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People v. Trejo

California Court of Appeals, Second District, Sixth Division
Apr 27, 2009
2d Crim. B205202 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 27, 2009)

Opinion

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Superior Court County of Santa Barbara No. 1184644, James F. Rigali, Judge

Randy S. Kravis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Linda C. Johnson, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Robert David Breton, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.


PERREN, J.

Daniel Trejo appeals the judgment entered after a jury convicted him of torture (Pen. Code, § 206), four counts of child abuse under circumstances likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 273a, subd. (a)), and misdemeanor unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor (§ 261.5, subd. (b)). The jury also found true allegations as to each count of child abuse that appellant inflicted great bodily injury on a child under the age of five (§ 12022.7, subd. (d)). He was sentenced to a determinate term of 34 years and an indeterminate term of 7 years to life. He contends (1) his trial attorney provided constitutionally ineffective assistance by calling certain defense witnesses; (2) the trial court violated its sua sponte duty to instruct the jury on aggravated assault as a lesser included offense of torture; (3) the court erred in failing to give CALCRIM No. 302; (4) the court erred in allowing the parties to stipulate that the court reporter not be required to transcribe the court's oral instructions to the jury; (5) he was subjected to multiple punishment in violation of section 654; and (6) the court erred in imposing the upper term on all four of the child abuse counts. We shall order the judgment modified to reflect stayed terms on three of the child abuse counts and corresponding enhancements, for a total determinate term of twelve years. In all other respects, we affirm.

All statutory references are to the Penal Code.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

In February 2006, 16-year-old N.O. gave birth to her daughter A. Trejo, A.'s father, was 18 years old. For the next four months, Trejo, N.O., and A. moved back and forth between Trejo's mother's house in Santa Maria and N.O.'s mother's house in Santa Ynez. During that time, N.O. worked part-time while Trejo had two jobs that each lasted one or two weeks. When Trejo was not working, he was A.'s primary caretaker.

In early April 2006, N.O. and her mother noticed that A. had dried blood in her nose and bruises on her back and stomach. When N.O. asked Trejo about the injuries, he claimed that A. must have either hit herself with a toy or banged her head against his shoulder while he was burping her. Later that month, N.O. noticed that something was wrong with A.'s left arm. In May and June, N.O. saw more bruises on A.'s face and body.

One day in early June, while N.O. was working and Trejo was caring for A. full time, N.O.'s mother arrived home from her job and heard A. screaming. When she went to A., she saw large abrasions covering both sides of the infant's face. When N.O. came home, she was extremely upset and asked Trejo for an explanation. Trejo told N.O. and her mother that A. must have hit herself with her plastic toy keys. Both women found the story incredible, although neither could believe that Trejo or anyone else could have intentionally harmed the child.

Later that month, N.O.'s 17-year-old cousin Roger noticed that A. had fresh bruises and blood on her lips and in her nose. Trejo claimed he did not know that anything had happened. After Roger found a small plastic hairbrush under A.'s pillow, Trejo offered that A. must have hit herself with it. Trejo asked Roger not to tell anyone about it because he did not want N.O.'s family to think poorly of him. Roger, however, did tell N.O. about the incident. When she confronted Trejo, he denied it and accused Roger of making up a story.

On June 26, 2006, Trejo told N.O. that something was wrong with A.'s arm. When N.O. had bathed A. earlier that day, her arm was fine and she had no bruises. N.O. now noticed that A.'s arm was not moving and saw bruises on her body and blood in her nostrils. Trejo once again suggested that A. had hit herself, and discouraged N.O. from taking her to see a doctor. The next day, Trejo called N.O. at work and told her he thought A.'s arm was broken. Joni Goodwin, N.O.'s work supervisor, immediately drove her home. N.O. and Goodwin both saw that A. had fresh bruises on her stomach and sternum and blood in her nose. There were also blood spatters in A.'s crib and on both sides of her head. The child's arm was limp, her breathing was labored and she was crying.

N.O. took A. to a clinic, where she was examined by a pediatrician, Dr. Anthony Howe. The examination revealed that the shaft of the humerus bone in A.'s right arm was broken in two. The doctor concluded that A. was being abused, and called child protective services. A. was sent to Cottage Hospital, where she was examined by Dr. Lori Brown. The differentiation of colors on A.'s bruises led Dr. Brown to conclude that they were caused by injuries that had been inflicted on different occasions. In addition to the bruises and the broken arm, the doctor also saw a scab lesion from a burn on A.'s foot and a punctuated lesion that could only have been produced by digging a sharp tool into her skin. The doctor also agreed that A. was too young to inflict the injuries on herself, and that they were not accidental.

Dr. James Benzian, a pediatric radiologist, examined A.'s X-rays and C.T. scan and noticed 25 bone fractures that were caused by non-accidental trauma. The doctor concluded that one arm fracture and five rib fractures occurred within a week of the examination, while fifteen others (consisting of seven rib fractures, two collarbone fractures, three arm fractures, and three leg fractures) were a week to thirty days old. The remaining four fractures, including three rib fractures and a leg fracture that caused the infant's foot bones to separate from her leg bone, were suffered more than a month prior to the exam, between March 27 and May 28.

After determining there was nothing abnormal about A.'s bone development and ruling out other potential medical causes for her injuries, Dr. Benzian concluded that the fractures could not have been accidental. A. did not have the mobility or physical ability to cause such injuries. Dr. Benzian determined that each grouping of rib fractures occurred during three separate incidents and were caused by someone intentionally squeezing her chest with a tremendous amount of pressure. The limb fractures were caused by someone either holding her by the limb and flinging her with enough force to throw her across the room, or pulling and twisting the extremity with enough force to strip away the lining of the bone.

In response to the call to child welfare services, Santa Barbara Police Detective Christopher Dallenbach went to N.O.'s mother's house the same day and spoke to Trejo. When Dallenbach asked Trejo if he knew how A.'s arm had been broken, Trejo claimed he only knew that A. had woken up crying that morning. The next day, Dallenbach learned about the full extent of A.'s injuries and obtained a warrant for Trejo's arrest. Trejo, who knew the police were looking for him, hid out for the next two weeks at his uncle's house and his grandmother's apartment. When Trejo was finally apprehended, he admitted that he sometimes got "frustrated" by A.'s crying and that family members had warned him not to hold her too tight. He acknowledged he might have caused some of A.'s bruises and rib injuries while holding her, and admitted that he lifted her by her ankles when he changed her diaper. He also conceded that he may have broken A.'s arm on June 26, when he grabbed her to stop her from sliding off his lap while he was playing a video game. He claimed that he first noticed the injury when he was changing her diaper the following morning.

Trejo continued to insist that A.'s bruises were self-inflicted. Although he claimed that the abrasions on her face occurred when he laid her face down on the couch, the detective could see that the couch's upholstery was not abrasive. He also claimed that A. frequently had bloody noses for no apparent reason. He further noted that he was not the only person who handled A., and said that Roger had helped care for her when he spent two weeks with them at the request of N.O.'s mother. Trejo acknowledged, however, that N.O. was a good mother and was incapable of intentionally hurting A.

N.O.'s relatives and coworkers testified she was a loving and caring mother to A., while Trejo was "very rough" whenever he handled the child. All of them believed that appellant had deliberately and intentionally caused all of A.'s injuries. Trejo's mother Claudia, on the other hand, testified that N.O. squeezed and hit A., twisted her arms, and even bit her on one occasion. In a secretly recorded telephone call, however, Claudia admitted that she had never seen N.O. hurt or mistreat A. Claudia had also warned her daughter Zinai not to leave A. alone with Trejo, and admitted to an investigator that she had concerns about her son's parenting skills.

Trejo's mother, grandmother, sister, brother, and a friend all testified on his behalf. All of them denied ever seeing Trejo harm A., yet claimed that N.O. had frequently hit A. when she would not stop crying. They also claimed that N.O. was rough with the child and had once hit the child's head on the headboard as the result of burping her too hard.

Karen Roberts, Robert Pirnat, and Luis Rojas were also called to testify for the defense. Roberts, the bookkeeper at the store where N.O. worked, testified that N.O. did not work from December 2005 through May 2006, and then worked 13 to 20 hours a week from June 1 through July 2. Pirnat, who was the manager of the Santa Maria Car Wash, testified that Trejo worked at the car wash for 30 hours the first 2 weeks of May 2006, 25 hours the next 2 weeks, and a total of 9 hours on June 1 and 2. Rojas, who identified himself as Trejo's friend, recounted an incident in 2006 in which he claimed N.O. initially refused to take A. into a medical clinic for treatment, then threw a tantrum after Trejo took her.

DISCUSSION

I.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Trejo claims his trial attorney provided constitutionally ineffective assistance by calling Roberts and Pirnat to testify. According to Trejo, his attorney had no legitimate tactical reason for calling either of the witnesses because their testimony bolstered the prosecution's theory that Trejo was A.'s primary caretaker during the time her injuries were inflicted. He also asserts it is reasonably probable that the result would have been different absent the error because his access to A. "was arguably the central issue of the case." We disagree on both points.

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687-688.) "In general, reviewing courts defer to trial counsel's tactical decisions in assessing a claim of ineffective assistance, and the burden rests on the defendant to show that counsel's conduct falls outside the wide range of competent representation. [Citations.] In order to prevail on such a claim on direct appeal, the record must affirmatively disclose the lack of a rational tactical purpose for the challenged act or omission. [Citations.]" (People v. Ray (1996) 13 Cal.4th 313, 349.) Moreover, we presume counsel's conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. (People v. Hart (1999) 20 Cal.4th 546, 623-624.)

The decision to call certain witnesses is a "matter[] of trial tactics and strategy which a reviewing court generally may not second-guess. [Citation.]" (People v. Mitcham (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1027, 1059.) Here, the record does not affirmatively disclose the lack of any rational tactical purpose in calling Roberts and Pirnat to testify. While the testimony supported the prosecution's assertion that Trejo was A.'s primary caretaker during the time of her injuries, that fact was essentially undisputed and was established by other evidence. It was also undisputed that Trejo was home with A. when some of her injuries were inflicted. The testimony also indicated, however, that Trejo had been employed for a period of time and that N.O. may have been home more often than she claimed. There may also be other tactical reasons for calling these witnesses that are not readily apparent. Appellate counsel's identification of a reason why counsel might have decided to refrain from calling the witnesses is not enough to establish constitutionally deficient performance on direct appeal. "Even the most competent counsel may from time-to-time make decisions or conduct himself in a manner which might be criticized by equally competent counsel but that is not the measure of competency of counsel on review by an appellate court." (People v. Wallin (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 479, 485.)

In any event, Trejo fails to establish the requisite prejudice. As we have noted, Trejo's role as A.'s primary caretaker was essentially undisputed. Moreover, the record is replete with evidence of Trejo's guilt that is completely unrelated to any dispute regarding his work history. Because it is not reasonably probable that Trejo would have achieved a more favorable result in the absence of the challenged testimony, his claim of ineffective assistance fails.

II.

Failure to Instruct on Lesser Included Offense

Trejo argues that the trial court violated its sua sponte duty to instruct the jury on aggravated assault (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)) as a lesser included offense to the torture count. We disagree.

The trial court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on all lesser included offenses that find substantial support in the evidence, but only if there is evidence that the offense of which the defendant is guilty is less than that charged. (People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 154, 162.) "[A] lesser offense is necessarily included in a greater offense if either the statutory elements of the greater offense, or the facts actually alleged in the accusatory pleading, include all the elements of the lesser offense, such that the greater cannot be committed without also committing the lesser. [Citations.]" (People v. Birks (1998) 19 Cal.4th 108, 117-118.)

A comparison of the elements of aggravated assault and torture demonstrate that the former is not a lesser included offense of the latter. Section 245, subdivision (a)(1) defines aggravated assault as an assault upon the person of another "by any means of force" likely to produce great bodily injury. By contrast, the elements of torture are (1) the infliction of great bodily injury on another; and (2) the specific intent to cause cruel or extreme pain and suffering for revenge, extortion or persuasion or for any sadistic purpose. (§ 206; People v. Lewis (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 882, 888.) While torture requires that great bodily injury be inflicted, such injury need not be accomplished by the use of physical force or violence likely to produce great bodily injury. (See Lewis, supra, at pp. 887-888 [battery and aggravated battery are not lesser included offenses of torture].) Moreover, the language of the torture count as set forth in the information is identical to the statutory definition and therefore did not incorporate the "force" element of the aggravated assault offense.

Trejo's reliance on People v. Martinez (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1035, is unavailing. In Martinez, the court held that assault with a deadly weapon is not a lesser included offense of torture. (Id. at pp. 1038-1039, 1041-1045.) In noting that section 245, subdivision (a)(1) identifies two different ways of committing aggravated assault, the court stated in dicta: "[W]hile an assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury is arguably an included offense within the crime of torture, assault with a deadly weapon is not." (Id. at p. 1043.) As we have explained, aggravated assault, defined as assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury, does not constitute a lesser included offense of torture under the statutory elements and pleading test that governs our analysis. Martinez did not conduct this analysis, but rather merely indicated that its holding was limited to the crime of assault with a deadly weapon. "A case is not authority for propositions not considered. [Citation.]" (Jones v. First American Title Ins. Co. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 381, 390.)

III.

CALCRIM No. 302

Trejo asserts that the court violated its sua sponte duty to give CALCRIM No. 302, which defines the jury's duty to weigh conflicting witness testimony. We agree with Trejo that the instruction should have been given in light of the conflicting testimony offered by Trejo and N.O.'s friends and relatives. (See People v. Cleveland (2004) 32 Cal.4th 704, 751 [recognizing that CALCRIM No. 302's predecessor (CALJIC No. 2.22) "must be given sua sponte in every criminal case in which conflicting testimony has been presented"].) Failure to give the instruction is prejudicial, however, only where there is a reasonable likelihood that the error caused juror misunderstanding. (People v. Snead (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1088, 1097.) To make that determination, we consider the entire record and the totality of the instructions that were actually given. (Ibid.)

CALCRIM No. 302 provides: "If you determine there is a conflict in the evidence, you must decide what evidence, if any, to believe. Do not simply count the number of witnesses who agree or disagree on a point and accept the testimony of the greater number of witnesses. On the other hand, do not disregard the testimony of any witness without a reason or because of prejudice or a desire to favor one side or the other. What is important is whether the testimony or any other evidence convinces you, not just the number of witnesses who testify about a certain point."

We conclude that the court's error in failing to give the instruction was not prejudicial. The jury was instructed on witness credibility, and was directed not to "automatically reject testimony just because of inconsistencies or conflicts." (CALCRIM No. 226.) The same instruction also informed the jurors that they were to be the sole judges of credibility and the weight to be given to each witness's testimony. (Ibid.) The jury was also instructed on how to evaluate direct and circumstantial evidence (CALCRIM Nos. 222, 223), and was directed to give Trejo the benefit of reasonable doubt and "impartially compare and consider all the evidence that was received throughout the entire trial" (CALCRIM No. 220). The sufficiency of a single witness's testimony to prove any fact was also explained (CALCRIM No. 301), and the jurors were told they could use a witness's prior inconsistent statements in evaluating whether their testimony was believable (CALCRIM No. 318). Other instructions explained how the jury should evaluate witness testimony offered to establish Trejo's good or bad character (CALCRIM Nos. 350, 351), while others instructed on how to weigh expert and lay opinions (CALCRIM Nos. 303, 332). The record also reflects that the number of witnesses testifying for and against Trejo was fairly even, which undermines Trejo's assertion that the jury may have violated CALCRIM No. 302's directive to refrain from making its credibility determinations by counting the number of witnesses on each side. Moreover, the prosecution did not urge any improper ground for the jury to reject the testimony of Trejo's witnesses. Because it is not reasonably probable that the jury would have reached a different result had CALCRIM No. 302 been given, the court's error in failing to give the instruction is harmless. (People v. Snead, supra, 20 Cal.App.4th at p. 1097; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.32d 818, 831.)

IV.

Reporting of Jury Instructions

Trejo contends that the court erred in allowing the parties to stipulate that the court reporter need not transcribe the court's reading of the jury instructions. It is well settled that the parties may so stipulate, and that Trejo thereby forfeited his right to claim on appeal that the record is deficient in this regard. (People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 857; People v. Gaston (1978) 20 Cal.3d 476, 485.) Trejo acknowledges this authority in his reply brief, yet urges us to reject it. We have no power to do so. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455.)

V.

Section 654

Trejo asserts that the court violated section 654 by imposing consecutive sentences on each of the child abuse counts and corresponding enhancements because the crimes "were part of the same course of conduct as the torture alleged in [c]ount 1." While we conclude that Trejo was properly subjected to a consecutive sentence on the child abuse charged in count 2, we agree that the sentences on the other three counts should have been stayed pursuant to section 654.

Section 654 provides that "[a]n act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law shall be punished under the provision that provides for the longest term of imprisonment, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished under more than one provision." "Whether section 654 applies in a given case is a question of fact for the trial court, which is vested with broad latitude in making its determination. [Citations.] Its findings will not be reversed on appeal if there is any substantial evidence to support them. [Citations.] We review the trial court's determination in the light most favorable to the respondent and presume the existence of every fact the trial court could reasonably deduce from the evidence. [Citation.]" (People v. Jones (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1143.)

Torture and child abuse can both be charged as continuous course of conduct offenses. (People v. Napoles (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 108, 115 [child abuse]; People v. Jenkins (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 287, 300 [torture].) When the crimes are charged in this manner, the multiple acts allegedly committed over a period of time are treated as a single criminal act. (People v. Napoles, supra, at p. 115.) "[I]f one criminal act is charged, but the evidence tends to show the commission of more than one such act, 'either the prosecution must elect the specific act relied upon to prove the charge to the jury, or the court must instruct the jury that it must unanimously agree that the defendant committed the same specific criminal act.' [Citations.]" (Id. at p. 114, italics omitted.)

Trejo was charged in count 1 with committing torture between March 27, 2006, and June 25, 2006. In count 2, he was charged with committing child abuse on June 26, 2006, by fracturing A.'s right arm. Counts 3, 4, and 5, however, were all charged as continuous conduct offenses that occurred between different time frames from March 27, 2006, until June 25, 2006, i.e., the same time period as the torture. In arguing that Trejo was guilty of torture, the prosecutor did not focus on any particular act. Rather, she argued that the crime was committed continuously during the time that A. was in Trejo's custody. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury was instructed that it could not find Trejo guilty of each of the crimes unless they either all agreed on which act he committed for each offense, or all agreed that the prosecution had proven that Trejo committed all of the acts alleged to have occurred during the time frame set forth in the information as to each count. (See CALCRIM No. 3501.)

Because acts upon which the torture count is based were committed during the same time frame as three of the child abuse counts, and the prosecutor argued that the acts of child abuse committed during that time frame were the basis for the torture charge, the crimes were plainly based on the same course of conduct. Accordingly, separate punishment on counts 3, 4 and 5 was prohibited by section 654. (In re Jose P. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 458, 469.)

The child abuse alleged in count 2, however, referred to a single incident that occurred on June 26, 2006, the day after the time frame during which the torture was alleged to have occurred. Separate punishment on this count was therefore warranted. It is well settled "that a course of conduct divisible in time, although directed to one objective, may give rise to multiple violations and punishment. [Citations.]" (People v. Beamon (1973) 8 Cal.3d 625, 639, fn. 11.) Because Trejo was charged in count 2 with a distinct offense occurring at a different time than the crimes charged in the other counts, 654 did not prohibit the court from imposing separate punishment. (Ibid.)

While the prosecutor referred to the torture as occurring "from the age of approximately two months up until four months, which would finally take them to the tribal clinic on June 27th, 2006," the jury was instructed that the crime was based on a continuous course of conduct that was alleged to have occurred between March 27, 2006, and June 25, 2006. We presume the jury followed the court's instruction that counsel's arguments were not evidence. (People v. Sanchez (1995) 12 Cal.4th 1, 70, overruled on another point in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22.) The record also unequivocally demonstrates that the jury's finding of child abuse in count 2 was based on a single incident that occurred on June 26, 2006.

The People argue that the torture and child abuse counts were not committed pursuant to the same intent, because torture requires a sadistic purpose and child abuse does not. This argument confuses the intent that is an element of a crime with the intent that determines whether section 654 applies. The statute prohibits separate punishment for crimes that plainly involve different intent elements but are part of a course of conduct with one overall objective. (See, e.g., People v. Latimer (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1203, 1216 [sexual offenses and kidnapping to facilitate sexual offenses]; People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 492 [burglary and murder committed while burglarizing victim's home].) The People fail to identify any separate and distinct objectives Trejo harbored in committing the torture and the child abuse offenses charged in counts 3, 4 and 5. Because the torture and child abuse offenses charged in counts 3, 4 and 5 were based on the same continuous course of conduct and the record does not reflect that Trejo harbored separate and distinct objectives in committing these crimes, separate punishment on the child abuse counts was barred by section 654. We shall therefore order the judgment modified to reflect stayed terms on counts 3, 4, and 5.

As Trejo correctly notes, the indeterminate term imposed on the torture count cannot be stayed in favor of the child abuse counts because he must be punished on the count that provides for the longest potential term of imprisonment. (§ 654, subd. (a).)

VI.

Sentencing on Great Bodily Injury Enhancements

In sentencing Trejo on the four child abuse counts (counts 2 through 5), the court imposed the upper term of six years as the principal base term on count 2, plus six years for the great bodily injury enhancement pursuant to section 12022.7, subdivision (d). The court then imposed consecutive subordinate terms of one year, four months (one-third the midterm) on the remaining three counts, plus a full six-year upper term great bodily injury enhancement on each count, for a total determinate term of thirty-four years. Trejo contends the court erred in imposing the full term of six years on each of the subordinate section 12022.7, subdivision (d) enhancements, instead of one-third of each term, i.e., two years. The People assert that full terms were authorized by section 1170.1, subdivision (g). We agree with Trejo.

Section 1170.1, subdivision (a) provides that in sentencing a defendant to consecutive terms on multiple felony counts, "[t]he subordinate term for each consecutive offense shall consist of one-third of the middle term of imprisonment prescribed for each other felony conviction for which a consecutive term of imprisonment is imposed, and shall include one-third of the term imposed for any specific enhancements applicable to those subordinate offenses." While there are exceptions to this rule (see, e.g., §§ 667.6, subds. (c) & (e), 1170.1, subd. (b)), the People have identified no such exception that applies to the instant case. Subdivision (g) of section 1170.1 merely directs the sentencing court to choose "the greatest" great bodily injury enhancement when more than one such enhancement is found true as to a single count. The issue here is whether the court is authorized to impose full terms for great bodily injury enhancements on subordinate counts. Subdivision (a) of section 1170.1 plainly provides that the sentence shall be limited to one-third of the term imposed for each enhancement, i.e., two years. We shall order the judgment modified accordingly.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is modified to reflect stayed sentences of three years four months on each of counts 3, 4, and 5, consisting of one-third of the midterm (one year, four months) for each substantive offense, plus one-third of the upper term (two years) for each great bodily injury enhancement pursuant to section 12022.7, subdivision (d). As so modified, the total determinate term shall be 12 years. The trial court shall forward a modified abstract of judgment to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

We concur: GILBERT, P.J. COFFEE, J.


Summaries of

People v. Trejo

California Court of Appeals, Second District, Sixth Division
Apr 27, 2009
2d Crim. B205202 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 27, 2009)
Case details for

People v. Trejo

Case Details

Full title:THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DANIEL TREJO, Defendant and…

Court:California Court of Appeals, Second District, Sixth Division

Date published: Apr 27, 2009

Citations

2d Crim. B205202 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 27, 2009)