robinette, the United States Supreme Court described the proper method of assessing the reasonableness of official intrusions by police officers as follows: “Reasonableness, ... is measured in objective terms by examining the totality of the circumstances. [¶] In applying this test we have consistently eschewed bright-line rules, instead emphasizing the fact-specific nature of the reasonableness inquiry. Thus, in Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 75 L.Ed.2d 229, 103 S.Ct. 1319 (1983), we expressly disavowed any ‘litmuspaper test’ or single ‘sentence or... paragraph... rule, ’ in recognition of the ‘endless variations in the facts and circumstances’ implicating the Fourth Amendment. [Citation.]” (Ohio v. Robinette, supra, 519 U.S. at p. 39.) Hence, the high court has repeatedly reiterated that the proper inquiry necessitates a consideration of “all the circumstances surrounding the encounter....” (Florida v. Bostick (1991) 501 U.S. 429, 439 [111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389].)

The trial court held that the officers initially trespassed when they stepped through the gap in the fence. In United States v. Karo (1984) 468 U.S. 705, 712-713 [104 S.Ct. 3296, 82 L.Ed.2d 530], the United States Supreme Court held: “The existence of a physical trespass is only marginally relevant to the question of whether the Fourth Amendment has been violated, however, for an actual trespass is neither necessary nor sufficient to establish a constitutional violation.”

As the People argue, this case is analogous to People v. Manderscheid (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 355, where the officers, while executing a parolee arrest warrant after they were informed by an informant that the subject of the arrest warrant could be found at the defendant’s house, “went to the back door by way of a gate accessible from the driveway, ” opened the gate in order to walk into the defendant’s backyard, and knocked on the door. (Id. at p. 358.) The defendant argued the Fourth Amendment violation invalidated the subsequently obtained written and oral consents to search the premises. (Id. at p. 361.) The Court of Appeal rejected this argument and held that the seizure was reasonable, since there was probable cause to believe that a potentially armed parolee who was the subject of an arrest warrant was at the defendant’s residence, and there was a legitimate public interest in ensuring he was promptly apprehended, particularly since he was hiding in a residential neighborhood. (Id. at p. 362.) The court also found that although the initial entry by the officer into the backyard in order to knock on the rear door was a technical trespass; it did not invalidate the subsequently obtained oral and written consents to search the residence. (Id. at pp. 361-362.) Relying on United States v. Karo, supra, 468 U.S. at pages 712- 713, the court explained: “Certainly, the fact that Detective Anderson trespassed in defendant’s backyard is ‘marginally relevant, ’ but not conclusive, in determining whether the ultimate seizure of the contraband was reasonable.” (Manderscheid, at p. 361.)

Similarly, in the present matter, the officers’ entry into defendant’s yard was reasonable. The deputies went to defendant’s residence to investigate a report regarding vehicle thefts. They therefore had reasonable suspicion to believe there might be stolen vehicles on the property. There is no evidence in the record to suggest that any of the officers examined the yard for stolen vehicles after they entered the yard but before they obtained Ms. Valdes’s consent to search. The evidence established that the officers walked straight from the opening in the fence toward the mobilehome residence, in order to make contact with the residents, after having tried to make contact from outside the property. Once the deputies made contact with Ms. Valdes and described to her what they were doing there, Ms. Valdes gave them permission to look around. The deputies thereafter found evidence of stolen vehicles. The facts here created a legitimate public interest in promptly investigating the tip regarding vehicle thefts, which tip was buttressed by the presence in plain sight from the street of numerous vehicle parts and vehicles in various stages of disassembly. This outweighed the minimal intrusion caused by the technical trespass into defendant’s yard in order to make contact with the residents. The officers here did not try to conceal the fact that they were present on defendant’s property. Moreover, the subsequent search and seizure at defendant’s residence by the officers were not the products of trespass; rather Ms. Valdes gave permission to search the property. The trial court did not err when it denied defendant’s motion to suppress.

2. Restitution Fine

Defendant argues, and the People agree, that the trial court ordered a $200 restitution fine but declined to order the $30,000 restitution fine under Vehicle Code section 10801, which was recommended in the probation report. The record transcript reflects this, but both the minute order from the sentencing hearing and the abstract of judgment indicate that the trial court ordered appellant to pay the $30,000 restitution fine under Vehicle Code section 10801. We agree with the parties and order the minute order and abstract of judgment amended to reflect the trial court’s actual order.

DISPOSITION

The superior court clerk is directed to correct the sentencing minute order and abstract of judgment to reflect that the trial court imposed a $200 restitution fine, rather than a $30,000 restitution fine under Vehicle Code section 10801, and to forward the corrected minute order and abstract of judgment to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. In all other respects the judgment is affirmed.

We concur: MILLER J., CODRINGTON J.


Summaries of

People v. Valdes

California Court of Appeals, Fourth District, Second Division
Jan 27, 2012
No. E053090 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 27, 2012)
Case details for

People v. Valdes

Case Details

Full title:THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JULIO LAZARD VALDES, Defendant…

Court:California Court of Appeals, Fourth District, Second Division

Date published: Jan 27, 2012

Citations

No. E053090 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 27, 2012)