Opinion
E043115
4-25-2008
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JOHN CHARLES TRUJILLO, Defendant and Appellant.
Richard Schwartzberg, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Peter Quon, Jr., Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Quisteen S. Shum, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
A jury found defendant guilty of second degree commercial burglary. (Pen. Code, § 459.) Defendant admitted suffering three prior convictions that resulted in prison terms. (§ 667.5, subd. (b).) The court sentenced defendant to state prison for a term of five years. Defendant contends the court erred by failing to inform defendant of his Boykin-Tahl rights prior to accepting defendants admissions concerning the prior offense enhancements. We affirm the judgment.
All further statutory references will be to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238, 242 (Boykin); In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122, 132-133 (Tahl).
FACTS
Before the jury delivered its verdict concerning the substantive charge in the instant case, defendant informed the court that he wanted a jury to find whether or not he suffered the prior offenses alleged in the information. After the jury delivered its verdict concerning the substantive offense, the judge ordered the jury to return the next day for a trial regarding defendants prior offenses.
At the trial concerning the allegations of prior offenses, San Bernardino County Deputy Sheriff Young testified that she witnessed another deputy roll defendants fingers on a card to make a copy of defendants fingerprints. An employee of the San Bernardino County Sheriffs Department, who works in the Cal-ID unit, testified that defendants fingerprints matched those included in the packet for crimes committed in June 2001, February 1999, and February 1997. Both witnesses were cross-examined by defendants trial attorney.
When questioning defendant about the prior offenses for purposes of defendants admission, the court asked if defendant was convicted of crimes that occurred in different months than those asked of the witness. Specifically, the court asked if defendant was convicted of crimes in May 2001, February 1999, and January 1997.
After the two witnesses testified, the parties held a sidebar conference where it was indicated that defendant wanted to admit that he suffered prior convictions. The following exchange then took place:
"The Court: Okay. [Defendant], I want to emphasize on the record that you have an absolute right to have the jury determine this matter. You have a right to continue with this proceeding this afternoon, and I do not want you to feel under any coercion or pressure to make these admissions. You have a right to go ahead and admit them now and just be done with these proceedings this afternoon. If thats what you wish to do, thats fine. I just want you to understand that nobody is trying to force you to do that. Do you understand that, sir?
"The Defendant: Yes.
"The Court: Now, if you wish to make those admissions, theyd be entirely voluntarily and knowing on your part. Do you understand that?
"The Defendant: Yes.
"The Court: Knowing that, do you wish to waive further juror proceedings in this case and admit the allegations made by the People?
"The Defendant: Can I say something?
"The Court: Yes, sir, you may.
"The Defendant: It is — okay, it is me. I mean its like beating a dead dog. You know what I mean? Im not going to
"The Court: I havent heard it referred to exactly that way before, but I think I know what you mean. Yes, sir. [¶] Well, let me — do you want me to just go ahead and ask you, then, specifically about the admissions, and well just go through them one at a time? Is that what youd like to do?
"The Defendant: Yeah, I mean Im not here to waste nobodys time.
"The Court: Okay. No, thats fine.
"The Defendant: But I — but I mean I was found guilty."
The court then asked defendant if he admitted the facts alleged concerning his three prior convictions and related prison terms. Defendant admitted each of the allegations. The court accepted defendants admissions and found them "to be knowing, intelligent, willing, and voluntar[y]."
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends his three prior conviction enhancements must be reversed because the trial court did not advise defendant of his Boykin-Tahl rights prior to defendants admission.
Under both the federal and state Constitutions, before a court accepts a guilty plea a defendant must be advised of his rights to a jury trial and to confront witnesses against him and of the privilege against compelled self-incrimination. (Boykin, supra, 395 U.S. at pp. 242-243; Tahl, supra, 1 Cal.3d at pp. 132-133.) In California, the same rule applies to the acceptance of an admission of the truth of an alleged prior conviction. (In re Yurko (1974) 10 Cal.3d 857, 863.)
We note, as did our Supreme Court in People v. Mosby (2004) 33 Cal.4th 353, 360 (Mosby), that the federal and state Constitutions do not extend the right to a jury trial to the factual determination of whether a defendant has suffered a prior conviction. "That right is purely statutory in origin. [Citations.]" (Ibid.)
The failure to properly advise a defendant of his rights prior to his admission concerning a prior conviction allegation is not reversible per se. (People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1178.) "The pertinent inquiry . . . [is] whether `the record affirmatively shows that [the admission] is voluntary and intelligent under the totality of the circumstances [citation] . . . ." (Mosby, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 360.) The focus of this examination is not "whether the defendant received express rights advisements, and expressly waived them, [but] whether the defendants admission was intelligent and voluntary because it was given with an understanding of the rights waived." (Id. at p. 361.) In order to properly analyze the issue, "an appellate court must go beyond the courtroom colloquy" and "examine the record of `the entire proceeding to assess whether the defendants admission of the prior conviction was intelligent and voluntary in light of the totality of circumstances." (Ibid.)
In reviewing the entire record, it is also proper to note whether the defendant has experience with the criminal justice system that is "`relevant to the question [of] whether he knowingly waived constitutional rights. [Citation.] That is so because previous experience in the criminal justice system is relevant to a recidivists `"knowledge and sophistication regarding his [legal] rights." [Citations.]" (Mosby, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 365, fn. omitted.)
We begin by addressing facts concerning defendants understanding of his privilege against compelled self-incrimination. First, during the jury trial concerning the substantive charge, defendants trial attorney stated, "I discussed with my client, your Honor, advised him of the consequences pro and con with respect[] to him taking the stand in his own self-defense, because of his prior record at this time he chooses not to testify." Second, the record reflects that two of defendants three prior offenses involved no contest pleas, which would have informed defendant of his privilege against self-incrimination. Third, we interpret defendants comments—"its like beating a dead dog" and "Im not here to waste nobodys time"—to mean defendant was aware of his constitutional rights, because he had been informed of his rights during prior hearings. The trial attorneys statement, defendants past plea experiences, and defendants comments indicate defendant understood he was waiving his privilege against compelled self-incrimination when admitting the allegations in the instant case.
Next, as to defendants right to confront witnesses against him, defendant was in the midst of a jury trial concerning his prior offenses when he decided to admit the allegations. Additionally, defendants trial attorney aptly cross-examined witnesses concerning defendants prior offenses. We infer from these facts that defendant was aware he was waiving his right to confront witnesses against him when he admitted the allegations.
Finally, in regard to defendants right to a jury trial, defendant concedes that the trial court expressly informed defendant of this right and defendant expressly waived it.
We conclude that under the totality of the circumstances defendant voluntarily and intelligently admitted his prior convictions despite being advised of and having expressly waived only his right to a jury trial.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We Concur:
Richli, J.
King, J.