Opinion
D058720 Super. Ct. No. SCS233661
01-13-2012
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. GUSTAVO N. TORRES, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Kathleen M. Lewis, Judge. Affirmed.
Gustavo N. Torres pled guilty to driving under the influence, causing injury (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (a)), driving under the influence with a measureable blood alcohol level of at least .08 percent, causing injury (id., subd. (b)), and hit and run with injury (§ 20001, subd. (a)). He now appeals, claiming evidence supporting his conviction was improperly obtained by an unreasonable warrantless search. We disagree and affirm the judgment of conviction.
All further statutory references are to the Vehicle Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Shortly before 7:00 p.m. on October 30, 2009, Officer Jeffrey Lane arrived at the intersection of Tocayo Avenue and Oro Vista Road to find debris scattered through the westbound traffic lanes of Tocayo and a car down the nearby embankment. The occupants of that vehicle had been injured in the crash. Lane spoke at the scene to witness Roger Hornecker, who relayed that he saw an "older gentleman, dark gray hair, lighter complexion" drive slowly away in a metallic SUV with front end damage, steam coming from the hood and airbags deployed. Hornecker identified this older man in court as the defendant, and testified Torres had "appeared to be dazed" while driving.
From Hornecker's information and a fluid trail in the south lane of Tocayo Avenue, Officer Lane found a metallic gold Toyota 4-Runner with front-end damage in front of Torres's home at 1735 Honestidad Avenue. Officer Lane examined the vehicle, noting the hood was still warm and there appeared to be blood on the deployed air bags. Officer Lane then radioed for backup and ran the vehicle's license plates, which returned a registration to Torres at 1735 Honestidad Avenue. He made no effort to obtain a warrant to arrest Torres or search his house.
When backup arrived, Officer Lane knocked on Torres's front door. Nobody answered the door, but Officer Lane observed movement from within as well as a light in the house being turned off. Officer Lane continued to knock and sent other officers to knock on the windows in an attempt to announce their presence. After several minutes with no response, Officer Lane and another officer went around the rear of the house and entered through a sliding glass door which had been left slightly ajar. When asked in court, Officer Lane testified he was concerned about the welfare of the driver due to the significant damage to the vehicle and blood on the air bag, which was an indication of possible head trauma.
Inside the house, Officer Lane made contact with Torres, who seemed "slightly confused" and had blood coming from his nose. Officer Lane asked Torres who was the last person to drive the damaged 4-Runner. Torres identified himself as the driver. After ensuring Torres was not hurt, Officer Lane subjected him to field sobriety tests, then arrested him for driving under the influence.
Prior to trial, Torres moved to suppress the evidence collected by Officer Lane following his entry into Torres's home. That motion was denied. Torres then renewed his motion to suppress and pled guilty to all counts, retaining the right to challenge his conviction pursuant to the denied motion.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Torres claims the trial court erred when it denied his suppression motion because the police entry into his residence was an unlawful search not justified by any exceptions to the warrant requirement.
We review a refusal to suppress evidence as a mixed question of law and fact, deferring to the trial court's factual findings and independently reviewing whether the search violated the Fourth Amendment. (People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 465.) We must sustain the trial court's ruling if it is" ' " right upon any theory of the law applicable to the case.(People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 976.)
Here, we find substantial evidence to support the inference officers entered Torres's residence to render emergency assistance, and conclude the trial court was correct to deny the motion to suppress evidence.
Although" ' " searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable," ' " "the warrant requirement is subject to certain exceptions." (Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart (2006) 547 U.S. 398, 403 (Brigham City), quoting Payton v. New York (1980) 445 U.S. 573, 586 .) One such "exigency obviating the requirement of a warrant is the need to assist persons who are seriously injured or threatened with such injury." (Brigham City, supra, at p. 403.) This emergency aid exigency does not depend on an officer's subjective intent in entering the house, but rather on " 'an objectively reasonable basis for believing' that medical assistance was needed, or persons were in danger." (Michigan v. Fisher (2009) 558 U.S. ____, ____ [130 S. Ct. 546, 549] (Fisher), quoting Brigham City, supra, at p. 406; see also Mincey v. Arizona (1978) 437 U.S. 385, 392 .)
Here, substantial evidence exists to show police possessed the objectively reasonable belief that Torres required medical attention. At the time of entry, Officer Lane suspected the occupant of the house had recently been in an automobile accident that resulted in serious injury and hospitalization to the other participants. He was told by a witness that Torres appeared dazed while driving off. He also had seen in plain view blood on Torres's airbags consistent with an injury causing possible head trauma. That Torres refused to answer the door and turned out the lights did not prove that he was unhurt, nor did it abrogate Officer Lane's responsibility to ensure Torres's welfare. Torres may have been disoriented and confused, with medical needs beyond those immediately apparent in the absence of examination.
Although Torres was not injured as badly as feared, the officers still acted reasonably in entering the home based on the information objectively available to them at the time. "The possibility that immediate police action will prevent injury or death outweighs the affront to privacy when police enter the home under the reasonable but mistaken belief that an emergency exists." (People v. Troyer (2011) 51 Cal.4th 599, 606 (Troyer).)It would be error for this court in hindsight to determine that no emergency actually existed in light of the substantial evidence then available to the officers, which suggested otherwise. We conclude the reasonable belief Torres was injured, albeit non-fatally, and needed treatment that in his confused and shaken state he was unable to procure, was sufficient to invoke the emergency aid exception. (See Fisher, supra, 558 U.S. at p. ____, .)
Torres argues the questions presented by Officer Lane when he entered the house are dispositive to show the officers were engaged in investigation rather than emergency response. We disagree. While Officer Lane's first questions to Torres sought to identify the driver of the wrecked car, such an inquisition is consistent with a determination of medical necessity. Officer Lane needed to ascertain the identity of the potentially injured party to ensure he or she received proper diagnosis and treatment.
Torres further argues that because the exigency exception is attached to the investigatory function of the police, case law requires a showing of probable cause to enter a home without a warrant. This is a misstatement of the issue. We are dealing in the instant case with the emergency aid doctrine, a form of exigency to which courts, including our Supreme Court, have roundly refused to graft a probable cause standard. (See Troyer, supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 606 - 607; People v. Ray (1999) 21 Cal.4th 464, 475-476.) We find no valid controlling authority relevant to Torres's case to support his argument, nor has Torres provided us with any. We thus reject it.
DISPOSITION
The judgment of conviction is affirmed.
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BENKE, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
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McDONALD, J.
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O'ROURKE, J.